

FIRST PRINCIPLES
SELECTIONS FROM
THE SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
OF
EDMUND BURKE
(1729-1797)

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Formatted, lightly modernized, corrected, and annotated (– WHG)
by William H. Gross www.onthewing.org April 2, 2024

*Latin and Greek phrases have been translated into English.
Most British spellings have been retained.*

Note on Modernization



I believe these selections were compiled by an unnamed editor for the University of California Libraries (Jan. 1, 1911). They exemplify Burke's extraordinary gift of oratory and persuasion. But being excerpts, they are incomplete arguments. Burke lived during a violent transition from the old governing paths of refined nobility, public service, and a classical education, to the modern paths of crassness, self-gratification, and illiteracy. He was an elitist, and a nobleman (by sentiment, not by birth). He was also an idealist. He decries tearing down the ideals and heroes of the past, and replacing them with pragmatism and various forms of self-idolatry.

Of two major revolutions in his day, he describes the American as a *reformation*, but the French as *destruction*. The upheaval we see in the west today, is akin to the French, where a mob's irrational rage erupts in cries of "tear it all down!" Burke's theme is that the relationship of the government to the governed, of the gifted few to the distracted many, is built on *trust*. Being in positions of power and authority, the few must care for the many. He prescribes how to do that; and he lists the sort of political activities and relationships that will either further or diminish the people's trust. If a society is governed with integrity and compassion, the many will appreciate and respect the work of the few — not because they're indebted to a paternalistic government, but because both parties perceive themselves as *mutual stewards* of the nation's capital. We're all equal under the law; and we're all equal beneficiaries of the labors of generations of those who have gone before us. Burke therefore pleads that we not discount or disdain our heritage; and he exhorts us to leave behind a worthy inheritance for our descendants.

His ideas sound as fresh and applicable today as they did at the close of the 18th century. And the evils he describes are disturbingly familiar. The issue is constant: shall we gradually *reform* our societies, or *destroy* them outright? The socialist movement, which arose from the ashes of the French Revolution, would *destroy* our "bourgeois" societies. Their progeny make the same arguments now as the philosophers of the French Revolution. They employ the same tactics of fear and coercion. They are barbarians at the gate of western civilization, seeking its destruction.

In formatting these selections, I occasionally added a parenthetical word or phrase to explain an archaic or ambiguous one. I substituted dashes and parenthesis for commas and semi-colons, to help the reader more easily digest Burke's lengthy sentences; others were split into separate sentences. I joined split clauses to make a sentence less complex, or broke it into bullet points. I superscripted some scripture references he alluded to. I added italics for emphasis where he contrasts two ideas. I also added italics where I thought his words needed emphasis to drive home his point, grab his listeners' attention, or keep the rhythm of his speech. For context, I footnoted some of the people and events he mentions. The English renderings of Greek and Latin, are taken from online sources (no, not Google translate). Some translations are better than others; but the context may reveal his meaning better than the quotations themselves.

I hope you find these selections as informative and provocative as I have over the years.

William H. Gross

For a brief overview of Burke's life, and an introduction to his works, try these links:

Biography: <https://thegreatthinkers.org/burke/biography/>

Introduction: <https://thegreatthinkers.org/burke/introduction/>

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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.

“I mean that he who is a speaker must be a good man. There is so much authority in all that he says, that he is ashamed to disagree; nor the zeal of a lawyer, but a witness or a judge should bring faith.” — Quintilianus.

“Democracy is the most monstrous of all governments, because it is impossible at once to act and control; and consequently, the Sovereign Power is then left without any restraint whatever. That form of government is the best which places the efficient direction in the hands of the aristocracy, subjecting them in its exercise to the control of the people at large.”

— Sir James MacIntosh

The intellectual homage of more than half a century has assigned to Edmund Burke a lofty pre-eminence in the aristocracy of mind, and we may justly assume succeeding ages will confirm the judgment which the Past has thus pronounced. His biographical history is so popularly known, that it is almost superfluous to record it in this brief introduction. It may, however, be summed up in a few sentences. He was born at Dublin in 1730. His father was an attorney in extensive practice, and his mother’s maiden name was Nogle, whose family was respectable, and resided near Castletown, Roche, where Burke himself received five years of boyish education under the guidance of a rustic schoolmaster. He was entered at Trinity College, Dublin, in 1746, but only remained there until 1749.

In 1753 he became a member of the Middle Temple, and maintained himself chiefly by literary toil. Bristol did itself the honour to elect him for her representative in 1774, and after years of splendid usefulness and mental triumph, as an orator, statesman, and patriot, he retired to his favourite retreat, Beaconsfield, in Buckinghamshire, where he died on July 9th, 1797. He was buried here; and the pilgrim who visits the grave of this illustrious man, when he gazes on the simple tomb which marks the earthly resting place of himself, brother, son, and widow, may feelingly recall his own pathetic wish uttered some forty years before, in London: —

“I would rather sleep in the southern corner of a little country churchyard, than in the tomb of the Capulets. I should like, however, that my dust should mingle with kindred dust. The good old expression, ‘family burying-ground,’ has something pleasing in it, at least to me.”

Alluding to his approaching dissolution, he thus speaks, in a letter addressed to a relative of his earliest schoolmaster: —

“I have been at Bath these four months for no purpose, and am therefore to be removed to my own house at Beaconsfield tomorrow, to be nearer a habitation more permanent, humbly and fearfully hoping that my better part may find a better mansion.”

It is a source of deep thankfulness for those who reverence the genius and eloquence of this great man, to state that Burke’s religion was that of the Cross, and to find him speaking of the “Intercession” of our Redeeming Lord, as “what he had long sought with unfeigned anxiety, and to which he looked with trembling hope.”

The commencing paragraph in his Will also authenticates the genuine character of his personal Christianity.

Introductory Essay

“According to the ancient, good, and laudable custom, of which my heart and understanding recognise the propriety, *I bequeath my soul to God, hoping for his mercy only through the merits of our lord and saviour Jesus Christ.* My body I desire to be buried in the church of Beaconsfield, near to the bodies of my dearest brother, and my dearest son, in all humility praying that as we have lived in perfect unity together, we may together have part in the resurrection of the just.”

In the “Epistolary Correspondence of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke and Dr. French Laurence,” Rivingtons, London, 1827, are several touching allusions to that master-grief which threw a mournful shadow over the closing period of Burke’s life. In one letter, the anxious father says,

“The fever continues much as it was. He sleeps in a very uneasy way from time to time, but his strength decays visibly, and his voice is, in a manner, gone. But God is all-sufficient — and surely His goodness and his mother’s prayers may do much” (page 30).

Again, in another communication addressed to his revered correspondent, we find a beautiful allusion to his departed son, which involves his belief in that most soothing doctrine of the Church — a recognition of souls in the kingdom of the Beatified.

“Here I am in the last retreat of hunted infirmity; I am indeed ‘*aux abois*’ (at bay). But, as through the whole of a various and long life I have been more indebted than thankful to Providence, so I am now singularly so, in being dismissed, as hitherto I appear to be, so gently from life, *and sent to follow those who in course ought to have followed me — those whom, I trust, I shall yet, in some inconceivable manner, see and know; and by whom I shall be seen and known.*” (pages 53, 54)

In reference to the intellectual grandeur, the eloquent genius, and prophetic wisdom of Burke, which have caused his writings to become oracles for future statesmen to consult, it is quite unnecessary for contemporary criticism to speak. By the concurring judgment, both of political friends and foes, as well as by the highest arbiters of taste throughout the civilized world, Burke has been pronounced, not only “*primus inter pares*” (first among equals), but “*facile omnium princeps*” (easily the leader of all).

At the termination of these introductory remarks, the reader will be presented with critical portraits of Burke from the writings and speeches of men who, while opposed to him in their principles of legislative policy, with all the chivalry and candour of genius, paid a noble homage to the vastness and variety of his unrivalled powers. Meanwhile, it may not be presumptuous for a writer, on an occasion like the present, to contemplate this great man under certain aspects which, perhaps, are not sufficiently regarded in their *distinctive* bearings on the worth and wisdom of his character and writings. We say “distinctive,” because the eloquence of Burke, beyond that of all other orators and statesmen which Great Britain has produced, is featured with expressions, and characterised by qualities, as peculiar as they are immortal. So far as invention, imagination, moral fervour, and metaphorical richness of illustration, combined with that intense “*pathos and ethos*” which the Roman critic ¹ describes as essential to the true orator are concerned, the author of

¹ “Here therefore the speaker leans: this is his work, this is his labor; without which the rest are naked, fasted, weak, and ungrateful: so much so is the spirit of this work and the soul in the *affections*. Now of these, as we received from

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“Reflections on the French Revolution,” and “Letters on a Regicide Peace,” is justly admired and appreciated. Moreover, if what we understand by the “sublime” in eloquence has ever been embodied, the speeches and writings of Burke appear to have been drawn from those five sources (“pegai”) to which Longinus alludes. In the 8th chapter of his fragment “On the Sublime,” he observes that if we assume an ability for speaking well, as a common basis, there are five copious fountains from whence sublimity in eloquence may be said to flow — namely.

1. Boldness and grandeur of thought.
2. The pathetic, or the power of exciting the passions into an enthusiastic reach and noble degree.
3. A skilful application of figures, both from sentiment and language.
4. A graceful, finished, and ornate style, embellished by tropes and metaphors.
5. Lastly, as that which completes all the rest — the structure of periods, in dignity and grandeur.

These five sources of the sublime, the same philosophical critic distinguishes into two classes: the first two he asserts to be gifts of nature, and the remaining three are considered to depend, in a great measure, upon literature and art. Again, if we may linger for a moment in the attractive region of classical authorship, how justly applicable are the words of Cicero in his “De Oratore,” to the vastness and variety of Burke’s attainments!

And in my opinion, no one can be an orator heaped with all praise, *unless he has acquired the knowledge of all great things and arts.* — Cic. “De Orat.” lib. i. cap. 6.

Equally descriptive of Burke’s power in raising the dormant sensibilities of our moral nature by his intuitive perception of what that nature really and fundamentally is, are the following expressions of the same great authority: —

“For who does not know that the great power of an orator exists in inciting men either to anger or to hatred, or to pain, or, by these same admonitions, to recall them to gentleness and mercy? Wherefore, *unless he has thoroughly understood the natures of men, and all the forces of humanity, and the causes by which minds are either excited or reflected, he will not be able to accomplish by saying what he wills.* — Cic. “De Orat.” lib. i. cap. 12.

But to return. If a critical analysis of Burke, as an exhibition of genius, is attempted, his characteristic endowments may, probably, not be incorrectly represented by the following succinct statement.

1. Endless variety in connection with exhaustless vigour of mind.
2. A lofty power of generalisation, both in speculative views and in his argumentative process.
3. Vivid intensity of conception, which caused abstractions to stand out with almost living force and visible feature, in his impassioned moments.

ancient times, there are two kinds: the Greeks call the other pathos, which, turning to us, we rightly and properly call *affection*; the other ethos, whose name (as I really feel) the Roman speech lacks, is called manners.” — Quintilian, “Instit. Orat.” lib. vi. cap. 2.

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4. An imagination of oriental luxuriance, whose incessant play in tropes, metaphors, and analogies, frequently causes his speeches to gleam on the intellectual eye, as Aeschylus says the ocean does when the Sun irradiates its bosom with the “anerithmon gelasma” (erratic laughter) of countless beams.

5. His positive acquirements in all the varied realms of art, science, and literature, endowed him with such vast funds of knowledge ² that Johnson declared of Burke — “Enter upon whatever subject you will, and Burke is ready to meet you.”

6. In addition to these high gifts may be added an ability to wield the weapons of sarcasm and irony, with a keenness of application and effect rarely equalled. But, in all candour, it may be added that just as a profusion of figures and metaphors sometimes tempted this great orator into incongruous images and coarse analogies, so his passion for irony was occasionally too intense. Hence, there are occasions where his pungency is embittered into acrimony, strength degenerates into vulgarism, and the vehemence of satire is infuriated with the fierceness of invective.

7. With regard to language and style, it may be truly said, they were the absolute vassals of his Genius, and did homage to its command in every possible mode by which it chose to employ them. Thus, in his “Letters on a Regicide Peace,” and above all, in “French Revolutions,” the reader will find almost every conceivable manner of style and mode of expression the English language can develop. And what is more, together with classical richness, there are also the pointed seriousness and persuasive simplicity of our own vernacular Saxon, which increase the attractions of Burke’s style to a wonderful extent. But beyond controversy, among these great endowments, the imaginative faculty is that which appears to be the most transcendent in the mental constitution of Burke. And so truly is this the case, that both among his contemporaries, as well as among his successors, this predominance of imagination has caused his just claims as a philosophic thinker and statesman to be partially overlooked. The union of ideal theory and practical realisation, of imaginative creation with logical induction, is indeed so rare, we cannot be surprised at the injustice which the genius of Burke has had to endure in this respect. And yet, in the nature of our faculties themselves, there exists no necessity why a vivid power to conceive ideas should NOT be combined with a dialectic skill in expressing them. Degerando, an admirable French writer, in one of his Treatises, has some profound observations on this subject; and does not hesitate to define poetry itself as a species of “logique cache.” (a cache of logic)

But when we assert that these excellencies, which have thus been succinctly exhibited, characterise the mental constitution of Burke, we do not mean that others have not, in their degree, possessed similar endowments. Such an inference would be an absurd extravagance. But what we mean to affirm is — the qualifications enumerated have never been combined into co-operative harmony, and developed in proportionable effect, as they appear in the speeches and writings of this wonderful man.

² In the wealth of his multitudinous acquirements, Burke seems to realise Cicero’s ideal of what a perfect orator should know: — “Indeed, I think that all that pertains to the habits of citizens, the manners of men, which are engaged in the custom of life, in the system of the republic, in this civil society, in the common sense of men, in nature, in manners, *must be given to the orator.*” — Cicero “De Orat.” lib. ii. cap. 16.

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But after all, we have not reached what may be considered a peerless excellence, the peculiar gift — the one great and glorious distinction which separates Burke’s oratory from that of all others, and which has caused his speeches to be blended with political History, and to incorporate themselves with the moral destiny of Europe — namely, *his intuitive perception of universal principles*. The truth of this statement may be verified by comparing the eloquence of Burke with specimens of departed orators; or by a reference to existing standards in the parliamentary debates. Compared, then, either with the speeches of Chatham, Holland, Pitt, Fox, etc., etc., we perceive at once the grand distinction to which we refer. These illustrious men were effective debaters, and in various senses, orators of surpassing excellency. But how is it, that with all their allowed grandeur of intellect and political eminence, they have ceased to operate upon the hearts and minds of the present Age, either as teachers of political Truth, or oracles of legislative Wisdom? Simply, *because* they were too popular in *temporary* effect, ever to become influential by *permanent* inspiration. In their highest moods, and amid their noblest hours of triumph, they were “of the earth earthy.” Party; personality; crushing rejoinders, or satirical attacks; a felicitous exposure of inconsistency, or a triumphant self-vindication; brilliant repartees, and logical gladiatorship — such are among the prominent characteristics which caused parliamentary debates in Burke’s day to be so animating and interesting to those who heard, or perused them, amid the excitements of the hour.

It is not to be denied that commanding eloquence, vast genius, political ardour, intellectual enthusiasm, together with indignant denunciation and argumentative subtlety, were thus summoned into exercise by the perils of the Nation, and the contentions of Party. Nevertheless, the local, the temporal, the conventional, and the individual — in all which relates to the science of politics or the tactics of partisanship — are sufficient to excite and employ the energies and qualities which made the general parliamentary debates of Burke’s period so captivating. But when we revert to his own speeches and writings, we at once perceive *why* — as long as the mind can comprehend what is true, the heart appreciate what is pure, or the conscience authenticate the sanction of heaven and the distinctions between right and wrong — Edmund Burke will continue to be admired, revered, and consulted, not only as the greatest of English orators, but as the profoundest teacher of political Science. It was not that he despised the arrangement of facts, or overlooked the minutiae of detail. On the contrary (as may be proved by his speeches on “economical reform,” and Warren Hastings), in these respects his research was boundless, and his industry inexhaustible.

Moreover, he was quite alive to the claims of a crisis; and with the coolness and calm of a practical statesman, he knew how to confront a sudden emergency, and to contend with a gigantic difficulty. Yet all these qualifications recede before Burke’s amazing power of *expanding particulars into universals*, and of associating the accidents of a transient discussion with the essential properties of some permanent Law in policy, or abstract Truth in morals. His genius looked through the local to the universal; in the temporal he perceived the eternal; and while facing the features of the Individual, he was enabled to contemplate the attributes of a Race.³ Hence his speeches are virtual prophecies; and his writings a

³ Cicero, in many respects a counterpart of Burke, both in statesmanship and oratory, appears to recognise what is here expressed when he says:

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storehouse of pregnant axioms and predictive enunciations, as limitless in their range as they are undying in duration. In one word, no speeches delivered in the English Parliament, are so likely to be eternalized as Burke's, because he has combined with his treatment of some especial case or contingency before him, the assertion of immutable Principles, which can be detached from what is local and national, and thus made to stand forth alone in all the naked grandeur of their truth and their tendency.

Let us be permitted to investigate this topic a little further. If, then, what Quintilian asserted of the Roman orator may be applied to our own British Cicero — "*Ille se profecisse sciat, cui Cicero valde placebit*" (Let him know that he has made progress, to whom Cicero will be very pleased). And if, moreover, this pre-eminence is chiefly discovered in Burke's instinctive grasp of that moral essence which is incorporated with all questions of political Science and social Ethics — from *whence* did this diviner energy of his Genius come? No believer in Christian revelation will hesitate to appropriate, even to this subject, the apostolic axiom, "*every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above.*" But while we subscribe with reverential sincerity to this announcement, it is equally true that the Infinite Inspirer of all good, adjusts His secret energies by certain laws, and He condescends to work by analogous means. Bearing this in mind, we venture to think Burke's gift of almost prescient insight into the recesses of our common nature, and his consummate faculty of instructing the Future through the medium of the Present — were partly derived from the elevation of his sentiments, and the purity of his private life.⁴

It would be unwise to draw invidious comparisons, but no student of the period in which Burke was in Parliament, can deny that, compared with *some* of his illustrious contemporaries, he was indeed a model of what reason and conscience alike approve in all the relative duties and personal conduct of a man, when beheld in his domestic career.

It is, indeed, a source of deep thankfulness, the admirer of Burke's genius in public, has no reason to blush for his character in private; and that when we have listened to his matchless oratory upon the arena of the House of Commons, we do not have to mourn over dissipation, impurity, and depravity amid the circles of private history. Our theory, then, is that beyond what his distinctive genius inspired, Burke's wondrous power of enunciating everlasting principles and of associating the loftiest abstractions of wisdom with the commonest themes of the hour — was sustained and strengthened by the purity of his heart, and the subjection of passion to the law of conscience. And if the worshippers of mere intellect, apart from, or as opposed to, moral elevation, are inclined to ridicule this view of

"Most of them gave two kinds of answer; one of a certain and definite cause, such as are those which are involved in disputes, which are involved in deliberations; — the second, which almost all writers address, no one explains, the infinite question of a genus without time and without person." — "De Orat." lib. ii. cap. 15

⁴ The action and reaction maintained between our moral and intellectual elements is but remotely discussed by Quintilian in his "Institutes." But still, in more than one passage, he most impressively declares, that mental proficiency is greatly retarded by perversity of heart and will. For instance, on one occasion we find him speaking thus: —

"Nothing is so flurried and agitated, so self-contradictory, or so violently rent and shattered by conflicting passions, as a bad heart. In the distractions which it produces, what room is there for the cultivation of letters, or the pursuits of any honourable art? Assuredly, no more than there is for the growth of corn in a field overrun with thorns and brambles."

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Burke's genius, we beg to remind them that "One greater than the Temple" of mortal Wisdom, and all the idols enshrined therein, has asserted a positive connection to exist between mental insight and moral purity. We allude to the Redeemer's words, when He declares — "If any man *wills* to do His will, he shall *know* of the doctrine."

How the passions act upon our perceptions, and by what process the motions of the Will elevate or depress the forces of the Intellect, is beyond our metaphysics to analyse. But that there exists a real, active, and influential connection between our moral and mental life, is undeniable. And since Burke's power of seizing the essential Idea, or fundamental Principle of every complex detail which came before him, was pre-eminently his gift — the intellectual insight such gift developed, was not only an expression of senatorial wisdom, but also a witness for the elevation of his moral character.

We must now allude to the *public* conduct of Burke, as a Statesman and Politician, and only regret the limited range of a popular essay confines us to one view, namely, his alleged inconsistency.

There *was* a period when charges of apostasy were brought against him with reckless audacity. But Time, the instructor of ignorance, and the subduer of prejudice, is now beginning to place the conduct of Burke in its true light. The facts of the case are briefly these. Up to the period of 1791, Fox and Burke fought in the same rank of opposition, and stood together upon a basis of complete identity in principle and sentiment. But even before the celebrated disruption of 1791, the progress of Republicanism in America, and the approaching separation of the colonies from their parent state, Burke's views of political liberty had received extensive modifications; and the ardour of his confidence in the so-called friends of freedom had been greatly cooled. But in 1791, the disruption between Burke and Fox became open, absolute, and final, when the latter statesman uttered, in the hearing of his friend, this fearful eulogium on the French Revolution: —

"The new constitution of France is the most stupendous and glorious edifice of liberty which had been erected on the foundation of human integrity in any age or country!"⁵

The reply of Burke to this burst of Jacobinism, with all its consequences in the political history of Europe, is far too well known to be quoted here. But, since it was at this point in

⁵ That ancient Sage to whose political wisdom frequent reference has been made in this essay, thus speaks on the reverence due unto an existing government, even when contemplated from its weakest side: —

"Formidable as these arguments seem, they may be opposed by others of not less weight; arguments which prove that even the rust of government is to be respected, and that its fabric is never to be touched but with a fearful and trembling hand. When the evil of persevering in hereditary institutions is small, it ought always to be endured, because the evil of departing from them is certainly very great. Slight imperfections, therefore, whether in the laws themselves, or in those who administer and execute the laws, ought always to be overlooked, because they cannot be corrected without occasioning a much greater mischief, and tending to weaken that reverence which the safety of all governments requires that the citizens at large should entertain, cultivate, and cherish for the hereditary institutions of their country. The comparison drawn from the improvement of arts does not apply to the amendment of laws. To change or improve an art, and to alter or amend a law, are things as dissimilar in their operation as different in their tendency; for laws operate as practical principles of moral action; and, like all the rules of morality, derive their force and efficacy, as even the name imports, from the customary repetition of habitual acts, and the slow operation of time. Every alteration of the laws, therefore, tends to subvert that authority on which the persuasive agency of all laws is founded, and to abridge, weaken, and destroy the power of the law itself." — Aristotle's "Politics."

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the career of Burke the charge of apostasy was commenced, and which has never quite died away, even in existing times, we may be permitted, first, to cite a noble passage from Burke's self-vindication; and secondly, to adduce a still more impressive evidence of his political rectitude and wisdom, derived from the admission of those who were once his uncompromising opponents. In relation to the attacks of Fox upon his supposed inconsistency, Mr. Burke thus replies [speaking in third person]: —

“I pass to the next head of charge — Mr. Burke's inconsistency. It is certainly a great aggravation of his fault in embracing false opinions, that in doing so he is not supposed to fill up a void, but that he is guilty of a dereliction of opinions that are true and laudable. This is the great gist of the charge against him. It is not so much that he is wrong in his book (that however is alleged also), as that he has therein belied his whole life. I believe, if he could venture to value himself upon anything, it is on the virtue of consistency that he would value himself the most. Strip him of this, and you leave him naked indeed.

“In the case of any man who had written something, and spoken a great deal upon every multifarious matter, during upwards of twenty-five years' public service, and in as great a variety of important events as perhaps have ever happened in the same number of years, it would appear a little hard, in order to charge such a man with inconsistency, to see collected by his friend, a sort of digest of his sayings, even to such as were merely sportive and jocular. This digest, however, has been made with equal pains and partiality, and without bringing out those passages of his writings which might tend to show with what restrictions any expressions quoted from him ought to have been understood. From a great statesman he did not quite expect this mode of inquisition. If it only appeared in the works of common pamphleteers, Mr. Burke might safely trust to his reputation. When thus urged, he ought, perhaps, to do a little more. It shall be as little as possible, for I hope not much is lacking. To be totally silent on his charges would not be respectful to Mr. Fox. Accusations sometimes derive a weight from the persons who make them, to which they are not entitled for their matter.

“A man who, among various objects of his equal regard, is secure of some, and full of anxiety for the fate of others, is apt to go to much greater lengths in his preference of the objects of his immediate solicitude than Mr. Burke has ever done. A man so circumstanced often seems to undervalue, to vilify, almost to reprobate and disown those that are out of danger. This is the voice of nature and truth, and not of inconsistency and false pretence. The danger of anything very dear to us removes, for the moment, every other affection from the mind. When Priam had his whole thoughts employed on the body of his Hector, he repels with indignation, and drives from him with a thousand reproaches, his surviving sons, who with an officious piety crowded about him to offer their assistance. A good critic (there is no better than Mr. Fox) would say, that this is a master-stroke, and marks a deep understanding of nature in the father of poetry. He would despise a Zoilus, who would conclude from this passage that Homer meant to represent this man of affliction as hating, or being indifferent and cold in his affections to the poor relics of his house, or that he preferred a dead carcass to his living children.

“Mr. Burke does not stand in need of an allowance of this kind which, if he did, ought to be granted to him by candid critics. If the principles of a mixed constitution are admitted, he wants no more to justify to consistency everything he has said and done during the course of a political life just touching its close. I believe that gentleman has kept himself more clear of

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running into the fashion of wild, visionary theories, or of seeking popularity through every means, than any man perhaps ever did in the same situation.

“He was the first man who, on the hustings at a popular election,⁶ rejected the authority of instructions from constituents; or who, in any place, has argued so fully against it. Perhaps the discredit into which that doctrine of compulsive instructions under our constitution has since fallen, may be due in a great degree to his opposing himself to it in that manner, and on that occasion.

“The reformers in representation, and the Bills for shortening the duration of Parliaments, he uniformly and steadily opposed for many years together, in contradiction to many of his best friends. These friends, however, in his better days, when they had more to hope from his service and more to fear from his loss than now they have, never chose to find any inconsistency between his acts and expressions in favour of liberty, and his votes on those questions. But there is a time for all things.”

We need not, however, confine our vindication of Burke to his own eloquence, but invite the especial attention of his accusers and defamers to two forgotten facts: *1st.* A few weeks before Fox died, he dictated a dispatch to Lord Yarmouth, which confirmed all the policy for which Pitt for fifteen years had contended. *Moreover*, in a debate on Wyndham’s “Military System,” 1806, Fox thus delivered his own recantation: —

“Indeed, by the circumstances of Europe, *I am ready to confess I have been weaned from the opinions I formerly held with respect to the force which might suffice in time of peace*: nor do I consider this any inconsistency, because I see no rational prospect of any peace which would exempt us from the necessity of watchful preparation and powerful establishment.”

But the change of Fox’s opinions, and their similarity to those maintained by Pitt with reference to our war with France, are by no means *all* which history can produce in justification of Burke’s political wisdom and consistency. The whole civilized world has read the “Reflections on the French Revolution,” whose sale, in one year, achieved the enormous number of 30,000 copies, in connection with medals or marks of honour from almost every Court in Europe. Now, of all the replies made to this masterpiece of reasoning and reflection, Mackintosh’s “*Vindiciae Gallicae*” was incontestably the ablest and profoundest. And yet this greatest of all his intellectual opponents thus addresses Burke, as appears from “Memoirs” of Mackintosh, volume i. page 87: —

“The enthusiasm with which I once embraced the instruction conveyed in your writings is now ripened into solid conviction by the experience and conviction of more mature age. For a time, *seduced by the love of what I thought liberty*, I ventured to oppose, without ceasing to venerate, that writer who had nourished my understanding with the most wholesome principles of political wisdom...Since that time, *a melancholy experience has undeceived me on many subjects in which I was the dupe of my own enthusiasm.*”

Let us part from this branch of our subject by quoting Burke’s own words uttered, as it were, on the very brink of eternity. They attest to the latest moment of his life, with what a sacred intensity and unflinching sincerity he clung to his original sentiments touching the French

⁶ *Hustings*: the activities involved in political campaigning (especially speech making). – WHG

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Revolution. Nor let the present writer shrink from adding, they constitute but one of the many specimens of that instinctive prescience whereby this profoundest of philosophical statesmen was enabled to herald from afar the final triumphs of courage, patriotism, and truth. The passage occurs towards the conclusion of his “Letters on a Regicide Peace,” and is as follows:

“Never succumb. It is a struggle for your existence as a nation. If you must die, die with the sword in your hand. But I have no fear whatever for the result. There is a salient living principle of energy in the public mind of England, which only requires proper direction to enable her to withstand this, or any other ferocious foe. *Persevere*, therefore, till this tyranny be over-past.”

If from the glare of public history, we follow this great man into the shades of domestic seclusion, or watch the features of his social character unfolding themselves in the varied circle which he graced by his presence, or dignified by his worth — he is alike the object of respectful esteem and love. Warmth of heart, chivalry of sentiment, and that true high-breeding which springs from the soul rather than a pedigree, eminently characterise the history of Burke in private life. Above all, a sympathising tendency for the children of Genius, and a catholic largeness of view in all which relates to mental effort, combined with the utmost charity for human failings and infirmities — cannot but endear him to our deepest affections, while his unrivalled endowments command our highest admiration. To illustrate what is alluded to here, let the reader recall Burke’s noble generosity towards that erratic victim of genius and grief, the painter Barry — or his instantaneous sympathy in behalf of Crabbe the poet, when he was almost a foodless wanderer in our vast metropolis — and our estimate of Burke’s excellencies as a man will not be deemed overdrawn.

It now remains for the selector of the following pages to offer a few remarks on their nature and design. Accustomed from the earliest period of his mental life to read and study the writings of Edmund Burke, he has long wished that such a selection as now appears, should be published. The works of Burke extend through a vast range of large volumes; and it is feared thousands have been deterred from holding communion with a master-spirit of British literature, by the magnitude of his labours. Hence, a concentrated specimen of his intellect may not only tempt the “reading public”⁷ to study some of Burke’s noblest passages, but even ultimately to introduce them into a full acquaintance with his entire products. Let it be distinctly understood, the selection now published is not a second-hand one, grafted on some pre-existing volume; but the result of a diligent, careful, and analytical perusal of Burke’s writings. In attempting such a work, there was one difficulty which none but those who have intimately studied this great orator can appreciate — we allude to the giving of general titles or descriptive headings to passages selected for quotation. There is a mental fulness, a moral variety, and such a rapid transition of idea in most of Burke’s speeches, that it almost baffles the ability to abbreviate the spirit of his paragraphs so as to exhibit under some general head the bearing of the whole. In this respect, the selector can

⁷ Coleridge’s horror, yet an author’s friend!

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only say he has done his best; and those who are most competent to appreciate difficulty, will be least inclined to criticise failure.

Finally, as to the leading design of this volume, its title, “First Principles,” is sufficiently descriptive to save much explanation. Burke represents an unrivalled combination of patriot, senator, and orator. And as such, the moral and intellectual nature of the Age will be purified and expanded when brought into contact with the attributes of his character, and the productions of his mind. Nor can the meditative statesman, whose party is his country, and whose political creed is based upon a true philosophy of human nature, forget that while the French revolution as involving *facts*, belongs to History, as enclosing *principles*, it pertains to Humanity — hence the abiding application of Burke’s profound views not only to France and England, but to the world. Of course, those who reverence the majesty of eloquence, and are fascinated by a florid richness of style, boundless imagination, inexhaustible metaphor, and all the attending graces of consummate rhetoric, will also be charmed by the appropriate supply these pages afford. But, without seeking to be homiletical, let the writer be permitted to add that a far higher purpose than mere literary amusement, or the gratification of taste, is designed by the present volume. It is the selector’s most earnest hope that the “First Principles” which these pages so eloquently inculcate, may be transcribed in all their purity, loftiness, and truth, into the Reason and Conscience of his countrymen. And among these, for whose especial guidance he ventures to think the profound wisdom of these pages to be invaluable, are the rising statesmen and senators of the day — those who are either being trained in our Public Schools, at the Universities, or about to enter upon the difficult but inspiring arena of the House of Commons.

In reference to this sphere of legislative action, with all reverence to its claims and character, let it be said — material ends,⁸ commercial objects, and secular aggrandizement, are now receiving an idolatrous homage and passionate regard, which no Christian patriot can contemplate without anxiety. The ideal, the imaginative, and the religious element, is almost sneered out of the House of Commons at the existing moment; and any glowing exhibition of oratory, or splendid manifestation of intellect, is derided, as being

⁸ A boundless passion for physical good, whether indulged in by a nation, or professed by an individual, is rebuked with solemn wisdom in the following passage from Aristotle: —

“The external advantages of power and fortune are acquired and maintained by virtue, but virtue is not acquired and maintained by them; and whether we consider the virtuous energies themselves, or the fruits which they unceasingly produce, *the sovereign good of life must evidently be found in moral and intellectual excellence, moderately supplied with external accommodations, rather than in the greatest accumulation of external advantages, unimproved and unadorned by virtue.* External prosperity is, indeed, instrumental in producing happiness, and, therefore, like every other instrument, must have its assigned limits, beyond which it is inconvenient or hurtful. But to mental excellence no limit can be assigned; the further it extends the more *useful* it becomes, if the epithet of ‘*useful*’ need ever be added to that of *honourable*. Besides this, the relative importance of qualities is best estimated by that of their respective subjects. But the mind, both in itself and in reference to man, is far better than the body, or than property. The excellencies of the mind, therefore, are in the same proportion to be preferred to the highest perfection of the body, and the best disposition of external circumstances. The two last are of a far inferior, and merely subservient nature, since no man of sense covets or pursues them but for the sake of the mind, with a view to promote its genuine improvement and augment its native joys. Let this great truth then be acknowledged — *a truth evinced by the Deity himself, who is happy, not from any external cause, but through the inherent attributes of his divine nature.*” — “Politics,” lib. iv.

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“unpractical” and ill-adapted to the sobriety of the English Senate! Against this heartless materialism and unholy mammon-worship, Burke’s pages are a magnificent protest; and they are admirably suited to protect the political youth and dawning statesmen of our country, from the blight and the blast of doctrines which decry *Enthusiasm* as folly, and condemn the *Beautiful* as worthless and untrue. Ships, colonies, and commerce; exports and imports; taxes and imposts; charters and civic arrangements — none but a madman will depreciate what such themes involve of duty, energy, and zeal, in political life. Still, let it be fearlessly maintained that neither wealth nor commerce, *in themselves*, can constitute the real greatness of an empire. It is only because they stand in relation to the higher destinies and holier responsibilities of an Empire, that a true statesman will regard them as vitally wound up with the vigour and prosperity of national development. Such, at least, is the philosophy of *Politics*, breathed from the undying pages of Edmund Burke. He who studies this great writer, will more and more sympathise with what Hooker taught,⁹ and Bishop Sanderson inculcates. In one word, he will learn to venerate with increasing reverence *The British Constitution*¹⁰ as,

“*That peerless growth of patriotic mind,
The great eternal Wonder of mankind!*”

Burke traced the ultimate origin of civil government to the Divine Will, both as declared in revelation, and imaged forth by the moral Constitution of man. In this respect, it is well-known how fundamentally he differs from the theories of Hobbes, Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson. Also, he is no less opposed to Locke, who tells us —

“The original compact which begins and *actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority, to unite and incorporate into such a society. and this is that, and that only, which could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.*”

In one word, Locke declares that civil government is not from God in the way of principle, but from man in the way of fact; and thus, being a mere contingency or moral accident in the history of human development, self-government is the essential prerogative of our nature. In accordance with this irrational and unscriptural hypothesis, we find Price and Priestly expanding Locke’s views at the period of Burke. While in the writings of that apostle of political Antinomianism, Rousseau, and his English counterpart Tom Paine — the principles of the *assumed “contrat social”* (social contract) display their utmost virulence. This is not the place to discuss the origin of Civil Government. But the classical reader, who has been taught to revere the political wisdom of those ancient Teachers, whose insight was

⁹ Thomas Hooker (1586-1647), author of the *Fundamental Orders of Connecticut*, a constitutional form of government which limits the power of the state, and declares the state’s authority is from the consent of the governed. — WHG

¹⁰ England does not have a formal written constitution; rather, it has an “uncodified constitution.” It is a set of rules and regulations constituted by jurisprudence and laws, and by various treaties and international agreements to which the United Kingdom has signed up. The founding document of England’s “constitution” is generally considered to be the *Magna Carta*, or *Great Charter of the Liberties of England*, which the barons drew up and forced King John to sign in the year 1215. Other landmark bills include the *English Bill of Rights*, passed after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and the *Acts of Union 1707*, combining England, Scotland, and Wales into a “United Kingdom.” — WHG

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almost prophetic in abstract science, will thank us for an extract from Aristotle's "Politics," which bears upon this subject. It presents a most striking coincidence of sentiment between two master-spirits on the philosophy of government. And it will at once remind the reader of Burke's memorable passage beginning with, "Society is a *partnership*," etc., etc.

The passage to which we allude in Aristotle's "Politics," begins thus: "*Ote men oun e polis phusei proteron e ekastos*," k.t.l. The whole passage may be thus freely translated:

"A participation in rights and advantages forms the bond of political society; *an institution prior, in the intention of nature, to the families and individuals from whom it is constituted.* What members are to the body, citizens are to a commonwealth. The hand or foot, when separated from the body, retains its name, but totally changes its nature, because it is completely divested of its uses and powers. In the same manner, a citizen is a constituent part of a whole system which invests him with powers, and qualifies him for functions for which he is totally unfit in his individual capacity. And independently of such a system, he might subsist indeed as a lonely savage, but he could never attain that improved and happy state to which his progressive nature invariably tends. Perfected by the offices and duties of social life, man is the best of animals; but rude and undisciplined, he is the very worst. For nothing is more detestable than armed improbity. And man is armed with craft and courage which, if uncontrolled by justice, he will most wickedly pervert, and become at once the most impious and fiercest of monsters, the most abominable in gluttony, and the most shameless in personality. *But justice is the fundamental virtue of political society*, since the order of Society cannot be maintained without law, and laws are constituted to proclaim what is just."

Let us add to this noble passage, Aristotle's remarks in his "Ethics" (lib. x. c. 8), that a higher destination than political virtue is the true end of man. In this respect, he concurs with Plato, who teaches us in his "Theaetetus," that the main object of human pursuit ought to be "*omoiosis to theo kata to dunaton*," etc., etc. — that is, "A similitude to God as far as possible; which similitude consists in an imitation of His justice, holiness, and wisdom."

To conclude:

The noblest end of all Policy on earth, is to educate Human Nature for that august "*politeuma*" (*citizenship*, Phi 3.20), that Eternal Commonwealth which awaits perfected Spirits above when, through infinite grace, they are finally admitted into a "city which has foundations, whose builder and maker is God." (Heb 11.10.)¹¹

¹¹ The dim approximations of Platonic philosophy to certain discoveries in Divine Revelation, have rightly challenged the attention of theological enquirers. The above quotation from St. Paul suggests a reference to one of these, which occurs towards the termination of Plato's ninth book of "The Republic."

He is uttering a protest against our concluding that, because degeneracy appears to be the invariable law or destiny of all human commonwealths, *therefore* no Archetypal Model exists of any perfect state or polity: and then, in opposition to this political scepticism, Plato adds these remarkable words:

"*en ourano isos paradeigma anakeitai to boulomeno oran kai oronti eauton katoikizein*," etc. etc. — "The state we have here established, exists only in our reasoning, it seems to me; *it has no existence on earth. But in heaven, probably, I replied, there is a model of it for anyone inclined to contemplate the same, and by so contemplating it, to regulate himself accordingly.*"

APPENDIX.

The following are the critical sketches of Burke's character alluded to at the commencement of this Essay. They are from the pens of his most distinguished contemporaries *who were opposed to him* in their political views and public career.

(From *Sir James Mackintosh*.)

“There can be no hesitation in according to him a station among the most extraordinary men that ever appeared; and we think there is now but little diversity of opinion as to the kind of place which it is fit to assign him. He was a writer of the first class, and excelled in almost every kind of composition. Possessed of the most extensive knowledge, and of the most various description; acquainted alike with what different classes of men knew, each in his own province, and with much that hardly anyone ever thought of learning; he could either bring his masses of information to bear directly upon the subjects to which they severally belonged — or he could avail himself of them generally to strengthen his faculties, and enlarge his views — or he could turn any of them to account for the purpose of illustrating his theme, or enriching his diction. Hence, when he is handling any one matter, we perceive that we are conversing with a reasoner or a teacher, to whom almost every other branch of knowledge is familiar. His views range over all the cognate objects. His reasonings are derived from principles applicable to other themes, as well as the one in hand. Arguments pour in from all sides, as well as those which start up under our feet — the natural growth of the path he is leading us over. While, to throw light round our steps, and either explore its darkest places or serve for our recreation, illustrations are fetched from a thousand quarters. With an imagination marvellously quick to descry unthought of resemblances, he points to our use the stores which a love has yet more marvellously gathered from all ages and nations, and arts and tongues. We are, in respect to the argument, reminded of Bacon's multifarious knowledge, and the exuberance of his learned fancy; while the many-lettered diction recalls to mind the first of English poets, and his immortal verse, rich with the spoils of all sciences and all times.

“He produced but one philosophical treatise; but no man lays down abstract principles more soundly, or better traces their application. All his works, indeed, even his controversial, are so infused with general reflection, so variegated with speculative discussion, that they wear the air of the Lyceum, as well as the Academy.”

(From *Lord Erskine*.)

“I shall take care to put Burke's work on the French Revolution into the hands of those whose principles are left to my protection. I shall take care that they have the advantage of doing, in the regular progression of youthful studies, what I have done even in the short intervals of laborious life; that they shall transcribe with their own hands from all the works of this most extraordinary person, and from this last, among the rest, the soundest truths of religion, the justest principles of morals, inculcated and rendered delightful by the most sublime eloquence; the highest reach of philosophy brought down to the level of common minds by the most captivating taste; the most enlightened observations on history, and the most copious collection of useful maxims for the experience of common life.”

(From *King*, Bishop of Rochester.)

“In the mind of Mr. Burke, political principles were not objects of barren speculation. Wisdom in him was always practical. Whatever his understanding adopted as truth, made its way to his heart, and sank deep into it; and his ardent and generous feelings seized with promptitude

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every occasion of applying it to mankind. Where shall we find recorded exertions of active benevolence at once so numerous, so varied, and so important, made by one man? Among those, the redress of wrongs, and the protection of weakness from the oppression of power, were most conspicuous...

“The assumption of arbitrary power, in whatever shape it appeared, whether under the veil of legitimacy, or skulking in the disguise of State necessity, or presenting the shameless front of usurpation — whether the prescriptive claim of ascendancy, or the career of official authority, or the newly-acquired dominion of a mob — was the pure object of his detestation and hostility; and this is not a fanciful enumeration of possible cases,” etc.

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Whatever alterations time and the necessary accommodation of business may have introduced, this character can never be sustained, unless the House of Commons shall be made to bear some stamp of the actual disposition of the people at large. It would (among public misfortunes) be an evil more natural and tolerable, that the House of Commons should be infected with every epidemical frenzy of the people, as this would indicate some consanguinity, some sympathy of nature with their constituents, than that they should in all cases be wholly untouched by the opinions and feelings of the people out of doors. By this want of sympathy, they would cease to be a house of commons. For it is not the derivation of the power of that house from the people, which makes it in a distinct sense their representative. The king is the representative of the people; so are the lords, so are the judges. They all are trustees for the people, as well as the commons; because no power is given for the sole sake of the holder. And although government certainly is an institution of Divine authority, yet its forms and the persons who administer it, all originate from the people.

A popular origin cannot therefore be the characteristic distinction of a popular representative. This belongs equally to all parts of government, and in all forms. The virtue, spirit, and essence of a house of commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation. It was not instituted to be a control *upon* the people, as it has been taught of late by a doctrine of the most pernicious tendency. It was designed as a control *for* the people. Other institutions have been formed for the purpose of checking popular excesses; and they are, I apprehend, fully adequate to their object. If not, they ought to be made so. The House of Commons, as it was never intended for the support of peace and subordination, is miserably appointed for that service; having no stronger weapon than its mace, and no better officer than its serjeant-at-arms, which it can command of its own proper authority. A vigilant and jealous eye over executory and judicial magistracy; an anxious care of public money; an openness, approaching towards facility, to public complaint — these seem to be the true characteristics of a house of commons. But an addressing house of commons, and a petitioning nation; a house of commons full of confidence, when the nation is plunged in despair; in the utmost harmony with ministers whom the people regard with the utmost abhorrence; who vote thanks, when the public opinion calls upon them for impeachments; who are eager to grant, when the general voice demands account; who, in all disputes between the people and administration, presume against the people; who punish their disorders, but refuse even to inquire into the provocations to them — this is an unnatural, a monstrous state of things in this constitution. Such an assembly may be a great, wise, awful senate; but it is not, to any popular purpose, a house of commons. This change from an immediate state of procuration and delegation, to a course of acting as from original power, is the way in which all the popular magistracies in the world have been perverted from their purposes. It is indeed their greatest and sometimes their incurable corruption. For there is a material distinction between that corruption by which particular points are carried against reason (this is a thing which

cannot be prevented by human wisdom, and is of less consequence), and the corruption of the principle itself. For then the evil is not incidental, but settled. The distemper becomes the natural habit.

RETROSPECT AND RESIGNATION.

You are but just entering into the world; I am going out of it. I have played long enough to be heartily tired of the drama. Whether I have acted my part in it well or ill, posterity will judge with more candour than I, or than the present age, with our present passions, can possibly pretend to. For my part, I quit it without a sigh, and submit to the sovereign order without murmuring. The nearer we approach to the goal of life, the better we begin to understand the true value of our existence, and the real weight of our opinions. We set out much in love with both: but we leave much behind us as we advance. We first throw away the tales along with the rattles of our nurses; those of the priest keep their hold a little longer; those of our governors the longest of all. But the passions which prop these opinions are withdrawn one after another; and the cool light of reason, at the setting of our life, shows us what a false splendour played upon these objects during our more sanguine seasons.

MODESTY OF MIND.

If any inquiry thus carefully conducted should fail at last to discover the truth, it may answer an end perhaps as useful, in revealing to us the weakness of our own understanding. If it does not make us knowing, it may make us modest. If it does not preserve us from error, it may at least preserve us from the *spirit* of error; and it may make us cautious of pronouncing with positiveness or with haste, when so much labour may end in so much uncertainty.

NEWTON AND NATURE.

When Newton first discovered the property of attraction, and settled its laws, he found it served very well to explain several of the most remarkable phenomena in nature. Yet with reference to the general system of things, he could consider attraction but as an effect, whose cause at that time he did not attempt to trace. But when he afterwards began to account for it by a subtle elastic ether, this great man (if in so great a man it is not impious to reveal anything like a blemish) seemed to have quitted his usual cautious manner of philosophizing: since perhaps, allowing all that has been advanced on this subject to be sufficiently proved, I think it leaves us with as many difficulties as it found us. That great chain of causes, which linking one to another even to the throne of God himself, can never be unravelled by any industry of ours. *When we go but one step beyond the immediate sensible qualities of things, we go out of our depth.* All we do after is but a faint struggle, that shows we are in an element which does not belong to us.

THEORY AND PRACTICE.

It is, I own, not uncommon to be wrong in theory, and right in practice; and we are happy that it is so. Men often act right from their feelings, who afterwards reason but badly on

them from principle. But as it is impossible to avoid an attempt at such reasoning, and equally impossible to prevent its having some influence on our practice, surely it is worth taking some pains to have it just, and founded on the basis of sure experience.

INDUCTION AND COMPARISON.

We must not attempt to fly, when we can scarcely pretend to creep. In considering any complex matter, we ought to examine every distinct ingredient in the composition, one by one, and reduce everything to the utmost simplicity, since the condition of our nature binds us to a strict law and vary narrow limits. We ought afterwards to re-examine the principles by the effect of the composition, as well as the composition by that of the principles. We ought to compare our subject with things of a similar nature, and even with things of a contrary nature — for discoveries may be, and often are, made by the contrast, which would escape us on the single view. The greater number of the comparisons we make, the more general and the more certain our knowledge is likely to prove, as built upon a more extensive and perfect induction.

DIVINE POWER ON THE HUMAN IDEA.

While we consider the Godhead merely as He is an object of the understanding, which forms a complex idea of power, wisdom, justice, goodness, all stretched to a degree far exceeding the bounds of our comprehension — I say, while we consider the Divinity in this refined and abstracted light — the imagination and passions are affected little or nothing. But because we are bound by the condition of our nature, to ascend to these pure and intellectual ideas through the medium of sensible images, to judge these divine qualities by their evident acts and exertions, it becomes extremely hard to disentangle our idea of the cause from the effect by which we are led to know it. Thus, when we contemplate the Deity, His attributes and their operation coming united on the mind, form a sort of sensible image; and as such, they are capable of affecting the imagination. Now, though in a just idea of the Deity, perhaps none of His attributes are predominant, yet to our imagination His power is by far the most striking. Some reflection, some comparing, is necessary to satisfy us of his wisdom, his justice, and his goodness. To be struck with his power, it is only necessary that we should open our eyes. But while we contemplate so vast an object under the arm, as it were, of almighty power, and invested upon every side with omnipresence, we shrink into the minuteness of our own nature; and we are, in a way, annihilated before Him.

UNION OF LOVE AND DREAD IN RELIGION.

True religion has, and must have, a large mixture of salutary fear; and *false* religions have generally nothing else but fear to support them. Before the Christian religion had, as it were, humanized the idea of the Divinity, and brought it somewhat nearer to us, there was very little said of the love of God. The followers of Plato have something of it, and *only* something; the other writers of pagan antiquity, whether poets or philosophers, have nothing at all. And those who consider with what infinite attention, by what a disregard of every perishable object, through what long habits of piety and contemplation it is that any

man is able to attain an entire love and devotion to the Deity, will easily perceive that it is not the first, the most natural, and the most striking effect which proceeds from that idea.

OFFICE OF SYMPATHY.

Whenever we are formed by nature to any active purpose, the passion which animates us to it is attended with delight or a pleasure of some kind, let the subject-matter be what it will. And as our Creator had designed that we should be united by the bond of sympathy, he has strengthened that bond by a proportionable delight; and *there* most strengthened, where our sympathy is most wanted — in the distresses of others.

WORDS.

Natural objects affect us by the laws of that connection which Providence has established between certain motions and configurations of bodies, and certain consequent feelings in our mind. *Painting* affects in the same manner, but with the superadded pleasure of imitation. *Architecture* affects by the laws of nature, and the law of reason; from which latter result the rules of proportion, which make a work to be praised or censured, in the whole or in some part, when the end for which it was designed is or is not properly answered (reflected).

But as to *words*, they seem to me to affect us in a manner very different from that in which we are affected by natural objects, or by painting or architecture. Yet words have as considerable a share in exciting ideas of beauty and of the sublime, as many of those, and sometimes a much greater share than any of them.

NATURE ANTICIPATES MAN.

Whenever the wisdom of our Creator intended that we should be affected with anything, he did not confide the execution of his design to the languid and precarious operation of our *reason*; but he endued it with powers and properties that prevent the understanding, and even the will — which, seizing upon the senses and imagination, captivate the soul before the understanding is ready either to join with them, or to oppose them. It is by a long deduction, and much study, that we discover the adorable wisdom of God in his works. When we discover it, the effect is very different, not only in the manner of acquiring it, but in its own nature, from that which strikes us without any preparation from the sublime or the beautiful.

SELF-INSPECTION.

Whatever turns the soul inward on itself, tends to concentrate its forces, and to fit it for greater and stronger flights of science. By looking into physical causes, our minds are opened and enlarged; and in this pursuit, whether we take our game or lose it, the chase is certainly of service.

POWER OF THE OBSCURE.

Poetry, with all its obscurity, has a more general, as well as a more powerful, dominion over the passions, than the other art. And I think there are reasons in nature, why the obscure idea, when properly conveyed, should be more affecting than the clear. It is our ignorance of things that causes all our admiration, and chiefly excites our passions. Knowledge and acquaintance make the most striking causes affect but little. It is thus with the vulgar; and all men are like the vulgar in what they do not understand. The ideas of eternity and infinity are among the most affecting we have: and yet there is perhaps nothing of which we really understand so little, as of infinity and eternity.

FEMALE BEAUTY.

The object therefore of this mixed passion which we call love, is the *beauty* of the *sex*. Men are carried to the *sex in general*, as it is the *sex*, and by the common law of nature. But they are attached to *particulars* by personal *beauty*. I call beauty a social quality; for where women and men — and not only them, but when other animals give us a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them (and there are many that do so) — they inspire us with sentiments of tenderness and affection towards their persons. We like to have them near us, and we enter willingly into a kind of relation with them, unless we have strong reasons to the contrary.

NOVELTY AND CURIOSITY.

Curiosity is the most superficial of all the affections. It changes its object perpetually. It has an appetite which is very sharp, but very easily satisfied; and it always has an appearance of giddiness, restlessness, and anxiety. Curiosity, from its nature, is a very active principle. It quickly runs over the greatest part of its objects, and soon exhausts the variety which is commonly to be met with in nature. The same things make frequent returns, and they return with less and less of any agreeable effect. In short, the occurrences of life, by the time we come to know it a little, would be incapable of affecting the mind with any other sensations than those of loathing and weariness, if many things were not adapted to affect the mind by means of other powers besides novelty in them, and of other passions besides curiosity in ourselves.

PLEASURES OF ANALOGY.

The mind of man has naturally a far greater alacrity and satisfaction in tracing resemblances than in searching for differences. This is because, by making resemblances, we produce *new images* — we unite, we create, we enlarge our stock. But in making distinctions we offer no food at all to the imagination; the task itself is more severe and irksome, and what pleasure we derive from it is something of a negative and indirect nature.

AMBITION.

God has planted in man a sense of ambition, and a satisfaction arising from the contemplation of his excelling his fellows in something deemed valuable among them. It is

this passion that drives men to all the ways we see in the use of signaling themselves; and that tends to make whatever excites in a man the idea of this distinction so very pleasant. It has been so strong as to make very miserable men take comfort, that they were supreme in misery. And it is certain that where we cannot distinguish ourselves by something excellent, we begin to take a complacency in some singular infirmities, follies, or defects of one kind or other. It is on this principle, that flattery is so prevalent; for flattery is no more than what raises in a man's mind an idea of a preference, which he does not have.

EXTENSIONS OF SYMPATHY.

For sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in many respects as he is affected. So that this passion may either partake of the nature of those which regard *self-preservation*, and turning upon pain may be a source of the sublime; or it may turn upon ideas of *pleasure*; and then whatever has been said of the social affections may be applicable here, whether they regard society in general, or only some particular modes of it. It is chiefly by this principle that poetry, painting, and other affecting arts, transfuse their passions from one breast to another, and are often capable of grafting a delight onto wretchedness, misery, and death itself.

PHILOSOPHY OF TASTE.

So far, then, as taste belongs to the imagination, its principle is the same in all men. There is no difference in the manner of their being affected, nor in the causes of the affection. But there is a difference in the *degree*, which arises principally from two causes: either from a greater degree of natural sensibility, or from a closer and longer attention to the object.

CLEARNESS AND STRENGTH IN STYLE.

In our observations upon language, we do not sufficiently distinguish between a *clear* expression, and a *strong* expression. These are frequently confounded with each other, though they are in reality extremely different. The former regards the *understanding*; the latter belongs to the *passions*. The one describes a thing as it *is*; the latter describes it as it *is felt*. Now, as there is a moving tone of voice, an impassioned countenance, an agitated gesture which affect us independently of the things about which they are exerted, so there are words and certain dispositions of words, which being peculiarly devoted to passionate subjects, and always used by those who are under the influence of any passion, touch and move us more than those which far more clearly and distinctly express the subject-matter. We yield to *sympathy* what we refuse to *description*. The truth is, all verbal description, merely as naked description, however exact, conveys so poor and insufficient an idea of the thing described, that it could scarcely have the smallest effect if the speaker did not call to his aid those modes of speech that mark a strong and lively feeling in himself. Then, by the contagion of our passions, we catch a fire already kindled in another, which probably might never have been struck by the object described. Words, strongly conveying the passions by those means which we have already mentioned, fully compensate for their weakness in other respects.

UNITY OF IMAGINATION.

Since the imagination is only the representation of the senses, it can only be pleased or displeased with the images, from the same principle on which the sense is pleased or displeased with the realities — and consequently there must be just as close an agreement in the *imaginations* as in the *senses* of men. A little attention will convince us that this must of necessity be the case.

EFFECT OF WORDS.

If words have all their possible extent of power, three effects arise in the mind of the hearer. The first is, the *sound*; the second, the *picture*, or representation of the thing signified by the sound; the third is the *affection* of the soul produced by one or by both of the foregoing. *Compounded abstract* words, of which we have been speaking (honour, justice, liberty, and the like), produce the first and the last of these effects, but not the second. *Simple abstracts* are used to signify some one simple idea without much adverting to others which may chance to attend it, such as blue, green, hot, cold, and the like. These are capable of effecting all three of the purposes of words; just as the *aggregate* words, man, castle, horse, etc. are in a still higher degree. But I am of opinion that the most general effect, even of these words, does not arise from their forming pictures of the several things they would represent in the imagination. This is because, on a very diligent examination of my own mind, and getting others to consider theirs, I do not find that once in twenty times, any such picture is formed; and when it is, there is most commonly a particular effort of the imagination for that purpose. But the aggregate words operate, as I said of the compound-abstracts, not by presenting any image to the mind, but by having from use the same effect upon being mentioned, that their original has when it is seen.

INVESTIGATION.

I am convinced that the method of *teaching* which approaches most nearly to the method of *investigation*, is incomparably the best — since, not content with serving up a few barren and lifeless truths, it leads to the stock on which they grew. It tends to set the reader himself in the track of invention, and to direct him into those paths in which the author has made his own discoveries, if he should be so happy as to have made any that are valuable.

THE SUBLIME.

Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger — that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror — is a source of the *sublime*. That is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.

OBSCURITY.

Those despotic governments which are founded on the passions of men, and principally upon the passion of *fear*, keep their chief [objective] as much as possible from the public eye. The policy has been the same in many cases of religion. Almost all the heathen temples

were dark. Even in the barbarous temples of the Americans at this day, they keep their idol in a dark part of the hut which is consecrated to his worship. For this purpose too, the Druids performed all their ceremonies in the bosom of the darkest woods, and in the shade of the oldest and most spreading oaks. No person seems to have better understood the secret of heightening, or of setting terrible things (if I may use the expression) in their strongest light, by the force of a judicious obscurity, than Milton.¹²

PRINCIPLES OF TASTE.

Whatever certainty is to be acquired in morality and the science of life, we have just the same degree of certainty in what relates to them in works of imitation. Indeed, it is for the most part in our skill in manners, and in the observances of time and place, and of decency in general, which is only to be learned in those schools to which Horace¹³ recommends us. What is called *taste* (by way of distinction) consists in, and in reality is none other than, a more refined *judgment*. On the whole, it appears to me that what is called *taste*, in its most general acceptation, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of *sense*, the secondary pleasures of the *imagination*, and the conclusions of the *reasoning* faculty concerning the various relations of these, and concerning human passions, manners, and actions. All this is requisite to form taste; and the ground-work of all these is the same in the human mind. For as the senses are the great origins of all our ideas (and consequently of all our pleasures), if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, then the whole ground-work of taste is common to all. And therefore there is a sufficient foundation for a conclusive reasoning on these matters.¹⁴

THE BEAUTIFUL.

Beauty is a thing much too affecting not to depend upon some positive qualities. And since it is not a creature of our reason, and since it strikes us without any reference to use (and even where no use at all can be discerned), and since the order and method of *nature* is generally very different from *our* measures and proportions — we must conclude that beauty is, for the greater part, some quality in bodies acting mechanically upon the human mind by the intervention of the senses.

THE REAL AND THE IDEAL.

Choose a day on which to represent the most sublime and affecting tragedy we have. Appoint the most favourite actors; spare no cost upon the scenes and decorations; unite the greatest efforts of poetry, painting, and music. And when you have collected your audience, just at the moment when their minds are erect with expectation, let it be reported that a state criminal of high rank is on the point of being executed in the adjoining square. In a *moment*, the emptiness of the theatre would demonstrate the comparative weakness of the

¹² John Milton (1608-1674), author of *Paradise Lost*. He also wrote *Areopagitica* (1644), condemning pre-publication censorship; he defended freedom of speech and freedom of the press. He was a civil servant under Oliver Cromwell.

¹³ *Horace* (65-8 BC): a Roman lyric poet said to have influenced English poetry.

¹⁴ That is, taste is not merely subjective in nature; it has objective and therefore determinable qualities. – WHG

imitative arts, and proclaim the triumph of real sympathy. I believe that this notion of our having a simple pain in the *reality*, yet a delight in the *representation*, arises from this: that we do not sufficiently distinguish what we would by no means choose to do, from what we should be eager enough to see once it was done. We delight in seeing things which, so far from doing, our heartiest wishes would be to see them redressed. I believe no man is so strangely wicked as to desire to see this noble capital, the pride of England and of Europe, destroyed by a conflagration or an earthquake, even if he should be removed to the greatest distance from the danger. But supposing such a fatal accident to have happened, what numbers from all parts would crowd to behold the ruins, and among them many who would have been content never to have seen London in its glory!

JUDGMENT IN ART.

A rectitude of judgment in the arts, which may be called a *good taste*, in a great measure depends upon sensibility; because, if the mind has no bent to the pleasures of the imagination, it will never apply itself sufficiently to works of that species to acquire a competent knowledge in them. But, though a degree of sensibility is requisite to form a *good judgment*, yet a good judgment does not necessarily arise from a quick sensibility of *pleasure*.

MORAL EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE.

This arises chiefly from these three causes.

First. That we take an extraordinary part in the passions of others, and that we are easily affected and brought into sympathy by any tokens which are shown of them. And there are no tokens which can express all the circumstances of most passions so fully as *words*. So that if a person speaks upon any subject, he can not only convey the subject to you, but likewise the manner in which he is himself affected by it. It is certain that the influence of most things on our passions is not so much from the things themselves, as from our opinions concerning them. And these again, depend very much on the opinions of other men, conveyable for the most part only by words.

Secondly. There are many things of a very affecting nature, which can seldom occur in the reality; but the words that represent them often do. And thus they have an opportunity to make a deep impression and take root in the mind, while the idea of the reality was transient. To some, perhaps, these things never really occurred in any shape; it is notwithstanding very affecting to them, such as war, death, famine, etc. Besides, many ideas have never been at all presented to the senses of any men except by words — words such as God, angels, devils, heaven, and hell, all of which have, however, a great influence over the passions.

Thirdly. By words we have it in our power to make such *combinations* as we cannot possibly do otherwise. By this power of combining, we are able, by the addition of well-chosen circumstances, to give a new life and force to the simple object. In painting, we may represent any fine figure we please; but we can never give it those enlivening touches which it may receive from words. To represent an angel in a picture, you can only draw a beautiful

young man, winged. But what painting can furnish anything so grand as the addition of one word, “the angel of the LORD?”

SECURITY OF TRUTH.

I then thought (and I am still of the same opinion) that error, and not truth of any kind, is *dangerous* — that ill conclusions can only flow from false propositions; and that, to know whether any proposition is true or false, it is a preposterous method to examine it by its apparent consequences.

IMITATION AN INSTINCTIVE LAW.

For as sympathy makes us take a concern in whatever men feel, so this affection prompts us to copy whatever they do. And consequently, we have a pleasure in imitating, and in whatever belongs to imitation merely as it is such. This is without any intervention of the reasoning faculty, but solely from our natural constitution which Providence has framed in such a manner as to find either pleasure or delight, according to the nature of the object, in whatever regards the purposes of our being. It is by imitation, far more than by precept, that we learn everything; and what we learn thus, we acquire not only more effectually, but more pleasantly. This forms our manners, our opinions, our lives. It is one of the strongest links of society; it is a species of mutual compliance, which all men yield to each other without constraint to themselves, and which is extremely flattering to all.

STANDARD OF REASON AND TASTE.

It is probable that the standard both of reason and taste is the same in all human creatures. For if there were not some principles of judgment as well as of sentiment common to all mankind, no hold could possibly be taken either on their reason or their passions, sufficient to maintain the ordinary correspondence of life.

USE OF THEORY.

A theory founded on experiment, and not assumed, is always good for so much as it explains. Our inability to push it indefinitely is no argument at all against it. This inability may be owing to our ignorance of some necessary *mediums*; to a lack of proper application; or to many other causes, besides a defect in the principles we employ.

POLITICAL OUTCASTS.

In the meantime, that power which all these changes aimed at securing, still remains as tottering and as uncertain as ever. They are delivered up into the hands of those who feel neither respect for their persons, nor gratitude for their favours, who are put about them in *appearance* to serve, but in *reality* to govern them — and when the signal is given, to abandon and destroy them in order to set up some new dupe of ambition, who in his turn is to be abandoned and destroyed. Thus living in a state of continual uneasiness and ferment, softened only by the miserable consolation of giving preferments now and then to those for whom they have no value, they are unhappy in their situation, yet find it impossible to

resign. Until at length, soured in temper, and disappointed by the very attainment of their ends, in some angry, haughty, or negligent moment, they incur the displeasure of those upon whom they have rendered their very being dependent. Then *perierunt tempora longi servitii* (the times of long service are gone). They are cast off with scorn; they are turned out, emptied of all natural character, of all intrinsic worth, of all essential dignity, and deprived of every consolation of friendship. Having rendered all retreat to old principles ridiculous, and to old regards impracticable, and not being able to counterfeit pleasure, nor to discharge discontent — nothing being sincere or right, or balanced in their minds — it is more than a chance that, in the delirium of the last stage of their distempered power, they will make an insane political testament by which they throw all their remaining weight and consequence into the scale of their declared enemies, and the avowed authors of their destruction.

INJUSTICE TO OUR OWN AGE.

If these evil dispositions should spread much further, they must end in our destruction. For nothing can save a people destitute of public and private faith. However, the author, for the present state of things, has extended the charge much too widely, as men are too apt to take the measure of all mankind from their own particular acquaintance. Barren as this age may be in the growth of honour and virtue, the country at this moment does not lack examples as strong as were ever known (and those not a few) of an unshaken adherence to principle, and an attachment to connection, against every allurements of interest. Those examples are not furnished by the great alone; nor by those whose activity in public affairs may render it suspected that they make such a character one of the rungs in their ladder of ambition. But they are furnished by men more quiet, and more in the shade, on whom an unmixed sense of honour alone could operate.

FALSE COALITIONS.

No system of that kind can be formed, which will not leave room fully sufficient for healing coalitions. But no coalition which — under the specious name of *independency* — carries in its bosom the unreconciled principles of the original discord of parties, ever was or will be a *healing* coalition. Nor will the mind of our sovereign ever know repose, his kingdom know settlement, or his business know order, in efficiency or grace with his people, until things are established on the basis of some set of men who are trusted by the public, and who can trust one another.

POLITICAL EMPIRICISM.

Men of sense, when new projects come before them, always think a discourse proving the mere right or mere power of acting in the manner proposed, to be no more than a very unpleasant way of mis-spending time. They must see the object to be of proper magnitude to engage them; they must see the means of compassing it to be next to certain; the mischiefs not to counterbalance the profit. They will examine how a proposed imposition or regulation agrees with the opinion of those who are likely to be affected by it; they will not despise the consideration even of their habitudes and prejudices. They wish to know how it

accords or disagrees with the true spirit of prior establishments, whether of government or of finance, because they well know that in the complicated economy of great kingdoms and immense revenues, which in a length of time and by a variety of accidents have coalesced into a sort of body, an attempt towards a compulsory equality in all circumstances, and an exact practical definition of the supreme rights in every case, is the most dangerous and chimerical of all enterprises. The old building stands well enough, though part Gothic, part Grecian, and part Chinese, until an attempt is made to square it into uniformity. Then it may come down upon our heads altogether, in much uniformity of ruin; and great will be the fall thereof. Mat 7.27

A VISIONARY.

Enough of this visionary union, in which much extravagance appears without any fancy, and the judgment is shocked without anything to refresh the imagination. It looks as if the author had dropped down from the moon, without any knowledge of the general nature of this globe, of the general nature of its inhabitants, and without the least acquaintance with the affairs of this country.

PARTY DIVISIONS.

Party divisions, whether on the whole operating for good or evil, are things inseparable from free government. This is a truth which, I believe, admits little dispute, having been established by the uniform experience of all ages. The part a good citizen ought to take in these divisions has been a matter of much deeper controversy. But God forbid that any controversy relating to our essential morals should allow no decision. It appears to me that this question, like most of the others which regard our duties in life, is to be determined by our station in it. Private men may be wholly neutral and entirely innocent. But those who are legally invested with public trust, or who stand on the high ground of rank and dignity, which is an implied trust, can hardly in any case remain indifferent without the certainty of sinking into insignificance. And thereby they are in effect deserting that post in which, with the fullest authority and for the wisest purposes, the laws and institutions of their country have fixed them. However, if it is the office of those who are thus circumstanced, to take a decided part, then it is no less their duty that it should be a sober one.

DECORUM IN PARTY.

It ought to be circumscribed by the same laws of decorum, and balanced by the same temper, which bound and regulate *all* the virtues. In a word, we ought to act in party with all the moderation which does not absolutely enervate that vigour, and quench that fervency of spirit, without which the best wishes for the public good must evaporate in empty speculation.

NOT SO BAD AS WE SEEM.

Our circumstances are indeed critical; but then they are the critical circumstances of a strong and mighty nation. If corruption and meanness are greatly spread, they are not universally spread. Many public men are up to now examples of public spirit and integrity.

Whole parties, as far as large bodies can be uniform, have preserved character. However deceived they may be in some particulars, I know of no set of men among us which does not contain persons on whom the nation, in a difficult exigence, may well value itself. Private life, which is the nursery of the commonwealth, is still pure in general, and on the whole it is disposed to virtue; and the people at large lack neither generosity nor spirit. No small part of that very luxury which is so much the subject of the author's declamation, but which in most parts of life, by being well balanced and diffused, is only decency and convenience, has perhaps as many or more good than evil consequences attending it. It certainly excites industry, nourishes emulation, and inspires some sense of personal value into all ranks of people. What we want is to establish more fully an opinion of uniformity and consistency of character in the leading men of the state; such as will restore some confidence to profession and appearance; such as will fix *subordination* upon *esteem*. Without this, all schemes are begun at the wrong end.

POLITICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLE.

People who are not very well grounded in the principles of public morality find a set of maxims in office ready made for them, which they assume as naturally and inevitably as any of the insignia or instruments of the situation. A certain tone of the solid and practical is immediately acquired. Every former profession of public spirit is to be considered as a debauch of youth, or at best, as a visionary scheme of unattainable perfection. The very idea of consistency is exploded. The convenience of the business of the day is to furnish the *principle* for doing it. Then the whole ministerial cant is quickly gotten by heart. The prevalence of faction is to be lamented. All opposition is to be regarded as the effect of envy and disappointed ambition. All administrations are declared to be alike; the same necessity justifies all their measures. It is no longer a matter of discussion, who or what administration is; but it is a general maxim that administration is to be supported. Flattering themselves that their power has become necessary to the support of all order and government, everything which tends to the support of that power is thus sanctified, and it becomes a part of the public interest.

MORAL DEBASEMENT IS PROGRESSIVE.

I believe the instances are exceedingly rare of men immediately passing over a clear, marked line of virtue, into declared vice and corruption. There are a sort of middle tints and shades between the two extremes. There is something uncertain on the confines of the two empires which they first pass through, and which renders the change easy and imperceptible. There are even a sort of splendid impositions, so well contrived that at the very time the path of rectitude is quit forever, men seem to be advancing into some higher and nobler road of public conduct. Not that such impositions are strong enough in themselves; but a powerful interest, often concealed from those whom it affects, works at the bottom, and secures the operation. Men are thus debauched away from those legitimate connections which they had formed on a judgment that was perhaps early, but sufficiently mature and wholly unbiased.

DESPOTISM.

It is the nature of despotism to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleasure; and to annihilate all intermediate situations between boundless strength on its own part, and total debility on the part of the people.

JUDGMENT AND POLICY.

Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation, but what must either render us totally desperate, or sooth us into the security of idiots. We must soften into a credulity below the milkiness of infancy, to think all men virtuous. We must be tainted with a truly diabolical malignity, to believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in public as in private, some good, some evil. The elevation of the one, and the depression of the other, are the first objects of all true policy. But that form of government which, neither in its direct institutions nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the most trustworthy hands, but has left its whole executory system to be disposed of agreeably to the uncontrolled pleasures of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity that is defective not only in *that* member, but consequentially erroneous in every part of it.

POPULAR DISCONTENT.

To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the present possessors of power, to lament the past, to conceive extravagant hopes of the future, these are the common dispositions of the greatest part of mankind — indeed, they are the necessary effects of the ignorance and levity of the vulgar. Such complaints and feeling have existed in all times. Yet, as all times have *not* been alike, true political sagacity manifests itself in distinguishing that complaint which only characterises the general infirmity of human nature, from those which are symptoms of the particular distemperature of our own air and season.

THE PEOPLE AND THEIR RULERS.

I am not one of those who think that the people are never in the wrong. They have been so, frequently and outrageously, both in other countries and in this one. But I do say that in all disputes between them and their rulers, the presumption is at least on a par in favour of the people. Experience may perhaps justify me in going further. When popular discontents have been very prevalent, it may well be affirmed and supported that generally there has been something found amiss in the constitution or in the conduct of *government*. The people have no interest in disorder. When they do wrong, it is their *error*, and not their *crime*.

GOVERNMENT FAVOURITISM.

It is this unnatural infusion of a government which in a great part of its constitution is popular, that has raised the present ferment in the nation. The people, without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effects in much violence, in a great spirit of innovation, and a general disorder in all the functions of government. I keep my eye solely on this system. If I speak of those measures which have arisen from it, it will be only

so far as they illustrate the general scheme. This is the fountain of all those bitter waters of which we have drunk through a hundred different conduits, until we are ready to burst. The discretionary power of the Crown in the formation of ministry, abused by bad or weak men, has given rise to a system which, without directly violating the letter of any law, operates against the spirit of the whole constitution.

A plan of favouritism for our executory government is essentially at variance with the plan of our legislature. Undoubtedly, one great end of a mixed government like ours — composed of a monarchy, and of controls on the part of the higher people and the lower — is that the prince shall not be able to violate the laws. This is useful indeed, and fundamental. But this, even at first view, in no more than a negative advantage — a merely defensive armour. It is therefore next in order, and equal in importance, *that the discretionary powers which are necessarily vested in the monarch, whether for the execution of the laws, or for the nomination to magistracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, should all be exercised upon public principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a court.*¹⁵

ADMINISTRATION AND LEGISLATION.

In arbitrary governments, the constitution of the *ministry*¹⁶ follows the constitution of the *legislature*. Both the law and the magistrate are the creatures of [public] will. It must be so. Indeed, nothing will appear more certain on any tolerable consideration of this matter, than that *every sort of government ought to have its administration correspondent to its legislature.*¹⁷ If it should be otherwise, things must fall into a hideous disorder. The people of a free commonwealth, who have taken such care that their laws should be the result of *general consent*, cannot be so senseless as to allow their executive system to be composed of persons who have no dependence on them, and whom no proofs of the public's love and confidence have recommended the use of those powers on which the very being of the state depends.

INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN.

The power of the Crown, almost dead and rotten as *Prerogative*,¹⁸ has grown up anew, with much more strength and far less odium, under the name of *Influence*. An influence which operated without noise and without violence; an influence which converted the very antagonist into the instrument of power; which contained in itself a perpetual principle of growth and renovation; and which the distresses and the prosperity of the country equally tend to augment, was an admirable substitute for a prerogative that, being only the offspring of antiquated prejudices, had moulded into its original stamina, irresistible principles of

¹⁵ Not a judicial court, but the monarch's court — vested interests who seek the monarch's favor to enrich themselves and their constituency at public expense. — WHG

¹⁶ *Ministry* refers to government ministers, the heads of various government agencies. — WHG

¹⁷ That is, agency heads, like legislators, must be accountable to the people or their representatives. — WHG

¹⁸ This refers to the "divine right" of kings to rule without constraint of law. — WHG

decay and dissolution. The ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a *temporary* system; the interest of active men in the state, is a perpetual and infallible foundation.

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE.

Government is deeply interested in everything which may tend finally to compose the minds of the subjects, and to conciliate their affections, even through the medium of some temporary uneasiness. I have nothing to do here with the abstract value of the voice of the people. But as long as reputation, the most precious possession of every individual, and as long as opinion, the great support of the state, depend entirely upon that voice, it can never be considered as a thing of little consequence either to individuals or to governments. Nations are not primarily ruled by laws; even less by violence. Whatever original energy may be supposed either in *force* or *regulation*, the operation of both is, in truth, merely instrumental. Nations are governed by the same methods, and on the same principles by which an individual without authority is often able to govern those who are his equals or his superiors — by a knowledge of their temper, and by a judicious management of it. By this I mean, when public affairs are steadily and quietly conducted; and when government is nothing but a continued scuffle between the magistrate and the multitude, in which sometimes the one and sometimes the other is uppermost; in which they alternately yield and prevail in a series of contemptible victories, and scandalous submissions. The temper of the people among whom he presides should therefore be the first study of a statesman. And it is by no means impossible for him to attain the knowledge of this temper, if he does not have an interest in being ignorant of what it is his duty to learn.

FALLACY OF EXTREMES.

It is a fallacy in constant use with those who would level all things, and confound right with wrong, to insist upon the inconveniences which are attached to every choice, without taking into consideration the different weight and consequence of those inconveniences. The question is not concerning *absolute* discontent or *perfect* satisfaction in government — neither of which can be pure and unmixed at any time, or upon any system. The controversy is about that degree of good humour in the people, which may possibly be attained, and should certainly be looked for. While some politicians may be waiting to know whether the sense of every individual is against them — accurately distinguishing the vulgar from the better sort, drawing lines between the enterprises of a *faction* and the efforts of a *people* — they may chance to see the government which they are so nicely weighing, dividing, and distinguishing, tumble to the ground in the midst of their wise deliberation. Prudent men, when so great an object as the security of government, or even its peace, is at stake, will not run the risk of a decision which may be fatal to it. Those who can read the political sky will see a hurricane in a cloud no bigger than a hand at the very edge of the horizon, and will run into the first harbour. No lines can be laid down for civil or political wisdom. They are a matter incapable of exact definition. But, even though no man can draw a line between the confines of day and night, yet light and darkness are, on the whole, tolerably distinguishable. Nor will it be impossible for a prince to find such a mode of government, and such persons to administer it, as will give a great degree of contentment to his people, without any curious and anxious research for that abstract, universal, perfect harmony

which, while he seeks it, he abandons those means of ordinary tranquility which are in his power, without any research at all.

PRIVATE CHARACTER A BASIS FOR PUBLIC CONFIDENCE.

Before men are put forward into the great trusts of the state, they should, by their conduct, have obtained such a degree of estimation in their country, as may be some sort of pledge and security to the public, that they will not abuse those trusts. It is no mean security for a proper use of power, that a man has shown by the general tenor of his actions, that the affection, the good opinion, the confidence of his fellow citizens, have been among the principal objects of his life; and that he has owed none of the degradations of his power or fortune to a settled contempt, or an occasional forfeiture of their esteem.

That man who before he comes into power has no friends, or who coming into power is obliged to desert his friends, or who losing power has no friends to sympathise with him — he who has no sway among any part of the landed or commercial interest, but whose whole importance has begun with his office, and is sure to end with it — is a person who should never to be allowed by a controlling parliament to continue in any of those positions which confer the lead and direction of all our public affairs. This is because such a man *has no connection with the interest of the people*. Those knots or cabals of men who have gotten together avowedly without any public principle, in order to sell their conjunct iniquity at the higher rate, and are therefore universally odious, should never be suffered to domineer in the state; because they have *no connection with the sentiments and opinions of the people*.

PREVENTION.

Every good political institution must have a *preventive* operation as well as a *remedial*. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from government, and not to trust for the safety of the state to subsequent punishment alone — punishment which has ever been tardy and uncertain, and which, when power is suffered in bad hands, may chance to fall rather on the injured than the criminal.

CONFIDENCE IN THE PEOPLE.

They may be assured that however they amuse themselves with a variety of projects for substituting something else in the place of that great and only foundation of government, the confidence of the people, every attempt will but make their condition worse. When men imagine that their food is only a cover for poison, and when they neither love nor trust the hand that serves it, it is not the name of the roast beef of Old England, that will persuade them to sit down to the table that is spread for them. When the people conceive that laws, and tribunals, and even popular assemblies, are perverted from the ends of their institution, they find in those names of degenerated establishments, only new motives for discontentment. Those bodies which, when they are full of life and beauty, lay in their arms, and were their joy and comfort, when dead and putrid, they become only more loathsome from remembrance of former endearments. A sullen gloom and furious disorder prevail by fits. The nation loses its relish for peace and prosperity; as it did in that season of fulness which opened our troubles in the time of Charles the First. A species of men to whom a state

of order would become a sentence of obscurity, are nourished into a dangerous magnitude by the heat of intestine disturbances. And it is no wonder that, by a sort of sinister piety, they cherish in their turn, the disorders which are the parents of all their consequents.

FALSE MAXIMS ASSUMED AS FIRST PRINCIPLES.

It is an advantage to all narrow wisdom and narrow morals, that their maxims have a plausible air; and on a cursory view, appear equal to first principles. They are light and portable. They are as current as copper coin; and about as valuable. They serve equally the first capacities and the lowest; and they are at least as useful to the worst men, as to the best. Of this stamp is the cant of *not men, but measures* — a sort of charm by which many people get loose from every honourable engagement. When I see a man acting this desultory and disconnected part, with as much detriment to his own fortune as prejudice to the cause of any party, I am not persuaded that he is *right*; but I am ready to believe he is *in earnest*. I respect virtue in all its situations, even when it is found in the unsuitable company of weakness. I lament to see rare and valuable qualities squandered away without any public utility. But when a gentleman with great visible emoluments abandons the party in which he has long acted, and he tells you it is because he proceeds upon his own judgment; that he acts on the merits of the several measures as they arise; and that he is obliged to follow his own conscience and not that of others — he gives reasons which it is impossible to controvert, and reveals a character which it is impossible to mistake. What should we think of someone who never differed from a certain set of men until the moment they lost their power, and who never agreed with them in a single instance afterwards? Would such a coincidence of interest and opinion not be rather fortunate? Would it not be an extraordinary toss of the dice, that a man's connections should degenerate into faction, precisely at the critical moment when they lose their power, or he accepts a place? When people desert their connections, the desertion is a manifest *fact* upon which a direct simple issue lies, triable by plain men. Whether a *measure* of government is right or wrong, is *no matter of fact*, but a mere affair of opinion on which men may, as they do, dispute and wrangle without end. But whether the individual *thinks* the measure right or wrong, is a point at still a greater distance from the reach of all human decision. It is therefore very convenient to politicians not to put the judgment of their conduct upon overt acts, cognizable in any ordinary court — but upon such matter as can be triable only in that secret tribunal where they are sure of being heard with favour, or where at worst the sentence will be only private whipping.

NOTABLE FIGURES

LORD CHATHAM.

Another scene was opened, and other actors appeared on the stage. The State, in the condition I have described it, was delivered into the hands of Lord Chatham ¹⁹ — a great and

¹⁹ Lord Chatham was also known as *William Pitt the Younger* (1759-1806). He was the youngest Prime Minister of the time, and served concurrently as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1783-1801). — WHG

celebrated name; a name that keeps the name of this country respectable in every other country on the globe. It may be truly called —

A famous and venerable name

*To the Gentiles and many of our own, that had benefited the city.*²⁰

Sir, the venerable age of this great man, his merited rank, his superior eloquence, his splendid qualities, his eminent services, the vast space he fills in the eye of mankind; and more than all the rest, his fall from power which, like death, canonizes and sanctifies a great character, will not permit me to censure any part of his conduct. I am afraid to flatter him; I am sure I am not disposed to blame him. Let those who have betrayed him by their adulation, insult him with their malevolence. But what I do not presume to censure, I may have leave to lament. For a wise man, he seemed to me at that time to be governed too much by general maxims. I speak with the freedom of history, and I hope without offence. One or two of these maxims, flowing from an opinion not the most indulgent to our unhappy species, and surely a little too general, led him into measures that were greatly mischievous to himself — and for that reason, among others, perhaps fatal to his country — measures, the effects of which, I am afraid, are forever incurable. He made an administration so checkered and speckled; he put together a piece of joinery, so crossly indented and whimsically dove-tailed; a cabinet so variously inlaid; such a piece of diversified mosaic; such a tessellated pavement without cement (here a bit of black stone, and there a bit of white); patriots and courtiers, king's friends and republicans; Whigs and Tories;²¹ treacherous friends and open enemies — that it was indeed a very curious show. But it was utterly unsafe to touch, and unsure to stand on. The colleagues whom he had assorted at the same boards stared at each other, and were obliged to ask, "Sir, your name? — Sir, you have the advantage of me — Mr. Such-a-one, I beg a thousand pardons." — I venture to say, it so happened that persons had a single office divided between them, who had never spoken to each other in their lives until they found themselves, they knew not how, pigging together, heads and points, in the same truckle-bed.

Sir, in consequence of this arrangement, of having put so much the larger part of his enemies and opposers into power, the confusion was such that his own principles could not possibly have any effect or influence in the conduct of affairs. If ever he fell into a fit of the gout, or if any other cause withdrew him from public cares, principles directly the contrary were sure to predominate. When he had executed his plan, he did not have an inch of ground to stand on. When he had accomplished his scheme of administration, he was no longer a minister. When his face was hidden but for a moment, his whole system was on a wide sea without chart or compass. The gentlemen (his particular friends) who had the names of various departments of ministry, seemed as if they acted a part under him — with a modesty that becomes all men, and with a confidence in him which was justified even in its extravagance, by his superior abilities. But they had never in any instance presumed upon any opinion of their own. Deprived of his guiding influence, they were whirled about,

²⁰ Originally, *Clarum et venerabile nomen Gentibus, et multum nostrae quod proderat urbi*, a quotation alluding to the murder of Roman General Pompey in 48 BC. — WHG

²¹ Whigs were the political party that urged social reform; the Tories were the Conservative party. — WHG

the sport of every gust, and easily driven into any port. And as those who joined with them in manning the vessel were the most directly opposite to his opinions, measures, and character, and by far the most artful and most powerful of the set, they easily prevailed, so as to seize upon the vacant, unoccupied, and derelict minds of his friends. Instantly they turned the vessel wholly out of the course of his policy. As if it were to insult as well as to betray him, even long before the close of the first session of his administration, when everything was publicly transacted, and with great parade, they made an act in his name, declaring it highly just and expedient to raise a revenue in America. For even then, Sir, even before this splendid orb was entirely set, and while the western horizon was ablaze with his *descending* glory, another luminary arose on the opposite quarter of the heavens; and for his hour, he became lord of the ascendant.

GEORGE GRENVILLE.

Mr. Grenville was a first-rate figure in this country. With a masculine understanding, and a stout and resolute heart, he had an application undissipated and unwearied. He took public business not as a duty which he was to fulfil, but as a pleasure he was to enjoy; and he seemed to have no delight out of this house, except in such things as some way related to the business that was to be done within it. If he was ambitious, I will say this for him, his ambition was of a noble and generous strain. It was to raise himself, not by the low, pimping politics of a court, but to win his way to power through the laborious gradations of public service; and to secure himself a well-earned rank in Parliament by a thorough knowledge of its constitution, and a perfect practice in all its business.

Sir, if such a man fell into errors, it must be from defects that are not intrinsic; they must rather be sought in the particular habits of his life. Though they do not alter the groundwork of character, they tinge it with their own hue. He was bred in a profession. He was bred to the law, which is, in my opinion, one of the first and noblest of human sciences. It is a science which does more to quicken and invigorate the understanding, than all the other kinds of learning put together. But it is not apt except in persons very happily born to open and to liberalize the mind in exactly the same proportion. Passing from that study, he did not go very largely into the world, but plunged into business — I mean into the business of office, and the limited and fixed methods and forms established there. Undoubtedly, much knowledge is to be had in that line, and there is no knowledge which is not valuable. But it may be truly said that men who are too conversant in office are rarely minds of remarkable enlargement. Their habits of office are apt to give them a turn to think the *substance* of business not to be much more important than the *forms* in which it is conducted. These forms are adapted to ordinary occasions; and therefore, persons who are nurtured in office do admirably well, as long as things go on in their common order. But when the high roads are broken up, and the waters are out, when a new and troubled scene is opened and the file affords no precedent, then a greater knowledge of mankind and a far more extensive comprehension of things is requisite than office ever gave, or than office can ever give.

CHARLES TOWNSHEND.

This light too is passed and set forever. You understand, to be sure, that I speak of Charles Townshend, officially the reproducer of this fatal scheme. Even now I cannot remember him

without some degree of sensibility. In truth, Sir, he was the delight and ornament of this house, and the charm of every private society which he honoured with his presence. Perhaps there never arose in this country, nor in any country, a man of a more pointed and finished wit; and (where his passions were not concerned) of a more refined, exquisite, and penetrating judgment. If he did not have so great a stock of knowledge, long treasured up, as some who flourished formerly have had, he knew better by far than any man I was ever acquainted with, how to bring together in a short time, all that was necessary to establish, illustrate, and decorate that side of the question which he supported. He stated his matter skilfully and powerfully. He particularly excelled in a most luminous explanation and display of his subject. His style of argument was neither trite and vulgar, nor subtle and abstruse. He hit the house just between wind and water. And not being troubled with too anxious a zeal for any matter in question, he was never more tedious, or more earnest, than the pre-conceived opinions and present temper of his hearers required — to whom he was always in perfect unison. He conformed exactly to the temper of the house; and he seemed to guide, because he was always sure to follow it.

PARTY AND PLACE.

Party is a body of men united for promoting the national interest by their joint endeavours, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impossible to conceive that anyone believes in his own politics, or thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of having them reduced into *practice*. It is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore every honourable connection will avow it is their first purpose to pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the state. As this power is attached to certain situations, it is their duty to contend for these situations. Without a proscription of others, they are bound to give to their own party the preference in all things; and by no means, for *private* considerations, to accept any offers of power in which the *whole* body is not included. Nor are they to suffer themselves to be led, or to be controlled, or to be overbalanced, in office or in council, by those who contradict the very fundamental principles on which their party is formed, and even those upon which every fair connection must stand. Such a generous contention for power, on such manly and honourable maxims, will easily be distinguished from the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument. The very style of such persons will serve to discriminate them from those numberless imposters who have deluded the ignorant with professions that are incompatible with human practice, and have afterwards incensed them by practices below the level of vulgar rectitude.

POLITICAL CONNECTIONS.

Every profession, not excepting the glorious one of a soldier, or the sacred one of a priest, is liable to its own particular vices which, however, form no argument against those ways of life; nor are the vices themselves inevitable to every individual in those professions. Of such a nature are connections in politics. They are essentially necessary for the full performance

of our public duty, and accidentally liable to degenerate into *faction*. Commonwealths are made of families; free commonwealths are made of parties also. And we may as well affirm that our natural regards and ties of blood inevitably tend to make men bad citizens, just as the bonds of our party weaken those bonds by which we are held to our country.

Some legislators went so far as to make neutrality in party a crime against the state. I do not know whether this might not have been rather to overstrain the principle. It is certain that the best patriots in the greatest commonwealths have always commended and promoted such connections. *Idem sentire de republica* (I feel the same way about the republic), was with them a principal ground of friendship and attachment. Nor do I know any other connection capable of forming firmer, dearer, more pleasing, more honourable, and more virtuous habitudes. The Romans carried this principle a great way. Even holding offices together, the disposition of which arose from chance, not selection, gave rise to a relation which continued for life. It was called *necessitudo sortis* (a relationship of fate); and it was looked upon with a sacred reverence. Breaches of any of these kinds of civil relation were considered as acts of the most distinguished turpitude. The whole people was distributed into political societies in which they acted in support of such interests in the state as they severally affected. For then it was not thought a crime to endeavour, by every honest means, to advance to superiority and power those of your own sentiments and opinions. This wise people was far from imagining that those connections had no tie, and obliged to no duty; but that men might quit them without shame, upon every call of interest. They believed private honour to be the great foundation of public trust; that friendship was no mean step towards patriotism; that he who, in the common intercourse of life, showed that he regarded somebody besides himself when he came to act in a public situation, might probably consult some other interest than his own.

NEUTRALITY.

They were a race of men (I hope in God the species is extinct) who, when they rose in their place, no man living could divine from any known adherence to parties, to opinions, or to principles — from any order or system in their politics, or from any sequel or connection in their ideas — what part they were going to take in any debate. It is astonishing how much this uncertainty, especially at critical times, called the attention of all parties on such men. All eyes were fixed on them, all ears open to hear them; each party gaped, and looked alternately for their vote, almost to the end of their speeches. While the house hung on this uncertainty, now the *hear hims* rose from this side, now they rebelled from the other. And that party to whom they fell at length from their tremulous and dancing balance, always received them in a tempest of applause. The fortune of such men was a temptation too great to be resisted by one to whom a single whiff of incense withheld, gave much greater pain than he received delight in the clouds of it which daily rose about him from the prodigal superstition of innumerable admirers. He was a candidate for contradictory honours; and his great aim was to make those agree in admiration of him, who never agreed in anything else.

WEAKNESS IN GOVERNMENT.

Let us learn from our experience. It is not support that is lacking in government, but reformation. When ministry rests upon public opinion, it is not indeed built upon a rock of adamant; it does have some stability, however. But when it stands upon private feelings, its structure is of stubble, and its foundation is on quicksand. I repeat it again — *he that supports every administration, subverts all government*. The reason is this: the whole business in which a court usually takes an interest goes on at present equally well, in whatever hands, whether high or low, wise or foolish, scandalous or reputable. There is nothing, therefore, to hold it firm to any one body of men, or to any one consistent scheme of politics. Nothing interposes to prevent the full operation of all the caprices and all the passions of a court upon the servants of the public. The system of administration is open to continual shocks and changes upon the principles of the meanest cabal, and the most contemptible intrigue. Nothing can be solid and permanent. All good men at length fly with horror from such a service. Men of *rank and ability* — with the spirit which ought to animate such men in a free state, while they decline the jurisdiction of dark cabal on their actions and their fortunes — will, for both, cheerfully put themselves upon their country. They will trust an inquisitive and distinguishing parliament, because it *does* inquire, and it *does* distinguish. If they act well, they know that in such a parliament, they will be supported against any intrigue; and if they act badly, they know that no intrigue can protect them. This situation, however awful, is honourable. But in one hour, and in the self-same assembly, without any assigned or assignable cause, *to be precipitated from the highest authority to the most marked neglect, possibly into the greatest peril of life and reputation*, is a situation full of danger and destitute of honour. It will be shunned equally by every man of prudence, and every man of spirit.

AMERICAN PROGRESS.

Nothing in the history of mankind is like their progress. For my part, I never cast an eye on their flourishing commerce, and their cultivated and commodious life, but they seem to me rather ancient nations grown to perfection through a long series of fortunate events, and a train of successful industry, accumulating wealth in many centuries — than the colonies of yesterday; than a set of miserable outcasts a few years ago — not so much sent as thrown out on the bleak and barren shore of a desolate wilderness, three thousand miles from all civilized intercourse.

COMBINATION, NOT FACTION.

That *connection* and *faction* are equivalent terms, is an opinion which has been carefully inculcated at all times by *unconstitutional* statesmen. The reason is evident. While men are linked together, they easily and speedily communicate the alarm of any evil design. They are enabled to fathom it with common counsel, and to oppose it with united strength. Whereas, when they lie dispersed, without concert, order, or discipline, communication is uncertain, counsel difficult, and resistance impracticable. Where men are not acquainted with each other's principles, nor experienced in each other's talents, nor at all practised in their mutual habitudes and dispositions by joint efforts in business — having no personal

confidence, no friendship, no common interest subsisting among them — it is evidently impossible that they can act a public part with uniformity, perseverance, or efficacy. In a connection, the most inconsiderable man, by adding to the weight of the whole, has his value, and his use; out of it, the greatest talents are wholly unserviceable to the public. No man, who is not inflamed by vain-glory into enthusiasm, can flatter himself that his single, unsupported, desultory, unsystematic endeavours, are of power to defeat the subtle designs and united cabals of ambitious citizens. When bad men combine, the good must *associate*; or else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle.

GREAT MEN.

Great men are the guide-posts and land-marks in the state. The credit of such men at court, or in the nation, is the sole cause of all the public measures. It would be an invidious thing (most foreign, I trust, to what you think my disposition) to remark on the errors into which the authority of great names has brought the nation, without doing justice at the same time to the great qualities from which that authority arose. The subject is instructive to those who wish to form themselves on whatever of excellence has gone before them. There are many young members in the house (such of late has been the rapid succession of public men) who never saw that prodigy, Charles Townshend; nor of course know what a ferment he was able to excite in everything, by the violent ebullition of his mixed virtues and failings. For he undoubtedly had failings — many of us remember them; we are this day considering the *effect* of them. But he had no failings which were not owing to a noble cause; to an ardent, generous, perhaps an immoderate passion for fame — a passion which is the instinct of all great souls.

POWER OF CONSTITUENTS.

The power of the people, within the laws, must show itself sufficient to protect every representative in the animated performance of his duty, or that duty cannot be performed. The House of Commons can never be a control on other parts of government, unless they are controlled themselves by their constituents; and unless these constituents possess some right in the choice of that house, which it is not in the power of that house to take away. If they suffer this power of *arbitrary incapacitation* to stand, they have utterly perverted every other power of the House of Commons. The recent proceeding I will not say is contrary to law, it *must* be so — for the power which is claimed cannot, by any possibility, be a legal power in any limited member of government.

INFLUENCE OF PLACE IN GOVERNMENT.

It is no inconsiderable part of wisdom to know how much of an evil ought to be tolerated — lest, by attempting a degree of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, instead of cutting off the subsisting ill practices, new corruptions might be produced for the concealment and security of the old. It would be better, undoubtedly, that no influence at all could affect the mind of a member of Parliament. But of all modes of influence, in my opinion, a place under the government is the least disgraceful to the man who holds it, and by far the safest to the country. I would not shut out that sort of influence which is *open and*

visible, which is connected with the dignity and the service of the state — when it is not in my power to prevent the influence of contracts, of subscriptions, of direct bribery, and those innumerable methods of clandestine corruption which are abundantly in the hands of the court, and which will be applied as long as these means of corruption, and the disposition to be corrupted, have existence among us.

Our constitution stands on a nice equipoise, with steep precipices and deep waters on all sides of it. In removing it from a dangerous leaning towards one side, there may be a risk of oversetting it on the other. Every project of a material change in a government so complicated as ours, combined at the same time with external circumstances still more complicated, is a matter full of difficulties: in which a considerate man will not be too ready to decide; nor a prudent man too ready to undertake; nor an honest man too ready to promise. They do not respect the public nor themselves, who engage for more than they are sure that they ought to attempt, or that they are able to perform.

TAXATION INVOLVES PRINCIPLE.

No man ever doubted that the commodity of tea could bear an imposition of three-pence. But no commodity will bear three-pence, or will bear a penny, when the general feelings of men are irritated, and two million people are resolved not to pay. The feelings of the colonies were formerly the feelings of Great Britain. Theirs were formerly the feelings of Mr. Hampden when called upon for the payment of twenty shillings. Would twenty shillings have ruined Mr. Hampden's fortune? No! but the payment of half twenty shillings, on the principle that it was *demande*d, would have made him a slave.

GOOD MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT.

To be a good member of parliament is, let me tell you, no easy task — especially at this time, when there is so strong a disposition to run into the perilous extremes of servile compliance or wild popularity. To unite circumspection with vigour is absolutely necessary; but it is extremely difficult. We are now members for a rich commercial *city*; this city, however, is but a part of a rich commercial *nation*, the interests of which are various, multiform, and intricate. We are members for that great nation which, however, is itself but part of a great *empire*, extended by our virtue and our fortune to the farthest limits of the east and of the west. All these wide-spread interests must be considered; must be compared; must be reconciled if possible. We are members for a *free* country; and surely we all know that the machine of a free constitution is no simple thing; but it is as intricate and as delicate as it is valuable. We are members in a great and ancient *monarchy*; and we must preserve religiously the true legal rights of the sovereign, which form the key-stone that binds together the noble and well-constructed arch of our empire and our constitution.

FISHERIES OF NEW ENGLAND.

As to the wealth which the colonies have drawn from the sea by their fisheries, you had all that matter fully opened at your bar. You surely thought those acquisitions of value, for they seemed even to excite your *envy*. And yet the spirit by which that enterprising employment has been exercised should rather, in my opinion, have *raised your esteem and admiration*.

And pray, Sir, what in the world is equal to it! Pass by the other parts, and look at the manner in which the people of New England have of late carried on the whale fishery. While we follow them among the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits, while we are looking for them beneath the arctic circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen serpent of the south. Falkland Island, which seemed too remote and romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting-place in the progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to them, than the accumulated winter of both the poles. We know that while some of them draw the line and strike the harpoon on the coast of Africa, others run the longitude, and pursue their gigantic game along the coast of Brazil. There is no sea that is not vexed by their fisheries, no climate that is not witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise, ever carried this most perilous mode of hard industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this recent people — a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood.

PREPARATION FOR PARLIAMENT.

When I first devoted myself to the public service, I considered how I should render myself fit for it; and this I did by endeavouring to discover what it was that gave this country the rank it holds in the world. I found that our prosperity and dignity arose principally, if not solely, from two sources — our *constitution* and *commerce*. Both of these I have spared no study to understand, and no endeavour to support.

The distinguishing part of our constitution is its *liberty*. To preserve that liberty inviolate, seems the particular duty and proper trust of a member of the House of Commons. But the liberty, the only liberty I mean, is a liberty connected with order — that not only exists along with order and virtue, but which cannot exist at all without them. It inheres in good and steady government, as in its substance and vital principle.

The other source of our power is *commerce*, of which you are so large a part, and which cannot exist, no more than your liberty, without a connection with many virtues. It has ever been a very particular and a very favourite object of my study, in its principles and in its details. I think many here are acquainted with the truth of what I say. This I know, that I have ever had my house open, and my poor services ready, for traders and manufacturers of every denomination. My favourite ambition is to have those services acknowledged. I now appear before you to test whether my earnest endeavours have been so wholly oppressed by the weakness of my abilities, as to be rendered insignificant in the eyes of a great trading city; or whether you choose to give weight to my humble abilities, for the sake of the honest exertions with which they are accompanied. This is my trial today. My industry is not on trial. Of my industry I am sure, as far as my constitution of mind and body admitted.

LORD BATHURST AND AMERICA'S FUTURE.

Let us, however, before we descend from this noble eminence, reflect that this growth of our national prosperity has happened within the short period of the life of man. It has happened

within sixty-eight years. There are those alive whose memory might touch the two extremities. For instance, my Lord Bathurst might remember all the stages of the progress. He was, in 1704, of an age at least to be made to comprehend such things. He was then old enough "*acta parentum jam legere, et quae sit poterit cognoscere virtus*" (to read the records of his parents, and know what virtue is). Suppose, Sir, that the angel of this auspicious youth, foreseeing the many virtues which made him one of the most amiable, as he is one of the most fortunate men of his age, had opened to him a vision that when, in the fourth generation, the third prince of the house of Brunswick had sat twelve years on the throne of that nation which was to be made Great Britain (by the happy issue of moderate and healing councils), he would see his son, Lord Chancellor of England, turn back the current of hereditary dignity to its fountain, and raise him to a higher rank of peerage, while he enriched the family with a new one. If amidst these bright and happy scenes of domestic honour and prosperity, that angel had drawn up the curtain and unfolded the rising glories of his country, and while he was gazing with admiration on the then commercial grandeur of England, the genius should point out to him a little speck, scarcely visible in the mass of the national interest, a small seminal *principle*, rather than a formed *body*, and had told him —

"Young man, *there* is America — which at this day serves for little more than to amuse you with stories of savage men and uncouth manners. Yet, before you taste death, it shall show itself equal to the whole of that commerce which now attracts the envy of the world. Whatever England has been growing to — by a progressive increase of improvement brought in by varieties of people, by a succession of civilizing conquests and civilizing settlements, in a series of seventeen hundred years — you shall see as much added to her by America in the course of a single life!"

If this state of his country had been foretold to him, would it not require all the sanguine credulity of youth, and all the fervid glow of enthusiasm, to make him believe it? Fortunate man, he has lived to see it! Fortunate, indeed, if he lives to see nothing that shall vary the prospect, and cloud the setting of his day!

CANDID POLICY.

Refined policy has ever been the parent of confusion; and it ever will be so, as long as the world endures. Plain good intention, which is as easily discovered at the first view, as fraud is surely detected at last, is (let me say) of no mean force in the government of mankind. Genuine simplicity of heart is a healing and cementing principle. My plan, therefore, being formed upon the simplest grounds imaginable, may disappoint some people when they hear it. It has nothing to recommend it to the pruriency (itching) of curious ears. There is nothing at all new and captivating in it. It has nothing of the splendour of the project which has been lately laid upon your table by the noble lord in the blue riband. It does not propose to fill your lobby with squabbling colony agents, who will require the interposition of your mace at every instant, to keep the peace among them. It does not institute a magnificent auction of finance, where captivated provinces come to general ransom by bidding against each other, until you knock down the hammer, and determine a proportion of payments beyond all the powers of algebra to equalize and settle.

WISDOM OF CONCESSION.

Peace implies reconciliation; and where there has been a material dispute, reconciliation, in a manner, always implies *concession* on the one part or the other. In this state of things, I have no difficulty in affirming that the proposal ought to originate from *us*. Great and acknowledged force is not impaired, either in effect or in opinion, by an unwillingness to exert itself. The superior power may offer peace with honour and with safety. Such an offer from such a power will be attributed to magnanimity. But the concessions of the *weak* are the concessions of *fear*. When such a one is disarmed, he is wholly at the mercy of his superior; and he loses forever that time and those chances which, as they happen to all men, are the strength and resources of all inferior power.

MAGNANIMITY.

As for the trifling petulance which the rage of party stirs up in little minds, though it should show itself even in this court, it has not made the slightest impression on me. The highest flight of such clamorous birds is winged in an inferior region of the air. We hear them, and we look upon them, just as you gentlemen, when you enjoy the serene air on your lofty rocks, look down upon the gulls that skim the mud of your river when it is exhausted of its tide.

DUTY OF REPRESENTATIVES.

It ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business unremitting attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions to theirs; and above all, ever, and in *all* cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But he ought not to sacrifice his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, to you, to any man, or to any *set* of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you not only his industry, but his judgment; and if he sacrifices it to your opinion, he *betrays*, instead of *servng* you,.

PRUDENTIAL SILENCE.

Though I gave so far into his opinion, that I immediately threw my thoughts into a sort of parliamentary form, I was by no means equally ready to produce them. It generally argues some degree of natural impotence of mind, or some lack of knowledge of the world, to hazard plans of government except from a seat of authority. Propositions are made not only ineffectually, but somewhat disreputably, when the minds of men are not properly disposed for their reception. And for my part, I am not ambitious of ridicule; not absolutely a candidate for disgrace.

COLONIAL TIES.

They are “our children;” but when children ask for bread, we are not to give a stone. ^{Mat 7.9} Is it because the natural resistance of things, and the various mutations of time, hinders our government, or any scheme of government, from being any more than a sort of approximation to the right? Is it therefore that the colonies are to recede from it infinitely? When this child of ours wishes to assimilate to its parent, and to reflect with a true filial resemblance the beautiful countenance of British liberty, are we to turn to them the shameful parts of our constitution? Are we to give them our weakness for their strength? Our opprobrium for their glory? And the slough of slavery, which we are not able to work off, to serve them for their freedom?

GOVERNMENT AND LEGISLATION.

If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination. And what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?

PARLIAMENT.

Parliament is not a *congress* of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates. Rather, parliament is a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest — that of the whole — where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of *parliament*.

MORAL LEVELLERS.

This moral levelling is a *servile principle*. It leads to practical passive obedience far better than all the doctrines which the pliant accommodation of theology to power has ever produced. It cuts up by the roots, not only all idea of forcible resistance, but even of civil opposition. It disposes men to an abject submission, not by opinion — which may be shaken by argument or altered by passion — but by the strong ties of public and private interest. For if all men who act in a public situation are equally selfish, corrupt, and venal, what reason can be given for desiring any sort of change which, besides the evils which must attend all changes, can be productive of no possible advantage? The active men in the state are true samples of the mass. If they are universally depraved, the commonwealth itself is not sound. We may amuse ourselves with talking as much as we please of the virtue of middle or humble life; that is, we may place our confidence in the virtue of those who have never been tried. But if the persons who are continually emerging out of that sphere are no better than those whom birth has placed above it, what hopes are there in the remainder of the body, which is to furnish the perpetual succession of the state? All who have ever written on

government are unanimous, that *among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot long exist*. And indeed, how is it possible when those who are to make the laws, to guard, to enforce, or to obey them, are by a tacit confederacy of manners, indisposed to the spirit of all generous and noble institutions?

PUBLIC SALARY AND PATRIOTIC SERVICE.

I am not possessed of an exact common measure between real service and its reward. I am very sure that states do sometimes receive services which it is hardly in their power to reward according to their worth. If I were to give my judgment with regard to this country, I do not think the great efficient offices of the state are overpaid. The service of the public is a thing which cannot be put to auction, and struck down to those who will agree to execute it the cheapest. When the proportion between reward and service is our object, we must always consider of what nature the service is, and what sort of men they are that must perform it. What is just payment for one kind of labour, and full encouragement for one kind of talents, is fraud and discouragement to others. Many of the great offices have much duty to do, and much expense of representation to maintain. A secretary of state, for instance, must not appear sordid in the eyes of the ministers of other nations; neither should our ministers abroad appear contemptible in the courts where they reside. In all offices of duty there is, almost necessarily, a great neglect of all domestic affairs. A person in high office can rarely take a view of his family house. If he sees that the state takes no detriment, the state must see that his affairs should take as little. I will even go so far as to affirm that if men were willing to serve in such situations without salary, they should not be permitted to do it. Ordinary service must be secured by the motives to ordinary integrity. I do not hesitate to say that that state which lays its foundations in rare and heroic virtues, will be sure to have its superstructure in the basest profligacy and corruption. An honourable and fair profit is the best security against avarice and rapacity; as in all other things, a lawful and regulated enjoyment is the best security against debauchery and excess. For as wealth is power, so all power will infallibly draw wealth to itself by some means or other. And when men are left no way of ascertaining their profits but by their means of obtaining them, those means will be increased to infinity. This is true in all the parts of administration, as well as in the whole. If any individual were to decline his appointments, it might give an unfair advantage to ostentatious ambition over unpretending service; it might breed invidious comparisons; it might tend to destroy whatever little unity and agreement may be found among ministers. And, after all, when an ambitious man had run down his competitors by a fallacious show of disinterestedness, and fixed himself in power by that means, what security is there that he would not change his course, and claim as an indemnity ten times more than he has given up?

RATIONAL LIBERTY.

Liberty, too, must be limited in order to be possessed. The degree of restraint in any case is impossible to settle precisely. But it ought to be the constant aim of every wise public council to find out by cautious experiments, and rational, cool endeavours, with how little, not how much of this restraint the community can subsist. For liberty is a good to be improved, and not an evil to be lessened. It is not only a private blessing of the first order,

but the vital spring and energy of the state itself, which has just so much life and vigour as there is liberty in it. But whether liberty is advantageous or not (for I know it is a fashion to decry the very principle), none will dispute that peace is a blessing; and peace must, in the course of human affairs, be frequently bought by at least some indulgence and toleration to liberty. For just as the sabbath (though of Divine institution) was made for man, not man for the sabbath, ^{Mar 2.27} government, which can claim no higher origin or authority (in its exercise at least), ought to conform to the exigencies of the time, and to the temper and character of the people with whom it is concerned — and not always attempt to violently bend the people to their theories of subjection. The bulk of mankind, on their part, are not excessively curious concerning any theories while they are really happy; and one sure symptom of an ill-conducted state, is the propensity of the people to resort to them.

IRELAND AND THE MAGNA CHARTA.

The feudal baronage and the feudal knighthood, the roots of our primitive constitution, were early transplanted into that soil, and grew and flourished there. Magna Charta, if it did not give us originally the House of Commons, gave us at least a house of commons of weight and consequence. But your ancestors did not churlishly sit down alone to the feast of Magna Charta. Ireland was made immediately a partaker. This benefit of English laws and liberties, I confess, was not at first extended to *all* Ireland. Mark the consequence. English authority and English liberty had exactly the same boundaries. Your standard could never be advanced an inch beyond your privileges. Sir John Davis shows, beyond a doubt, that the refusal of a general communication of these rights was the true cause why Ireland was five hundred years in subduing. And after the vain projects of a military government attempted in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, it was soon discovered that nothing could make that country English in civility and allegiance, except *your* laws and *your* forms of legislature. It was not English arms, but the English constitution that conquered Ireland. From that time, Ireland has ever had a *general* parliament, as she had before a *partial* parliament. You changed the people; you altered the religion; but you never touched the form or the vital substance of free government in that kingdom. You deposed kings; you restored them; you altered the succession to theirs, as well as to your own crown; but you never altered their constitution, the principle of which was respected by usurpation; restored with the restoration of monarchy, and established, I trust forever, by the glorious Revolution.

COLONIES AND BRITISH CONSTITUTION.

For that service — for *all* service, whether of revenue, trade, or empire — my trust is in her interest in the British constitution. My hold of the colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection. These are ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let the colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your government — they will cling and grapple to you; and no force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance. But let it be once understood that *your government* may be one thing, and *their privileges* another — that these two things may exist without any mutual relation — and the cement is gone; the cohesion is loosened; and everything hastens to decay and dissolution. As long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country

as *the sanctuary of liberty*, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, then wherever the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn their faces towards you. The more they multiply, the more friends you will have; the more ardently they love liberty, the more perfect will be their obedience.

Slavery they can have anywhere. It is a weed that grows in every soil. They may have it from Spain, they may have it from Prussia. But until you become lost to all feeling of your true interest and your natural dignity, they can have freedom from none but you. *This* is the commodity of price, of which you have the monopoly. This is the true act of navigation which binds to you the commerce of the colonies, and through them secures to you the wealth of the world. Deny them this participation of freedom, and you break that sole bond which originally *made* and must still *preserve* the unity of the empire. Do not entertain so weak an imagination, as that your registers and your bonds, your affidavits and your sufferances, your cockets ²² and your clearances, are what form the great securities of your commerce. Do not dream that your letters of office, and your instructions, and your suspending clauses, are the things that hold together the great contexture of this mysterious whole. These things do not make your government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the English *communion* that gives all their life and efficacy to them. It is the spirit of the English *constitution* which, infused through the mighty mass, pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the empire, even down to the minutest member.

RECIPROCAL CONFIDENCE.

At the first fatal opening of this contest [*the Am. Revolution*], the wisest course seemed to be to put an end as soon as possible to the immediate causes of the dispute — and to quiet a discussion not easily settled upon clear principles, and arising from claims which pride would permit neither party to abandon — by resorting as nearly as possible to the old, successful course. A mere repeal of the obnoxious tax, with a declaration of the legislative authority of this kingdom, was then fully sufficient to procure peace to *both sides*. Man is a creature of habit, and the first breach being of very short continuance, the colonies fell back exactly into their ancient state. The congress has used an expression with regard to this pacification, which appears to me truly significant. After the repeal of the Stamp Act, “the colonies fell,” says this assembly, “into their ancient state of *unsuspecting confidence in the mother country*.” This unsuspecting confidence is the true centre of gravity among mankind, about which all the parts are at rest. It is this *unsuspecting confidence* that removes all difficulties, and reconciles all the contradictions which occur in the complexity of all ancient, puzzled, political establishments. Happy are the rulers which have the secret of preserving it!

PENSIONS AND THE CROWN.

When men receive obligations from the Crown, through the pious hands of fathers, or of connections as venerable as the paternal, the dependencies which arise from thence are the

²² A certificate warranting a merchant's goods were duly entered through customs, and all duties paid. — WHG

obligations of gratitude, and not the fetters of servility. Such ties originate in virtue, and they promote it. They continue men in those habitudes of friendship, those political connections, and those political principles, in which they began life. They are antidotes against a corrupt levity, instead of the causes of it. What an unseemly spectacle it would afford, what a disgrace it would be to the commonwealth that allowed such things, to see the hopeful son of a meritorious minister begging his bread at the door of that treasury from where his father dispensed the economy of an empire, and promoted the happiness and glory of his country! Why should he be obliged to prostrate his honour, and to submit his principles at the levee of some proud favourite, shouldered and thrust aside by every impudent pretender, on the very spot where a few days before he saw himself adored? — obliged to cringe to the author of the calamities of his house, and to kiss the hands that are red with his father's blood.

COLONIAL PROGRESS.

But nothing in progression can rest on its original plan. We may as well think of rocking a grown man in the cradle of an infant. Therefore, as the colonies prospered and increased to a numerous and mighty people, spreading over a very great tract of the globe, it was natural that they should attribute to assemblies — so respectable in their formal constitution — some part of the dignity of the great nations which they represented. No longer tied to by-laws, these assemblies made acts of all sorts, and in all cases whatsoever. They levied money, not for parochial purposes, but upon regular grants to the Crown, following all the rules and principles of a parliament to which they approached every day more and more nearly. Those who think themselves wiser than Providence, and stronger than the course of nature, may complain of all this variation, on the one side or the other, as their several inclinations and prejudices may lead them. But things could not be otherwise; and English colonies must be had on these terms, or not had at all.

FEUDAL PRINCIPLES AND MODERN TIMES.

In the first place, it is formed, in many respects, upon *feudal principles*. In the feudal times, it was not uncommon, even among subjects, for the lowest offices to be held by considerable persons — persons as unfit by their incapacity, as improper from their rank — to occupy such employments. They were held by patent, sometimes for life, and sometimes by inheritance. If my memory does not deceive me, a person of no slight consideration held the office of patent hereditary cook to an earl of Warwick. The earl of Warwick's soups, I fear, were not better for the dignity of his kitchen. I think it was an earl of Gloucester who officiated as steward of the household to the archbishops of Canterbury. Instances of the same kind may in some degree be found in the Northumberland house-book, and other family records. There was some reason in ancient necessities, for these ancient customs. Protection was wanted; and the domestic tie, not thought to be the highest, was yet the closest. The king's household has not only several strong traces of this *feudality*, but it is also formed upon the principles of a *body corporate*: it has its own magistrates, courts, and by-laws. This might be necessary in ancient times, in order to have a government within itself, capable of regulating the vast and often unruly multitude which composed and attended it. This was the origin of the ancient court called the *green cloth* — composed of

the marshal, treasurer, and other great officers of the household, with certain clerks. The rich subjects of the kingdom who formerly had the same establishments (only on a reduced scale) have since altered their economy. They have turned the course of their expense from the maintenance of vast establishments within their walls, to the employment of a great variety of independent trades abroad. Their influence is lessened; but a mode of accommodation, and a style of splendour, suited to the manners of the times, has been increased. Royalty itself has insensibly followed, and the royal household has been carried away by the resistless tide of manners — but with this very material difference: private men have gotten rid of the establishments along with the reasons for them — whereas, the royal household has lost all that was stately and venerable in the antique manners, without retrenching anything of the cumbrous charge of a Gothic establishment. It has shrunk into the polished littleness of modern elegance and personal accommodation. It has evaporated from the gross concrete, into an essence and rectified spirit of expense, where you have tuns²³ of ancient pomp in a vial of modern luxury.

RESTRICTIVE VIRTUES.

I know that all parsimony (stinginess) is of a quality approaching unkindness; and that (on some person or other) every reform must operate as a sort of punishment. Indeed, the whole class of the severe and restrictive virtues are at a market value almost too high for humanity. What is worse, there are very few of those virtues which are not capable of being imitated and even outdone in many of their most striking effects, by the worst of vices. Malignity and envy will carve much more deeply and finish much more sharply in the work of retrenchment,²⁴ than frugality and providence will do. I do not, therefore, wonder that gentlemen have kept away from such a task, from good-nature as well as from prudence. Private feeling might, indeed, be overborne by legislative reason. And a man of a long-sighted and a strong-nerved humanity might bring himself, not so much to consider *from whom* he takes a superfluous enjoyment, as *for whom* in the end he may preserve the absolute necessities of life.

LIBELLERS OF HUMAN NATURE.

I hope none of you are corrupted with the doctrine taught by wicked men for the worst purposes, and received by the malignant credulity of envy and ignorance, which is this: that the men who act upon the public stage are all alike; all equally corrupt; all influenced by no other views than the sordid lure of salary and pension. This thing I know by experience to be false. Never expecting to find perfection in men, and not looking for divine attributes in created beings, in my commerce with my contemporaries, I have found much human virtue. I have seen not a little public spirit; a real subordination of interest to duty; and a decent and regulated sensibility to honest fame and reputation. The age unquestionably produces (whether in a greater or lesser number than former times, I know not) daring profligates, and insidious hypocrites. What then? Am I not to avail myself of whatever good is to be

²³ *Tun*: a large barrel or cask capable of holding 252 gallons. — WHG

²⁴ *Retrenchment*: The reduction of expenditures in order to become financially stable. — WHG

found in the world, because of the mixture of evil that will always be in it? The smallness of the quantity in currency only heightens the value. Those who raise suspicions on good men, on account of the behaviour of bad men, are of the *party* of the latter. The common cant is no justification for taking this party. I have been deceived, they say, by Titius and Maevius;²⁵ I have been the dupe of this pretender, or of that mountebank,²⁶ and I can trust appearances no longer. But my credulity and lack of discernment cannot, as I conceive, amount to a fair presumption against any man's integrity. A conscientious person would rather doubt his own judgment, than condemn his species. He would say, I have observed without attention, or judged upon erroneous maxims; I trusted to *profession* when I should have attended to *conduct*. Such a man will grow wise, not malignant, by his acquaintance with the world. But whoever accuses *all* mankind of corruption, ought to remember that he is sure to convict only *one*. In truth, I would much rather admit those whom I have disrelished the most at any time, to be patterns of perfection, than to seek consolation as to my own unworthiness, in a general communion of depravity with all about me.

REFUSAL IS A REVENUE.

“What (says the financier) is *peace* to us without *money*? Your plan gives us no revenue.” No! But it does — for it secures to the subject, the power of *refusal*, the first of all revenues. Experience is a cheat, and fact is a liar, if this power in the subject of proportioning his grant (or of not granting it at all) has not been found the richest mine of revenue ever discovered by the skill or fortune of man. It does not indeed vote you 152,752 pounds : 11 : 2 ³/₄, nor any other paltry limited sum. But it gives you the strong box itself, the fund, the bank, from whence only revenues can arise among a people who are sensible of freedom: *Posita luditur arca* (the box is played). Can you not *in England*; can you not *at this time of day*; can you not, *a House of Commons*, trust to the principle which has raised so mighty a revenue, and accumulated a debt of nearly 140 million in this country? Is this principle to be true in England, and false everywhere else? Is it not true in Ireland? Has it not till now been true in the colonies? Why should you presume that in any country, a body duly constituted for any function, will neglect to perform its duty and abdicate its trust? Such a presumption would go against all governments in all modes. But in truth, this dread of penury of supply, from a free assembly, has no foundation in nature. For first observe that, besides the desire which all men naturally have of supporting the honour of their own government, that sense of dignity, and that security for property, which ever attend freedom, have a tendency to increase the stock of the free community. Most may be taken where most is accumulated. And what is the soil or climate where experience has not uniformly proved that the voluntary flow of heaped-up plenty, bursting from the weight of its own rich luxuriance, has ever run with a more copious stream of revenue than could be squeezed from the dry husks of oppressed indigence, by the straining of all the politic machinery in the world.²⁷

²⁵ Marcus *Titius* was a follower of Mark Antony, and involved in his intrigues. *Maevius* was a poet at Rome; his ardent followers claimed he was a better poet than Virgil or Horace. Thus party, bias, and loyalty are linked. – WHG

²⁶ *Mountebank*: A flamboyant deceiver; one who attracts customers with tricks or jokes. – WHG

²⁷ *Politic* (as distinct from political): Marked by artful prudence, expedience, and shrewdness. – WHG

A PARTY MAN.

The only method which has ever been found effectual to preserve any man against the corruption of nature and example, is a habit of life and communication of counsels with the most virtuous and public-spirited men of the age you live in. Such a society cannot be kept without advantage, nor deserted without shame. For this rule of conduct, I may be called in reproach a *party man*; but I am little affected with such aspersions. In the way which they call *party*, I worship the constitution of your fathers; and I shall never blush for my political company. All reverence to honour, all idea of what it is, will be lost out of the world before it can be imputed as a fault to any man, that he has been closely connected with those incomparable persons, living and dead, with whom for eleven years I have constantly thought and acted. If I have wandered out of the paths of rectitude into those of interested faction, it was in company with the Saviles, the Dowdeswells, the Wentworths, the Bentincks; with the Lenoxes, the Manchesters, the Keppels, the Saunderses; with the temperate, permanent, hereditary virtue of the whole house of Cavendish — names among which some have extended your fame and empire in arms; and all have fought the battle of your liberties in fields not less glorious. These and many more like these, grafting public principles on private honour, have redeemed the present age. and would have adorned the most splendid period in your history.

PATRIOTISM AND PUBLIC INCOME.

Is it not the same virtue which does everything for us here in England? Do you imagine, then, that it is the land-tax which raises your revenue? that it is the annual vote in the committee of supply, which gives you your army? or that it is the Mutiny Bill, which inspires it with bravery and discipline? No! surely no! It is the love of the people; it is their attachment to their government, from the sense of the deep stake they have in such a glorious institution, which gives you your army and your navy, and infuses into both that liberal obedience without which your army would be a base rabble, and your navy nothing but rotten timber.

All this, I know well enough, will sound wild and chimerical to the profane herd of those vulgar and mechanical politicians who have no place among us — a sort of people who think that nothing exists but what is gross and material; and who therefore, far from being qualified to be directors of the great movement of empire, are not fit to turn a wheel in the machine. But to men truly initiated and rightly taught, these ruling and master principles which, in the opinion of such men as I have mentioned, have no substantial existence, are in truth *everything*, and *all in all*. Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom; and a great empire and little minds go ill together. If we are conscious of our situation, and glow with zeal to fill our places as becomes our station and ourselves, we ought to auspicate all our public proceedings on America, with the old warning of the Church, *Sursum corda!* (lift up your hearts!) We ought to elevate our minds to the greatness of that trust to which the order of Providence has called us. By adverting to the dignity of this high calling, our ancestors have turned a savage wilderness into a glorious empire. And they have made the most extensive, and the only honourable conquests, not by destroying, but by promoting the wealth, the number, and the happiness of the human race. Let us get an American revenue

as we have gotten an American empire. English privileges have made it all that it is; English privileges alone will make it all that it can be.

AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM.

If anything were lacking to this necessary operation of the form of government, religion would have given it a complete effect. Religion, always a principle of energy, is in no way worn out or impaired in this new people. And their mode of professing it is also one main cause of this free spirit. The people are *Protestants*; and of that kind which is the most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion. This is a persuasion not only *favourable* to liberty, but *built* upon it. I do not think, Sir, that the reason for this averseness in the dissenting churches, from all that looks like absolute government, is so much to be sought in their religious tenets, as in their history. Every one knows that the Roman Catholic religion is at least coeval with most of the governments where it prevails; that it has generally gone hand in hand with them, and received great favour and every kind of support from authority. The Church of England, too, was formed from her cradle, under the nursing care of regular government. But the dissenting interests have sprung up in direct opposition to all the ordinary powers of the world; and could justify that opposition only on a strong claim to natural liberty. Their very existence depended on the powerful and unremitted assertion of that claim. All Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most prevalent in our northern colonies is a refinement on the principle of resistance; it is the dissidence of dissent, and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion.

RIGHT OF TAXATION.

I am resolved this day to have nothing at all to do with the question of the right of taxation. Some gentlemen startle, but it is true; I put it totally out of the question. It is less than nothing in my consideration. I do not indeed wonder, nor will you, Sir, that gentlemen of profound learning are fond of displaying it on this profound subject. But my consideration is narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the policy of the question. I do not examine whether giving away a man's money is a power excepted and reserved out of the general trust of government; and how far all mankind, in all forms of polity, are entitled to an exercise of that right by the charter of nature. Or whether, on the contrary, a right of taxation is necessarily involved in the general principle of legislation, and inseparable from the ordinary supreme power. These are deep questions where great names militate against each other; where reason is perplexed, and an appeal to authorities only thickens the confusion. For high and reverend authorities lift up their heads on both sides; and there is no sure footing in the middle.

This point is the "great Serbonian bog, between damiata and mount casius old, where armies whole have sunk." ²⁸ I do not intend to be overwhelmed in that bog, though in such

²⁸ Milton, *Paradise Lost*, book 2, 592-594. – WHG

respectable company. The question with me is not whether you have a right to render your people *miserable*, but whether it is not your interest to make them *happy*. It is not what a lawyer tells me I *may* do; but what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I *ought* to do. Is a politic act the worse for being a generous one? Is no concession proper but that which is made from your want of right to keep what you grant? Or does it lessen the grace or dignity of relaxing in the exercise of an odious claim, because you have your evidence-room full of titles, and your magazines stuffed with arms to enforce them? What do all those titles, and all those arms signify? Of what avail are they when the reason of the thing tells me that the assertion of my title is the loss of my suit; and that I could do nothing but wound myself by the use of my own weapons?

CONTRACTED VIEWS.

It is exceedingly common for men to contract their love for their country into an attachment to its petty subdivisions; they sometimes even cling to their provincial abuses as if they were franchises and local privileges. Accordingly, in places where there is much of this kind of estate, persons will be always found who would rather trust to their talents in recommending themselves to power for the renewal of their interests, than to encumber their purses, however lightly, in order to transmit independence to their posterity. It is a great mistake that the desire to secure property is universal among mankind. Gaming is a principle inherent in human nature. It belongs to us all. I would therefore break those tables; I would furnish no evil occupation for that spirit. I would make every man look everywhere, except to the intrigue of a court, for the improvement of his circumstances, or the security of his fortune.

ASSIMILATING POWER OF CONTACT.

I am sure that the only means of checking precipitate degeneracy is to heartily concur with whatever is the best in our time; and to have some more correct standard of judging what that best is, than the transient and uncertain favour of a court. If once we are able to find, and can prevail upon ourselves to strengthen, a union of such men, whatever accidentally becomes indisposed to ill-exercised power — even by the ordinary operation of human passions — must join with that society, and cannot long be joined without assimilating to it in some degree. Virtue will catch as well as vice, by *contact*; and the public stock of honest, manly principle will daily accumulate. We are not to scrutinize motives too carefully, as long as the action is irreproachable. It is enough (and for a worthy man perhaps too much) to deal out its infamy to convicted guilt and declared apostacy.

PRUDENCE OF TIMELY REFORM.

But there is a time when men will not suffer bad things, because their ancestors have suffered worse. There is a time when the hoary head of inveterate abuse will neither draw reverence nor obtain protection. If the noble lord in the blue riband pleads “not guilty” to the charges brought against the present system of public economy, it is not possible to give a fair verdict by which he will not stand acquitted. But pleading is not our present business. His plea or his traverse may be allowed as an answer to a charge, when a charge is made.

But if he puts himself in the way to obstruct reformation, then the faults of his office instantly become his own. Instead of a public officer in an abusive department, whose province is an object to be regulated, he becomes a criminal who is to be punished. I do most seriously put it to administration, to consider the wisdom of a timely reform. Early reformations are amicable arrangements with a friend in power; late reformations are terms imposed upon a conquered enemy. Early reformations are made in cool blood; late reformations are made under a state of inflammation. In that state of things, people behold in government nothing that is respectable. They see the abuse, and they will see nothing else. They fall into the temper of a furious populace, provoked at the disorder of a house of ill-fame. They never attempt to correct or regulate; instead, they go to work by the shortest way — they abate the nuisance, they pull down the house.

DIFFICULTIES OF REFORMERS.

Nothing, you know, is more common than for men to wish, and call loudly too, for a reformation, who when it arrives, by no means like the severity of its aspect. Reformation is one of those pieces which must be put at some distance in order to please. Its greatest favourers love it better in the abstract than in the substance. When any old prejudice of their own, or any interest that they value, is touched, they become scrupulous; they become captious; and every man has his separate exception. Some pluck out the black hairs, some the gray; one point must be given up to one; another point must be yielded to another; nothing is suffered to prevail upon its own principle. The whole is so frittered down and disjointed, that scarcely a trace of the original scheme remains! Thus, between the resistance of power, and the unsystematic process of popularity, the undertaker and the undertaking are both exposed, and the poor reformer is hissed off the stage both by friends and foes.

PHILOSOPHY OF COMMERCE.

If honesty is true policy with regard to the transient interest of individuals, it is certainly much more so with regard to the permanent interests of communities. I know that it is only too natural for us to see our own *certain ruin*, in the *possible prosperity* of other people. It is hard to persuade us that everything which is *gotten* by another is not *taken* from ourselves. But it is fitting that we should get the better of these suggestions which come from what is not the best and soundest part of our nature, and that we should form ourselves to a way of thinking that is more rational, more just, and more religious. Trade is not a limited thing, as if the objects of mutual demand and consumption could not stretch beyond the bounds of our jealousies. God has given the earth to the children of men, and he has undoubtedly, in giving it to them, given them what is abundantly sufficient for all their exigencies — not a scanty, but a most liberal provision for them all. The author of our nature has written it strongly in that nature, and he has promulgated the same law in his written word, that man shall eat his bread by his labour. And I am persuaded that no man, and no combination of men, for their own ideas of their particular profit can, without great impiety, undertake to say that he *shall not* do so: they have no sort of right either to prevent the labour, or to withhold the bread.

THEORIZING POLITICIANS.

There are people who have split and anatomised the doctrine of free government, as if it were an abstract question concerning metaphysical liberty and necessity; and not a matter of moral prudence and natural feeling. They have disputed whether liberty is a positive or a negative idea; whether it does not consist in being governed by laws, without considering what are the laws or who are the makers; whether man has any rights by nature; and whether all the property he enjoys is not the alms of his government, and his life itself their favour and indulgence. *Others*, corrupting religion as *these* have perverted philosophy, contend that Christians are redeemed into captivity; and the blood of the Saviour of mankind has been shed to make them the slaves of a few proud and insolent sinners. By these shocking extremes, provoking to extremes of another kind, speculations are let loose as destructive to all authority, as the former are to all freedom. And every government is called *tyranny* and *usurpation*, which is not formed on their fancies. In this manner, the stirrers-up of this contention, not satisfied with distracting our dependencies and filling them with blood and slaughter, are corrupting our understandings. They are endeavouring to tear up, along with practical liberty, all the foundations of human society, all equity and justice, religion, and order.²⁹

ECONOMY AND PUBLIC SPIRIT.

Economy and public spirit have made a beneficent and an honest spoil. They have plundered from extravagance and luxury, for the use of substantial service, a revenue of nearly four hundred thousand pounds. The reform of the finances, joined to this reform of the court, gives to the public nine hundred thousand pounds a year and upwards.

The minister who does these things is a great man — but the king who desires that they should be done is a far greater. We must do justice to our enemies — these are the acts of a patriot king. I am not in dread of the vast armies of France; I am not in dread of the gallant spirit of its brave and numerous nobility; I am not alarmed even at the great navy which has been so miraculously created. All these things Louis the Fourteenth had before. With all these things, the French monarchy has more than once fallen prostrate at the feet of the public faith of Great Britain. It was the lack of public credit which disabled France from recovering after her defeats, or recovering even from her victories and triumphs. It was a prodigal court, it was an ill-ordered revenue, that sapped the foundations of all her greatness. *Credit cannot exist under the arm of necessity*. Necessity strikes at credit, I allow, with a heavier and quicker blow under an arbitrary monarchy, than under a limited and balanced government. But still, necessity and credit are natural enemies, and cannot be

²⁹ Edmund Burke wrote this at the end of the 18th century, when the Enlightenment was at its peak. In 1843, as Hegel and Marx were gaining a following among the working class, John Buchanan preached this warning:

“There is a class of men calling themselves *socialists*. They maintain that the three cardinal *evils* of society in modern times, are – (1) the *belief in a God*, (2) the *institution of marriage*, and (3) the *right of private property*. They propose to abolish and sweep them all away, in order to introduce a new social order – a *new moral world* – in which religion will be exchanged for Atheism, and marriage for indiscriminate license, and all personal rights for a community of goods.”

Burke’s many exhortations against abusing power, and of having a duty of care to *all*, had gone unheeded. – WHG

long reconciled in any situation. From necessity and corruption, a free state may lose the spirit of that complex constitution which is the foundation of confidence.

REFORM OUGHT TO BE PROGRESSIVE.

Whenever we improve, it is right to leave room for further improvement. It is right to consider, to look about us, to examine the *effect* of what we have done. Then we can proceed with confidence, because we can proceed with intelligence. Whereas in hot reformations, in what men (more zealous than considerate) call *making clear work*, the whole is generally so crude, so harsh, so indigested — mixed with so much imprudence, and so much injustice; so contrary to the whole course of human nature and human institutions — that the very people who are most eager for it, are among the first to grow disgusted at what they have done. Then some part of the abdicated grievance is recalled from its exile, in order to become a corrective of the correction. Then the *abuse* assumes all the credit and popularity of a *reform*. The very idea of purity and disinterestedness in politics falls into disrepute, and is considered a vision of hot and inexperienced men. And thus disorders become incurable, not by the virulence of their own quality, but by the unapt and violent nature of the remedies. Therefore, a great part of my idea of reform is meant to operate *gradually*; some benefits will come at a nearer, some at a more remote period. We must no more make haste to be rich by parsimony, than by intemperate acquisition.

CIVIL FREEDOM.

Civil freedom, gentlemen, is not, as many have endeavoured to persuade you, a thing that lies hidden in the depth of abstruse science. It is a blessing and a benefit, not an abstract speculation. And all the just reasoning that can be upon it, is of so coarse a texture as to perfectly suit the ordinary capacities of those who are to enjoy it, and of those who are to defend it. Far from any resemblance to those propositions in geometry and metaphysics — which allow for no medium, but must be true or false in all their latitude — social and civil freedom, like all other things in common life, are variously mixed and modified. They are enjoyed in very different degrees, and shaped into an infinite diversity of forms, according to the temper and circumstances of every community. The *extreme* of liberty (which is its abstract perfection, but its real fault) obtains nowhere, nor ought to obtain anywhere. Because extremes, as we all know, in every point which relates either to our duties or satisfactions in life, are destructive both to virtue and enjoyment.

TENDENCIES OF POWER.

When any community is subordinately connected with another, the great danger of the connection is the extreme pride and self-complacency of the superior, which in all matters of controversy will probably decide in its own favour. It is a powerful corrective to such a very rational cause of fear, if the inferior body can be made to believe that the party inclination (or political views) of several in the principal state, will induce them in some degree to counteract this blind and tyrannical partiality. There is no danger that anyone acquiring consideration or power in the presiding state should carry this leaning to the inferior too far. The fault of human nature is not of that sort. Power, in whatever hands, is

rarely guilty of too strict limitations on itself. But one great advantage to the support of authority attends such an amicable and protecting connection: that those who have conferred favours, obtain influence; and from the foresight of future events, they can persuade men who have received obligations, sometimes to return them. Thus, by the mediation of those healing principles (call them good or evil), troublesome discussions are brought to some sort of adjustment, and every hot controversy is not a civil war.

INDIVIDUAL GOOD AND PUBLIC BENEFIT.

The individual good felt in a public *benefit* is comparatively small, coming round through such an involved labyrinth of intricate and tedious revolutions. While a present, personal *detriment* is so heavy where it falls, and so instant in its operation, that the cold commendation of a public advantage never was, and never will be a match for the quick sensibility of a private loss. You may depend upon it, sir, that when many people have an interest in railing, sooner or later, they will bring a considerable degree of unpopularity upon any measure, So that, for the present at least, the *reformation* will operate against the reformers, and *revenge* (as against them at the least) will produce all the effects of corruption.

PUBLIC CORRUPTION.

Nor is it the worst effect of this unnatural contention, that our *laws* are corrupted. While *manners* remain entire, they will correct the vices of law, and soften it at length to their own temper. But we have to lament that in most of the late proceedings we see very few traces of that generosity, humanity, and dignity of mind which formerly characterized this nation. War suspends the rules of moral obligation, and what is long suspended is in danger of being totally abrogated. Civil wars strike deepest of all into the manners of the people. They vitiate their politics; they corrupt their morals; they pervert even the natural taste and relish of equity and justice. By teaching us to consider our fellow-citizens in a hostile light, the whole body of our nation becomes gradually less dear to us. The very names of *affection* and *kindred*, which were the bond of charity while we agreed, become new incentives to hatred and rage when the communion of our country is dissolved. We may flatter ourselves that we shall not fall into this misfortune. But we have no charter of exemption that I know of, from the ordinary frailties of our nature.

CRUELTY AND COWARDICE.

A conscientious man would be cautious how he dealt in blood. He would feel some apprehension at being called to a tremendous account for engaging in so deep a play, without any sort of knowledge of the game. It is no excuse for presumptuous ignorance, that it is directed by insolent passion. The poorest being that crawls on earth, contending to save itself from injustice and oppression, is an object respectable in the eyes of God and man. But I cannot conceive any existence under heaven (which in the depths of its wisdom, tolerates all sorts of things) that is more truly odious and disgusting, than an impotent helpless creature — without civil wisdom or military skill, without a consciousness of any other qualification for power but his servility to it, bloated with pride and arrogance — calling for

battles which he is not to fight, contending for a violent dominion which he can never exercise, and satisfied to be himself mean and miserable, in order to render others contemptible and wretched.

BAD LAWS PRODUCE BASE SUBSERVIENCY.

Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny. In such a country as this, of all bad things, they are the worst — worse by far than anywhere else. And they derive a particular malignity even from the wisdom and soundness of the rest of our institutions. For very obvious reasons you cannot trust the crown with a dispensing power over any of your laws. However, a government, however bad it may be, will in the exercise of a discretionary power, discriminate times and persons; it will not ordinarily pursue any man when its own safety is not concerned. But a *mercenary informer* knows no distinction. Under such a system, the obnoxious people ³⁰ are slaves not only to the government, but they live at the mercy of every individual. They are at once the slaves of the whole community, and of every part of it. And the worst and most unmerciful men, are those on whose goodness [these slaves] most depend.

In this situation, men not only shrink from the frowns of a stern magistrate, but they are obliged to fly from their very species. The seeds of destruction are sown in civil intercourse, in social habitudes. The blood of wholesome kindred is infected. Their tables and beds are surrounded with snares. All the means given by Providence to make life safe and comfortable, are perverted into instruments of terror and torment. This species of universal subserviency, that makes the very servant who waits behind your chair the arbiter of your life and fortune, has such a tendency to degrade and abase mankind, and to deprive them of that assured and liberal state of mind which alone can make us what we ought to be, that I vow to God I would sooner bring myself to put a man to immediate death for opinions I disliked, and so to get rid of the man and his opinions at once, than to fret him with a feverish being, tainted with the jail-distemper of a contagious servitude, to keep him *above ground* an animated mass of putrefaction — corrupted himself, and corrupting all about him.³¹

FALSE REGRET.

If we repent of our *good* actions, what, I pray you, is left for our *faults* and *follies*? What is to be lamented is not the beneficence of the laws, but the unnatural temper which beneficence can fret and sour. It is this temper which, by all rational means, ought to be sweetened and corrected. If froward men should refuse this cure, can they vitiate anything but themselves? Does evil so react upon good, as not only to retard its motion, but to change its nature? If it can so operate, then good men will always be in the power of the bad; and virtue, by a dreadful reversal of order, must lie under perpetual subjection and bondage to vice.

³⁰ *Obnoxious* here means objectionable, and thus vulnerable people, who are liable to unfair treatment. – WHG

³¹ In other words, better to kill a man for his opinions, than to turn him into a living corpse. – WHG

BRITISH DOMINION IN EAST INDIA.

With very few intervals, and those inconsiderable, the British dominion, either in the Company's name or in the names of princes who are absolutely dependent on the Company, extends from the mountains that separate India from Tartary to Cape Comorin — that is, one-and-twenty degrees of latitude!

In the northern parts it is a solid mass of land, about eight hundred miles in length, and four or five hundred broad. As you go southward, it becomes narrower for a space. It afterwards dilates; but narrower or broader, you possess the whole eastern and north-eastern coast of that vast country, quite from the borders of Pegu. Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, with Benares (now unfortunately in our immediate possession), measure 161,978 square English miles — a territory considerably larger than the whole kingdom of France. Oude, with its dependent provinces, is 53,286 square miles, not a great deal less than England. The Carnatic, with Tanjore and the Circars, is 65,948 square miles, very considerably larger than England. And the whole of the Company's dominions, comprehending Bombay and Salsette, amounts to 281,412 square miles. This forms a territory larger than any European dominion, Russia and Turkey excepted. Through all that vast extent of country, there is not a man who eats a mouthful of rice but by permission of the East-India Company.

So far with regard to the *extent*. The *population* of this great empire is not to be easily calculated. When the countries of which it is composed came into our possession, they were all eminently peopled, and eminently productive — though at that time, considerably declined from their ancient prosperity. But since they have come into our hands! — ! However, if we make the period of our estimate immediately before the utter desolation of the Carnatic, and if we allow for the havoc which our government had even then made in these regions, we cannot, in my opinion, rate the population at much less than thirty million souls — more than four times the number of persons on the Island of Great Britain.

My next inquiry to that of the *number*, is the quality and *description* of the inhabitants. This multitude of men does not consist of an abject and barbarous populace, much less of gangs of savages, like the Guaranies and Chiquitos who wander on the waste borders of the river Amazon, or the Plate. But this is a people civilized and cultivated for ages — cultivated by all the arts of polished life, while we were still in the woods. There have been princes (and their skeletons still remain), once of great dignity, authority, and opulence. There are to be found the chiefs of tribes and nations. There is to be found an ancient and venerable priesthood, the depository of their laws, learning, and history, the guides of the people while living, and their consolation in death — a nobility of great antiquity and renown — a multitude of cities not exceeded in population and trade by those of the first class in Europe — merchants and bankers, individual houses of whom have once vied in capital with the Bank of England; whose credit had often supported a tottering state, and preserved their governments in the midst of war and desolation — millions of ingenious manufacturers and mechanics — millions of the most diligent, and not the least intelligent, tillers of the earth. There are to be found almost all the religions professed by men — the Brahminical, the Mussulman, the Eastern and the Western Christian.

If I were to take the whole aggregate of our possessions there, I should compare it, as the nearest parallel I can find, with the empire of Germany. Our immediate possessions I should compare with the Austrian dominions — and they would not suffer in the comparison. The nabob of Oude might stand for the king of Prussia; the nabob of Arcot I would compare, as superior in territory and equal in revenue, to the elector of Saxony. Cheyt Sing, the rajah of Benares, might well rank with the prince of Hesse, at least; and the rajah of Tanjore (though hardly equal in extent of dominion, superior in revenue), to the elector of Bavaria. The Polygars and the northern Zemindars, and other great chiefs, might well class with the rest of the princes, dukes, counts, marquises, and bishops, in the empire; all of whom I mention to honour — and surely without disparagement to any or all of those most respectable princes and grandees. All this vast mass, composed of so many orders and classes of men, is again infinitely advocated by manners, by religion, by hereditary employment, through all their possible combinations. This renders the handling of India a matter that is in a high degree critical and delicate. But oh! it has been handled rudely indeed. Even some of the reformers seem to have forgotten that they had anything to do but to regulate the tenants of a manor, or the shopkeepers of the next county town.

It is an empire of this extent, of this complicated nature, of this dignity and importance, that I have compared to Germany and the German government — not for an exact resemblance, but as a sort of a middle term by which India might be approximated to our *understandings*, and if possible our *feelings* — in order to awaken something of sympathy for the unfortunate natives of which, I am afraid, we are not perfectly susceptible while we look at this very remote object through a false and cloudy medium.

POLITICAL CHARITY.

Honest men will not forget either their merit or their sufferings. There are men (and there are *many*, I trust) who, out of love to their country and their kind, would torture their invention to find excuses for the mistakes of their brethren — and who, to stifle dissension, would construe even doubtful appearances with the utmost favour. Such men will never persuade themselves to be ingenious and refined in discovering disaffection and treason in the manifest, palpable signs of suffering loyalty. Persecution is so unnatural to them, that they gladly snatch the very first opportunity to lay aside all the tricks and devices of penal politics — and of returning home, after all their irksome and vexatious wanderings, to our natural family mansion, to the grand social principle that unites all men in all descriptions, under the shadow of an equal and impartial justice.

EVILS OF DISTRACTION.

The very attempt towards pleasing everybody reveals a temper always flashy, and often false and insincere. Therefore as I have proceeded straight onward in my conduct, so I will proceed in my account of those parts of it which have been most excepted to. But I must first beg leave just to hint to you, that we may suffer very great detriment by being open to every talker. It is not to be imagined how much of service is lost from spirits full of activity and full of energy — who are pressing, who are rushing forward to great and capital objects — when you oblige them to be continually looking back. While they are defending one service, they

defraud you of a hundred. Applaud us when we run; console us when we fall; cheer us when we recover; but *let us pass on* — for God's sake *let us pass on*.

CHARLES FOX. ³²

And now, having done my duty to the bill, let me say a word to the author. I should leave him to his own noble sentiments, if the unworthy and illiberal language with which he has been treated, beyond all example of parliamentary liberty, did not make a few words necessary — not so much in justice to him, as to my own feelings. I must say, then, that it will be a distinction honourable to the age, that the rescue of the greatest number of the human race who were ever so grievously oppressed, from the greatest tyranny that was ever exercised, has fallen to the lot of abilities and dispositions equal to the task — that it has fallen to one who has the enlargement to comprehend, the spirit to undertake, and the eloquence to support so great a measure of hazardous benevolence. His spirit is not owing to his ignorance of the state of men and things. He well knows what snares are spread about his path from personal animosity, from court intrigues, and possibly from popular delusion. But he has put to hazard his ease, his security, his interest, his power, even his darling popularity, for the benefit of a people whom he has never seen. This is the road that all heroes have trodden before him. He is traduced and abused for his supposed motives. He will remember that obloquy is a necessary ingredient in the composition of all true glory. He will remember that it was not only in the Roman customs, but it is in the nature and constitution of things, that *calumny and abuse are essential parts of triumph*. These thoughts will support a mind which only exists for honour, under the burden of temporary reproach. He is doing indeed a great good, such as rarely falls to the lot, and almost as rarely coincides with the desires of any man. Let him use his time. Let him give the whole length of the reins to his benevolence. He is now on a great eminence, where the eyes of mankind are turned to him. He may live long, he may do much. But here is the *summit*. He never can exceed what he does this day.

He has faults; but they are faults that, though they may in a small degree tarnish the lustre and sometimes impede the march of his abilities, have nothing in them to extinguish the fire of great virtues. In those faults there is no mixture of deceit, of hypocrisy, of pride, of ferocity, of complexional despotism, or lack of feeling for the distresses of mankind. His are faults which might exist in a descendant of Henry the Fourth of France, as they did exist in that father of his country. Henry the Fourth wished that he might live to see a fowl in the pot of every peasant in his kingdom. That sentiment of homely benevolence was worth all the splendid sayings that are recorded of kings. But he wished perhaps for more than could be obtained, and the *goodness of the man exceeded the power of the king*.

But *this* gentleman, a subject (not a king) may this day say this at least with truth: that he secures the rice in his pot to every man in India. A poet of antiquity thought it one of the first distinctions to a prince whom he meant to celebrate, that through a long succession of

³² Charles Fox (1749-1806), was Britain's first foreign secretary (1782, 1783, 1806), a famous champion of liberty. He achieved only two important reforms: a Parliamentary resolution pledging to *abolish the slave trade* speedily, and the 1792 *Libel Act*, restoring to juries their right to decide not only whether an allegedly libellous article had been published, but also what constituted libel in any given case, and whether or not a defendant was guilty of it. — WHG

generations, he had been the progenitor of an able and virtuous citizen, who by force of the arts of peace had corrected governments of oppression, and suppressed wars of rapine.

*The character of the young man, and how much he will give
A citizen of the people of Ausonia for centuries to come.
He over the Ganges, heard over the Indians,
He will fill the earth with his voice; and furious wars
He controls the tongue with lightning.*³³

This was what was said of the predecessor of the only person to whose eloquence it does not wrong that of the mover of this bill, to be compared. But the Ganges and the Indus are the patrimony of the fame of my honourable friend, and not of Cicero. I confess, I anticipate with joy the reward of those whose whole consequence, power, and authority, exist only for the benefit of mankind. And I carry my mind to all the people, and all the names and descriptions that, relieved by this bill, will bless the labours of this parliament, and the confidence which the best House of Commons has given to him who best deserves it. The little cavils of party will not be *heard*, where freedom and happiness will be *felt*. There is not a tongue, a nation, or religion in India, which will not bless the presiding care and manly beneficence of this house, and of him who proposes to you this great work. Your names will never be separated before the throne of the Divine goodness, in whatever language or with whatever rites, pardon is asked for sin, and reward for those who imitate the Godhead in His universal bounty to his creatures. These honours you deserve, and they will surely be paid, when all the jargon of influence, and party, and patronage, are swept into oblivion.

THE IMPRACTICABLE IS UNDESIRABLE.

I know it is common for men to say that such and such things are perfectly right — very *desirable* — but that, unfortunately, they are not *practicable*. Oh! no, sir, *no*. Those things, which are not practicable, are *not* desirable. There is nothing in the world really *beneficial*, that does not lie within the reach of an informed understanding, and a well-directed pursuit. There is nothing that God has judged good for us, that he has not given us the *means* to accomplish, both in the natural and the moral world. If we cry like children for the moon, then like children we must *cry on*.

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONS.

The recent House of Commons has been punished for its *independence*. That example is made. Have we an example on record of a House of Commons punished for its *servility*? The rewards of a senate so disposed are manifest to the world. Several gentlemen are very desirous of altering the constitution of the House of Commons. But they must alter the frame and constitution of human nature itself, before they can so fashion it by any mode of

³³ Presumably, this is an adaptation by Burke, of Cicero's *pro Milone*. — WHG
*Indole proh quanta juvenis, quantumque daturus
Ausoniae populis ventura in saecula civem.
Ille super Gangem, super exauditus et Indos,
Implebit terras voce; et furialia bella
Fulmine compescet linguae.* —

election that its conduct will not be influenced by reward and punishment, by fame and by disgrace. If these examples take root in the minds of men, what members hereafter will be bold enough not to be corrupt? Especially as the king's highway of obsequiousness is so very broad and easy. To make a passive member of parliament, no dignity of mind, no principles of honour, no resolution, no ability, no industry, no learning, no experience, are in the least degree necessary. To defend a post of importance against a powerful enemy, requires an *Elliot*.³⁴ A drunken invalid is qualified to hoist a white flag, or to deliver up the keys of the fortress on his knees.

EMOLUMENTS OF OFFICE.

No man knows, when he cuts off the incitements to a virtuous ambition, and the just rewards of public service, what infinite mischief he may do his country through all generations. Such saving to the public may prove the worst mode of robbing it. The crown, which has in its hands the trust of the daily pay for national service, should also have in its hands the means for the repose of public labour, and the fixed settlement of acknowledged merit. There is a time when the weather-beaten vessels of the state ought to come into harbour. They must at length have a retreat from the malice of rivals, from the perfidy of political friends, and the inconstancy of the people. Many of the persons who in all times have filled the great offices of state, have been younger brothers who originally had little if any fortune. These offices do not furnish the means of amassing wealth. There ought to be some power in the crown, of granting pensions out of the reach of its own caprices. *An entail of dependence is a bad reward of merit.*

MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

Those who are least anxious about your conduct are not those who love you most. Moderate affection and satiated enjoyment are cold and respectful. But an ardent and injured passion is tempered with wrath, and grief, and shame, and conscious worth, and the maddening sense of violated right. A jealous love lights his torch from the firebrands of the furies. Those who call upon you to belong *wholly* to the people, are those who wish you to return to your *proper* home — to the sphere of your duty, to the post of your honour, to the mansion-house of all genuine, serene, and solid satisfaction.

ELECTORS AND REPRESENTATIVES.

Look, gentlemen, to the *whole tenour* of your member's conduct. Test whether his ambition or his avarice have jostled him out of the straight line of duty; or whether that grand foe of the offices of active life, that master vice in men of business — a degenerate and inglorious sloth — has made him flag and languish in his course. This is the object of our inquiry. If our member's conduct can bear this touch, mark it for sterling. He may have fallen into errors; he must have faults. But our error is greater, and our fault is radically ruinous to ourselves,

³⁴ George Elliott, 1st *Baron Heathfield*, KB, PC (1717-1790), a Scottish officer of the British Army. He is most notable for his command of the Gibraltar garrison during the Great Siege of Gibraltar, which lasted from 1779 to 1783. He was celebrated for his successful defence of the fortress, and decisive defeat of Spanish and French attackers. — WHG

if we do not bear, if we do not even *applaud* the whole compound and mixed mass of such a character. Not to act thus is folly; I almost said it is *impiety*. He censures God, who quarrels with the imperfections of man.

Gentlemen, we must not be peevish with those who serve the people. For none will serve us while there is a court to serve except those who are of a nice and jealous honour. Those who think everything to be dust and ashes in comparison to that honour, will not bear to have it soiled and impaired by those for whose sake they make a thousand sacrifices to preserve it immaculate and whole. We shall either drive such men from the public stage, or we shall send them to the court for protection — where, if they must sacrifice their reputation, they will at least secure their interest. Depend upon it, that the lovers of freedom will be free. None will violate their conscience to please us, in order afterwards to discharge that conscience which they have violated by doing us faithful and affectionate service. If we degrade and deprave their minds by servility, it will be absurd to expect that those who are creeping and abject towards us, will ever be bold and incorruptible assertors of our freedom, against the most seducing and the most formidable of all powers. No! human nature is *not* so formed; nor shall we improve the faculties or better the morals of public men, by our possession of the most infallible receipt in the world for making cheats and hypocrites.

Let me say with plainness, I who am no longer in a public character, that if by a fair, by an indulgent, by a gentlemanly behaviour toward our representatives, we do not give confidence to their minds, and a liberal scope to their understandings — if we do not permit our members to act upon a *very* enlarged view of things — we shall at length infallibly degrade our national representation into a confused and scuffling bustle of local agency. When the popular member is narrowed in his ideas, and rendered timid in his proceedings, the service of the *crown* will be the sole nursery of statesmen. Among the frolics of the court, it may at length take that of attending to its business. Then the monopoly of mental power will be added to the power of all other kinds it possesses. On the side of the people there will be nothing but impotence. For *ignorance* is impotence; *narrowness of mind* is impotence; *timidity* is itself impotence, and it makes all other qualities that go along with it, impotent and useless.

POPULAR OPINION A FALLACIOUS STANDARD.

When we know that the opinions of even the greatest multitudes are the standard of rectitude, I shall think myself obliged to make those opinions the masters of my conscience. But if it may be doubted whether Omnipotence itself is competent to alter the essential constitution of right and wrong, I am sure that such *things* as they and I, are possessed of no such power. No man carries further than I do the policy of making government pleasing to the people. But the widest range of this politic complaisance is confined within the limits of justice. I would not only consult the interest of the people, but I would cheerfully gratify their humours. We are all a sort of children that must be soothed and managed. I think I am not austere or formal in my nature. I would bear, I would even play my part, in any innocent buffooneries to divert them. *But I will never act the tyrant for their amusement.* If they will mix malice in their sports, I shall never consent to throw them any living, sentient creature whatsoever — no, not so much as a kitten to torment.

ENGLISH REFORMATION.

The condition of our nature is such that we buy our blessings at a price. The Reformation, one of the greatest periods of human improvement, was a time of trouble and confusion. The vast structure of superstition and tyranny — which had been in rearing for ages, and which was combined with the interest of the great and of the many; which was moulded into the laws, the manners, and civil institutions of nations, and blended with the frame and policy of states — could not be brought to the ground without a fearful struggle. Nor could it fall without a violent concussion of itself and all about it. When this great revolution was attempted in a more regular mode by *government*, it was opposed by plots and seditions of the people; when by *popular* efforts, it was repressed as a rebellion by the hand of power. And bloody executions (often bloodily returned) marked the whole of its progress through all its stages. The affairs of religion, which are no longer heard of in the tumult of our present contentions, made a principal ingredient in the wars and politics of that time. The enthusiasm of religion threw a gloom over the politics; and political interests poisoned and perverted the spirit of religion on all sides. The Protestant religion in that violent struggle, infected as the Popish had been before, by worldly interests and worldly passions, became a persecutor in its turn. Sometimes it was of the new sects which carried their own principles further than it was convenient to the original reformers; and always of the body from whom they parted. And this persecuting spirit arose not only from the bitterness of retaliation, but from the merciless policy of fear.

It was a long time before the spirit of true piety and true wisdom involved in the principles of the Reformation, could be depurated (purified) from the dregs and feculence of the contention with which it was carried through. However, until this is done the Reformation is not complete. And those who think themselves good Protestants, from their animosity to others, are in that respect no Protestants at all.

PROSCRIPTION.

This way of *proscribing the citizens by denominations and general descriptions*, dignified by the name of *reason of state*, and *security for constitutions and commonwealths*, is nothing better at bottom than the miserable invention of an ungenerous ambition, which would gladly hold the sacred trust of power, without any of the virtues or any of the energies that give a title to it. It is a receipt of policy made up of a detestable compound of malice, cowardice, and sloth. *They would govern men against their will*. But in that government, they would be discharged from the exercise of vigilance, providence, and fortitude. And therefore, that they may sleep on their watch, they consent to take some one division of the society into partnership of the tyranny over the rest. But let government, in whatever form it may be, comprehend the whole in its justice, and restrain the suspicious by its vigilance — let it keep watch and ward; let it discover by its sagacity, and punish by its firmness, all delinquency against its power, whenever delinquency exists in the overt acts — and then it will be as safe as ever God and nature intended it should be. Crimes are the acts of individuals, and not of denominations. And therefore, to arbitrarily class men under general descriptions, in order to proscribe and punish them in the lump for a presumed delinquency of which perhaps only a part, or perhaps none at all, are guilty — is indeed a compendious

(efficient) method, and it saves a world of trouble about proof. But such a method, instead of being law, is an act of unnatural rebellion against the legal dominion of reason and justice. And this vice, in any constitution that entertains it at one time or other, will certainly bring on its ruin.

JUST FREEDOM.

I must fairly tell you, that so far as my principles are concerned (principles that I hope will only depart with my last breath), *I have no idea of a liberty unconnected with honesty and justice*. Nor do I believe that any good constitutions of government, or of freedom, can find it necessary for their security, to doom any part of the people to a permanent slavery. Such a constitution of freedom, if such can be, is in effect no more than another name for the tyranny of the strongest faction. And factions in republics have been, and *are*, as fully capable as monarchs of the most cruel oppression and injustice. It is but too true that the *love*, and even the very *idea* of genuine liberty is extremely rare. It is only too true that there are many whose whole scheme of freedom is made up of pride, perverseness, and insolence. They feel themselves in a state of thralldom — they imagine that their souls are cooped and cabined in — unless they have some man, or some body of men, dependent on their mercy. The desire of having someone below them, descends to those who are the very lowest of all — and a Protestant cobbler, debased by his poverty but exalted by his share of the ruling church, feels a pride in knowing that it is by his generosity alone that the peer, whose footman's instep he measures, is able to keep his chaplain from a gaol (jail).

ENGLAND'S EMBASSY TO AMERICA.

They enter the capital of America only to abandon it. And these assertors and representatives of the dignity of England, at the tail of a flying army, let fly their Parthian shafts of memorials and remonstrances at random behind them. Their promises and their offers, their flatteries and their menaces, were all despised. And we were saved from the disgrace of their formal reception, only because the congress scorned to receive them; while the state-house of independent Philadelphia opened her doors to the public entry of the ambassador of France. From war and blood, we went to submission; and from submission plunged back again to war and blood — to desolate and be desolated, without measure, hope, or end. I am a Royalist. I blushed for this degradation of the crown. I am a Whig, I blushed for the dishonour of parliament. I am a true Englishman, I felt to the quick for the disgrace of England. I am a man, I felt for the melancholy reversal of human affairs in the fall of the first power in the world.

HOWARD, THE PHILANTHROPIST. ³⁵

I cannot name this gentleman without remarking that his labours and writings have done much to open the eyes and hearts of mankind. He has visited all Europe — not to survey the sumptuousness of palaces, or the stateliness of temples; not to make accurate measurements of the remains of ancient grandeur, nor to form a scale of the curiosity of

³⁵ John Howard (1726-1790), British philanthropist who made significant contributions to prison reform. — WHG

modern art; not to collect medals, or collate manuscripts — but to dive into the depths of dungeons; to plunge into the infection of hospitals; to survey the mansions of sorrow and pain; to take the gauge and dimensions of misery, depression, and contempt; to remember the forgotten, to attend to the neglected, to visit the forsaken, and to compare and collate the distresses of all men in all countries. His plan is original, and as full of genius as it is of humanity. It was a voyage of discovery; a circumnavigation of charity. Already the benefit of his labour is felt more or less in every country. I hope he will anticipate his final reward by seeing all its effects fully realized in his own. He will receive, not by detail, but in gross, the reward of those who visit the prisoner. And he has so forestalled and monopolized this branch of charity, that there will be, I trust, little room to merit by such acts of benevolence hereafter.

PARLIAMENTARY RETROSPECT.

It is certainly not pleasing to be put out of the public service. But I wish to be a member of parliament, to have my share of doing good and resisting evil. It would therefore be absurd to renounce my objects in order to obtain my seat. I deceive myself indeed most grossly if I had not much rather pass the remainder of my life hidden in the recesses of the deepest obscurity, feeding my mind even with the visions and imaginations of such things, than to be placed on the most splendid throne of the universe, tantalized with a denial of the practice of all which can make the greatest situation any other than the greatest curse. Gentlemen, I have had my day. I can never sufficiently express my gratitude to you for having set me in a place in which I could lend the slightest help to great and laudable designs. If I have had my share in any measure giving quiet to private property and private conscience; if by my vote I have aided in securing to families the best possession, which is peace; if I have joined in reconciling kings to their subjects, and subjects to their prince; if I have assisted to loosen the foreign holdings of the citizen, and taught him to look for his protection to the laws of his country, and for his comfort to the goodwill of his countrymen — if I have thus taken my part with the best of men in the best of their actions, then I can shut the book. I might wish to read a page or two more — but this is enough for my measure — *I have not lived in vain.*

PEOPLE AND PARLIAMENT.

Let the commons in parliament assembled, be one and the same thing with the commons at large. The distinctions that are made to separate us are unnatural and wicked contrivances. Let us identify, let us incorporate ourselves with the people. Let us cut all the cables and snap the chains which tie us to an unfaithful shore, and enter the friendly harbour that shoots far out into the main its moles and jetties to receive us. — “War with the world, and peace with our constituents.” Let this be our motto and our principle. Then indeed we shall be truly great. Respecting ourselves, we shall be respected by the world. At present all is troubled, and cloudy, and distracted, and full of anger and turbulence, both abroad and at home; but the air may be cleared by this storm, and light and fertility may follow it. Let us give a faithful pledge to the people, that we honour indeed the crown, but that we *belong* to them; that we are their auxiliaries, and not their task-masters — their fellow-labourers in the same vineyard — not lording over their rights, but helpers of their joy; that to tax them is

a grievance to ourselves; but to be cut off from our enjoyments to forward theirs, is the highest gratification we are capable of receiving.

REFORMED CIVIL LIST.

As things now stand, every man, in proportion to his consequence at court, tends to add to the expense of the civil list ³⁶ by all manner of jobs, if not for himself, yet for his dependents. When the new plan is established, those who are now *suitors* for jobs will become the most strenuous *opposers* of them. They will have a common interest with the minister in public economy. Every class, as it stands now, will become security for the payment of the preceding class. And thus the persons whose insignificant services defraud those that are useful, would then become interested in their payment. Then the powerful, instead of oppressing, would be obliged to support the weak; and idleness would become concerned in the reward of industry. The whole fabric of the civil economy would become compact and connected in all its parts. It would be formed into a well-organized body where every member contributes to the support of the whole; and where even the lazy stomach secures the vigour of the active arm.

FRENCH AND ENGLISH REVOLUTION.

He felt some concern that this strange thing, called a Revolution in France, should be compared with the glorious event commonly called the Revolution in England; and the conduct of the soldiery on that occasion, compared with the behaviour of some of the troops of France in the present instance. At that period the prince of Orange, a prince of the blood-royal in England, was called in by the flower of the English aristocracy to defend its ancient constitution, and not to level all distinctions. To this prince, so invited, the aristocratic leaders who commanded the troops went over with their several corps, in bodies, to the deliverer of their country. Aristocratic leaders brought up the corps of citizens who newly enlisted in this cause. Military obedience changed its object; but military discipline was not for a moment interrupted in its principle. The troops were ready for war, but indisposed to mutiny. But as the conduct of the English armies was different, so was that of the whole English nation at that time. In truth, the circumstances of our revolution (as it is called) and that of France, are just the reverse of each other in almost every particular, and in the whole spirit of the transaction. With us it was the case of a legal monarch attempting arbitrary power — in France it is the case of an arbitrary monarch, beginning from whatever cause, to legalize his authority. The one was to be resisted, the other was to be managed and directed; but in neither case was the order of the state to be changed, lest government might be *ruined* which ought only to be *corrected* and *legalized*. With us we got rid of the man, and preserved the constituent parts of the state. *There* they get rid of the constituent parts of the state, and keep the man.

What we did was in truth and substance, and in a constitutional light, a revolution not *made*, but *prevented*. We took solid securities; we settled doubtful questions; we corrected

³⁶ *Civil list*: a list of individuals to whom money is paid by the government, typically for service to the state or as honorary pensions.

anomalies in our law. In the stable, fundamental parts of our constitution, we made no revolution — no, nor any alteration at all. We did not impair the monarchy. Perhaps it might be shown that we strengthened it very considerably. The nation kept the same ranks, the same orders, the same privileges, the same franchises, the same rules for property, the same subordinations, the same order in the law, in the revenue, and in the magistracy; the same lords, the same commons, the same corporations, the same electors.

The church was not impaired. Her estates, her majesty, her splendour, her orders and gradations, continued the same. She was preserved in her full efficiency, and cleared only of a certain intolerance which was her weakness and disgrace. The church and the state were the same after the revolution that they were before, but better secured in every part.

Was little done because a revolution was not made in the constitution? No! Everything was done because we commenced with *reparation*, not with *ruin*. Accordingly the state flourished. Instead of laying as dead in a sort of trance, or exposed as some others in an epileptic fit, to the pity or derision of the world for her wild, ridiculous, convulsive movements — impotent to every purpose but that of dashing out her brains against the pavement — Great Britain rose above the standard even of her former self. An era of a more improved domestic prosperity then commenced, and still continues not only unimpaired, but growing under the wasting hand of time. All the energies of the country were awakened. England never preserved a firmer countenance, nor a more vigorous arm, to all her enemies and to all her rivals. Europe under her respired and revived. Everywhere she appeared as the protector, assertor, or avenger of liberty. A war was made and supported against fortune itself. The treaty of Ryswick, which first limited the power of France, was soon after made. The grand alliance very shortly followed, which shook to the foundations the dreadful power which menaced the independence of mankind. The states of Europe lay happy under the shade of a great and free monarchy which knew how to be great without endangering its own peace at home, or the internal or external peace of any of its neighbours.

ARMED DISCIPLINE.

He knew too well, and he felt as much as any man, how difficult it was to accommodate a standing army to a free constitution, or to any constitution. An armed, disciplined body is in its essence, dangerous to liberty; undisciplined, it is ruinous to society. Its component parts are, in the latter case, neither good citizens nor good soldiers. What have they thought of in France, under such a difficulty as almost puts the human faculties to a stand? They have put their army under such a variety of principles of duty, that it is more likely to breed litigants, pettifoggers (whiners), and mutineers, than soldiers. To balance their crown army, they have set up another army, deriving under another authority, called a *municipal* army — a balance of armies, not of orders. These latter they have destroyed with every mark of insult and oppression. *States* may and will best exist with a partition of civil powers. But *armies* cannot exist under a divided command. This state of things he thought to be, in effect, a state of war — or at best, but a truce instead of peace in the country.

GILDED DESPOTISM.

In the last century, Louis the Fourteenth had established a greater and better disciplined military force than had ever been seen before in Europe, and with it a perfect despotism. Though that despotism was proudly arrayed in manners, gallantry, splendour, magnificence, and even covered over with the imposing robes of science, literature, and arts — in its *government* it was nothing better than a painted and gilded tyranny; in *religion*, a hard, stern intolerance, the fit companion and auxiliary to the despotic tyranny which prevailed in its government. The same character of despotism insinuated itself into every court of Europe: the same spirit of disproportioned magnificence; the same love of standing armies above the ability of the people. In particular, our then sovereigns, King Charles and King James, fell in love with the government of their neighbour, so flattering to the pride of kings. A similarity of sentiments brought on connections equally dangerous to the interests and liberties of their country. It was well that the infection had gone no further than the throne. The admiration of a government that was flourishing and successful, unchecked in its operations, and therefore seeming to compass its objects more speedily and effectually, gained something upon all ranks of people. The good *patriots* of that day, however, struggled against it. They sought nothing more anxiously than to break off all communication with France, and to beget a total alienation from its councils and its example which, by the animosity prevalent between the abettors of their religious system and the assertors of ours, was in some degree effected.

OUR FRENCH DANGERS.

In the last age we were in danger of being entangled by the example of France, in the net of a relentless despotism. It is not necessary to say anything about that example. It exists no longer. Our present danger from the example of a people whose character knows no medium, is, with regard to government, a danger from *anarchy* — a danger of being led through an admiration of successful fraud and violence, to an imitation of the excesses of an irrational, unprincipled, proscribing, confiscating, plundering, ferocious, bloody, and *tyrannical democracy*. On the side of religion, the danger of their example is no longer from intolerance, but from atheism — a foul, unnatural vice, foe to all the dignity and consolation of mankind. In France, it seems for a long time to have been embodied in a faction, accredited and almost avowed.

SIR GEORGE SAVILLE. ³⁷

When an act of great and signal humanity was to be done, and done with all the weight and authority that belonged to it, the world would cast its eyes upon none but him. I hope that few things which have a tendency to bless or to adorn life have wholly escaped my observation in my passage through it. I have sought the acquaintance of that gentleman, and have seen him in all situations. He is a true genius; with an understanding that is vigorous,

³⁷ Saville (1726-1784) was a member of Parliament for Yorkshire. He advocated for relief to Roman Catholics and to Protestant dissenters, and he defended the action of the American colonists. He introduced the Catholic Relief Act, leading to the Gordon Riots in 1780.

and acute, and refined, and distinguishing even to excess; and illuminated with a most unbounded, peculiar, and original cast of imagination. With these he possesses many external and instrumental advantages; and he makes use of them all. His fortune is among the largest; a fortune which, wholly unencumbered as it is, with one single charge from luxury, vanity, or excess, sinks under the benevolence of its dispenser. This private benevolence, expanding itself into patriotism, renders his whole being the estate of the public, in which he has not reserved a peculium for himself of profit, diversion, or relaxation. During the session, he is the first in, and the last out of the House of Commons; he passes from the senate to the camp; and seldom seeing the seat of his ancestors, he is always in the senate to serve his country, or in the field to defend it.

CORRUPTION IS NOT SELF-REFORMED.

Those, who would commit the reformation of India to the destroyers of it, are the enemies to that reformation. They would make a distinction between directors and proprietors, which in the present state of things, does not and cannot exist. But a right honourable gentleman says he would keep the present government of India in the court of directors; and to curb them, he would provide salutary regulations — wonderful! That is, he would appoint the old offenders to correct the old offences; and he would render the vicious and the foolish, wise and virtuous by salutary regulations. He would appoint the wolf as guardian of the sheep; but he has invented a curious muzzle by which this protecting wolf will not be able to open his jaws above an inch or two at the utmost. Thus his work is finished. But I tell the right honourable gentleman, that *controlled depravity is not innocence*; and it is not the labour of delinquency in chains that will correct abuses. Will these gentlemen of the direction censure the partners of their own guilt? Never did a serious plan of amending any old tyrannical establishment propose to have the authors and abettors of the abuses as the reformers of them.

THE BRIBED AND THE BRIBERS.

If I am to speak my private sentiments, I think that in a thousand cases for one it would be far less mischievous to the public, and full as little dishonourable to themselves, to be polluted with direct bribery, than thus to become a standing auxiliary to the oppression, usury, and peculation (embezzlement) of multitudes in order to obtain a corrupt support to their power. It is by bribing, not so often by being bribed, that wicked politicians bring ruin on mankind. Avarice is a rival to the pursuits of many. It finds a multitude of checks and many opposers in every walk of life. But the objects of ambition are for the few; and every person who aims at indirect profit, and therefore wants other protection than innocence and law, instead of its *rival* becomes its *instrument*. There is a natural allegiance and fealty due to this domineering, paramount evil, from all the vassal vices which acknowledge its superiority, and readily militate under its banners. And it is under that discipline alone that avarice is able to spread to any considerable extent, or to render itself a general, public mischief.

HYDER ALI. 38

When at length Hyder Ali found that he had to deal with men who either would sign no convention, or whom no treaty and no signature could bind, and who were the determined enemies of human intercourse itself, he decreed to make the country possessed by these incorrigible and predestinated criminals, a memorable example to mankind. He resolved, in the gloomy recesses of a mind capacious of such things, to leave the whole Carnatic an everlasting monument of vengeance, and to put perpetual desolation as a barrier between him and those against whom the faith which holds the moral elements of the world together, was no protection. He became at length so confident of his force, so collected in his might, that he made no secret whatsoever of his dreadful resolution. Having terminated his disputes with every enemy and every rival who buried their mutual animosities in their common detestation against the creditors of the nabob of Arcot,³⁹ he drew from every quarter whatever a savage ferocity could add to his new rudiments in the arts of destruction. And compounding all the materials of fury, havoc, and desolation, into one black cloud, he hung for a while on the declivities (slopes) of the mountains. While the authors of all these evils were idly and stupidly gazing on this menacing meteor which blackened all their horizon, it suddenly burst, and poured down the whole of its contents upon the plains of the Carnatic. Then ensued a scene of woe, the like of which no eye had seen, no heart conceived, and which no tongue can adequately tell. All the horrors of war before known or heard of, were mercy to that new havoc. A storm of universal fire blasted every field, consumed every house, destroyed every temple. The miserable inhabitants flying from their flaming villages, in part were slaughtered. Others, without regard to sex, to age, to the respect of rank, or sacredness of function — fathers torn from children, husbands from wives, enveloped in a whirlwind of cavalry, and amidst the goading spears of drivers and the trampling of pursuing horses — were swept into captivity, in an unknown and hostile land. Those who were able to evade the tempest, fled to the walled cities. But escaping from fire, sword, and exile, they fell into the jaws of famine.

The alms of the settlement in this dreadful exigency, were certainly liberal; and all was done by charity that private charity could do. But it was a people in beggary; it was a nation which stretched out its hands for food. For months together these creatures of sufferance, whose very excess and luxury in their most plenteous days had fallen short of the allowance of our most austere fasts — silent, patient, resigned, without sedition or disturbance, almost without complaint — perished by an hundred a day in the streets of Madras. Every day at least seventy laid their bodies in the streets, or on the glacis (banks) of Tanjore, and expired of famine in the granary of India. I was going to awake your justice towards this unhappy part of our fellow-citizens, by bringing before you some of the circumstances of this plague

³⁸ Hyder Ali (1722-1782) – a Muslim ruler of Mysore who played an important part in the wars in southern India in the mid-18th century. After studying the military tactics of the Frenchman Joseph-François Dupleix, he induced his older brother, a brigade commander in the Mysore army, to obtain military equipment from the Bombay government, and to enroll 30 European sailors as gunners. This became the first Indian-controlled corps of sepoys, armed with firelocks and bayonets, backed by artillery, and served by Europeans. – *Ency. Britannica*.

³⁹ Nabob: a governor in India during the Mogul empire. Muhammad Ali Wallajah (r.1749-1795) was installed as the Nabob of Arcot and the Carnatic by the British, after he committed support for their campaigns in the Deccan. Unable to sustain the payments he promised, he was forced to surrender most of his kingdom to the East India Company.

of hunger. Of all the calamities which beset and waylay the life of man, this comes the nearest to our heart, and is that wherein the proudest of us all, feels himself to be nothing more than he is. But I find myself unable to manage it with decorum. These details are of a species of horror so nauseous and disgusting; they are so degrading to the sufferers and to the hearers; they are so humiliating to human nature itself — that on better thoughts, I think it more advisable to throw a pall over this hideous object, and to leave it to your general conceptions.

REFORMATION AND ANARCHY CONTRASTED AND COMPARED.

That the house must perceive, from his coming forward to mark an expression or two of his best friend, *how anxious he was to keep the distemper of France from the least countenance in England,* where he was sure some wicked persons had shown a strong disposition to recommend an imitation of the French spirit of reform. He was so strongly opposed to the least tendency towards the *means* of introducing a democracy like theirs, as well as to the *end* itself, that much as it would afflict him if such a thing could be attempted, and that any friend of his could concur in such measures (he was far, very far, from believing they could), he would abandon his best friends, and join with his worst enemies, to oppose either the means or the end; and would resist all violent exertions of the spirit of innovation, so distant from all principles of true and safe reformation — a spirit well calculated to overturn states, but perfectly unfit to amend them.

That he was no enemy to reformation. Almost every business in which he was much concerned, from the first day he sat in that house to *that* hour, was a business of reformation. And when he had not been employed in correcting, he had been employed in resisting abuses. Some traces of this spirit in him now stand on their statute-book. In his opinion, anything which unnecessarily tore to pieces the contexture of the state, not only prevented all real reformation, but introduced evils which would call (but perhaps call in vain) for new reformation.

That he thought the French nation very unwise. What they valued themselves on, was a disgrace to them. They had gloried (and some people in England had thought fit to take share in that glory) in making a revolution — as if revolutions were good things in themselves. All the horrors, and all the crimes of the anarchy which led to their revolution, which attend its progress, and which may virtually attend it in its establishment, pass for nothing with the lovers of revolutions. The French have made their way, through the destruction of their country, to a bad constitution, when they were absolutely in possession of a good one. They were in possession of it the day the states met in separate orders. Their business, had they been either virtuous or wise, or had they been left to their own judgment, was to secure the stability and independence of the states, according to those orders, under the monarch on the throne. It was then their duty to redress grievances.

Instead of redressing grievances, and improving the fabric of their state, to which they were called by their monarch, and sent by their country, they were made to take a very different course. They first destroyed all the balances and counterpoises which serve to fix the state, and to give it a steady direction, and which furnish sure correctives to any violent spirit

which may prevail in any of the orders. These balances existed in their oldest constitution, and in the constitution of *this* country; and in the constitution of *all* the countries in Europe. These they rashly destroyed, and then they melted down the whole into one incongruous, ill-connected mass.

When they had done this, they instantly, and with the most atrocious perfidy and breach of all faith among men, laid the axe to the root of all property, and consequently of all national prosperity, by the principles they established, and the example they set in confiscating all the possessions of the church. They made and recorded a sort of *institute* and *digest* of anarchy, called the *Rights of Man*, in such a pedantic abuse of elementary principles as would have disgraced boys at school. But this declaration of rights was worse than trifling and pedantic in them, as by their name and authority they systematically destroyed every hold of authority by opinion, religious or civil, on the minds of the people. By this mad declaration, they subverted the state, and brought on such calamities as no country, without a long war, has ever been known to suffer; and which may in the end *produce* such a war, and perhaps many such wars.

With them the question was not between despotism and liberty. The sacrifice they made of the peace and power of their country was not made on the altar of freedom. They might have had freedom, and a better security for freedom than that they have taken, without any sacrifice at all. They brought themselves into all the calamities they suffer, not that through them they might obtain a British constitution. Rather, they plunged themselves headlong into those calamities to *prevent* themselves from settling into that constitution, or into anything resembling it.

CONFIDENCE AND JEALOUSY.

Confidence might become a vice, and jealousy a virtue, according to circumstances. Of all public virtues, *confidence* was the most dangerous; and of all public vices, *jealousy* in a house of commons was the most tolerable — especially where the number and the charge of standing armies in time of peace was the question.

ECONOMY OF INJUSTICE.

Strange as this scheme of conduct in ministry is, and inconsistent with all just policy, it is still true to itself and faithful to its own perverted order. Those who are bountiful to *crimes*, will be rigid to *merit*, and penurious to *service*. Their penury is even held out as a blind and cover to their prodigality. The economy of injustice, is to furnish resources for the fund of corruption. Then they pay off their protection to great crimes and great criminals, by being inexorable to the paltry frailties of little men. And these modern flagellants are sure, with a rigid fidelity, to whip their own enormities on the vicarious back of every small offender.

SUBSISTENCE AND REVENUE.

The benefits of heaven to any community ought never to be connected with political arrangements, or made to depend on the personal conduct of princes. In this, the mistake, or error, or neglect, or distress, or passion of a moment on either side, may bring famine on

millions, and ruin an innocent nation perhaps for ages. The means of the *subsistence* of mankind should be as immutable as the laws of nature, let power and dominion take what course they may.

AUTHORITY AND VENALITY.

It is difficult for the most wise and upright government to correct the abuses of remote, delegated power, productive of unmeasured wealth, and protected by the boldness and strength of the same ill-gotten riches. These abuses, full of their own wild native vigour, will grow and flourish under mere neglect. But where the supreme authority, not content with winking at the rapacity of its inferior instruments, is so shameless and corrupt as to openly give bounties and premiums for disobedience to its laws — when it will not trust to the activity of avarice in the pursuit of its own gains; when it secures public robbery by all the careful jealousy and attention with which it ought to protect property from such violence — the commonwealth then has become totally perverted from its purposes. Neither God nor man will long endure it; nor will it long endure itself. In that case, there is an unnatural infection, a pestilential taint fermenting in the constitution of society, which fever and convulsions of some kind or other must throw off; or in which the vital powers, worsted in an unequal struggle, are pushed back upon themselves, and by a reversal of their whole functions, fester unto gangrene and death. And instead of what was but just now the delight and boast of the creation, there will be cast out in the face of the sun, a bloated, putrid, noisome carcass, full of stench, and poison — an offence, a horror, a lesson to the world.

PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN AND PRIVILEGE OF PARLIAMENT.

It is the undoubted prerogative of the crown to dissolve parliament. But we beg leave to lay before his majesty that it is, of all the trusts vested in his majesty, the most critical and delicate, and that in which this house has the most reason to require not only the good faith, but the *favour* of the crown. His commons are not always on a par with his ministers in an application to popular judgment. It is not in the power of the members of this house to go to their election at the moment which is the most favourable to them. It is in the power of the crown to choose a time for their dissolution while great and arduous matters of state and legislation are depending, which may be easily misunderstood, and which cannot be fully explained, before that misunderstanding may prove fatal to the honour that belongs, and to the consideration that is due to members of parliament. With his majesty is the gift of all the rewards, the honours, distinctions, favour, and graces of the state; with his majesty is the mitigation of all the rigours of the law. And we rejoice to see the crown possessed of trusts calculated to obtain goodwill, and charged with duties which are popular and pleasing. *Our* trusts are of a different kind; *our* duties are harsh and invidious in their nature; and justice and safety are all we can expect in the exercise of them. We are to offer salutary counsel, which is not always pleasing. We are to inquire and to accuse. And the objects of our inquiry and charge will be for the most part persons of wealth, power, and extensive connections.

We are to make rigid laws for the preservation of revenue, which of necessity more or less confine some action, or restrain some function, which before was free. What is the most

critical and invidious of all, the whole body of the public impositions *originate from us*, and the hand of the House of Commons is seen and felt in every burden that presses on the people. While ultimately we are serving *them*, and in the first instance, while we are serving *his majesty*, it will be hard indeed if we should see a House of Commons the victim of its zeal and fidelity, sacrificed by his ministers to those very popular discontents which shall be excited by our dutiful endeavours for the security and greatness of his throne. No other consequence can result from such an example, but that in future, the House of Commons, consulting its *safety* at the expense of its *duties*, and suffering the whole energy of the state to be relaxed, will shrink from every service which, however necessary, is of a great and arduous nature — or that, willing to provide for the public necessities, and at the same time to secure the means of performing that task, they will exchange *independence* for *protection*, and will court a subservient existence through the favour of those ministers of state, or those secret advisers, who should themselves stand in awe of the commons of this realm.

A House of Commons respected by his ministers is essential to his majesty's service. It is fit that they should yield to parliament, and not that parliament should be newly modelled until it is fitted to their purposes. If our authority is only to be held up when we coincide in opinion with his majesty's advisers, but is to be set at nought the moment it differs from them, the House of Commons will sink into a mere appendage of administration. And it will lose that independent character which, inseparably connecting the honour and reputation with the acts of this house, enables us to afford a real, effective, and substantial support to his government. It is the deference shown to our opinion when we dissent from the servants of the crown, which alone can give authority to the proceedings of this house when it concurs with their measures.

That authority once lost, the credit of his majesty's crown will be impaired in the eyes of all nations. Foreign powers, who may yet wish to revive a friendly intercourse with this nation, will look in vain for that hold which gave a connection with Great Britain the preference to an alliance with any other state. A House of Commons, of which ministers were known to stand in awe, where everything was necessarily discussed on principles fit to be openly and publicly avowed, and which could not be retracted or varied without danger, furnished a ground of confidence in the public faith, which the engagement of no state dependent on the fluctuation of personal favour, and private advice, can ever pretend to. If faith with the House of Commons, the grand security for the national faith itself, can be broken with impunity, a wound is given to the political importance of Great Britain, which will not easily be healed.

BURKE AND FOX.

His confidence in Mr. Fox was such,⁴⁰ and so ample, as to be almost implicit. That he was not ashamed to avow that degree of docility. That when the choice is well made, it strengthens instead of oppressing our intellect. That he who calls in the aid of an equal understanding doubles his own. He who profits from a superior understanding, raises his

⁴⁰ Burke is speaking of himself in third person, so as not to detract from the honor due Fox. — WHG

powers to a level with the height of the superior understanding he unites with. He had found the benefit of such a junction, and would not lightly depart from it. He wished almost, on all occasions, that his sentiments were understood to be conveyed in Mr. Fox's words. And he wished, as among the greatest benefits he could wish the country, an eminent share of power to that right honourable gentleman. It was because he knew that, to his great and masterly understanding, he had joined the greatest possible degree of that natural moderation which is the best corrective of power; that he was of the most artless, candid, open, and benevolent disposition; disinterested in the extreme; of a temper mild and placable even to a fault; without one drop of gall in his whole constitution.

PEERS AND COMMONS.

The commons have the deepest interest in the purity and integrity of the peerage. The peers dispose of all the property in the kingdom, in the last resort; and they dispose of it on their honour and not on their oaths, as all the members of every other tribunal in the kingdom must do — though in them the proceeding is not conclusive. We have, therefore, a right to demand that no application shall be made to peers of such a nature as may give room to call into question, much less to attain our sole security for all that we possess. This corrupt proceeding appeared to the House of Commons — who are the natural guardians of the purity of parliament, and of the purity of every branch of judicature — a most reprehensible and dangerous practice, tending to shake the very foundation of the authority of the House of Peers; and they branded it as such by their resolution.

NATURAL SELF-DESTRUCTION.

The French had shown themselves the ablest architects of ruin that had hitherto existed in the world. In that very short space of time, they had completely pulled down to the ground their monarchy, their church, their nobility, their law, their revenue, their army, their navy, their commerce, their arts, and their manufactures. They had done their business for us as rivals, in a way in which twenty Ramilies or Blenheims could never have done it. Were we absolute conquerors, and France were to lie prostrate at our feet, we would be ashamed to send a commission to settle their affairs, which could impose so hard a law upon the French, and so destructive of all their consequence as a nation, as they had imposed on themselves.

THE CARNATIC IN INDIA.

The Carnatic is a country not much inferior in extent to England. Figure to yourself, Mr. Speaker, the land in whose representative chair you sit; figure to yourself the form and fashion of your sweet and cheerful country from Thames to Trent, north and south, and from the Irish to the German sea, east and west, emptied and embowelled by so accomplished a desolation (may God avert the omen of our crimes!). Extend your imagination a little further, and then suppose your ministers taking a survey of this scene of waste and desolation. What would be your thoughts if you should be informed that they were computing how much had been the amount of the excises, how much the customs, how much the land and malt-tax, in order that they should charge (take it in the most favourable light) for public service, upon the relics of the satiated vengeance of relentless enemies, the

whole of what England had yielded in the most exuberant seasons of peace and abundance? What would you call it? To call it *tyranny sublimed into madness*, would be too faint an image. Yet this very madness is the principle upon which the ministers at your right hand have proceeded in their estimate of the revenues of the Carnatic when they were providing, not supply for the establishments of its *protection*, but rewards for the authors of its *ruin*.

Every day you are fatigued and disgusted with this cant, “the Carnatic is a country that will soon recover, and become instantly as prosperous as ever.” They think they are talking to innocents who will believe that by the sowing of dragons’ teeth, men may come up ready grown and ready armed. Those who will take the trouble to consider (for it requires no great reach of thought, no very profound knowledge) the manner in which mankind are increased, and countries are cultivated, will regard all this raving as it ought to be regarded. In order that the people, after a long period of vexation and plunder, may be in a condition to maintain government, government must begin by maintaining them. Here the road to economy lies not through receipt, but through expense; and in that country, nature has given no shortcut to your object. Men must propagate like other animals, *by the mouth*. Never did oppression light the nuptial torch; never did extortion and usury spread out the genial bed. Does any one of you think that England, so wasted, would, under such a nursing attendance, so rapidly and cheaply recover? But he is meanly acquainted with either England or India, who does not know that England would a thousand times sooner resume population, fertility, and what ought to be the ultimate secretion from both — *revenue*, than such a country as the Carnatic. The Carnatic is not by the bounty of nature a fertile soil. The general size of its cattle is proof enough that it is much otherwise. It is some days since I moved that a curious and interesting map, kept in the India house, should be laid before you. The India House is not yet in readiness to send it. I have therefore brought down my own copy, and there it lies for the use of any gentleman who may think such a matter worthy of his attention. It is indeed a noble map, and of noble things. But it is decisive against the golden dreams and sanguine speculations of avarice run mad. In addition to what you know must be the case in every part of the world (the necessity of a previous provision of habitation, seed, stock, capital), that map will show you that the uses of the influences of Heaven itself are a work of art in that country. The Carnatic is refreshed by few or no living brooks or running streams, and it has rain only at a season. But its production of rice exacts the use of water subject to perpetual command. *This* is the national bank of the Carnatic, on which it must have a perpetual credit, or it perishes irretrievably. For that reason, in the happier times of India, a number, almost incredible, of reservoirs have been made in chosen places throughout the whole country. They are formed for the greater part of mounds of earth and stones, with sluices of solid masonry; the whole constructed with admirable skill and labour, and maintained at a mighty charge. In the territory contained in that map alone, I have been at the trouble of reckoning the reservoirs, and they amount to upwards of eleven hundred, from the extent of two or three acres to five miles in circuit. From these reservoirs, currents are occasionally drawn over the fields; and these watercourses again call for a considerable expense to keep them properly scoured and duly leveled. Taking the district in that map as a measure, there cannot be in the Carnatic and Tanjore, fewer than ten thousand of these reservoirs of the larger and middling dimensions, to say nothing of those for domestic services, and the uses of religious purification. These are not the enterprises of

your power, nor in a style of magnificence suited to the taste of your minister. These are the monuments of *real kings* who were the fathers of their people; *testators* to a posterity which they embraced as their own. These were the grand sepulchres built by ambition; but by the ambition of an insatiable benevolence, which not contented with reigning in the dispensation of happiness during the contracted term of human life, had strained with all the reachings and graspings of a vivacious mind, to extend the dominion of their bounty beyond the limits of nature, and to perpetuate themselves through generations of generations, the guardians, the protectors, the nourishers of mankind.

ABSTRACT THEORY OF HUMAN LIBERTY.

I love a manly, moral, regulated liberty as well as any gentleman of that society, whoever he may be. And perhaps I have given as good proofs of my attachment to that cause in the whole course of my public conduct. I think I envy liberty as little as they do, to any other nation. But I cannot stand forward and give praise or blame to anything which relates to human actions and human concerns, on a simple view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which pass for nothing with some gentlemen) give in reality to every political principle, its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind. Abstractedly speaking, government, as well as liberty, is *good*. Yet ten years ago, in common sense, could I have congratulated France on her enjoyment of a government (for she then *had* a government) without inquiring what the nature of that government was, or how it was administered? Can I now congratulate the same nation upon its freedom? Is it because liberty in the abstract may be classed among the blessings of mankind, that I am seriously to felicitate a *madman* who has escaped from the protecting restraint and wholesome darkness of his cell, on his restoration to the enjoyment of light and liberty? Am I to congratulate a highwayman and murderer who has broken prison, upon the recovery of his natural rights? This would be to act over again the scene of the criminals condemned to the galleys, and their heroic deliverer, the metaphysic knight of the sorrowful countenance.

When I see the spirit of liberty in action, I see a strong principle at work; and for a while, this is all I can possibly know of it. The wild *gas*, the fixed air, has plainly broken loose. But we ought to suspend our judgment until the first effervescence is a little subsided, till the liquor is cleared, and until we see something deeper than the agitation of a troubled and frothy surface. I must be tolerably sure before I venture to publicly congratulate men upon a blessing, that they have really *received* one. Flattery corrupts both the receiver and the giver; and adulation is not of more service to the people than to kings. I should therefore suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France until I was informed how it had been combined with government; with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with solidity and property; with peace and order; with civil and social manners. All these (in their way) are good things too; and without them, liberty is not a benefit while it lasts, and it is not likely to continue long. The effect of liberty on individuals is that they may do what they please. We ought to see what it will please them to do before we risk congratulations, which may soon be turned into complaints. Prudence would dictate this in

the case of separate, insulated, private men. But liberty, when men act in *bodies*, is **power**. Considerate people, before they declare themselves, will observe the use which is made of **power**; and particularly of so arduous a thing as *new* power in *new* persons, of whose principles, tempers, and dispositions they have little or no experience, and in situations where those who appear to be the most stirring in the scene, may possibly not be the real movers.

POLITICS AND THE PULPIT.

Supposing, however, that something like moderation were visible in this political sermon, yet *politics* and the *pulpit* are terms that have little agreement. No sound ought to be heard in the church but the healing voice of Christian charity. The cause of civil liberty and civil government gains as little as that of religion, by this confusion of duties. Those who quit their proper character to assume what does not belong to them, are for the greater part, ignorant both of the character they leave, and of the character they assume. Wholly unacquainted with the world in which they are so fond of meddling, and inexperienced in all its affairs on which they pronounce with so much confidence, they have nothing of *politics* but the *passions* they excite. Surely the church is a place where one day's truce ought to be allowed to the dissensions and animosities of mankind.

IDEA OF FRENCH REVOLUTION.

It appears to me as if I were in a great crisis, not of the affairs of France alone, but of all Europe, and perhaps of *more* than Europe. All circumstances taken together, the French revolution is the most astonishing that has hitherto happened in the world. The most wonderful things are brought about in many instances by the most absurd and ridiculous *means*; in the most ridiculous *modes*; and apparently by the most contemptible *instruments*. Everything seems out of nature in this strange chaos of levity and ferocity, and of all sorts of crimes jumbled together with all sorts of follies. In viewing this monstrous tragi-comic scene, the most opposite passions necessarily succeed, and sometimes mix with each other in the mind — alternate contempt and indignation; alternate laughter and tears; alternate scorn and horror.

PATRIOTIC DISTINCTION.

I certainly have the honour to belong to more clubs than one in which the constitution of this kingdom and the principles of the glorious Revolution are held in high reverence. And I reckon myself among the most forward in my zeal for maintaining that constitution and those principles in their utmost purity and vigour. It is because I do so, that I think it necessary for me that there should be no mistake. Those who cultivate the memory of our revolution, and those who are attached to the constitution of this kingdom, will take good care how they are involved with persons who, under the pretext of zeal towards the Revolution and constitution, too frequently wander from their true principles, and are ready on every occasion to depart from the firm but cautious and deliberate spirit which produced the one, and which presides in the other.

KINGLY POWER NOT BASED ON POPULAR CHOICE.

According to this spiritual doctor of politics, if his majesty does not owe his crown to the choice of his people, he is *no lawful king*. Now, nothing can be more untrue than that the crown of this kingdom is so held by his majesty. Therefore, if you follow their rule, the king of Great Britain (who most certainly does not owe his high office to any form of popular election) is in no respect better than the rest of the gang of usurpers who reign, or rather rob, all over the face of this our miserable world, without any sort of right or title to the allegiance of their people. The policy of this general doctrine, so qualified, is evident enough. The propagators of this political gospel are in hopes that their abstract principle (their principle that a popular choice is necessary to the legal existence of the sovereign magistracy) would be overlooked, while the king of Great Britain was not affected by it. In the meantime, the ears of their congregations would be gradually habituated to it, as if it were a first principle admitted without dispute. For the present, it would only operate as a theory pickled in the preserving juices of pulpit eloquence, and laid by for future use. *Condo et compono quae mox depromere possim*.⁴¹ By this policy, while our government is soothed with a reservation in its favour, to which it has no claim, the security which it has in common with all governments (so far as *opinion* is security) is taken away.

Thus these politicians proceed, while little notice is taken of their doctrines. But when they come to be examined upon the plain meaning of their words, and the direct tendency of their doctrines, then equivocations and slippery construction come into play. When they say the king owes his crown to the choice of his people, and is therefore the only lawful sovereign in the world, they will perhaps tell us they mean to say no more than that some of the king's predecessors have been called to the throne by some sort of choice, and therefore he owes his crown to the choice of his people. Thus, by a miserable subterfuge, they hope to render their proposition safe by rendering it nugatory. They are welcome to the asylum they seek for their offence, since they take refuge in their folly. For if you admit this interpretation, how does their idea of *election* differ from our idea of *inheritance*? And how does the settlement of the crown in the Brunswick line derived from James I, come to legalize our monarchy, rather than that of any of the neighbouring countries? At some time or other, to be sure, all the beginners of dynasties were chosen by those who called them to govern.

There is ground enough for the opinion that all the kingdoms of Europe, at a remote period, were *elective*, with more or fewer limitations in the objects of their choice. But whatever kings might have been here or elsewhere a thousand years ago, or in whatever manner the ruling dynasties of England or France may have begun, the king of Great Britain is, at this day, king by a fixed rule of succession, according to the laws of his country. And while the legal conditions of the compact of sovereignty are performed by him (as they *are* performed), he holds his crown in contempt of the choice of the Revolution Society, who have not a single vote for a king among them, either individually or collectively — though I have no doubt they would soon erect themselves into an electoral college, if things were ripe to give effect to their claim. His majesty's heirs and successors, each in his time and order,

⁴¹ I amass and arrange my stores, so that afterwards I may be able to bring them forth. — Horace, *Epistles*, I. i. 12.

will come to the crown with the same contempt of *their choice*, with which his majesty has *succeeded* to that crown he wears.

Whatever may be the success of evasion in explaining away the gross error of *fact*, which supposes that his majesty (though he holds it in concurrence with the *wishes*) owes his crown to the *choice* of his people, yet nothing can evade their full explicit declaration concerning the principle of a right in the people to *choose*, which right is directly maintained and tenaciously adhered to. All the oblique insinuations concerning election bottom in this proposition, and are referable to it. Lest the foundation of the king's exclusive legal title should pass for a mere rant of adulatory freedom, the political divine proceeds dogmatically to assert that, by the principles of the Revolution, the people of England have acquired three fundamental rights, all of which with him compose one system, and lie together in one short sentence; namely, that we have acquired a right,

1. "To choose our own governors."
2. "To cashier them for misconduct."
3. "To frame a government for ourselves."

This new and hitherto unheard of bill of rights, though made in the name of the whole people, belongs to those gentlemen and their faction only. The body of the people of England have no share in it. They utterly disclaim it. They will resist the practical assertion of it with their lives and fortunes. They are bound to do so by the laws of their country, made at the time of that very Revolution which is appealed to in favour of the fictitious rights claimed by the society which abuses its name.

PREACHING A DEMOCRACY OF DISSENT.

If the noble *seekers* should find nothing to satisfy their pious fancies in the old staple of the national church, or in all the rich variety to be found in the well-assorted warehouses of the dissenting congregations, then Dr. Price ⁴² advises them to improve upon non-conformity; and to set up, *each of them*, a separate meeting-house upon his own particular principles. It is somewhat remarkable that this reverend divine should be so earnest for setting up new churches, and so perfectly indifferent concerning the *doctrine* which may be taught in them. His zeal is of a curious character. It is not for the propagation of his own opinions, but of *any* opinions. It is not for the diffusion of truth, but for the spreading of contradiction. Let the noble teachers but dissent; it is no matter from whom or from what. This great point, once secured, it is taken for granted that their religion will be rational and manly. I doubt whether religion would reap all the benefits which the calculating divine computes from this "great company of great preachers." It would certainly be a valuable addition of nondescripts to the ample collection of known classes, genera, and species, which at present beautify the *hortus siccus* (herbarium) of dissent. A sermon from a noble duke, or a noble marquis, or a noble earl, or bold baron, would certainly increase and diversify the amusements of this town, which begins to grow satiated with the uniform round of its vapid

⁴² Richard Price (1723-1791) – Welsh moral philosopher, Arian nonconformist, mathematician, political reformer, and pamphleteer. He was an influential supporter of the American and French Revolutions. – WHG

dissipations. I should only stipulate that these new Mess-Johns ⁴³ in robes and coronets, should keep some sort of bounds in the democratic and levelling principles which are expected from their titled pulpits. I dare say the new evangelists will disappoint the hopes that are conceived of them. They will not become (literally as well as figuratively) polemic divines, nor be disposed to drill their congregations so that they may, as in former blessed times, preach their doctrines to regiments of dragoons, and to corps of infantry and artillery. Such arrangements, however favourable to the cause of *compulsory freedom*, both civil and religious, may not be equally conducive to the national tranquility. These few restrictions I hope are no great stretches of intolerance, nor very violent exertions of despotism.

THE JARGON OF REPUBLICANISM.

Dr. Price in this sermon condemns very properly the practice of gross, adulatory addresses to kings. Instead of this fulsome style, he proposes that his majesty should be told on occasions of congratulation, that “he is to consider himself as more properly the *servant* than the *sovereign* of his people.” For a compliment, this new form of address does not seem to be very soothing. Those who are servants in name as well as in effect, do not like to be told of their situation, their duty, and their obligations. The slave in the old play, tells his master, “*Haec commemoratio est quasi exprobatio*” (This commemoration is almost like a rebuke). It is not pleasant as a compliment; and it is not wholesome as an instruction. After all, if the king were to bring himself to echo this new kind of address — to adopt it in terms, and even to take the appellation of *Servant of the People* as his royal style — I cannot imagine how either he or we should be much mended by it. I have seen very assuming letters signed, *Your most obedient, humble servant*. The proudest denomination that was ever endured on earth took a title of still greater humility than that which is now proposed for sovereigns by the Apostle of Liberty.⁴⁴ Kings and nations were trampled upon by the foot of one calling himself “the Servant of Servants;” and mandates for deposing sovereigns were sealed with the signet of “the Fisherman.”⁴⁵

I would have considered all this as no more than a sort of flippant, vain discourse in which, as in an unsavoury fume, several persons allow the spirit of liberty to evaporate — were it not plainly in support of the idea and a part of the scheme of “cashiering kings for misconduct.” In *that* light, it is worth some observation.

Kings, in one sense, are undoubtedly the servants of the people because their power has no other rational end than that of the general advantage. But it is *not* true that they are, in the ordinary sense (by our constitution at least), anything like *servants* — the essence of whose situation is to obey the commands of some other, and to be removable at pleasure. But the king of Great Britain obeys no other person. All other persons are under *him*, individually and collectively too, and they owe to him a legal obedience. The law, which knows neither to flatter nor to insult, calls this high magistrate, not our *servant*, as this humble divine calls

⁴³ *Mess John* is an old Scottish epithet for a Catholic priest. The English equivalent is “Jack Priest.” – WHG

⁴⁴ Apparently a title applied by some to Dr. Price. - WHG

⁴⁵ These were the self-proclaimed titles of Gregory I, who was pope from 590-604 AD. - WHG

him, but “*our sovereign Lord the King.*” And on our parts, we have learned to speak only the primitive language of the law, and not the confused jargon of their Babylonian pulpits.

CONSERVATIVE PROGRESS OF INHERITED FREEDOM.

The policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection; or rather the happy effect of following nature, which is wisdom *without* reflection, and above it. A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors. Besides, the people of England well know that the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation, and a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free; but it secures what it acquires. Whatever advantages are obtained by a state proceeding on these maxims, are locked fast as in a sort of family settlement; grasped as in a kind of mortmain forever.⁴⁶ By a constitutional policy working after the pattern of nature, we receive, we hold, and we transmit our government and our privileges in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives. The institutions of policy, the goods of fortune, the gifts of Providence, are handed down *to* us, and *from* us, in the same course and order. Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts, in which — by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race — the whole at one time is never old, or middle-aged, or young. But in a condition of unchangeable constancy, it moves on through the varied tenour of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus, by preserving the method of *nature* in the conduct of the state, in what we improve, we are never wholly new; and in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete. By adhering to our forefathers in this manner and on those principles, we are guided not by the superstition of antiquarians, but by the spirit of philosophic analogy. In this choice of inheritance, we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood — binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars.

Through the same plan of a conformity to nature in our artificial institutions, and by calling in the aid of her unerring and powerful instincts to fortify the fallible and feeble contrivances of our reason, we have derived several other and not small benefits, from considering our *liberties* in the light of an *inheritance*. Always acting as if in the presence of canonized forefathers, the spirit of freedom — leading in itself to misrule and excess — is tempered with an awful gravity. This idea of a liberal descent inspires us with a sense of habitual native dignity, which prevents that upstart insolence almost inevitably adhering to and disgracing those who are the first acquirers of any distinction. By this means our liberty becomes a noble freedom. It carries an imposing and majestic aspect. It has a pedigree and illustrating ancestors. It has its bearings and its ensigns armorial.⁴⁷ It has its gallery of

⁴⁶ *Mortmain*: inalienable real property (it is held in perpetuity). - WHG

⁴⁷ The image is an armory with a coat of arms at its entrance, and a portrait gallery of forbears. – WHG

portraits; its monumental inscriptions; its records, evidences, and titles. We procure reverence to our civil institutions on the principle upon which nature teaches us to revere individual men on account of their age, and on account of those from whom they are descended. All your sophisters cannot produce anything better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom, than the course that we have pursued — we who have chosen our nature rather than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions, for the great conservatories and magazines of our rights and privileges.

CONSERVATION AND CORRECTION.

A state without the means of some *change* is without the means of its *conservation*. Without such means it might even risk the loss of that part of the constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve. The two principles of conservation and correction operated strongly at the two critical periods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England found itself without a king. At both those periods, the nation had lost the bond of union in their ancient edifice. They did not, however, dissolve the whole fabric. On the contrary, in both cases they regenerated the deficient part of the old constitution through the parts which were not impaired. They kept these old parts exactly as they were, so that the part recovered might be suited to them. They acted by the ancient organized states in the shape of their old organization, and not by the organic molecule of a disbanded people. At no time, perhaps, did the sovereign legislature manifest a more tender regard to that fundamental principle of British constitutional policy than at the time of the Revolution, when it deviated from the direct line of hereditary succession. The crown was carried somewhat out of the line in which it had moved before; but the new line was derived from the same stock. It was still a line of hereditary descent; still an hereditary descent in the same blood, though an hereditary descent qualified with Protestantism. When the legislature altered the direction, but kept the principle, they showed that they held it inviolable.

HEREDITARY SUCCESSION OF ENGLISH CROWN.

Unquestionably there was at the Revolution, in the person of King William, a small and a temporary deviation from the strict order of a regular hereditary succession. But it is against all genuine principles of jurisprudence to draw a principle from a law made in a special case, and regarding an individual person. *Privilegium non transit in exemplum*. (The right of an individual does not translate into a general rule).⁴⁸ If ever there was a time favourable for establishing the principle that a king of popular choice was the only legal king, without all doubt it was at the Revolution. Its not being done at *that* time is a proof that the nation was of opinion it ought not to be done at *any* time. There is no person so completely ignorant of our history as not to know that the majority in parliament of both parties were so little disposed to anything resembling that principle, that at first they were determined to place the vacant crown, not on the head of the prince of Orange, but on that of his wife Mary, daughter of King James, the eldest born of the issue of that king, which they acknowledged as undoubtedly his. It would be to repeat a very trite story to recall to your memory all those

⁴⁸ This is a maxim of Roman law. — WHG

circumstances which demonstrated that their accepting King William was not properly a *choice*. But to all those who did not wish, in effect, to recall King James, or to deluge their country in blood and to again bring their religion, laws, and liberties into the peril they had just escaped, it was an act of *necessity*, in the strictest moral sense in which necessity can be taken.

So far is it from being true, that we acquired a right by the Revolution to elect our kings, that if we had possessed it before, the English nation did at that time most solemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themselves and for all their posterity forever. These gentlemen may value themselves as much as they please on their Whig principles. But I never desire to be thought a better Whig than Lord Somers; or to understand the principles of the Revolution better than those by whom it was brought about; or to read in the Declaration of Right any mysteries unknown to those whose penetrating style has engraved in our ordinances, and in our hearts, the words and spirit of that immortal law.

It is true that, aided with the powers derived from force and opportunity, the nation was at that time, in some sense, free to take whatever course it pleased for filling the throne. But it was only free to do so upon the same grounds on which they might have wholly abolished their monarchy and every other part of their constitution.

However, they did not think such bold changes within their commission. It is indeed difficult, perhaps impossible, to give limits to the mere *abstract competence* of the supreme power, such as was exercised by parliament at that time. But the limits of a *moral competence* — subjecting (even in powers more indisputably sovereign) occasional will to permanent reason, and to the steady maxims of faith, justice, and fixed fundamental policy — are perfectly intelligible, and perfectly binding upon those who exercise any authority under any name or under any title in the state. The House of Lords, for instance, is not *morally competent* to dissolve the House of Commons; no, nor even to dissolve itself, nor if it would, to abdicate its portion in the legislature of the kingdom. Though a king may abdicate for his own person, he cannot abdicate for the monarchy. By as strong, or by a *stronger* reason, the House of Commons cannot renounce its share of authority. The engagement and pact of society which generally goes by the name of *the constitution*, forbids such invasion and such surrender. The constituent parts of a state are obliged to hold their public faith with each other, and with all those who derive any serious interest under their engagements, as much as the whole state is bound to keep its faith with separate communities. Otherwise, competence and power would soon be confounded, and no law would be left but the will of a prevailing force. On this principle, the succession of the crown has always been what it now is, an hereditary succession by law. In the old line, it was a succession by the *common law*; in the new, by the *statute law* operating on the principles of the common law — not changing the substance, but regulating the mode and describing the persons. Both these descriptions of law are of the same force, and are derived from an equal authority emanating from the common agreement and original compact of the state, *communi sponsione reipublicae* (the common sponsorship of the republic). And as such, they are equally binding on king people too, as long as the terms are observed, and they continue the same body politic.

LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY.

If we were to know nothing of this assembly except by its title and function, no colours could paint to the imagination anything more venerable. In that light, the mind of an inquirer, subdued by such an awful image as that of the virtue and wisdom of a whole people collected into one focus, would pause and hesitate in condemning things even of the very worst aspect. Instead of blameable, they would appear only mysterious. But no name, no power, no function, no artificial institution whatsoever, can make the men of whom any system of authority is composed, any other than God, and nature, and education, and their habits of life have made them. The people do not have capacities beyond these to give. Virtue and wisdom may be the objects of their choice; but their choice confers neither the one nor the other on those upon whom they lay their ordaining hands. They have not the engagement of nature, they have not the promise of revelation, for any such power.

OUR CONSTITUTION NOT FABRICATED, BUT INHERITED.

The Revolution was made to preserve our *ancient*, indisputable laws and liberties, and that *ancient* constitution of government which is our only security for law and liberty. If you are desirous of knowing the spirit of our constitution, and the policy which predominated in that great period which has secured it to this hour, pray look for both in our histories, in our records, in our acts of parliament, and journals of parliament, and *not* in the sermons of the Old Jewry,⁴⁹ and the after-dinner toasts of the Revolution Society.⁵⁰ In the former you will find other ideas and another language. Such a claim is as ill-suited to our temper and wishes as it is unsupported by any appearance of authority. The very idea of the fabrication of a new government is enough to fill us with disgust and horror. We wished at the period of the Revolution, and we now wish, to derive all we possess as *an inheritance from our forefathers*. Upon that body and stock of inheritance, we have taken care not to inoculate any scion (offshoot) alien to the nature of the original plant. All the reformations we have hitherto made have proceeded upon the principle of reverence to antiquity. And I hope, no, I am *persuaded* that all those which possibly may be made hereafter, will be carefully formed upon analogical precedent, authority, and example.

Our oldest reformation is that of Magna Charta. You will see that Sir Edward Coke, that great oracle of our law, and indeed all the great men who follow him, to Blackstone, are industrious to prove the pedigree of our liberties. They endeavour to prove that the ancient charter, the Magna Charta of King John, was connected with another positive charter from Henry I, and that both the one and the other were nothing more than a re-affirmance of the still more ancient standing law of the kingdom. In the matter of fact, for the greater part, these authors appear to be in the right; perhaps not always. But if the lawyers mistake in some particulars, it proves my position still more strongly, because it demonstrates the

⁴⁹ The *Old Jewry* was a Jewish ghetto in London. It was formed in the 12th c. by Henry I, as a safe haven for untitled Jewish financiers and their families, who had made loans to the king at interest. They were expelled in 1290 and only allowed back by Oliver Cromwell in 1657, who defeated the Royalists. So this refers to that class conflict. – WHG

⁵⁰ The London Revolution Society was formed in 1788 to commemorate the centennial of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It was one of several radical societies in Britain in the 1790s, advocating for the French Revolution. It was disbanded when their activities and meetings were labelled seditious and punishable by law.

powerful prepossession towards antiquity, with much the minds of all our lawyers and legislators, and of all the people whom they wish to influence, have been always filled — and the stationary policy of this kingdom in considering their most sacred rights and franchises as an *inheritance*.

In the famous law of the 3rd of Charles I, called the *Petition of Right*, the parliament says to the king, “Your subjects have *inherited* this freedom,” claiming their franchises not on abstract principles “as the rights of men,” but as the rights of Englishmen, and as a patrimony derived from their forefathers. Selden and the other profoundly learned men who drew this petition of right, were as well acquainted, at least, with all the general theories concerning the “rights of men,” as any of the discourses in our pulpits, or on your tribune — full as well as Dr. Price, or as the Abbe Sieyes. But for reasons worthy of that practical wisdom which superseded their theoretic science, they preferred this positive, recorded, *hereditary* title to all which can be dear to the man and the citizen, to that vague speculative right which exposed their sure inheritance to be scrambled for and torn to pieces by every wild, litigious spirit.

The same policy pervades all the laws which have since been made for the preservation of our liberties. In the 1st of William and Mary, in the famous statute called the Declaration of Right, the two houses utter not a syllable of “a right to frame a government for themselves.” You will see that their whole care was to secure the religion, laws, and liberties that had been long possessed, and had been lately endangered. “Taking into their most serious consideration the *best* means for making such an establishment that their religion, laws, and liberties, might not be in danger of being again subverted,” they auspicate all their proceedings, by stating as some of those *best* means, “in the *first place*” to do “as their *ancestors in like cases have usually* done for vindicating their *ancient* rights and liberties, to *declare*,” — and then they pray the king and queen, “that it may be *declared* and enacted, that *all and singular* the rights and liberties *asserted and declared*, are the true *ancient* and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom.”

You will observe that, from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right, it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an *entailed inheritance* derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity, as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom — without any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right. By this means, our constitution preserves a unity in so great a diversity of its parts. We have an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and a house of commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties, from a long line of ancestors.

LOW AIMS AND LOW INSTRUMENTS.

When men of rank sacrifice all ideas of dignity to an ambition without a distinct object, and work with low instruments and for low ends, the whole composition becomes low and base. Doesn't something like this now appear in France? Doesn't it produce something ignoble and inglorious? — a kind of meanness in all the prevalent policy? — a tendency in all that is done, to lower along with *individuals*, all the dignity and importance of the *state*? Other revolutions have been conducted by persons who, while they attempted or affected changes

in the commonwealth, sanctified their ambition by advancing the dignity of the people whose peace they troubled. *They had long views*. They aimed at the *rule*, not at the *destruction* of their country. They were men of great civil and great military talents, and if the terror, the ornament of their age. They were not like Jew brokers,⁵¹ contending with each other as to who could best remedy with fraudulent circulation and depreciated paper, the wretchedness and ruin brought on their country by their degenerate councils. The compliment made to one of the great bad men of the old stamp (Cromwell) by his kinsman, a favourite poet of that time, shows what it was that he proposed, and what indeed to a great degree he accomplished in the success of his ambition: —

*“Still as you rise, the state exalted too,
Finds no distemper while ‘tis changed by you:
Changed like the world’s great scene, when without noise
The rising sun night’s vulgar lights destroys.”*⁵²

These disturbers were not so much like men usurping power, as asserting their natural place in society. Their rising was to illuminate and beautify the world. Their conquest over their competitors was by outshining them. The hand that, like a destroying angel, smote the country, communicated to it the force and energy under which it suffered. I do not say (God forbid), *I do not say* that the virtues of such men were to be taken as a balance to their crimes; but they *were* some corrective to their effects. Such was, as I said, our Cromwell. Such were your whole race of Guises, Condes, and Colignis. Such the Richelieus, who in more quiet times acted in the spirit of a civil war.⁵³ Such (better men in a less dubious cause) were your Henry the Fourth and your Sully — though nursed in civil confusions, and not wholly without some of their taint. It is a thing to be wondered at, to see how very soon France, when she had a moment to respire, recovered and emerged from the longest and most dreadful civil war that was ever known in any nation. Why? Because among all their massacres, they had not slain the *mind* in their country. A conscious dignity, a noble pride, a generous sense of glory and emulation, was not extinguished. On the contrary, it was kindled and enflamed. The organs also of the state, however shattered, existed. All the prizes of honour and virtue, all the rewards, all the distinctions, remained.

But your present confusion, like a palsy, has attacked the fountain of life itself. Every person in your country, in a situation to be actuated by a principle of honour, is disgraced and degraded, and can entertain no sensation of life except in a mortified and humiliated indignation. But this generation will quickly pass away. The next generation of the nobility will resemble the artificers and clowns, and money-jobbers, usurers, and Jews, who will always be their *fellows*, sometimes their *masters*. Believe me, Sir, those who attempt to *level*, will never *equalise*. In all societies consisting of various descriptions of citizens, some

⁵¹ Burke is describing class wars in France (between the nobility and the poor); and in England (between the Royalists and the Levelers). Here he likewise distinguishes a *class* of Jews who took advantage of their fellow Jews, to profit by them. That same distinction is found in the New Testament regarding Jewish leaders (Pharisees, Scribes, Elders, and Sadducees), who imposed the law on others, but not themselves. “*Woe to you, hypocrites...*” Mat 23.13-30. — WHG

⁵² Edmund Waller, from *A Panegyric to my Lord Protector* (1655) — WHG

⁵³ The named families were of French nobility, and Richelieu was of the clergy. — WHG

description must be uppermost. The levellers,⁵⁴ therefore, only change and pervert the natural order of things. They load the edifice of society by setting up in the air, what the solidity of the structure requires to be on the ground. The associations of tailors and carpenters of which the republic of Paris, for instance, is composed, cannot be equal to the situation into which, by the worst of usurpations — a usurpation on the prerogatives of nature — you attempt to force them.

The Chancellor of France, at the opening of the states, said in a tone of oratorical flourish, that *all* occupations were honourable. If he meant only that no honest employment was disgraceful, he would not have gone beyond the truth. But in asserting that *anything* is honourable, we imply some distinction in its favour. The occupation of a hair-dresser, or of a working tallow-chandler, cannot be a matter of honour to any person — to say nothing of a number of other more servile employments. Such descriptions of men ought not to suffer oppression from the state. But the state suffers oppression if such as they, either individually or collectively, are permitted to *rule*. In this you think you are combating prejudice; but you are at war with nature.

HOUSE OF COMMONS CONTRASTED WITH FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

The British House of Commons, without shutting its doors to any merit in any class, is (by the sure operation of adequate causes) filled with everything illustrious in rank, in descent, in hereditary and in acquired opulence, in cultivated talents, in military, civil, naval, and politic distinction, that the country can afford. But supposing, what can hardly be supposed as a case, that the House of Commons should be composed in the same manner as the Tiers-Etat ⁵⁵ in France, would this dominion of chicane ⁵⁶ be borne with patience, or even conceived without horror? God forbid I should insinuate anything derogatory to that profession which is another priesthood, administering the rights of sacred justice. But while I revere men in the functions which belong to them, and I would do as much as one man can do to prevent their exclusion from any, I cannot, to flatter them, give the lie to nature. They are good and useful in the *composition*; but they must be mischievous if they preponderate so as to virtually become the *whole*. Their very excellence in their peculiar functions may be far from a qualification for others.

It cannot escape observation, that when men are too much confined to professional and faculty habits, and as it were, inveterate in the recurrent employment of that narrow circle, they are disabled rather than qualified for whatever depends on the knowledge of mankind, on experience in mixed affairs, on a comprehensive, connected view of the various, complicated, external, and internal interests, which go to the formation of that multifarious thing called a *state*. After all, if the House of Commons were to have a wholly professional and faculty composition, what is the power of the House of Commons, circumscribed and

⁵⁴ *Leveller*: a radical who advocates the abolition of social distinctions. — WHG

⁵⁵ The Third Estate, comprised of untitled citizens as distinct from nobility and clergy. For more about this topic, see: <https://pressbooks.nsc.ca/worldhistory/chapter/chapter-12-the-society-of-orders/> — WHG

⁵⁶ *Chicane*: the use of clever underhanded actions to achieve an end; it may involve quibbling over labels. — WHG

shut in by the immoveable barriers of law, usages, positive rules of doctrine and practice, counterpoised by the House of Lords, and every moment of its existence at the discretion of the crown to continue, prorogue (suspend), or dissolve us?

The power of the House of Commons, direct or indirect, is indeed great; and long may it be able to preserve its greatness and the spirit belonging to true greatness, at the full. And it will do so, as long as it can keep the *breakers* of law in India from becoming the *makers* of law for England. The power of the House of Commons, however, when least diminished, is like a drop of water in the ocean, compared to that power residing in a settled majority of your National Assembly. That assembly, since the destruction of the orders,⁵⁷ has no fundamental law, no strict convention, no respected usage to restrain it. Instead of finding themselves obliged to conform to a fixed constitution, they have a power to make a constitution which will conform to their designs. *Nothing in heaven or on earth can serve as a control on them.* What should be the heads, the hearts, the dispositions that are qualified, or that dare not only to make laws under a fixed constitution, but at one beat to strike out a totally new constitution for a great kingdom, and every part of it, from the monarch on the throne to the vestry of a parish? But — “fools rush in where angels fear to tread.” In such a state of unbounded power, for undefined and indefinable purposes, the evil of a moral and almost physical inaptitude of the man to the function, must be the greatest evil we can conceive to happen in the management of human affairs.

PROPERTY, MORE THAN ABILITY, REPRESENTED IN PARLIAMENT.

Nothing is a due and adequate representation of a state that does not represent its *ability*, as well as its *property*. But as ability is a vigorous and active principle, and as property is sluggish, inert, and timid, it never can be safe from the invasions of ability unless, out of all proportion, it is predominant in the representation. It must be represented too in great masses of accumulation, or it is not rightly protected. The characteristic essence of property, formed out of the combined principles of its acquisition and conservation, is to be *unequal*. The great masses, therefore, which excite envy, and tempt rapacity, must be put out of the possibility of danger. Then they form a natural rampart about the lesser properties in all their gradations. The same *quantity* of property, which is divided among many by the natural course of things, does not have the same *operation*. Its defensive power is weakened as it is diffused. In this diffusion, each man’s portion is less than what, in the eagerness of his desires, he may flatter himself to obtain by dissipating the accumulations of others. The plunder of the few would, indeed, give but an inconceivably small share in the distribution to the many. But the many are not capable of making this calculation; and those who lead them to rapine never intend this distribution.

⁵⁷ That is, the two orders of nobility and commoners. He distinguishes the Parliament of England with its House of Lords and House of Commons, from the National Assembly of France, in which there is no such distinction — where “the rabble rule.” This is an elitist view, in which the wealthy and educated fear their fellow citizens who are poor and ignorant. In Burke’s view, such fear is not without cause. — WHG

The power of perpetuating our property in our families is one of the most valuable and interesting circumstances belonging to it, and that which tends most to the perpetuation of society itself. It makes our weakness subservient to our virtue; it grafts benevolence even upon avarice. The possessors of family wealth, and of the distinction which attends hereditary possession (as most concerned in it), are the natural securities for this transmission. With us, the House of Peers is formed upon this principle. It is wholly composed of hereditary property and hereditary distinction; and it is therefore made the third of the legislature; and in the last event, the sole judge of all property in all its subdivisions. The House of Commons, too, is always so composed, in the far greater part — not necessarily, yet in fact. Let those large proprietors be what they will (and they have their chance of being among the best), they are at the very worst, the ballast in the vessel of the commonwealth. For though hereditary wealth and the rank which goes with it, are too much idolized by creeping sycophants, and the blind abject admirers of power, they are too rashly slighted in shallow speculations of the petulant, assuming, short-sighted coxcombs of philosophy.⁵⁸ Some decent, regulated pre-eminence, some preference given to birth (but not exclusive appropriation), is neither unnatural, nor unjust, nor impolitic. It is said that twenty-four million ought to prevail over two hundred thousand. True; if the constitution of a kingdom is a problem of arithmetic. This sort of discourse does well enough with the lamppost for its second. But to men who *may* reason calmly, it is ridiculous. The will of the many, and their interest, must very often differ; and great will be the difference when they make an evil choice.

VIRTUE AND WISDOM QUALIFY FOR GOVERNMENT.

I do not, my dear sir, conceive you to be of that sophisticated, captious spirit, or of that uncandid dullness, as to require, for every general observation or sentiment, an explicit detail of the correctives and exceptions which reason will presume to be included in all the general propositions which come from reasonable men. You do not imagine that I wish to confine power, authority, and distinction to blood, and names, and titles. *No, sir*. There is no qualification for government but virtue and wisdom, actual or presumptive. Wherever they are actually found, they have — in whatever state, condition, profession, or trade — the passport of heaven to human place and honour. Woe to that country which would madly and impiously reject the service of the talents and virtues (civil, military, or religious) that are given to grace and to serve it — and would condemn to obscurity everything formed to diffuse lustre and glory around a state. Woe to that country, too, that passing into the opposite extreme, considers a low education (a mean, contracted view of things, a sordid, mercenary occupation) as a preferable title to command. Everything ought to be open; but not indifferently to every man. No rotation; no appointment by lot; no mode of election operating in the spirit of sortition or rotation, can be generally good in a government that is conversant in extensive objects — because they have no tendency, direct or indirect, to select the man with a view to the duty, or to accommodate the one to the other. I do not hesitate to say that the road to eminence and power, from an obscure condition, should not be made too easy, nor too much a matter of course. If rare merit is the rarest of all rare things, it

⁵⁸ *Coxcomb*: a conceited dandy who is overly impressed by his own accomplishments. — WHG

ought to pass through some sort of probation. The temple of honour ought to be seated on an eminence. If it is opened through virtue, let it be remembered, too, that virtue is never tried except by some difficulty and some struggle.

NATURAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS.

I am far from denying in *theory*, fully as far as my heart is from withholding in *practice* (if I had the power to give or to withhold) the *real* rights of men. In denying their false claims of right, I do not mean to injure those which are real, and are such as their pretended rights would totally destroy. If civil society is made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for which it is made become his right. It is an institution of beneficence; and law itself is only beneficence acting by a rule. Men have a right to live by that rule; they have a right to do justice as between their fellows, whether their fellows are in politic function, or in ordinary occupation. They have a right to the fruits of their industry, and to the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions of their parents; to the nourishment and improvement of their offspring; to instruction in life, and to consolation in death. Whatever each man can separately do without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right to a fair portion of all which society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in his favour. In this partnership, all men have equal *rights*; but not to equal *things*. He that has but five shillings in the partnership, has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he does not have a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint-stock. And as to the share of power, authority, and direction which each individual ought to have in the management of the state, that I must deny to be among the direct original rights of man in civil society. For I have in my contemplation the civil *social* man, and no other. It is a thing to be settled by convention.

If civil society is the offspring of convention, that convention must be its law. That convention must limit and modify all the descriptions of constitution which are formed under it. Every sort of legislative, judicial, or executory power, are its creatures. They can have no being in any other state of things. And how can any man claim, under the conventions of civil society, rights which do not so much as suppose its existence? Rights which are absolutely repugnant to it? One of the first motives to civil society, and which becomes one of its fundamental rules, is *that no man should be judge in his own cause*. By this, each person has at once divested himself of the first fundamental right of uncovenanted man; that is, to judge for himself, and to assert his own cause. He abdicates all right to be his own governor. He inclusively, in great measure, abandons the right of self-defence, the first law of nature. Men cannot enjoy the rights of an *uncivil* and also of a *civil* state together. That he may obtain justice, he gives up his right of determining what it is in points the most essential to him. That he may secure *some* liberty, he makes a surrender in trust of the *whole* of it.

Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence of it; and they exist in much greater clearness, and in a much greater degree of abstract perfection. But their abstract perfection is their practical defect. By having a *right* to everything, they *want* everything. Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to

provide for human *wants*. Men have a right to have these wants provided for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection. This can only be done *by a power outside of themselves*, and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue. In this sense, the *restraints* on men, as well as their *liberties*, are to be reckoned among their rights. But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances, and allow for infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them upon that principle.

The moment you abate anything from the full rights of men (each to govern himself), and you permit any artificial, positive limitation upon those rights — from *that* moment the whole organization of government becomes a consideration of convenience. This is what makes the constitution of a state, and the due distribution of its powers, a matter of the most delicate and complicated skill. It requires a deep knowledge of human nature and human necessities, and of the things which facilitate or obstruct the various ends which are to be pursued by the mechanism of civil institutions. The state is to have recruits to its strength, and remedies to its distempers. What is the use of discussing a man's abstract right to food or medicine? The question is the method of procuring and administering them. In that deliberation I will always advise to call in the aid of the farmer and the physician, rather than the professor of metaphysics. The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is like every other experimental science: it is not to be taught *a priori*. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us in that practical science, because the real effects of moral causes are not always immediate. But that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation; and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces in the beginning. The reverse also happens; and very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements, often have shameful and lamentable conclusions. In states, there are often some obscure and almost latent causes — things which appear of little moment at first view, but on which a very great part of its prosperity or adversity may most essentially depend. The science of government is practical in itself, and intended for such practical purposes. It is a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be. It is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages, the common purposes of society; or to venture upon building it up again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.

These metaphysical rights entering into common life, like rays of light which pierce into a dense medium, are by the laws of nature, refracted from their straight line. Indeed, in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the primitive rights of men undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original direction. The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity; and therefore, no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's nature, or to the

quality of his affairs. When I hear the simplicity of contrivance aimed at and boasted of in any new political constitutions, I am at no loss to decide that the artificers are grossly ignorant of their trade, or totally negligent of their duty. The simple governments are fundamentally defective, to say no worse of them. If you were to contemplate society in but one point of view, all these simple modes of polity are infinitely captivating. In effect each would answer its single end much more perfectly than the more complex is able to attain all its complex purposes. But it is better that the whole should be imperfectly and anomalously answered, than to have some parts provided for with great exactness, while others might be totally neglected or perhaps materially injured, by the over-care of a favourite member.

The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes. And in proportion to their being metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false. The rights of men are in a sort of *middle* — incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned. The rights of men in governments are their advantages, and these are often in balances between differences of good; in compromises sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil. Political reason is a computing principle: adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing *morally*, and not metaphysically or mathematically, true moral denominations.

By these theorists, the *right* of the people is almost always sophistically confounded with their *power*. The body of the community, whenever it can come to act, can meet with no effectual resistance. But till power and right are the same, the whole body of them has no right that is inconsistent with virtue; and the first of all virtues is *prudence*.

MARIE ANTOINETTE.

It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France, then the dauphiness, at Versailles; and I surely never lighted on this orb, which she hardly seemed to touch, a more delightful vision. I saw her just above the horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to move in — glittering like the morning-star, full of life, and splendour, and joy. Oh! what a revolution! and what a heart must I have, to contemplate without emotion that elevation *and that fall!* Little did I dream when she added titles of veneration to those of enthusiastic, distant, respectful love, that she would ever be obliged to carry the sharp antidote against disgrace concealed in that bosom; little did I dream that I should have lived to see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honour and of cavaliers. I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. *But the age of chivalry is gone.* That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever. Never, never more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, is gone! It is *gone* — that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage while it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness.

SPIRIT OF A GENTLEMAN AND THE SPIRIT OF RELIGION.

How much of that prosperous state was owing to the spirit of our old manners and opinions is not easy to say. But as such causes cannot be indifferent in their operation, we must presume that, on the whole, their operation was beneficial.

We are but too apt to consider things in the state in which we find them, without sufficiently advert to the causes by which they have been produced, and possibly may be upheld. Nothing is more certain than that our manners, our civilization, and all the good things which are connected with manners and with civilization have, in this European world of ours, depended for ages upon two principles, and they were indeed the result of both combined. I mean the spirit of a *gentleman* and the spirit of *religion*. The *nobility* and the *clergy* (the one by profession, the other by patronage) preserved learning, even in the midst of arms and confusions, and while governments were still in their causes, rather than formed. Learning paid back to nobility and to priesthood what it received; and paid it with usury, by enlarging their ideas and furnishing their minds. Happy if they had all continued to know their indissoluble union and their proper place! Happy if learning, not debauched by ambition, had been satisfied to continue as the instructor, and not aspired to be the master! Along with its natural protectors and guardians, learning will be cast into the mire, and trodden down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude.

If, as I suspect, modern letters owe more to ancient manners than they are always willing to own, so do other interests which we value fully as much as they are worth. Even commerce, and trade, and manufacture — the gods of our economical politicians — are themselves perhaps but *creatures*; they are themselves but *effects* which, as first causes, we choose to worship. They certainly grew under the same shade in which learning flourished. They too may decay with their natural protecting principles. With you, for the present at least, they all threaten to disappear together. Where trade and manufactures are wanting to a people, and the spirit of nobility and religion remains, sentiment supplies (and not always ill supplies) their place. But if commerce and the arts should be lost in an experiment, to test how well a state may stand without these old fundamental principles, then what sort of a thing must be a nation of gross, stupid, ferocious, and at the same time, poor and sordid barbarians, destitute of religion, honour, or manly pride, possessing nothing at present, and hoping for nothing hereafter?

POWER SURVIVES OPINION.

But power of some kind or other will survive the shock in which manners and opinions perish! And it will find other and worse means for its support. The usurpation which has destroyed ancient principles in order to subvert ancient institutions, will hold power by arts similar to those by which it has acquired it. When the old feudal and chivalrous spirit of *fealty* — which, by freeing kings from fear, freed both kings and subjects from the precaution of tyranny — is extinct in the minds of men, plots and assassinations will be anticipated by preventive murder and preventive confiscation. And also by that long roll of grim and bloody maxims which form the political code of all power, not standing on its own honour and the honour of those who are to obey it. Kings will be tyrants from *policy*, when subjects are rebels from *principle*.

CHIVALRY A MORALIZING CHARM.

This mixed system of opinion and sentiment had its origin in the ancient chivalry. And the principle, though varied in its appearance by the varying state of human affairs, subsisted and influenced through a long succession of generations, even to the time we live in. If it should ever be totally extinguished, the loss I fear will be great. It is this which has given its character to modern Europe. It is this which has distinguished it under all its forms of government, and distinguished it, to its advantage, from the states of Asia and possibly from those states which flourished in the most brilliant periods of the antique world. It was this which, without confounding ranks, had produced a noble equality, and handed it down through all the gradations of social life. It was this opinion which mitigated kings into companions, and raised private men to be fellows with kings. Without force or opposition, it subdued the fierceness of pride and power; it obliged sovereigns to submit to the soft collar of social esteem, compelled stern authority to submit to elegance, and gave a dominating vanquisher of laws to be subdued by manners.

But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions which made power gentle and obedience liberal; which harmonized the different shades of life; and which, by a bland assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private society; are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of *light* and *reason*.⁵⁹ All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation — are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion.

On this scheme of things, a king is but a man, a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal — and an animal not of the highest order. All homage paid to the sex in general, as such, and without distinct views, is to be regarded as romance and folly. Regicide, and parricide, and sacrilege are but fictions of superstition, which corrupt jurisprudence by destroying its simplicity. The murder of a king, or a queen, or a bishop, or a father, are only common homicide. And if the people are by any chance, or in any way, *gainers* by it — then it is a sort of homicide which is mostly pardonable, and into which we should not make too severe a scrutiny.

On the scheme of this barbarous philosophy — which is the offspring of cold hearts and muddy understandings, and which is as void of solid wisdom as it is destitute of all taste and elegance — laws are to be supported only by their own terrors, and by the concern which each individual may find in them from his own private speculations, or can spare to them from his own private interests. In the groves of *their* academy, at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the gallows. Nothing is left which engages the affections on the part of the *commonwealth*. On the principles of this mechanistic philosophy, our institutions can never be embodied (if I may use the expression) in *persons*, so as to create in us love, veneration, admiration, or attachment. But that sort of reason which banishes the affections is incapable of filling their place. These public affections, combined with manners, are required

⁵⁹ Burke refers to the Enlightenment, an Age of Reason, which ended in the desolation of two world wars. — WHG

sometimes as supplements, sometimes as correctives, always as aids to law. The precept given by a wise man, as well as a great critic, for the construction of poems, is equally true as to states: — *Non satis est pulchra esse poemata, dulcia sunt* (It is not enough that the poems are beautiful, they must be sweet).⁶⁰ There ought to be a system of manners in every nation, which a well-formed mind would be disposed to relish. To make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely.

SACREDNESS OF MORAL INSTINCTS.

Why do I feel so differently from the Reverend Dr. Price, and those of his lay flock, who would choose to adopt the sentiments of his discourse? For this plain reason: because it is *natural* that I should; because we are so made as to be affected at such spectacles with melancholy sentiments upon the unstable condition of mortal prosperity and the tremendous uncertainty of human greatness; because in those natural feelings we learn great lessons; because in events like these our passions instruct our reason; because when kings are hurled from their thrones by the Supreme Director of this great drama, and they become the objects of insult to the base, and objects of pity to the good, we behold such disasters in the *moral order*, as we should behold a miracle in the *physical order* of things. We are alarmed into reflection; our minds (as it has long since been observed) are purified by terror and pity; our weak, unthinking pride is humbled under the dispensations of a mysterious wisdom. Some tears might be drawn from me if such a spectacle were exhibited on the stage. I would be truly ashamed of finding in myself that superficial, theatric sense of painted distress, while I could exult over it in real life. With such a perverted mind, I could never venture to show my face at a tragedy. People would think the tears that Garrick formerly, or Siddons not long since, have extorted from me, were the tears of *hypocrisy*. I should know them to be the tears of *folly*.

Indeed, the theatre is a better school of moral sentiments than churches, where the feelings of humanity are thus outraged. Poets who have to deal with an audience not yet graduated in the school of the rights of men, and who must apply themselves to the moral constitution of the heart, would not dare to produce such a triumph as a matter of exultation. There, where men follow their natural impulses, they would not bear the odious maxims of a Machiavelian policy, whether applied to the attainment of monarchical or democratic tyranny. They would reject them on the modern stage, as they once did on the ancient stage, where they could not bear even the hypothetical proposition of such wickedness in the mouth of a personated tyrant, even if suitable to the character he sustained. No theatric audience in Athens would bear what has been borne in the midst of the real tragedy of this triumphal day. Imagine a principal actor, weighing so much actual crime against so much contingent advantage, in scales hung in a shop of horrors, as it were, after putting weights in and out, declaring that the balance was on the side of the *advantages*. They would not bear to see the crimes of new democracy posted as in a ledger, against the crimes of old despotism, and the book-keepers of politics then finding democracy still in debt, but by no means unable or unwilling to pay the balance. In the theatre, the first intuitive glance will

⁶⁰ Horace, *De Arte Poetica liber*, l. 99.

show, without any elaborate process of reasoning, that this method of political computation would justify every extent of crime. They would see that on these principles, even where the very worst acts were not perpetrated, it was owing rather to the fortune of the conspirators, than to their parsimony in the expenditure of treachery and blood. They would soon see that criminal means, once *tolerated*, are soon *preferred*. They present a shorter cut to the object, than through the highway of the moral virtues. In justifying perfidy and murder for public benefit, public benefit would soon become the *pretext*, and perfidy and murder become the *end* — until rapacity, malice, revenge, and fear more dreadful than revenge, could satiate their insatiable appetites. Such must be the consequences of losing all natural sense of wrong and right, in the splendour of these triumphs of the “rights of men.”⁶¹

PARENTAL EXPERIENCE.

Had it pleased God to continue to me the hopes of succession, I would have been, according to my mediocrity and the mediocrity of the age I live in, a sort of founder of a family: I would have left a son who, in all the points in which personal merit can be viewed — in science, in erudition, in genius, in taste, in honour, in generosity, in humanity, in every liberal sentiment, and every liberal accomplishment — would not have shown himself inferior to the Duke of Bedford, or to any of those whom he traces in his line.⁶² His grace very soon would have wanted all plausibility in his attack upon that provision which belonged more to mine than to me. He would soon have supplied every deficiency, and symmetrized every disproportion. It would not have been for that successor to resort to any stagnant wasting reservoir of merit in me, or in any ancestry. He had in himself a salient, living spring of generous and manly action. Every day he lived he would have re-purchased the bounty of the Crown, and ten times more, if ten times more he had received. He was made a public creature, and had no enjoyment whatever but in the performance of some duty. At this exigent moment, the loss of a finished man is not easily supplied.

But a Disposer whose power we are little able to resist, and whose wisdom it behoves us not at all to dispute, has ordained it in another manner, and (whatever my querulous weakness might suggest) a far better one. The storm has gone over me, and I lie like one of those old oaks which the recent hurricane has scattered about me. I am stripped of all my honours, I am torn up by the roots, and lie prostrate on the earth! There, and prostrate there, I most unfeignedly recognise the divine justice, and in some degree submit to it. But while I humble myself before God, I do not know that it is forbidden to repel the attacks of unjust and inconsiderate men. The patience of Job is proverbial. After some of the convulsive struggles of our irritable nature, he submitted himself, and repented in dust and ashes. But even so, I do not find him blamed for reprehending (with a considerable degree of verbal asperity) those ill-natured neighbours of his who visited his dunghill to read moral, political, and economical lectures on his misery. *I am alone*. I have none to meet my enemies in the gate. Indeed, my Lord, I greatly deceive myself if in this hard season I would give a peck of refuse wheat for all that is called fame and honour in the world. This is the appetite of but a

⁶¹ In 1791, Thomas Paine published *The Rights of Man*, rebutting Burke’s critique of the French Revolution. – WHG

⁶² Burke’s first son, Christopher, died in infancy. His second son, Richard, died of tuberculosis in 1794. – WHG

few. It is a *luxury*, it is a *privilege*, it is an *indulgence* for those who are at their ease. But we are all of us made to shun disgrace, just as we are made to shrink from pain, and poverty, and disease. It is an instinct; and under the direction of reason, instinct is always in the right. I live in an inverted order. Those who ought to have succeeded me have gone before me. Those who should have been to me as posterity, are in the place of ancestors. I owe to the dearest relation (which ever must subsist in memory) that act of piety which he would have performed to me. I owe it to him to show that he was not descended, as the Duke of Bedford would have it, from an unworthy parent.

REVOLUTIONARY SCENE.

History, who keeps a durable record of all our acts, and exercises her awful censure over the proceedings of all sorts of sovereigns, will not forget either those events or the era of this liberal refinement in the intercourse of mankind. History will record that on the morning of the 6th of October 1789, the king and queen of France, after a day of confusion, alarm, dismay, and slaughter, lay down under the pledged security of public faith, to indulge nature in a few hours of respite, and troubled melancholy repose. From this sleep, the queen was first startled by the voice of the sentinel at her door, who cried out to her to save herself by flight — that this was the last proof of fidelity he could give — that they were upon him and he was dead. Instantly he was cut down. A band of cruel ruffians and assassins, reeking with his blood, rushed into the chamber of the queen, and pierced with a hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed from whence this persecuted woman had but just time to fly almost naked, and through ways unknown to the murderers, had escaped to seek refuge at the feet of a king and husband, not secure of his own life for a moment. This king, to say no more of him, and this queen, and their infant children (who once would have been the pride and hope of a great and generous people), were then forced to abandon the sanctuary of the most splendid palace in the world, which they left swimming in blood, polluted by massacre and strewn with scattered limbs and mutilated carcasses. From there they were conducted into the capital of their kingdom. Two had been selected from the unprovoked, unresisted, promiscuous slaughter which was made of the gentlemen of birth and family who composed the king's body-guard. These two gentlemen, with all the parade of an execution of justice, were cruelly and publicly dragged to the block, and beheaded in the great court of the palace. Their heads were stuck upon spears, and led the procession; while the royal captives who followed in the train were slowly moved along, amidst the horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the furies of hell, in the abused shape of the vilest of women. After they had been made to taste, drop by drop, more than the bitterness of death, in the slow torture of a journey of twelve miles, protracted to six hours, they were — under a guard composed of those very soldiers who had thus conducted them through this famous triumph — lodged in one of the old palaces of Paris, now converted into a Bastille for kings.

Is this a triumph to be consecrated at altars? to be commemorated with grateful thanksgiving? to be offered to the divine humanity with fervent prayer and enthusiastic ejaculation? — These Theban and Thracian orgies, acted in France and applauded only in the Old Jewry, I assure you, kindle prophetic enthusiasm in the minds of but very few people in this kingdom. Even if a saint and apostle — who may have revelations of his own,

and who has so completely vanquished all the mean superstitions of the heart — may incline to think it pious and decorous to compare this with the entrance into the world of the Prince of Peace, proclaimed in a holy temple by a venerable sage, and not long before — [it could not be] worse announced by the voice of angels, to quiet the innocence of shepherds.

ECONOMY ON STATE PRINCIPLES.

Economy in my plans was, as it ought to be, secondary, subordinate, instrumental. I acted on state principles. I found a great distemper in the commonwealth; and according to the nature of the evil and of the object, I treated it. The malady was deep; it was complicated in the causes and in the symptoms. Throughout it was full of contra-indicants. On one hand government, daily growing more invidious from an apparent increase of the means of strength, was every day growing more contemptible by real weakness. Nor was this dissolution confined to government commonly so called. It extended to parliament; which was losing not a little in its dignity and estimation, by an opinion of its not acting on worthy motives. On the other hand, the desires of the people (partly natural and partly infused into them by craftiness) appeared in so wild and inconsiderate a manner with regard to the economical object (for I set aside for a moment the dreadful tampering with the body of the constitution itself), that if their petitions had literally been complied with, the state would have been convulsed, and a gate would have been opened through which all property might be sacked and ravaged. Nothing could have saved the public from the mischiefs of the false reform but its absurdity, which would soon have brought itself, and with it all real reform, into discredit. This would have left a rankling wound in the hearts of the people, who would know they had failed in the accomplishment of their wishes, but who, like the rest of mankind in all ages, would impute the blame to anything rather than to their own proceedings.

But there were then persons in the world who nourished complaint, and would have been thoroughly disappointed if the people were ever satisfied. I was not of that humour. I wished that they *should* be satisfied. It was my aim to give to the people the substance of what I knew they desired, and what I thought was right, whether they desired it or not, before it had been modified for them into senseless petitions. I knew that there is a manifest, marked distinction which ill men with ill designs, or weak men incapable of *any* design, will constantly be confounding; and that is a marked distinction between *change* and *reformation*. The former alters the substance of the objects themselves, and gets rid of all their essential good, as well as all the incidental evil annexed to them. Change is novelty; and whether it is to operate any one of the effects of reformation at all, or whether it may not contradict the very principle upon which reformation is desired, cannot be certainly known beforehand. Reform is not a change in the substance, or in the primary modification of the object, but a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained of. So far as that is removed, all is sure. It stops there; and if it fails, the substance which underwent the operation, at the very worst, is only where it was before.

I think I have said all this in effect elsewhere, but I am not sure. It cannot at this time be too often repeated; line upon line; precept upon precept, until it comes into the currency of a proverb: *to innovate is not to reform*. The French revolutionists complained of everything;

they refused to reform anything; and they left nothing — no, nothing at all — *unchanged*. The consequences are *before* us — not in remote history; not in future prognostication. They are about us; they are upon us. They shake the public security; they menace private enjoyment. They dwarf the growth of the young; they break the quiet of the old. If we travel, they stop our way. They infest us in town; they pursue us to the country. Our business is interrupted; our repose is troubled; our pleasures are saddened; our very studies are poisoned and perverted, and knowledge is rendered worse than ignorance by the enormous evils of this dreadful innovation. The revolution harpies of France, sprung from night and hell, or from that chaotic anarchy which generates equivocally “all monstrous, all prodigious things.” Cuckoo-like, they adulterously lay their eggs, and brood over and hatch them in the nest of every neighbouring state. These obscene harpies who deck themselves in I know not what divine attributes, but who in reality are foul and ravenous birds of prey (both mothers and daughters), flutter over our heads, and souse down upon our tables, and leave nothing unrent, unrifled, unravaged, or unpolluted with the slime of their filthy offal.

PHILOSOPHICAL VANITY; ITS MAXIMS AND EFFECTS.

The Assembly [of France] recommends to its youth a study of the bold experimenters in morality. Everybody knows that there is a great dispute among their leaders, which of them is the best resemblance of Rousseau.⁶³ In truth, they all resemble him. His blood they transfuse into their minds and into their manners. Him they study; him they meditate; him they turn over in all the time they can spare from the laborious mischief of the day, or the debauches of the night. Rousseau is their canon of holy writ; in his life he is their canon of Polycletus; he is their standard figure of perfection. To this man and this writer, as a pattern to authors and to Frenchmen, the foundries of Paris are now running for statues, with the kettles of their poor and the bells of their churches. If an author had written like a great genius on geometry, though its practical and speculative morals were vicious in the extreme, it might appear that in voting the statue, they honoured only the geometrician. But Rousseau is a *moralist*, or he is nothing. Putting the circumstances together, it is therefore impossible to mistake their design in choosing the author with whom they have begun to recommend a course of studies.

Their great problem is to find a substitute for all the principles which hitherto have been employed to regulate the human will and action. They find dispositions in the mind of such force and quality as may fit men far better than the old morality, for the purposes of such a state as theirs. And they may go much further in supporting their power and destroying their enemies. They have therefore chosen a selfish, flattering, seductive, ostentatious vice, in the place of plain duty. *True humility*, the basis of the Christian system, is the low, but deep and firm foundation of all real virtue. But this — as very painful in the practice, and little imposing in the appearance — they have totally discarded. Their object is to merge all natural and all social sentiment in inordinate vanity. In a small degree, and conversant in

⁶³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) – French philosopher and writer. He believed that the natural goodness of man is *warped* by society. The Protestants of England, by contrast, believed that man is born depraved, and is *corrected* (i.e., civilized) by society. He is made a moral creature through faith in Christ, as instructed in the church. Rousseau’s ideas greatly influenced (or rather, justified) the French Revolution, as Burke describes here. – WHG

little things, vanity is of little moment. When full grown, it is the worst of vices, and the occasional mimic of them all. It makes the whole man false. It leaves nothing sincere or trustworthy about him. His best qualities are poisoned and perverted by it, and they operate exactly like the worst. When your lords had many writers as immoral as the object of their statue (such as Voltaire and others), they chose Rousseau, because in him that peculiar vice which they wished to erect into ruling virtue, was by far the most conspicuous.

We have had this great professor and founder of *the Philosophy of Vanity*, in England. As I had good opportunities of knowing his proceedings almost from day to day, he left no doubt on my mind that he entertained no principle either to influence his heart, or to guide his understanding, but *vanity*. With this vice he was possessed to a degree little short of madness. It is from the same deranged, eccentric vanity, that this, the insane Socrates of the National Assembly was impelled to publish a mad confession of his mad faults, and to attempt a new sort of glory from bringing hardily to light the obscure and vulgar vices which we know may sometimes be blended with eminent talents. Whoever has not observed the nature of vanity, does not know that it is omnivorous; that it has no choice in its food; that it is fond to talk even of its own faults and vices, as what will excite surprise and draw attention, and what will pass at worst for openness and candour.

It was this abuse and perversion which vanity makes even of hypocrisy, that has driven Rousseau to record a life not even so much as chequered, or spotted here and there with virtues, or even distinguished by a single good action. It is such a life that he chooses to offer to the attention of mankind. It is such a life that, with a wild defiance, he flings in the face of his Creator, whom he acknowledges only to brave (withstand). Your Assembly, knowing how much more powerful *example* is found than *precept*, has chosen this man (by his own account without a single virtue) for a model. To him they erect their first statue. From him they commence their series of honours and distinctions.

It is that new-invented virtue which your masters canonize, that led their model hero constantly to exhaust the stores of his powerful rhetoric in the expression of universal benevolence; while his heart was incapable of harbouring one spark of common parental affection.⁶⁴ Benevolence to the *whole species*, and lack of feeling for every *individual* with whom the professors come in contact, form the character of the new philosophy. Setting up for an unsocial independence, this their hero of vanity refuses the just price of common labour, as well as the tribute which opulence owes to genius and which, when paid, honours the giver *and* the receiver — and then he pleads his beggary as an excuse for his crimes. He melts with tenderness only for those who touch him by the remotest relation, and then, without one natural pang, he casts away as a sort of offal and excrement, the spawn of his disgustful amours, and sends his children to the hospital of foundlings. The bear loves, licks, and forms her young; but bears are not philosophers. Vanity, however, finds its account in reversing the train of our natural feelings. Thousands admire the sentimental writer; but the affectionate father is hardly known in his parish.

⁶⁴ Rousseau had a child by Thérèse Levasseur, a seamstress. According to his *Confessions*, he persuaded her to give up the newborn (and possibly four others) to a foundling hospital, for the sake of her “honor.” – WHG

Under this philosophic instructor in the *ethics of vanity*, they have attempted in France a regeneration of the moral constitution of man. Statesmen, like your present rulers, exist by everything which is spurious, fictitious, and false; by everything which takes the man from his house, and sets him on a stage; which makes him an artificial creature with painted theatric sentiments, fit to be seen by the glare of candlelight, and formed to be contemplated at a due distance. Vanity is too apt to prevail in all of us, and in all countries. To the improvement of Frenchmen, it seems not absolutely necessary that it should be taught upon a system. But it is plain that the present rebellion was its legitimate offspring; and it is piously fed by that rebellion with a daily dole. If the system of institution recommended by the Assembly is false and theatric, it is because their system of government is of the same character. To that, and to that alone, it is strictly conformable. To understand either, we must connect the *morals* with the *politics* of the legislators. Your practical philosophers, systematic in everything, have wisely begun at the source. As the relation between parents and children is the first among the elements of vulgar, natural morality,⁶⁵ they erect statues to a wild, ferocious, low-minded, hard-hearted father of fine general feelings; a lover of his *kind*, but a hater of his *kindred*. Your masters reject the duties of his vulgar relation as contrary to liberty; as not founded in the social compact; and not binding according to the rights of men, because the relation is not, of course, the result of *free election* — never so on the side of the children, not always on the part of the parents.

The next relation which they regenerate by their statues to Rousseau, is that which is next in sanctity to that of a father. They differ from those old-fashioned thinkers who considered pedagogues (tutors) as sober and venerable characters, and *allied* to the parental. The moralists of the dark times, the preceptors of this saint, would rather be *in the place* of the parent.⁶⁶ But in this “age of light,” they teach the people that preceptors ought to be in the place of *gallants*.⁶⁷ They systematically corrupt a very corruptible race (for some time a growing nuisance among you), a set of pert, petulant literators to whom — instead of their proper but severe and unostentatious duties — they assign the brilliant part of men of wit and pleasure, of gay, young, military sparks, and danglers at toilets. They call on the rising generation in France to take a sympathy in the adventures and fortunes, and they endeavour to engage their sensibility on the side of pedagogues who betray the most awful family trusts, and vitiate their female pupils. They teach the people that the debauchers of virgins, almost in the arms of their parents, may be safe inmates in the houses, and even fit guardians of the honour of those husbands who succeed legally to the office which the young literators had preoccupied, without asking leave of law or conscience.

Thus they dispose of all the family relations of parents and children, husbands and wives. Through this same instructor by whom they corrupt the *morals*, they corrupt the *taste*. Taste and elegance, though they are reckoned only among the smaller and secondary morals, yet they are of no mean importance in the regulation of life. A moral taste is not of

⁶⁵ *I am glad that your daughter pleases you, and it proves that you naturally favor the children: indeed, if this is not the case, there can be no attachment of nature to man: by which the association of life is taken away. Farewell Patron (Rousseau) and your classmates (l'Assemblée Nationale). – Cic. Ep. ad Atticum.*

⁶⁶ *preceptorum sancti voluere parentis esse loco.*

⁶⁷ *Gallant: A man who is much concerned with his dress and appearance. – WHG*

force to turn vice into virtue; but it recommends virtue with something like the blandishments of pleasure; and it infinitely abates the evils of vice. Rousseau, a writer of great force and vivacity, is totally destitute of taste in any sense of the word. Your masters, who are his scholars, conceive that all refinement has an aristocratic character. The last age had exhausted all its powers in giving a grace and nobleness to our mutual appetites, and in raising them into a higher class and order than seemed to justly belong to them. Through Rousseau, your masters are resolved to destroy these aristocratic prejudices. The passion called *love* has so general and powerful an influence — it makes so much of the entertainment, and indeed so much of the occupation of that part of life which decides the character forever — that the mode and the principles on which it engages the sympathy, and strikes the imagination, become of the utmost importance to the morals and manners of every society.

Your rulers were well aware of this; and in their system of changing your manners to accommodate them to their politics, they found nothing so convenient as Rousseau. Through him they teach men to love in the fashion of philosophers. That is, they teach to men, to Frenchmen, a love without gallantry; a love without anything of that fine flower of youthfulness and gentility which places it, if not among the virtues, among the ornaments of life. Instead of this passion, naturally allied to grace and manners, they infuse into their youth an unfashioned, indelicate, sour, gloomy, ferocious medley of pedantry and lewdness; of metaphysical speculations blended with the coarsest sensuality. Such is the general morality of the passions to be found in their famous philosopher, in his famous work of philosophic gallantry the “Nouvelle Eloise.” When the fence from the gallantry of preceptors is broken down, and your families are no longer protected by decent pride, and salutary domestic prejudice, there is but one step to a frightful corruption. The rulers in the National Assembly are in good hopes that the females of the first families in France may become an easy prey to dancing-masters, fiddlers, pattern-drawers, friseurs, and valets de chambre, and other active citizens of that description, who having entry into your houses, and being half domesticated by their situation, may be blended with you by regular and irregular relations. By a law, they have made these people their equals. By adopting the sentiments of Rousseau, they have made them your rivals. In this manner, these great legislators complete their plan of levelling, and establish their rights of men on a sure foundation.

I am certain that the writings of Rousseau lead directly to this kind of shameful evil. I have often wondered how he comes to be so much more admired and followed on the continent than he is here. Perhaps a secret charm in the language may have its share in this extraordinary difference. We certainly perceive, and to a degree we feel in this writer, a style that is glowing, animated, and enthusiastic. At the same time, we find it lax, diffuse, and not in the best taste of composition. All the members of the piece are pretty equally laboured and expanded, without any due selection or subordination of parts. He is generally too much on the stretch, and his manner has little variety. We cannot rest upon any of his works, even if they contain observations which occasionally reveal a considerable insight into human nature. But his doctrines, on the whole, are so inapplicable to real life and manners, that we never dream of drawing from them any rule for laws or conduct, or for fortifying or illustrating anything by a reference to his opinions. They have with us the fate of older paradoxes:

The truth of the matter is that sense and morality are against them, and utility itself, is the mother almost of right and of equity. ⁶⁸

Perhaps bold speculations are more acceptable because they are newer to you than to us, who have been long since satiated with them. We continue, as in the two last ages, to read more generally than I believe is now done on the continent, the authors of sound antiquity. These occupy our minds. They give us another taste and turn, and will not permit us to be more than transiently amused with paradoxical morality. It is not that I consider this writer as wholly destitute of just notions. Among his irregularities, it must be reckoned that he is sometimes moral, and moral in a very sublime strain. But the *general spirit and tendency* of his works is mischievous, and the more mischievous for this mixture: for perfect depravity of sentiment is not reconcilable with eloquence; and the mind (though corruptible, it is not complexionally vicious) would reject and throw off with disgust, a lesson of pure and unmixed evil. These writers make even virtue a pander to vice.

However, I less consider the author than the system of the Assembly in perverting morality through his means. This I confess makes me nearly despair of any attempt upon the minds of their followers, through reason, honour, or conscience. The great object of your tyrants is to destroy the gentlemen of France; and for that purpose they destroy, to the best of their power, all the effect of those relations which may render considerable men powerful or even safe. To destroy that order, they vitiate the whole community. So that no means may exist of confederating against their tyranny by the false sympathies of this “Nouvelle Eloise,” they endeavour to subvert those principles of domestic trust and fidelity which form the discipline of social life. They propagate principles by which every servant may think it, if it is not his duty, at least it is his privilege to betray his master. By these principles, every considerable father of a family loses the sanctuary of his house. Everyone's home should be their safest refuge, says the law,⁶⁹ which your legislators have taken so much pains first to decry, and then to repeal. They destroy all the tranquility and security of domestic life, turning the asylum of the house into a gloomy prison where the father of the family must drag out a miserable existence, endangered in proportion to the apparent means of his safety. He is worse than solitary in a crowd of domestics, and more apprehensive from his servants and inmate, than from the hired, bloodthirsty mob outside his doors, who are ready to pull him to the lantern. It is thus, and for the same end, that they endeavour to destroy that tribunal of conscience which exists independently of edicts and decrees. *Your despots govern by terror*. They know that he who fears God fears nothing else: and therefore they eradicate from the mind, through their Voltaire, their Helvetius,⁷⁰ and the rest of that infamous gang, that only sort of fear which generates true courage. Their object

⁶⁸ “*Cum ventum ad verum est, sensus moresque repugnant, Atque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et aequi.*” – Horace, *Sermons*, bk 1, n. 3.

⁶⁹ *Debet sua cuique domus esse perfugium tutissimum,*

⁷⁰ Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771) – philosopher, controversialist, and wealthy host to the Enlightenment group of French thinkers known as *Philosophes*. He is remembered for his hedonistic emphasis on physical sensation, his attack on the religious foundations of ethics, and his extravagant educational theory. – *Ency. Britannica*.

is that their fellow-citizens may be under the dominion of no awe, except that of their *Committee of Research*,⁷¹ and of their lantern.⁷²

Having found the advantage of assassination in the formation of their tyranny, it is the grand resource in which they trust for the support of it. Whoever opposes any of their proceedings, or is suspected of a design to oppose them, is to answer it with his life, or the lives of his wife and children. This infamous, cruel, and cowardly practice of assassination, they have the imprudence to call *merciful*. They boast that they operated their usurpation by terror rather than by force; and that a few seasonable murders have prevented the bloodshed of many battles. There is no doubt they will extend these acts of mercy whenever they see an occasion. Dreadful, however, will be the consequences of their attempt to avoid the evils of war by the merciful policy of murder. If, by the effectual punishment of the guilty, they do not wholly disavow that practice (and the threat of it too) as any part of their policy, then if ever a foreign prince enters into France, he must enter it as into a country of assassins. The mode of civilized war will not be practiced; nor are the French who act on the present system, entitled to expect it. Those whose known policy is to assassinate every citizen whom they suspect to be discontented by their tyranny, and to corrupt the soldiery of every open enemy, must look for no modified hostility. All war which is not *battle*, will be military *execution*. This will beget acts of retaliation from you; and every retaliation will beget a new revenge. The hell-hounds of war on all sides will be uncoupled and unmuzzled. The new school of murder and barbarism set up in Paris, having destroyed (so far as in it lies) all the other manners and principles which have up to now civilized Europe, will also destroy the mode of civilized war which, more than anything else, has distinguished the Christian world. Such is the approaching Golden Age which the Virgil of your assembly has sung to his Pollios! ⁷³ (Mirabeau's speech concerning universal peace) ⁷⁴

UNITY BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

They take this tenet of the head and heart, not from the great name which it immediately bears, nor from the greater name from whence it is derived; but from that which alone can give true weight and sanction to any learned opinion: the common nature and common relation of men. Persuaded that all things ought to be done with reference, and referring all things to the point of reference to which all should be directed, they think themselves bound not only as individuals in the sanctuary of the heart, or as congregated in that personal capacity to renew the memory of their high origin and caste, but also in their corporate character to perform their national homage to the Institutor, and Author, and Protector of civil society — without which civil society, man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make a remote and faint approach to it.

⁷¹ The secret *Committee of Research* uncovered threats to the Revolution, by reading private mail, reviewing newspaper articles, surveilling individuals, etc. It was a precursor and means to Robespierre's *Reign of Terror*. – WHG

⁷² During the early phase of the French Revolution, rampaging mobs used lamp posts for spontaneous lynchings of officials and aristocrats, yelling "À la lanterne!" (*To the Lamp Post!*). – WHG

⁷³ Virgil (70BC-19BC) wrote a poem predicting a Golden Age to come, and dedicated it to Pollio, a patron. – WHG

⁷⁴ Honoré Gabriel, comte de Mirabeau (1749–1791), a celebrated orator of the French Revolution. – WHG

They conceive that He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed also the necessary means of its perfection. He therefore willed the state.

He willed its connection with the source and original archetype of all perfection. Those who are convinced of this, His will — what is the law of laws, and the sovereign of sovereigns — cannot think it reprehensible that this our corporate fealty and homage, that this our recognition of a seignior⁷⁵ paramount (I almost said this oblation of the state itself) as a worthy offering on the high altar of universal praise, should be performed as all public, solemn acts are performed: in buildings, in music, in decoration, in speech, in the dignity of persons, according to the customs of mankind, taught by their nature. That is, performed with modest splendour and unassuming state, with mild majesty and sober pomp. For those purposes, they think that some part of the wealth of the country is as usefully employed as it can be, in fomenting the luxury of *individuals*. It is the *public* ornament. It is the *public* consolation. It nourishes the *public* hope. The poorest man finds his own importance and dignity in it, while the wealth and pride of *individuals* at every moment makes the man of humble rank and fortune sensible of his inferiority, and degrades and vilifies his condition. It is for the man in humble life — to raise his nature, and to put him in mind of a state in which the privileges of opulence will cease, when he will be equal by *nature*, and may be more than equal by *virtue* — that this portion of the general wealth of his country is employed and sanctified.⁷⁶

I assure you, I do not aim at singularity. I give you opinions which have been accepted among us from very early times to this moment, with a continued and general approval, and which indeed are so worked into my mind, that I am unable to distinguish what I have learned from others, from the results of my own meditation.

It is on some such principles that the majority of the people of England, far from thinking a religious national establishment is unlawful, hardly think it lawful to be *without* one. In France you are wholly mistaken if you do not believe us above all other things attached to it, and beyond all other nations. And when this people has acted unwisely and unjustifiably in its favour (as in some instances they have most certainly done) in their very errors you will at least discover their zeal.

This principle runs through the whole system of their polity. They do not consider their church establishment as *convenient*, but as *essential* to their state; not a heterogeneous and inseparable thing; not something added for accommodation; not what they may either keep or lay aside according to their temporary ideas of convenience. Rather, they consider it as the foundation of their whole constitution with which, and with every part of which, it holds an indissoluble union. Church and state are ideas inseparable in their minds, and scarcely is the one ever mentioned without mentioning the other.

(In preparing these pages for publication, the selector has discovered how unconsciously he was indebted to the intellectual inspiration of Burke, in the following extract: —

⁷⁵ *Seignior*: The estate of a feudal lord; or by inference, the power or authority of a lord; dominion. — WHG

⁷⁶ That is, all citizens can take vicarious pride in the national church, because it is funded by taxes. — WHG

*Founded in Christ, and by Apostles form'd,
Glory of England! oh, my Mother Church,
Hoary with time, but all untouched in creed,
Firm to thy Master, by as fond a grasp
Of faith as Luther, with his free-born mind
Clung to Emmanuel — doth thy soul remain.*

*But yet around Thee scowls a fierce array
Of Foes and Falsehoods; must'ring each their
powers,
Triumphantly. And well may thoughtful Hearts
Heave with foreboding swell and heavy fears,
To mark, how mad opinion doth infect
Thy children; how thine apostolic claims*

*And love maternal are regarded now,
By creedless Vanity, or careless Vice.
For time there was, when peerless Hooker
wrote,
And deep-soul'd Bacon taught the world to
think,
When thou wert paramount, thy cause sublime!
And in THY life, all Polity and Powers*

*The throne securing, or in law enshrined,
With all estates our balanced Realm contains,
In thee supreme, a master-virtue own'd
And honour'd. Church and State could then co-
work,
Like soul and body in one breathing Form
Distinct, but undivided; each with rule*

*Essential to the kingdom's healthful frame,
Yet BOTH, in unity august and good
Together, under Christ their living Head,
A hallow'd commonwealth of powers achieved.
But now, in evil times, sectarian Will
Would split the Body, and to sects reduce*

*Our sainted Mother of th'imperial Isles,
Which have for ages from Her bosom drank
Those truths immortal, Life and Conscience
need.
But never may the rude assault of hearts
Self-blinded, or the autocratic pride
Of Reason, by no hallowing faith subdued,*

*One lock of glory from Her rev'rend head
Succeed in tearing: Love, and Awe, and Truth
Her doctrines preach, with apostolic force:
Her creed is Unity, her head is Christ,
Her Forms primeval, and her Creed divine,
And Catholic, that crowning name she wears.”
— “Luther,” 6th edition 1852.)*

TRIPLE BASIS OF FRENCH REVOLUTION.

Instead of the religion and the law by which they were in a great politic communion with the Christian world, they have constructed their republic on three bases, all fundamentally opposite to those on which the communities of Europe are built. Its foundation is laid in Regicide, in Jacobinism, and in Atheism; and it has joined to those principles a body of systematic manners which secures their operation.

If I am asked how I would be understood in the use of these terms, *Regicide*, *Jacobinism*, *Atheism*, and a *Corresponding System* of manners and their establishment, I will tell you: —

I. — REGICIDE.

I call a commonwealth *Regicide*, which lays it down as a fixed law of nature and a fundamental right of man, that all government which is not a democracy, is a usurpation. That all kings, as such, are usurpers; and for being kings, they may and ought to be put to death, with their wives, families, and adherents. The commonwealth which acts uniformly upon those principles, and which, after abolishing every festival of religion, chooses the

most flagrant act of a murderous regicide as reason for a feast of eternal commemoration, and which forces all her people to observe it — this I call *regicide by establishment*.

II. — JACOBINISM.

Jacobinism is the revolt of the enterprising talents of a country against its *property*. When private men form themselves into associations for the purpose of destroying the pre-existing laws and institutions of their country; when they secure for themselves an army, by dividing among the people of no property, the estates of the ancient and lawful proprietors; when a state recognises those acts; when it does not make confiscations for crimes, but makes crimes for confiscations; when it has its principal strength and all its resources in such a violation of property; when it stands chiefly upon such a violation, massacring by judgments or otherwise, those who make any struggle for their old legal government, and their legal, hereditary, or acquired possessions — this I call *Jacobinism by establishment*.

III. — ATHEISM.

I call it *Atheism by establishment*, when any state, as such, will not acknowledge the existence of God as a moral governor of the world; when it offers to him no religious or moral worship; when it abolishes the Christian religion by a regular decree; when it persecutes all its ministers with a cold, unrelenting, steady cruelty, by every mode of confiscation, and by imprisonment, exile, and death; when it generally shuts up or pulls down churches; when the few buildings which remain of this kind are opened only for the purpose of making a profane apotheosis of monsters, whose vices and crimes have no parallel among men, and whom all other men consider as objects of general detestation and the severest condemnation of law; when in place of that religion of social benevolence and individual self-denial, and in mockery of all religion, they institute impious, blasphemous, indecent theatrical rites in honour of their vitiated, perverted reason, and erect altars to the personification of their own corrupted and bloody republic; when schools and seminaries are founded at the public expense, to poison mankind from generation to generation with the horrible maxims of this impiety; when wearied out with incessant martyrdom, and the cries of a people hungering and thirsting for religion, they permit it only as a tolerated evil — this I call *atheism by establishment*.

CORRESPONDING SYSTEM OF MANNERS AND MORALS.

When to these establishments of regicide, of Jacobinism, and of atheism, you add the *correspondent system of manners*, no doubt can be left on the mind of a thinking man, concerning their determined hostility to the human race. Manners are of more importance than laws. In a great measure, the laws depend upon them. The law touches us only here and there, and now and then. But manners are what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by a constant, steady, uniform, insensible operation, like that of the air we breathe. They give their whole form and colour to our lives. According to their quality, they aid morals, they supply them, or they totally destroy them. The new French legislators were aware of this. Therefore, with the same method and under the same authority, they settled upon a system of manners, the most licentious, prostituted, and abandoned that has ever been known, and at the same time the most coarse, rude, savage, and ferocious. Nothing in the Revolution — not to a phrase or gesture, not to the fashion of a

hat or a shoe — was left to accident. All has been the result of design; all has been a matter of institution. No mechanical means could be devised in favour of this incredible system of wickedness and vice, that has not been employed. The noblest passions — the love of glory, the love of country — have been debauched into means of its preservation and its propagation. All sorts of shows and exhibitions have been contrived, calculated to inflame and vitiate the imagination and pervert the moral sense. They have sometimes brought forth five or six hundred drunken women calling at the bar of the Assembly for the blood of their own children, as being royalists or constitutionalists. Sometimes they have gotten a body of wretches calling themselves fathers, to demand the murder of their sons, boasting that Rome had but one Brutus, but that they could show five hundred. There were instances in which they inverted, and retaliated the impiety, and produced sons who called for the execution of their parents. The foundation of their republic is laid in moral paradoxes. Their patriotism is always prodigy. All those instances to be found in history, whether real or fabulous, of a doubtful public spirit, at which morality is perplexed, reason is staggered, and from which affrighted nature recoils, are their chosen and almost *sole* examples for the instruction of their youth.

The whole drift of their institution is contrary to that of the wise legislators of all countries, who aimed at improving instincts into morals, and at grafting the virtues on the stock of the natural affections. They, on the contrary, have omitted no pains to eradicate every benevolent and noble propensity in the mind of men. In their culture, it is a rule to always graft virtues on vices. They think everything is unworthy of the name of *public virtue*, unless it indicates *violence on the private*. All their new institutions (and with them, *everything* is new) strike at the root of our social nature. Other legislators, knowing that marriage is the origin of all relations, and consequently the first element of all duties, have endeavoured by every art, to make it sacred. The Christian religion, by confining it to the pairs and by rendering that relation indissoluble, has by these two things done more towards the peace, happiness, settlement, and civilization of the world, than by any other part in this whole scheme of Divine Wisdom. The direct contrary course has been taken in the synagogue of antichrist, I mean in that forge and manufactory of all evil — the sect which predominated in the Constituent Assembly of 1789. Those monsters employed the same or greater industry, to desecrate and degrade that state which other legislators have used to render it holy and honourable.

FEROCITY OF JACOBINISM.

As for those whom they allow to die a natural death, they do not permit them to enjoy the last consolations of mankind, or those rights of sepulture which indicate hope, and which mere nature has taught to mankind in all countries, to soothe the afflictions and to cover the infirmity of mortal condition. They disgrace men in the entry into life; they vitiate and enslave them through the whole course of it; and they deprive them of all comfort at the conclusion of their dishonoured and depraved existence. Endeavouring to persuade the people that they are no better than beasts, the whole body of their institution tends to make them beasts of prey, furious and savage. For this purpose, the active part of them is disciplined into a ferocity which has no parallel. To this ferocity. there is joined not one of the rude, unfashioned virtues which accompany the vices; the whole are left to grow up

together in the rankness of uncultivated nature. But nothing is left to nature in their systems.

The same discipline which hardens their hearts, relaxes their morals. While courts of justice were thrust out by revolutionary tribunals, and silent churches were only the funeral monuments of departed religion, there were no fewer than nineteen or twenty theatres, great and small — most of them kept open at public expense, and all of them crowded every night. Among the gaunt, haggard forms of famine and nakedness, amidst the yells of murder, the tears of affliction, and the cries of despair — the song, the dance, the mimic scene, the buffoon laughter went on as regularly as in the gay hour of festive peace. I have it from good authority, that under the scaffold of judicial murder, and the gaping planks that poured down blood on the spectators, the space was hired out for a show of dancing dogs. I think, without concert, we have made the very same remark on reading some of their pieces which, being written for other purposes, let us into a view of their social life. It struck us that the habits of Paris had no resemblance to the finished virtues, or to the polished vice, and the elegant though not blameless luxury of the capital of a great empire. Their society was more like that of a den of outlaws on a doubtful frontier; of a lewd tavern for the revels and debauches of banditti, assassins, bravos, smugglers, and their more desperate paramours, mixed with bombastic players; the refuse and rejected offal of strolling theatres, puffing out ill-sorted verses about virtue, mixed with the licentious and blasphemous songs proper to the brutal and hardened course of life belonging to that sort of wretches. This system of manners in itself is at war with all orderly and moral society, and is unsafe in its neighbourhood. If great bodies of that kind were anywhere established in a bordering territory, we would have a right to demand of their governments the suppression of such a nuisance.

VOICE OF OPPRESSION.

Should we not obtest (beseech) Heaven, and whatever justice is yet on earth? Oppression makes wise men mad; but the distemper is still the madness of the wise — which is better than the sobriety of fools. The cry is the voice of sacred misery, exalted not into wild raving, but into the sanctified frenzy of prophecy and inspiration. In that bitterness of soul, in that indignation of suffering virtue, in that exaltation of despair, wouldn't persecuted English royalty cry out with an awful voice of warning, and denounce the destruction that awaits monarchs who consider fidelity to them as the most degrading of all vices; who suffer it to be punished as the most abominable of all crimes; and who have no respect but for rebels, traitors, regicides, and furious negro slaves, whose crimes have broken their chains? Wouldn't this heated language of high indignation have more of sound reason in it, more of real affection, more of true attachment, than all the lullabies of flatterers who would hush monarchs to sleep in the arms of death?

BRITAIN VINDICATED IN HER WAR WITH FRANCE.

There is one thing in this business which appears to be wholly unaccountable, or accountable on a supposition that I dare not entertain for a moment. I cannot help asking, Why all these pains to clear the British nation of ambition, perfidy, and the insatiate thirst

for war? At what period of time was it that our country has deserved that load of infamy of which nothing but preternatural humiliation in language and conduct can serve to clear us? If we have deserved this kind of evil fame from anything that we have done in a state of *prosperity*, I am sure that it is not abject conduct in *adversity* than can clear our reputation. It is well-known that ambition can creep as well as soar. The pride of no person in a flourishing condition is more justly to be dreaded, than that of one who is mean and cringing under a doubtful and unprosperous fortune. But it seems it was thought necessary to give some out-of-the-way proofs of our sincerity, as well as our freedom from ambition. Have fraud and falsehood then become the distinctive character of Englishmen? Whenever your enemy chooses to accuse you of perfidy and bad faith, will you put it into his power to throw you into the purgatory of self-humiliation? Is his charge equal to the finding of the grand jury of Europe, and sufficient to put you on trial? But on that trial I will defend the English ministry. I am sorry that on some points I have so good a defence to make, on the principles that I have always opposed.

*They were not the first to begin the war. They did not excite the general confederacy in Europe, which was so properly formed on the alarm given by the Jacobinism of France. They did not begin with an hostile aggression on the regicides, nor any of their allies. These parricides of their own country, disciplining themselves for foreign violence, by domestic violence, were the first to attack a power that was our ally by nature, by habit, and by the sanction of multiplied treaties.*⁷⁷

Is it not true, that they were the first to declare war upon this kingdom? Is every word in the declaration from Downing-Street concerning their conduct, and concerning ours and that of our allies, so obviously false, that it is necessary to give some new-invented proofs of our good faith in order to expunge the memory of all this perfidy?

POLISH AND FRENCH REVOLUTION.

A king without authority; nobles without union or subordination; a people without arts, industry, commerce, or liberty; no order within, no defence without; no effective public force but a foreign force, which entered a naked country at will, and disposed of everything at pleasure.⁷⁸ Here was a state of things which seemed to invite, and might perhaps justify, bold enterprise and desperate experiment. But in what manner was this chaos brought into order? The means were as striking to the imagination, as satisfactory to reason, and soothing to the moral sentiments. In contemplating that change, humanity has everything to rejoice and to glory in — nothing to be ashamed of, nothing to suffer. So far as it has gone, it is probably the purest and most decorated public good which has ever been conferred on

⁷⁷ The Editor has ventured to print these lines in italics, because it appears, while this selection from Burke is preparing for the press, an inflated demagogue has not only dared to deny the claims of the Duke of Wellington to be the Hero of a nation's heart, but has also accused the illustrious Burke of misrepresenting historical facts connected with our war in the French revolution. On which side both the truth and integrity of history are to be found, may safely be left to the moral decision of men who do *not* look at History through the exclusive medium of the market, and in listening to the voice of instruction are, at least, enabled to distinguish the bray of an ass from the peal of a trumpet.

⁷⁸ For Poland's history during this period: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Poland/Partitioned-Poland>

mankind. We have seen anarchy and servitude at once removed; a throne strengthened for the protection of the people without trenching on their liberties; all foreign cabal banished by changing the crown from elective to hereditary. And what was a matter of pleasing wonder, we have seen a reigning king, from an heroic love for his country, exerting himself with all the toil, dexterity, management, and intrigue, in favour of a family of *strangers*, with which ambitious men labour for the aggrandizement of *their own*.

Ten million men were being freed gradually, and therefore safely to themselves and the state — freed not from *civil* or *political* chains which, bad as they are, only fetter the mind — but from substantial *personal* bondage. Inhabitants of cities, without privileges before, placed in the consideration which belongs to that improved and connecting situation of *social life*. One of the most proud, numerous, and fierce bodies of nobility and gentry ever known in the world, was arranged only in the foremost rank of free and generous citizens. Not one man incurred loss or suffered degradation. All were improved in their condition, from the king to the day-labourer. Everything was kept in its place and order; but in that place and order, everything was *bettered*. To add to this happy wonder (this unheard-of conjunction of wisdom and fortune), not one drop of blood was spilled — no treachery; no outrage; no system of slander crueller than the sword; no studied insults on religion, morals, or manners; no spoil; no confiscation; no citizen beggared; none imprisoned; none exiled. The whole was effected with such a policy, discretion, unanimity, and secrecy as have never been before known on any occasion. But such wonderful conduct was reserved for this glorious conspiracy in favour of the true and genuine rights and interests of men. Happy the people, if they know how to proceed as they have begun! Happy the prince, worthy to begin with splendour, or to close with glory, a race of patriots and kings: and to leave,

*“A name, which ev’ry wind to heav’n would bear,
Which men to speak, and angels joy to hear.”*⁷⁹

To finish all, this great good as it is in the instant, contains in it the seeds of all further improvement. It may be considered as being in a regular progress, because it is founded on similar principles, towards the stable excellency of a British constitution.

Here was a matter for congratulation and for festive remembrance through ages. Here moralists and divines might indeed relax in their temperance, to exhilarate their humanity. *But mark the character of our faction*. All their enthusiasm is kept for the French revolution. They cannot pretend that France had stood so much in need of a change as Poland. They cannot pretend that Poland has not obtained a better system of liberty or of government, than it enjoyed before. They cannot assert that the Polish revolution cost more dearly than that of France, to the interests and feelings of multitudes of men. But the cold and subordinate light in which they look upon the one, and the pains they take to preach up the other of these revolutions, leave us no choice in fixing on their motives. Both revolutions profess liberty as their object; but in obtaining this object, the one proceeds from anarchy to order; the other from order to anarchy. The first secures its liberty by establishing its throne; the other builds its freedom on the subversion of its monarchy. In the one, their means are unstained by crimes, and their settlement favours morality. In the other, vice and

⁷⁹ Abraham Cowley (1618-1667), *Davideis*, a sacred poem of the troubles of David: book 3.

confusion are in the very essence of their pursuit and of their enjoyment. The circumstances in which these two events differ, must cause the difference we make in their comparative estimation. These turn the scale with the societies in favour of France. *Ferrum est quod amant* (Iron is what they love). The frauds, the violence, the sacrileges, the havoc and ruin of families, the dispersion and exile of the pride and flower of a great country, the disorder, the confusion, the anarchy, the violation of property, the cruel murders, the inhuman confiscations, and in the end, the insolent domination of bloody, ferocious, and senseless clubs — these are the things which they love and admire. What men admire and love, they would surely act upon. Let us see what is done in France; and then let us undervalue at all the slightest danger of falling into the hands of such a merciless and savage faction!

EUROPE IN 1789.

In the long series of ages which have furnished the matter of history, never was so beautiful and so august a spectacle presented to the moral eye, as Europe afforded the day before the revolution in France. I knew indeed that this prosperity contained in itself the seeds of its own danger. In one part of the society it caused laxity and debility; in the other it produced bold spirits and dark designs. A false philosophy passed from academies into courts; and the great were themselves infected with the theories which conducted to their ruin. Knowledge, which in the two last centuries either did not exist at all, or existed solidly on right principles and in chosen hands, was now diffused, weakened, and perverted. General wealth loosened morals, relaxed vigilance, and increased presumption. Men of talent began to compare, in the partition of the common stock of public prosperity, the proportions of the dividends with the merits of the claimants. As usual, they found their portion not equal to their estimate (or perhaps to the public estimate) of their own worth. Once it was discovered by the revolution in France, that a struggle between establishment and rapacity could be maintained, even if for one year, and in one place, I was sure that a practicable breach was made in the whole order of things and in every country. Religion, that held the materials of the fabric together, was first systematically loosened. All other opinions, under the name of prejudices, must fall along with it; and property left undefended by principles, became a repository of spoils to tempt cupidity, and not a magazine to furnish arms for defence. I knew that, attacked on all sides by the infernal energies of talents set in action by vice and disorder, authority could not stand upon authority alone. It wanted some other support than the poise of its own gravity. Situations formerly supported persons. It now became necessary that personal qualities should support situations.

Formerly, where authority was found, wisdom and virtue were presumed. But now the veil was torn; and to keep off sacrilegious intrusion, it was necessary that in the sanctuary of government, something should be disclosed as not only venerable, but dreadful. Government was at once to show itself full of *virtue* and full of *force*. It was to invite partisans, by making it appear to the world that a generous cause was to be asserted; one fit for a generous people to engage in. From passive submission was it to expect resolute defence? No! It must have heated advocates and passionate defenders, which a heavy, discontented acquiescence could never produce. What a base and foolish thing it is for any consolidated body of authority to say, or to act *as if* it said, “I will put my trust not in my own virtue, but in your patience; I will indulge in effeminacy, in indolence, in corruption; I

will give way to all my perverse and vicious feelings, because you cannot punish me without the hazard of ruining yourselves.”

ATHEISM CANNOT REPENT.

They undoubtedly feel disappointment and mortification; but to them, repentance is an impossible thing: *they are atheists*. This wretched opinion by which they are possessed, even to the height of fanaticism, leads them to exclude from their ideas of a commonwealth, the vital principle of the physical, the moral, and the political world. It engages them in a thousand absurd contrivances to fill up this dreadful void. They are incapable of innoxious repose, or honourable action, or wise speculation, in the lurking-holes of a foreign land into which (in a common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads, among the innocent victims of their madness. They are, at this very hour, as busy in the confection of the dirt-pies of their imaginary constitutions, as if they had not been quite fresh from destroying, by their impious and desperate vagaries, the finest country on earth.

OUTWARD DIGNITY OF THE CHURCH DEFENDED.

The English people are satisfied that to the great, the consolations of religion are as necessary as its instructions. They too are among the unhappy. They feel personal pain, and domestic sorrow. In these they have no privilege, but are subject to pay their full contingent to the contributions levied on mortality. They lack this sovereign balm under their gnawing cares and anxieties which, being less conversant about the limited wants of animal life, range without limit, and are diversified by infinite combinations in the wild and unbounded regions of imagination. Some charitable dole is lacking for these, our often very unhappy brethren, to fill the gloomy void that reigns in minds which have nothing on earth to hope for or fear; something to relieve in the killing languor and over-laboured lassitude of those who have nothing to do; something to excite an appetite to existence in the palled satiety which attends all pleasures which may be bought — where nature is not left to her own process; where even desire is anticipated, and therefore fruition defeated by meditated schemes and contrivances of delight — and where no interval, no obstacle, is interposed between the wish and the accomplishment.

The people of England know how little influence the teachers of religion are likely to have with the wealthy and powerful of long standing; and how much less influence with the newly fortunate, if they appear in a manner no way assorted to those with whom they must associate, and over whom they must exercise even, in some cases, something like authority. What must the privileged think of that body of teachers, if they see it in no part above the establishment of their domestic servants? If the poverty were voluntary, there might be some difference. Strong instances of self-denial operate powerfully on our minds; and a man who has no wants has obtained great freedom, firmness, and even dignity. But as the mass of any description of men *are* but men, and their poverty cannot be voluntary, that disrespect which attends all *lay* property, will not depart from the *ecclesiastical*. Our provident constitution has therefore taken care that those who are to instruct presumptuous ignorance, those who are to be censors over insolent vice, should neither incur their contempt, nor live upon their alms; nor will it tempt the rich to neglect the true medicine of

their minds. For these reasons, while we provide first for the poor, and do it with a parental solicitude, we have not relegated religion (like something we were ashamed to show) to obscure municipalities, or rustic villages. No! We will have her exalt her mitred front in courts and parliaments. We will have her mixed throughout the whole mass of life, and blended with all the classes of society. The people of England will show to the haughty potentates of the world, and to their talking sophisters, that a free, generous, informed nation honours the high magistrates of its church. It will not suffer the insolence of wealth and titles, or any other species of proud pretension, to look down with scorn upon what they look up to with reverence. Nor may they presume to trample on that acquired personal nobility which they intend always to be, and which often is, the fruit and not the reward (for what can be the reward) of learning, piety, and virtue. They can see, without pain or grudging, an archbishop precede a duke. They can see a bishop of Durham, or a bishop of Winchester, in possession of ten thousand pounds a year. And they cannot conceive why it is in worse hands than estates having a like amount in the hands of this earl, or that squire — although it may be true that so many dogs and horses are not kept by the former, and fed with the victuals which ought to nourish the children of the people. It is also true that the whole church revenue is not always employed to the last shilling in charity; nor perhaps should it be — but *something* is generally so employed. It is better to cherish virtue and humanity by leaving much to free will, even with some loss to the object, than to attempt to make men mere machines and instruments of a politic benevolence. The world on the whole will gain by a *liberty*, without which *virtue* cannot exist.

Once the commonwealth has established that the estates of the church are property, it cannot with consistency hear anything about the more or the less of it. “Too much” and “too little” are treason against property. What evil can arise from the quantity in any hand, while the supreme authority has the full, sovereign superintendence over this, as it does over any property, to prevent every species of abuse — and whenever it notably deviates, to give it a direction agreeable to the purposes of its institution. In England most of us conceive that it is envy and malignity towards those who are often the beginners of their own fortune, and not a love of the self-denial and mortification of the ancient church, that makes some look askance at the distinctions, honours, and revenues which, taken from no person, are set apart for virtue. The ears of the people of England are distinguishing. They hear these men speak broad; their tongue betrays them. Their language is in the *patois* (jargon) of fraud; in the cant and gibberish of hypocrisy. The people of England must think so, when these praters⁸⁰ affect to carry the clergy back to that primitive, evangelic poverty which, in the *spirit*, should always exist in them (and in us too, however we may like it), but in the *thing*, must be varied when the relation of that body to the state is altered — when manners, when modes of life, when indeed the whole order of human affairs has undergone a total revolution. We shall then believe those reformers to be honest enthusiasts, and not, as now we think them, cheats and deceivers; when we see them throwing their own goods into common, and submitting their own persons to the austere discipline of the early church.

⁸⁰ *Prater*: someone who talks a lot, esp. *too* much, or foolishly; they *prattle*. – WHG

DANGER OF ABSTRACT VIEWS.

It is not worth our while to discuss like sophisters, whether some evil is to be tolerated in *no* case, for the sake of *some* benefit. Nothing universal can be rationally affirmed on any moral or any political subject. Pure metaphysical abstraction does not belong to these matters. The lines of morality are not like the ideal lines of mathematics. They are broad and deep, as well as long. They admit exceptions; they demand modifications. These exceptions and modifications are not made by the process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not only the first in rank of the political and moral virtues, but she is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all. Metaphysics cannot live without definition; but prudence is cautious how she defines. Our courts cannot be more fearful in suffering fictitious cases to be brought before them, for eliciting their determination on a point of law, than prudent moralists are in putting extreme and hazardous cases of conscience upon nonexistent emergencies. Therefore, without attempting to define what can never be defined, in the case of a revolution in government, I think *this* may be safely affirmed: that a sore and pressing evil is to be removed, and that a good — great in its amount and unequivocal in its nature — must be probable almost to certainty, before the inestimable price of our own morals, and the well-being of a number of our fellow-citizens, is paid for a revolution. If ever we ought to be economists, even to parsimony, it is in the voluntary production of evil. And every revolution contains in it something of evil.

APPEAL TO IMPARTIALITY.

The quality of the sentence does not however decide on the justice of it. Angry friendship is sometimes as bad as calm enmity. For this reason, the cold neutrality of abstract justice is, to a good and clear cause, a more desirable thing than an affection liable to be in any way disturbed. When the trial is by friends, if the decision should happen to be favourable, the honour of the acquittal is lessened; if adverse, the condemnation is exceedingly embittered. It is aggravated by coming from lips professing friendship, and pronouncing judgment with sorrow and reluctance. Taking in the whole view of life, it is safer to live under the jurisdiction of severe but steady reason, than under the empire of indulgent but capricious passion. It is certainly well for Mr. Burke ⁸¹ that there are impartial men in the world. To them I address myself, pending the appeal which is made on his part from the living to the dead, from the modern Whigs to the ancient.

HISTORICAL ESTIMATE OF LOUIS XVI.

The unhappy Louis the Sixteenth was a man of the best intentions, probably who ever reigned. He was by no means deficient in talents. He had a most laudable desire to supply by general reading, and even by the acquisition of elemental knowledge, an education originally defective in all points. But nobody told him (and it was no wonder that he should not divine it himself) that the world about which he read, and the world in which he lived, were no longer the same. Desirous of doing everything for the best, fearful of cabal, distrusting his own judgment, he sought ministers of all kinds, upon public testimony. But

⁸¹ Speaking deferentially of himself in third person, as was the style of the day. — WHG

just as courts are the field for caballers, the public is the theatre for mountebanks ⁸² and imposters. The cure for both those evils is in the discernment of the prince. But an accurate and penetrating discernment is what could not be looked for in a young prince.

His conduct in its principle was not unwise; but like most other of his well-meant designs, it failed in his hands. It failed partly from mere ill-fortune, to which speculators are rarely pleased to assign that very large share to which she is justly entitled in human affairs. Perhaps the failure was owing in part to his permitting his system to be vitiated and disturbed by those intrigues which it is, humanly speaking, impossible to wholly prevent in courts, or indeed under any form of government. However, with these aberrations, he gave himself over to a succession of the statesmen of public opinion. In other things he thought that he might be a king on the terms of his predecessors. He was conscious of the purity of his heart, and the general good tendency of his government. He flattered himself, as most men in his situation will, that he might consult his *ease* without danger to his *safety*. It is not at all wonderful that both he and his ministers, giving way abundantly in other respects to *innovation*, should take up in policy, with the *tradition* of their monarchy.

Under his ancestors, the monarchy had subsisted, and even been strengthened, by the generation or support of republics. First, the Swiss republics grew under the guardianship of the French monarchy. The Dutch republics were hatched and cherished under the same incubation. Afterwards, a republican constitution was established in the empire, under the influence of France, and against the pretensions of its chief. Even while the monarchy of France — by a series of wars and negotiations, and lastly, by the treaties of Westphalia ⁸³ — had obtained the establishment of the Protestants in Germany as a law of the empire, the same monarchy under Louis the Thirteenth, had force enough to destroy the republican system of the Protestants at home. Louis the Sixteenth was a diligent reader of history. But the very lamp of prudence blinded him. The guide of *human life* led him astray. A silent revolution in the moral world preceded the political, and also prepared it. It became of more importance than ever, what examples were given, and what measures were adopted. Their causes no longer lurked in the recesses of cabinets, or in the private conspiracies of the factious. They were no longer to be controlled by the force and influence of the grandees, who formerly had been able to stir up troubles by their discontents, and to quiet them by their corruption. The chain of subordination, even in cabal and sedition, was broken in its most important links. It was no longer the *great*, and the *populace*. Other interests were formed, other dependencies, other connections, other communications.

The *middle classes* had swelled far beyond their former proportion. Like whatever is the most effectively rich and great in society, these classes became the seat of all the active politics; and the preponderating weight to decide on them. There were all the energies by which fortune is acquired; there the consequence of their success. There were all the talents which assert their pretensions and are impatient for the place which settled society prescribes to them. These descriptions had gotten between the *great* and the *populace*; and

⁸² *Mountebank*: a flamboyant deceiver. – WHG

⁸³ *Treaties of Westphalia*: the European settlements of 1648, which brought to an end the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch, and the German phase of the Thirty Years' War.

the influence on the *lower classes* was with them. The spirit of ambition had taken possession of *this* class, as violently as it ever possessed any other. They felt the importance of this situation. The correspondence of the monied and the mercantile world, the literary intercourse of academies, but above all, *the Press*, of which in a manner they had the entire possession, made a kind of electric communication everywhere. The Press, in reality, has made every government almost democratic in its spirit.⁸⁴ Without it, the great, the *first* movements in this Revolution, perhaps could not have been given. But the spirit of ambition, now for the first time connected with the spirit of speculation, was not to be restrained at will.

There was no longer any means of arresting a principle in its course. When Louis the Sixteenth, under the influence of the enemies to monarchy, meant to found but *one* republic, he set up *two*. When he meant to take away half the crown of his neighbour, he lost the whole of his own. Louis the Sixteenth could not with impunity countenance a new republic. Yet between his throne and that dangerous lodgment for an enemy — one which *he* had erected — he had the whole Atlantic for a ditch. He had for an outwork the English nation itself, friendly to liberty, adverse to that mode of it. He was surrounded by a rampart of monarchies, most of them allied to him, and generally under his influence. Yet even thus secured, a republic erected under his auspices, and dependent on his power, became fatal to his throne. The very money which he had lent to support this republic, by a good faith — which to him operated as perfidy — was punctually paid to his enemies, and became a resource in the hands of his assassins.

NEGATIVE RELIGION A NULLITY.

If mere dissent from the church of Rome is a merit, whoever dissents the most perfectly is the most meritorious. In many points, we hold strongly with that church. Whoever dissents throughout with that church will dissent with the church of England; and then it will be a part of his merit that he dissents with ourselves — a whimsical species of merit for any set of men to establish. We quarrel to extremity with those who we know agree with us in many things. But we are to be so malicious even in the principle of our friendships, that we are to cherish in our bosom those who accord with us in nothing, because while they despise us, they abhor even more than we do, those with whom we have some disagreement. A man is certainly the most perfect Protestant who protests against the whole Christian religion. Whether a person's having no Christian religion is a title to favour, in exclusion to the largest description of Christians who hold all the doctrines of Christianity — though holding along with them some errors and some superfluities — is rather more than any man who has not become recreant⁸⁵ and apostate from his baptism will, I believe, choose to affirm. The countenance given from a spirit of controversy to that *negative* religion may, by degrees, encourage light and unthinking people to a total indifference to everything positive in matters of *doctrine*; and in the end, of *practice* too. If continued, it would play the game of that sort of active, proselytizing, and persecuting atheism which is the disgrace and calamity

⁸⁴ He uses *democratic* pejoratively. Yet, when the Press is an agent of the state, the spirit is *tyranny*. — WHG

⁸⁵ *Recreant*: a person who betrays or deserts his cause, religion, political party, or friend, etc. — WHG

of our time, and which we see to be as capable of subverting a government, as any mode can be of misguided zeal for better things.

ANTECHAMBER OF REGICIDE.

To those who do not love to contemplate the fall of human greatness, I do not know a more mortifying spectacle than to see the assembled majesty of the crowned heads of Europe waiting as patient suitors in the antechamber of regicide. They wait, it seems, until the sanguinary tyrant Carnot ⁸⁶ has snorted away the fumes of the undigested blood of his sovereign. Then, when sunk on the down of usurped pomp, he has sufficiently indulged his meditations on which monarch will next glut his ravening maw (mouth), he may condescend to signify that it is his pleasure to be awake — that he is at leisure to receive the proposals of his high and mighty clients, for the terms on which he may respite the execution of the sentence he has passed upon them. At the opening of those doors, what a sight it must be to behold the plenipotentiaries of royal impotence, in the precedence which they will intrigue to obtain, and which will be granted to them according to the seniority of their degradation, sneaking into the regicide presence, and with the relics of the smile — which they had dressed up for the levee ⁸⁷ of their masters — still flickering on their curled lips, presenting the faded remains of their courtly graces, to meet the scornful, ferocious, sardonic grin of a bloody ruffian. While he is receiving their homage, he is measuring them with his eye, and fitting to their size the slider of his guillotine! These ambassadors may easily return as good courtiers as they went. But can they ever return from that degrading residence, as loyal and faithful subjects; or with any true affection to their master, or true attachment to the constitution, religion, or laws of their country? There is great danger that those who enter smiling into this Trophonian cave,⁸⁸ will come out of it sad and serious conspirators; and they will continue as such, for as long as they live. They will become true conductors of contagion to every country which has had the misfortune to send them to the source of that electricity. At best they will become totally indifferent to good and evil, to one institution or another. This species of indifference is but too generally distinguishable in those who have been much employed in foreign courts; but in the present case, the evil must be aggravated without measure. For they go from their country, not with the pride of the old character, but in a state of the lowest degradation. And what must happen in their place of residence can have no effect in raising them [again] to the level of true dignity, or of chaste self-estimation, either as men, or as representatives of crowned heads.

TREMENDOUSNESS OF WAR.

As if war was a matter of experiment! As if you could take it up or lay it down as an idle frolic! As if the dire goddess that presides over it, with her murderous spear in hand, and

⁸⁶ Lazare Carnot (1753-1823). As a member of the Committee of War, Carnot was assigned to the Committee for General Defense, a predecessor of the Committee of Public Safety — which was an instrument of the Terror. He did not take part in the debates accompanying Louis XVI's trial. He did, however, vote against an appeal to the people, and in favour of the king's death, thus siding with the Jacobins. — *Ency. Brit.*

⁸⁷ *Levee*: a formal reception of visitors or guests at a royal court.

⁸⁸ The cave of the oracle of Zeus, *Trophonius*. Those who entered were said to never smile again. — WHG

her gorgon at her breast, was a coquette to be flirted with! We should approach with reverence, that tremendous divinity which loves courage, but commands counsel. War never leaves where it found a nation. It is never to be entered into without mature deliberation; not a deliberation lengthened out into a perplexing indecision, but a deliberation leading to a sure and fixed judgment. When so taken up, it is not to be abandoned without reason, as valid, as fully, and as extensively considered. Peace may be made as unadvisedly as war. Nothing is so rash as fear; and the councils of pusillanimity,⁸⁹ while they are always sure to aggravate, very rarely put off the evils from which they would fly.

ENGLISH OFFICERS.

There is no lack of officers, that I ever understood, for the new ships which we commission or the new regiments which we raise. In the nature of things, it is not with their persons that the higher classes principally pay their contingent to the demands of war. There is another, and not less important part, which rests with almost exclusive weight upon them. They furnish the means,

*“How war may best upheld
Move by her two main nerves, iron and gold,
In all her equipage.”*

Not that they are exempt from contributing also by their personal service in the fleets and armies of their country. They do contribute, and in their full and fair proportion, according to the relative proportion of their numbers in the community. They contribute all the mind that actuates the whole machine. The fortitude required of them is very different from the unthinking alacrity of the common soldier, or common sailor, in the face of danger and death. It is not a passion; it is not an impulse; it is not a sentiment. It is a cool, steady, deliberate principle, always present, always equable; having no connection with anger; tempering honour with prudence; incited, invigorated, and sustained by a generous love of fame; informed, moderated, and directed by an enlarged knowledge of its own great public ends; flowing in one blended stream from the opposite sources of the heart and the head; carrying in itself its own commission, and proving its title to every other command, by the first and most difficult command: that of the bosom in which it resides. It is a fortitude which unites with the courage of the *field*, the more exalted and refined courage of the *council*; which knows to retreat, as well as to advance; which can conquer by delay, as well as by the rapidity of a march, or the impetuosity of an attack; which can be, with Fabius, the black cloud that lowers on the tops of the mountains, or with Scipio, the thunderbolt of war. Undismayed by false shame, it can patiently endure the severest trial that a gallant spirit can undergo, in the taunts and provocations of the enemy, the suspicions, the cold respect, and “mouth-honour” of those from whom it should meet a cheerful obedience. Undisturbed by false humanity, it can calmly assume that most awful moral responsibility of deciding when victory may be too dearly purchased by the loss of a single life, and when the safety and glory of their country may demand the certain sacrifice of thousands. Different stations of command may call for different modifications of this fortitude; but the character ought to be

⁸⁹ *Pusillanimity*: contemptible fear.

the same in all. And never, in the most “palmy state” of our martial renown, did it shine with brighter lustre than in the present sanguinary and ferocious hostilities, wherever British arms have been carried.

DIPLOMACY OF HUMILIATION.

It happens frequently that *pride* may reject a public advance, while *interest* listens to a secret suggestion of advantage. The opportunity has been afforded. At a very early period in the diplomacy of humiliation, a gentleman was sent on an errand of which — from the motive of it, whatever the event might be — we can never be ashamed. Humanity cannot be degraded by humiliation. It is its very character to submit to such things. There is a consanguinity between *benevolence* and *humility*. They are virtues of the same stock. *Dignity* is of as good a race; but it belongs to the family of *fortitude*. In the spirit of that benevolence, we sent a gentleman to beseech the Directory of regicide, not to be quite so prodigal as their republic had been of judicial murder. We solicited them to spare the lives of some unhappy persons of the first distinction, whose safety at other times could not have been an object of solicitation. They had quitted France on the faith of the declaration of the rights of citizens. They had never been in the service of the regicides, nor received any stipend at their hands. The very system and constitution of government that now prevails was settled subsequently to their emigration. They were under the protection of Great Britain, and in his majesty’s pay and service. Not an hostile invasion, but the disasters of the sea, had thrown them upon a shore more barbarous and inhospitable than the inclement ocean under the most pitiless of its storms. Here was an opportunity to express a feeling for the miseries of war; and to open some sort of conversation which (after our public overtures had glutted their pride) at a cautious and jealous distance, might lead to something like an accommodation. What was the event? A strange uncouth thing, a theatrical figure of the opera, his head shaded with three-coloured plumes, his body fantastically habited, strutted from the back scenes, and after a short speech, in the mock heroic falsetto of stupid tragedy, delivered the gentleman who came to make the representation into the custody of a guard, with directions not to lose sight of him for a moment; and then ordered him to be sent from Paris in two hours.

RELATION OF WEALTH TO NATIONAL DIGNITY.

We have a vast interest to preserve, and we possess great means of preserving it. But it is to be remembered that the artificer may be encumbered by his tools, and that *resources* may be among *impediments*. If wealth is the obedient and laborious slave of virtue and of public honour, then wealth is in its place, and has its use. But if this order is changed, and honour is to be sacrificed to the conservation of riches — then riches, which have neither eyes nor hands, nor anything truly vital in them, cannot long survive past the being of their vivifying powers, their legitimate masters, and their potent protectors. If we command our wealth, we shall be rich and free: if our wealth commands us, we are poor indeed. We are bought by the enemy with the treasure from our own coffers. Too great a sense of the value of a subordinate interest may be the very source of its danger, as well as the certain ruin of interests of a superior order. Often has a man *lost* his all because he would not submit to *hazard* all in defending it. A display of our wealth before robbers is not the way to restrain

their boldness, nor to lessen their rapacity. This display is made, I know, to persuade the people of England that thereby we shall awe the enemy, and improve the terms of our capitulation: it is made, not that we should fight with more animation, but that we should supplicate with better hopes. *We are mistaken*. We have an enemy to deal with who never regarded our contest as a measuring and weighing of purses. He is the Gaul that puts his *sword* into the scale. He is more tempted with our wealth as *booty*, than terrified with it as *power*. But let us be rich or poor, let us be either of these in whatever proportion we may — nature is false or this is true: that where the essential public force (of which money is but a part) is in any degree on a par in a conflict between nations, that state which is resolved to hazard its existence rather than abandon its objects, must have an infinite advantage over that which is resolved to *yield* rather than carry its *resistance* beyond a certain point. Humanly speaking, that people which bounds its efforts only with its *being* (its very existence), must give the law to (rule over) that nation which will not push its opposition beyond its *convenience*.

AMBASSADORS OF INFAMY.

On this their gaudy day, the new regicide Directory sent for their diplomatic rabble, who are as bad as themselves in principle, but infinitely worse in degradation. They called them out by a sort of roll of their nations, one after another, much in the manner in which they called wretches out of their prison to the guillotine. When these ambassadors of infamy appeared before them, the chief director, in the name of the rest, treated each of them with a short, affected, pedantic, insolent, theatrical laconium⁹⁰ — a sort of epigram of contempt. When they had thus insulted them in a style and language which never before was heard, and which no sovereign would for a moment endure from another (supposing any of them were frantic enough to use it), to finish their outrage, they drummed and trumpeted the wretches out of their hall of audience.

Among the objects of this insolent buffoonery was a person supposed to represent the king of Prussia. To this worthy representative, they did not so much as condescend to mention his master. They did not seem to know that he had one. They addressed themselves solely to Prussia in the abstract, notwithstanding the infinite obligation they owed to their early protector for their first recognition and alliance, and for the part of his territory that he gave into their hands for the first-fruits of his homage. None but dead monarchs are so much as mentioned by them, and those only to insult the living by an invidious comparison. They told the Prussians they ought to learn, after the example of Frederick the Great,⁹¹ a love for France. What a pity it is that he was not now alive — who loved France so well as to chastise it — to give them another instance of his paternal affection by an unsparing use of the rod (which indeed he would have spared little). But the Directory were mistaken. These are not days in which monarchs value themselves upon the title of *great*. They have grown *philosophic*; they are satisfied to be *good*.

⁹⁰ *Laconium*: the sweating room of an ancient Roman bath.

⁹¹ Frederick the Great: King of Prussia from 1740 to 1786; he brought Prussia military prestige by winning the War of the Austrian Succession, and the Seven Years' War.

Your lordship will pardon me for this not very long reflection on the short but excellent speech of the plumed director, to the ambassador of Cappadocia. The imperial ambassador was not in waiting; but they found a good Judean representation for Austria. With great judgment, his highness the Grand Duke had sent the most atheistic coxcomb to be found in Florence, to represent at the bar of impiety, the house of apostolic majesty, and the descendants of the pious (though high-minded) Maria Theresa.⁹² He was sent to humble the whole race of Austria before those grim assassins, reeking with the blood of the daughter of Maria Theresa, whom they sent in a dung-cart, half-dead, to a cruel execution. And this true-born son of apostasy and infidelity, this renegade from the faith and from all honour and all humanity, drove an Austrian coach over the stones which were still wet with her blood — with that blood which dropped every step through her tumbril, all the way she was drawn from the horrid prison in which they had finished all the cruelty and horrors, not executed in the face of the sun! The Hungarian subjects of Maria Theresa, when they drew their swords to defend her rights against France, called her with correctness of truth — though perhaps not with the same correctness of grammar, a king: *Moriamur pro rege nostro* (we die for our king) *Maria Theresa*. She lived and died a king; and others will have subjects ready to make the same vow when, in either sex, they show themselves to be real kings.

DIFFICULTY IS THE PATH TO GLORY.

When you choose an arduous and slippery path, God forbid that any weak feelings of my declining age — which calls for soothings and supports, and which can have none but from you — might make me wish that you should abandon what you are about, or should trifle with it. In this house we submit, though with troubled minds, to that order which has connected all great duties with toils and with perils; order which has conducted the road to glory through the regions of obloquy and reproach; and which will never suffer the disparaging alliance of spurious, false, and fugitive praise, with genuine and permanent reputation. We know that the Power which has settled that order, and subjected you to it by placing you in the situation you are in, is able to bring you out of it with credit and with safety. *His will be done*. All must come right. You may open the way with pain and under reproach. *Others* will pursue it with ease and with applause.

ROBESPIERRE AND HIS COUNTERPARTS.

They have murdered one Robespierre.⁹³ This Robespierre they tell us was a cruel tyrant, and now that he is put out of the way, all will go well in France. Astraea⁹⁴ will again return to that earth from which she has been an emigrant, and all nations will resort to her golden

⁹² Maria Theresa (1717-1780) was the archduchess of Austria and queen of Hungary and Bohemia (1740–80), wife and empress of the Holy Roman emperor Francis I (reigned 1745–65), and mother of the Holy Roman emperor Joseph II (reigned 1765–90). Upon her accession, the War of the Austrian Succession erupted (1740–48), challenging her inheritance of the Habsburg lands. This contest with Prussia was followed by two more: the Seven Years' War (1756–63), and the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778–79), which further checked Austrian power. — *Ency. Brit.*

⁹³ Maximilien Robespierre (1758-1794) — French revolutionary; leader of the Jacobins, and architect of the Reign of Terror. He was himself executed in a coup d'état. — WHG

⁹⁴ In Greek mythology, Astraea is the virgin goddess of justice, innocence, purity, and precision. — WHG

scales. It is extraordinary that the very instant the mode of Paris is known here, it becomes all the fashion in London. This is *their* jargon. It is the old *bon ton* (style) of robbers, to cast their common crimes on the wickedness of their departed associates. I care little about the memory of this same Robespierre. I am sure he was an execrable villain. I rejoiced at his punishment neither more nor less than I would at the execution of the present Directory or any of its members. But who *gave* Robespierre the power of being a tyrant? And who were the *instruments* of his tyranny? The present virtuous constitution-mongers. He was a tyrant, but they were his satellites and his hangmen. Their sole merit is in the murder of their colleague. They have expiated their other murders by a new murder. It has always been the case among this banditti. They have always had the knife at each other's throats, after they had almost blunted it at the throats of every honest man. These people thought that, in the commerce of murder, he was likely to have the better of the bargain if any time was lost. Therefore they took one of their short revolutionary methods, and massacred him in a manner so perfidious and cruel, as would shock all humanity if the stroke was not struck by the present rulers on one of their own associates. But this last act of infidelity and murder is to expiate all the rest, and to qualify them for the amity of a humane and virtuous sovereign and civilized people. I have heard that a Tartar believes, when he has killed a man, that all his estimable qualities pass with his clothes and arms to the murderer. But I have never heard that it was the opinion of any savage Scythian, that if he kills a brother villain, he is *ipso facto* absolved of all his own offences. The Tartarian doctrine is the most tenable opinion. The murderers of Robespierre, besides what they are entitled to by being engaged in the same tontine ⁹⁵ of infamy, are his representatives, and they have inherited all his murderous qualities in addition to their own private stock. But it seems we are always to be of a party with the last and victorious assassins. I confess I am of a different mind; and of the two, I am rather inclined to think and speak less hardly of a dead ruffian, than to associate with the living. I could better bear the stench of the gibbeted ⁹⁶ murderer than the society of the bloody felons who yet annoy the world. While they wait the recompense due their ancient crimes, they merit new punishment by the new offences they commit. There is a period to the offences of Robespierre; but they survive in his assassins. *Better a living dog*, says the old proverb (Ecc 9.4), than a dead lion; not so here. Murderers and hogs never look good till they are hanged. No good can arise from villainy, except in the example of its fate. So I leave them their dead Robespierre, either to gibbet his memory, or to deify him in their Pantheon, along with their Marat ⁹⁷ and their Mirabeau.

ACCUMULATION, A STATE PRINCIPLE.

There must be some impulse besides public spirit to put private interest into motion along with it. Monied men ought to be allowed to set a value on their money; if they did not, there could be no monied men. This desire of accumulation is a principle without which the means of their service to the state could not exist. The love of lucre, though sometimes

⁹⁵ *Tontine*: a money scheme in which, on the death of one participant, his share is distributed to the others. – WHG

⁹⁶ *Gibbeted*: Hanged or beheaded on an instrument or platform of execution. – WHG

⁹⁷ Jean-Paul Marat (1743-1793). French revolutionary leader, political theorist, physician, and scientist, active in overthrowing the Girondists. He was stabbed to death in his bath by Charlotte Corday, a Gerondist. – *Ency. Brit.*

carried to a ridiculous, sometimes to a vicious excess, is the grand cause of prosperity to all states. In this natural, this reasonable, this powerful, this prolific principle, it is for the satirist to expose the ridiculous; it is for the moralist to censure the vicious; it is for the sympathetic heart to reprobate the hard and cruel; it is for the judge to condemn on the fraud, the extortion, and the oppression — but it is for the statesman to employ it as he finds it, with all its concomitant excellencies, with all its imperfections on its head. It is his part, in *this* case as it is in all other cases where he is to make use of the general energies of nature, to take them as he finds them.

WARNING FOR A NATION.

With all these causes of corruption, we may well judge what the general fashion of mind will be through both sexes and all conditions. Such spectacles and such examples will overbear all the laws that ever blackened the cumbrous volumes of our statutes. When royalty has disavowed itself; when it has relaxed all the principles of its own support; when it has rendered the system of regicide fashionable, and received it as triumphant in the very persons who have consolidated that system by the perpetration of every crime — those who not only massacred the prince, but the very laws and magistrates which were the support of royalty; who slaughtered with an indiscriminate proscription, without regard to either sex or age, every person that was suspected of an inclination to king, law, or magistracy — I ask, *will anyone dare to be loyal?* Will anyone presume, against both authority and opinion, to hold up this unfashionable, antiquated, exploded constitution? The Jacobin faction in England must then grow in strength and audacity; it will be supported by other intrigues, and supplied by other resources than we have yet seen in action. Confounded at its growth, the government may fly to parliament for its support. But who will answer for the temper of a house of commons elected under these circumstances? Who will answer for the courage of a house of commons to arm the crown with the extraordinary powers that it may demand? But the ministers will not venture to ask for half of what they know they want. They will lose half of that half in the contest. And when they have obtained their nothing, they will be driven by the cries of *faction*, either to demolish the feeble works they have thrown up in a hurry, or in effect, to abandon them.

As to the House of Lords, it is not worth mentioning. The peers should naturally be the pillars of the crown. But when their titles are rendered contemptible, and their property invidious — a part of their weakness, and not of their strength — they will be found as so many degraded and trembling individuals, who will seek by evasion to put off the evil day of their ruin. Both houses will be in perpetual oscillation between abortive attempts at energy, and still more unsuccessful attempts at compromise. You will be impatient of your disease, and abhorrent of your remedy. A spirit of subterfuge and a tone of apology will enter into all your proceedings, whether of law or legislation. Your judges, who now sustain so masculine an authority, will appear more on trial than the culprits they have before them. The awful frown of criminal justice will be smoothed into the silly smile of seduction. Judges will think to insinuate and soothe the accused into conviction and condemnation, and to wheedle to the gallows the most artful of all delinquents.

But they themselves will not be so wheedled. They will not submit even to the appearance of persons on trial. Their claim to this exception will be admitted. The place in which some of the greatest names which ever distinguished the history of this country have stood, will appear beneath their dignity. The criminal will climb from the dock to the side-bar, and take his place and his tea with the counsel. From the bar of the counsel, by a natural progress, he will ascend to the bench, which long before had been virtually abandoned. Those who escape from justice will not suffer a question about reputation. They will take the crown of the causeway; they will be revered as martyrs; they will triumph as conquerors. Nobody will dare to censure that popular part of the tribunal, whose only restraint on misjudgment is the censure of the public. Those who find fault with the decision will be represented as enemies to the institution. Juries that convict for the crown will be loaded with obloquy. The juries who acquit will be held up as models of justice. If parliament orders a prosecution and fails (as fail it will), it will be treated to its face as guilty of a conspiracy to maliciously prosecute. Its care in discovering a conspiracy against the state will be treated as a forged plot to destroy the liberty of the subject. Every such discovery, instead of strengthening government, will weaken its reputation.

In this state, things will be permitted to proceed, lest measures of vigour precipitate a crisis. The timid will thus act from character, and the wise from necessity. Our laws had done all that the old condition of things dictated to render our judges erect and independent. But they will naturally fall on the side on which they had taken no precautions. The judicial magistrates will find themselves safe as against the crown, whose will is *not* their tenure; the power of executing their office will be held at the pleasure of those who deal out fame or abuse as they think fit. They will begin to consult their own repose and their own popularity, rather than the critical and perilous trust that is in their hands. They will speculate on consequences when they see at court an ambassador whose robes are lined with a scarlet dyed in the blood of judges. It is no wonder, nor are they to blame, when they are to consider how they shall answer for their conduct to the criminal of today, turned into the magistrate of tomorrow.

SANTERRE AND TALLIEN.

Is it only an oppressive nightmare with which we have been loaded? Is it then all a frightful dream, and are there no regicides in the world? Have we not heard of that prodigy of a ruffian, who would not suffer his benignant sovereign, with his hands tied behind him, and stripped for execution, to say one parting word to his deluded people; — of Santerre,⁹⁸ who commanded the drums and trumpets to strike up to stifle [the king's] voice, and dragged him backward to the machine of murder? This nefarious villain (for a few days I may call him so) stands high in France, as in a republic of robbers and murderers he ought. What hinders this monster from being sent as ambassador to convey to his majesty the first compliments of his brethren, the regicide Directory? They have none that can represent them more properly. I anticipate the day of his arrival. He will make his public entry into London on one of the pale horses of his brewery. As he knows that we are pleased with the Paris taste for the orders of knighthood, he will fling a bloody sash across his shoulders with

⁹⁸ Antoine Joseph Santerre (1752-1809) – general in the Revolutionary army, who executed Louis XVI. – *Ency. Brit.*

the order of the Holy Guillotine, surmounting the Crown, appendant to the riband. Thus adorned, he will proceed from Whitechapel to the further end of Pall Mall, all the music of London playing the Marseillais hymn before him, and escorted by a chosen detachment of the Legion de l'Echaffaud. It is only to be wished that no ill-fated loyalist for the imprudence of his zeal, may stand in the pillory at Charing Cross at the time of this grand procession, under the statue of King Charles the First, lest some of the rotten eggs (which the constitutional society shall let fly at his indiscreet head) may hit the virtuous murderer of his king. They might soil the state dress which the ministers of so many crowned heads have admired, and in which Sir Clement Cotterel ⁹⁹ is to introduce him at St. James's.

If Santerre cannot be spared from the constitutional butcheries at home, Tallien ¹⁰⁰ may supply his place, and in point of figure, with advantage. He has been habituated to commissions; and he is as well qualified as Santerre for this. Nero wished the Roman people had but one neck. The wish of the more exalted Tallien, when he sat in judgment, was that his sovereign had eighty-three heads, that he might send one to every one of the departments. Tallien will make an excellent figure at Guildhall at the next sheriff's feast. He may open the ball with my Lady Mayoress. But this will be after he has retired from the public table, and gone into the private room for the enjoyment of more social and unreserved conversation with the ministers of state and the judges of the bench. There these ministers and magistrates will hear him entertain the worthy aldermen with an instructing and pleasing narrative of the manner in which he made the rich citizens of Bordeaux squeak, and gently led them by the public credit of the guillotine, to disgorge their anti-revolutionary pelf.¹⁰¹

All this will be the display and talk of the town, when our regicide is on a visit of ceremony. At home nothing will equal the pomp and splendour of the Hotel de la Republique. There another scene of gaudy grandeur will be opened. When his citizen-excellency keeps the festival which every citizen is ordered to observe, for the glorious execution of Louis the Sixteenth, and he renews his oath of detestation of kings, then a grand ball will, of course, be given on the occasion. Then what a hurly-burly; what a crowding; what a glare of a thousand flambeaux ¹⁰² in the square; what a clamour of footmen contending at the door; what a rattling of a thousand coaches of duchesses, countesses, and Lady Marys, choking the way and overturning each other in a struggle over who should be first to pay her court to the *Citoyenne*, the spouse of the twenty-first husband, he the husband of the thirty-first wife, and to hail her in the rank of honourable matrons, before the four days' duration of

⁹⁹ He served as Master of Ceremonies for the crown. *St. James* is the royal palace in London. – WHG

¹⁰⁰ Jean-Lambert Tallien (1767-1820). Though, as a moderate, he helped engineer the fall of Robespierre, he was himself a participant in the Reign of Terror. After Robespierre's fall, Tallien became a leader of the Thermidorian reaction, taking part in the suppression of members of the Revolutionary tribunals, the Jacobins, and some of his former colleagues whom he accused of being royalist sympathizers. – *Ency. Brit.*

¹⁰¹ *Pelf*: "filthy lucre" or ill-gotten riches; a contemptuous term. – WHG

¹⁰² *Flambeaux*: flaming torches as used in a procession. – WHG

marriage is expired! Morals, as they were — *decorum*, the great outguard of the sex,¹⁰³ and the proud sentiment of *honour*, which makes virtue more respectable where it is, and conceals human frailty where virtue may not be — will be banished from this land of propriety, modesty, and reserve.

SIR SYDNEY SMITH.

This officer ¹⁰⁴ having attempted, with great gallantry, to cut out a vessel from one of the enemy's harbours, was taken after an obstinate resistance, such as obtained him the marked respect of those who were witnesses of his valour, and knew the circumstances in which it was displayed. Upon his arrival at Paris, he was instantly thrown into prison, where the nature of his situation will best be understood by knowing, that among its *mitigations* was permission to walk occasionally in the court, and to enjoy the privilege of shaving himself. On the old system of feelings and principles, his sufferings might have been entitled to consideration, and even in a comparison with those of citizen La Fayette, to a priority in the order of compassion. If the ministers had neglected to take any steps in his favour, a declaration of the sense of the House of Commons would have stimulated them to their duty. If they had caused a representation to be made, such a proceeding would have added force to it. If reprisal were thought advisable, the address of the House would have given an additional sanction to a measure which would have been, indeed, justifiable without any other sanction than its own reason. But, *no*. Nothing at all like it. In fact, the merit of Sir Sydney Smith, and his claim on British compassion, was of a kind altogether different from that which interested so deeply the authors of the motion in favour of citizen La Fayette.

In my humble opinion, Captain Sir Sydney Smith has another sort of merit with the British nation, and something of a higher claim on British humanity than citizen La Fayette. Faithful, zealous, and ardent in the service of his king and country; full of spirit; full of resources; going out of the beaten road but going rightly, because his uncommon enterprise was not conducted by a vulgar judgment. In his profession, Sir Sydney Smith might be considered a distinguished person, if any person could well be distinguished in a service in which scarcely a commander can be named without putting you in mind of some action of intrepidity, skill, and vigilance that has given them a fair title to contend with any men, and in any age.

But I will say nothing further of the merits of Sir Sydney Smith: the mortal animosity of the regicide enemy supersedes all other panegyric (praise). Their hatred is a judgment in his favour, without appeal. At present he is lodged in the tower of the Temple, the last prison of Louis the Sixteenth, and the last but one of Maria Antonietta of Austria; the prison of Louis the Seventeenth; the prison of Elizabeth of Bourbon. There he lies, unpitied by the grand philanthropy, to meditate upon the fate of those who are faithful to their king and country. While this prisoner, secluded from intercourse, was indulging in these cheering reflections, he might possibly have had the further consolation of learning (by means of the insolent

¹⁰³ *Outguard*: a guard or small body of troops at a distance from the main body of an army, that watches for the approach of an enemy. — WHG

¹⁰⁴ Sir William Sidney Smith (1764-1840) British naval and intelligence officer. He rose to the rank of Admiral. Known for being outspoken and acting on his own initiative, he irked many of his superiors, like Adm. Nelson. — WHG

exultation of his guards) that there was an English ambassador at Paris. He might have had the proud comfort of hearing that this ambassador had the honour of passing his mornings in respectful attendance at the office of a regicide pettifogger;¹⁰⁵ and that in the evening he relaxed in the amusements of the opera, and in the spectacle of a totally new audience, an audience in which he had the pleasure of seeing about him not a single face that he could formerly have known in Paris. But in place of that company, one indeed more than its equal in display of gaiety, splendour, and luxury, is a set of abandoned wretches, squandering in insolent riot the spoils of their bleeding country — a subject of profound reflection both to the prisoner and to the ambassador.

A MORAL DISTINCTION.

I think we might have found — before the rude hand of insolent office was on our shoulder, and the staff of usurped authority brandished over our heads — that contempt of the suppliant is not the best forwarder of a suit; and that national disgrace is not the high road to security, much less to power and greatness. Patience indeed strongly indicates the love of peace; but mere love does not always lead to enjoyment. It is the power of *winning* that palm,¹⁰⁶ which ensures our *wearing* it. Virtues have their place; but out of their place they hardly deserve the name. They pass into the neighbouring vice. The patience of fortitude and the endurance of pusillanimity (cowardice) are very different things — as in their principle, so in their effects.

INFIDELS AND THEIR POLICY.

In the revolution of France, two sorts of men were principally concerned in giving a character and determination to its pursuits: the *philosophers* and the *politicians*. They took different ways, but they met in the same end.

The *philosophers* had one predominant object which they pursued with a fanatical fury; that is, *the utter extirpation of religion*. To that, every question of empire was subordinate. They would rather domineer in a parish of atheists than rule over a Christian world. Their temporal ambition was wholly subservient to their proselytizing spirit in which they were not exceeded by Mahomet himself. Those who have made but superficial studies in the natural history of the human mind, have been taught to look at religious opinions as the only cause of enthusiastic zeal and sectarian propagation. But there is no doctrine whatever on which men can warm, that is not capable of the very same effect. The social nature of man impels him to propagate his principles, as much as physical impulses urge him to propagate his kind. The passions give zeal and vehemence. The understanding bestows design and system. The whole man moves under the discipline of his opinions. Religion is among the most powerful causes of enthusiasm. When anything concerning it becomes an object of much meditation, it cannot be indifferent to the mind. Those who do not love religion, hate it. The rebels to God perfectly abhor the Author of their being. They hate Him “with all their heart, with all their mind, with all their soul, and with all their strength.” He

¹⁰⁵ *Pettifogger*: Someone who quibbles over trivia, and raises petty objections; an unscrupulous lawyer. — WHG

¹⁰⁶ A palm (branch or leaf) is a symbol of victory, and of the peace and joy it brings. — WHG

never presents himself to their thoughts, except to menace and alarm them. They cannot strike the sun out of heaven, but they are able to raise a smouldering smoke that obscures Him from their own eyes.

Not being able to revenge themselves on God, they take delight in vicariously defacing, degrading, torturing, and tearing in pieces His image in man. Let no one judge them by what he has conceived of them when they were not incorporated, and had no lead. They were then only passengers in a common vehicle. They were then carried along with the general motion of religion in the community, and without being aware of it, they partook of its influence. In that situation, at worst, their nature was left free to counter-work their principles. They despaired of giving any very general currency to their opinions. They considered them as a reserved privilege for the chosen few. But when the possibility of dominion, lead, and propagation presented itself, and the ambition which so often before had made them hypocrites, might rather gain than lose by a daring avowal of their sentiments, *then* the nature of this infernal spirit which has “evil for its good” appeared in its full perfection. Nothing indeed but the possession of some *power* can with any certainty reveal what, at bottom, is the true character of any man. Without reading the speeches of Vergniaud, Francian of Nantes, Isnard, and some others of that sort, it would not be easy to conceive the passion, rancour, and malice of their tongues and hearts. They worked themselves up to a perfect frenzy against religion and all its professors. They tore the reputation of the clergy to pieces by their infuriated declamations and invectives, before they lacerated their bodies by their massacres. Leaving out this *fanatical atheism*, we omit the principal feature in the French revolution, and a principal consideration with regard to the effects to be expected from peace with it.

The other sort of men were the *politicians*. To them — who had little or not at all reflected on the subject — religion was in itself no object of love or hatred. They disbelieved it, and that was all. Neutral with regard to that object, they took the side which in the present state of things might best suit their purposes. They soon found that they could not do without the philosophers; and the philosophers soon made them sensible that the destruction of religion would supply them with means of conquest, first at home, and then abroad. The philosophers were the active internal agitators, and they supplied the spirit and principles: the politicians gave the practical direction. Sometimes the one predominated in the composition, sometimes the other. The only difference between them was in the necessity of concealing the general design for a time, and in dealing with foreign nations — the fanatics going straightforward and openly, the politicians by the surer mode of zigzag. In the course of events, this among other causes, produced fierce and bloody contentions between them. But at the bottom, they thoroughly agreed in all the objects of ambition and irreligion, and substantially agreed in all the means of promoting these ends.

WHAT A MINISTER SHOULD ATTEMPT.

After such an elaborate display had been made of the injustice and insolence of an enemy who seems to have been irritated by every one of the means which had been commonly used with effect to soothe the rage of intemperate power, the natural result would be that the scabbard in which we attempted in vain to plunge our sword, might have been thrown away

with scorn. It would have been natural that, rising in the fulness of their might, their insulted majesty, despised dignity, violated justice, rejected supplication, and patience being goaded into fury — that all this would have poured out all the length of the reins upon all the wrath which they had so long restrained. It might have been expected that he would emulate the glory of the youthful hero in alliance with him; that he would have been touched by the example of what one man, well-formed and well-placed, may do in the most desperate state of affairs. And being convinced that there is a courage of the *cabinet* that is fully as powerful and far less vulgar than that of the *field*, our minister might have changed the whole line of that useless, though prosperous prudence, which had up till then produced all the effects of the blindest *temerity*. If he found his situation full of *danger* (and I do not deny that it is perilous in the extreme), he must feel that it is also full of *glory*. He must also feel that no muse of fire, that had ascended the highest heaven of invention, could imagine anything more awful and august than the stage on which our minister is placed. It was hoped that in this swelling scene in which he moved with some of the first potentates of Europe for his fellow-actors, and with so many of the rest for anxious spectators of a part which, as he plays that part, determines forever their destiny and his own. He would be like Ulysses in the unravelling point of the epic story. He would have thrown off both his patience and his rags. And thus stripped of such unworthy disguises, he would have stood forth in the form and in the attitude of a *hero*.

On that day, it was thought he would have assumed the part of Mars; that he would bid to be brought forth from their hideous kennel (where his scrupulous tenderness had too long immured them) those impatient dogs of war, whose fierce regards affright even the minister of vengeance that feeds them; that he would let them loose, in famine, fever, plagues, and death, upon a guilty race to whose frame, and to all whose habit, order, peace, religion, and virtue are alien and abhorrent. It was expected that he would at last have thought of active and effectual war; that he would no longer amuse the British lion in the chase of mice and rats; that he would no longer employ the whole naval power of Great Britain, once the terror of the world, to prey upon the miserable remains of a peddling commerce which the enemy did not regard, and from which none could profit.

It was expected that he would have re-asserted the justice of his cause; that he would have re-animated whatever remained to him of his allies, and endeavoured to recover those whom their fears had led astray; that he would have rekindled the martial ardour of his citizens; that he would have held out to them the example of their ancestry, the assertor of Europe and the scourge of French ambition; that he would have reminded them of a posterity which, if this nefarious robbery under the fraudulent name and false colour of a government, should in full power be seated in the heart of Europe, it must forever be consigned to vice, impiety, barbarism, and the most ignominious slavery of body and mind.

In so holy a cause, it was presumed that (as he did in the beginning of the war) he would have opened all the temples; and with prayer, fasting, and supplication (better directed than to the grim Moloch of regicide in France), he would have called upon us to raise that united cry which has so often stormed heaven, and with a pious violence forced down blessings upon a repentant people. It was hoped that when he had invoked upon his endeavours, the favourable regard of the Protector of the human race, it would be seen that his menaces to

the enemy, and his prayers to the Almighty, were not *followed* but *accompanied* with correspondent action. It was hoped that his shrilling trumpet would be heard, not to announce a show, but to sound a charge.

LAW OF VICINITY.

This violent breach in the community of Europe we must conclude to have been made (even if they had not expressly declared it over and over again) either to force mankind into an adoption of their system, or to live in perpetual enmity with a community that is the most potent we have ever known. Can any person imagine that, in offering to mankind this desperate alternative, there is no indication of a hostile mind, because men in possession of the ruling authority are supposed to have a right to act without coercion in their own territories. As to the right of men to act anywhere according to their pleasure, without any moral tie, no such right exists. Men are never in a state of *total* independence of each other. It is not the condition of our nature. Nor is it conceivable how any man can pursue a considerable course of action without its having some effect upon others; or of course, without producing some degree of responsibility for his conduct. The *situations* in which men stand relatively, produce the rules and principles of that responsibility, and afford directions to prudence in exacting it. Distance of place does not extinguish the duties or the rights of men; but it often renders their exercise impracticable. The same circumstance of distance renders the noxious effects of an evil system in any community less pernicious. But there are situations where this difficulty does not occur; and in which, therefore, these duties are obligatory, and these rights are to be asserted.

It has ever been the method of public jurists to draw a great part of the analogies on which they form the law of nations, from the principles of law which prevail in civil community. Civil laws are not all merely positive. Those which are conclusions of legal reason rather than matters of statutable provision, belong to universal equity, and are universally applicable. Almost the whole Praetorian law is such. There is a “Law of Neighbourhood” which does not leave a man perfectly the master on his own ground. When a neighbour sees a *new erection* set up at his door, in the nature of a nuisance, he has a right to represent it to the judge who, on his part, has a right to order the work to be stayed; or if already established, to be removed. On this head, the parent law is express and clear, and it has made many wise provisions which, without destroying, regulate and restrain the right of *ownership*, by the right of *vicinage*. No *innovation* is permitted that may redound, even secondarily, to the prejudice of a neighbour. The whole doctrine of that important head of Praetorian law, “*De novi operis nunciatione*,” (the announcement of a new work) is founded on the principle that no *new* use should be made of a man’s private liberty, or operating upon his private property, from which a detriment may be justly apprehended by his neighbour.

This law of denunciation is prospective. It is to anticipate what is called *damnum infactum* (the damage done), or *damnum nondum factum* (the damage not yet done); that is, a damage justly apprehended but not actually done. Even before it is clearly known whether the innovation is damageable or not, the judge is competent to issue a prohibition to innovate, until the point can be determined. This prompt interference is grounded on

principles favourable to both parties. It is preventive of a mischief that is difficult to be repaired, and of ill blood that is difficult to be softened. The rule of law, therefore, which comes before the evil, is among the very best parts of equity, and it justifies the promptness of the remedy because, as it is well observed, *Res damni infecti celeritatem desiderat, et periculosa est dilation* (the matter of potential damage requires speed, and delay is dangerous). This right of denunciation does not hold when things continue according to the *ancient* mode, however inconvenient it is to the neighbourhood. For there is a sort of presumption against novelty, drawn out of a deep consideration of human nature and human affairs. And the maxim of jurisprudence is well laid down, *Vetustas pro lege semper habetur* (antiquity is always considered the law).

Such is the law of civil vicinity. Now, where there is no constituted judge, as between independent states, the vicinage itself is the natural judge. It is preventively, the assertor of its own rights, or remedially, their avenger. Neighbours are presumed to take cognizance of each other's acts (*vicini vicinorum facta praesumuntur scire*). This principle which, like the rest, is as true of nations as of individual men, has bestowed on the grand vicinage of Europe a duty to know, and a right to prevent, any capital innovation which may amount to the erection of a dangerous nuisance.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY – CHRISTENDOM.

The operation of dangerous and delusive first principles obliges us to have recourse to the true ones. In the intercourse between nations, we are apt to rely too much on the instrumental part. We lay too much weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts. We do not act much more wisely when we trust to the interests of men, as guarantees of their engagements. The interests frequently tear to pieces the engagements; and the passions trample upon both. To trust entirely to either, is to disregard our own safety, or to not know mankind. Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as it is with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men, without their knowledge, and sometimes against their intentions. The secret, unseen, but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse holds them together, even when their perverse and litigious nature sets them to equivocate, scuffle, and fight about the terms of their written obligations. As to war, if it is the means of wrong and violence, it is also the sole means of justice among nations. Nothing can banish it from the world. Those who say otherwise, intending to impose upon us, do not impose upon themselves. But it is one of the greatest objects of human wisdom to *mitigate* those evils which we are unable to *remove*. The conformity and analogy of which I speak, like everything else, is incapable of preserving perfect trust and tranquility among men. But it has a strong tendency to facilitate accommodation, and to produce a generous oblivion of the rancour of their quarrels. With this similitude between them, peace is more of peace, and war is less of war. I will go further. There have been periods of time in which communities, apparently at peace with each other, have been more perfectly separated, than in latter times many nations in Europe have been in the course of long and bloody wars. The cause must be sought in the similitude

throughout Europe, of religion, laws, and manners. At the bottom, these are all the same. The writers on public law have often called this *aggregate* of nations, a commonwealth. They had reason. It is virtually one great state having the same basis of general law, with some diversity of provincial customs and local establishments. The nations of Europe have had the very same CHRISTIAN RELIGION, agreeing in the fundamental parts, but varying a little in the ceremonies and in the subordinate doctrines. The whole of the polity and economy of every country in Europe has been derived from the same sources. It was drawn from the old Germanic or Gothic customary, and from the feudal institutions which must be considered an emanation from that customary. And the whole has been improved and digested into system and discipline by the Roman law. From this arose the several orders, with or without a monarch (which are called states), in every European country. The strong traces of these, where monarchy predominated, were never wholly extinguished or merged in despotism. In the few places where monarchy was cast off, the spirit of European monarchy was still left. Those countries still continued as countries of *states*; that is, of classes, orders, and distinctions such as had subsisted before, or nearly so. Indeed, the force and form of the institution called *states* continued in greater perfection in those republican communities, than under monarchies. From all those sources arose a system of manners and of education which was nearly similar in all this quarter of the globe; and which softened, blended, and harmonized the colours of the whole.

PERILS OF JACOBIN PEACE.

The same temper which brings us to solicit a Jacobin peace, will induce us to temporize with all its evils.¹⁰⁷ By degrees, our minds will be made to our circumstances. The novelty of such things, which produces half the horror and all the disgust, will be worn off. Our ruin will be disguised in profit, and the sale of a few wretched baubles will bribe a degenerate people to barter away the most precious jewel of their souls. Our constitution is not made for this kind of warfare. While it provides greatly for our happiness, it furnishes few means for our defence. It is formed, in great measure, upon the principle of jealousy of the crown, and as things stood when it took that turn, with very great reason. I go further: it must keep alive some part of that fire of jealousy eternally and chastely burning, or it cannot be the British constitution. At various periods we have had tyranny in this country, more than enough. We have had rebellions, with more or less justification. Some of our kings have made adulterous connections abroad, and trucked away for foreign gold the interests and glory of their crown. But before this time our liberty has never been corrupted. I mean to say that it has never been debauched from its domestic relations. Up to this time it has been English liberty, and English liberty only. Our love of liberty and our love of our country were not distinct things. Liberty is now, it seems, put upon a larger and more liberal bottom. We are men; and as men, undoubtedly nothing human is foreign to us. We cannot be too liberal in our general wishes for the happiness of our kind. But in all questions on the mode of procuring it for any particular community, we ought to be fearful of admitting into the consultation, those who have no interest in it, or who perhaps have an interest *against* it. Above all, we cannot be too cautious in our communication with those who seek their

¹⁰⁷ *Temporize*: draw out a discussion or process in order to gain time; stall, defer. – WHG

happiness by other roads than those of humanity, morals, and religion, and whose liberty consists, and consists alone, in being free from those restraints which are imposed by the virtues upon the passions.

When we invite danger from a confidence in defensive measures, we should *first* of all be sure that it is a species of danger against which any defensive measures that can be adopted, will be sufficient. *Next* we ought to know that the spirit of our laws, or that our own dispositions (which are stronger than laws) are susceptible to all those defensive measures which the occasion may require. A *third* consideration is whether these measures will not bring more odium than strength to government. And the *last*, whether the authority that *makes* them — in a general corruption of manners and principles — can insure their *execution*? Let no one argue from the state of things (as he sees them at present), concerning what will be the *means* and *capacities* of government (when the time arrives), which will call for those remedies that are commensurate with the enormous evils.

It is an obvious truth that no constitution can defend *itself*: it must be defended by the wisdom and fortitude of men. These are what no constitution can give. They are the gifts of God; and He alone knows whether we will possess such gifts at the time when we stand in need of them. Constitutions furnish the *civil* means of getting at the *natural* means; it is all that they can do in this case. But our constitution has more impediments than helps. Its excellencies, when they come to be put to this sort of proof, may be found among its defects.

Nothing looks more awesome and imposing than an ancient fortification. Its lofty, embattled walls, its bold, projecting, rounded towers that pierce the sky, strike the imagination and promise impregnable strength. But they are the very things that make its weakness. You may as well think of opposing one of these old fortresses to the mass of artillery brought by a French irruption into the field, as to think of resisting, by your old laws and your old forms, the new destruction which the corps of Jacobin engineers of today prepare for all such forms and all such laws. Besides the debility and false principle of their construction to resist the present modes of attack, the fortress itself is in ruinous repair, and there is a practicable breach in every part of it.

Such is the work. But miserable works have been defended by the constancy of the garrison. Weather-beaten ships have been brought safely to port by the spirit and alertness of the crew. But it is here that we will eminently fail. The day that the seat of regicide has its place among the thrones of Europe, by their consent, there is no longer a motive for zeal in favour of those thrones. It will at best be a cold, unimpassioned, dejected, melancholy duty. The glory will seem all on the other side. The friends of the crown will appear, not as champions, but as victims. Discouraged, mortified, lowered, and defeated, they will fall into listlessness and indifference. They will leave things to take their course — enjoy the present hour, and submit to their common fate.

PARLIAMENTARY AND REGAL PREROGATIVE.

Your throne cannot stand secure upon the principles of unconditional submission and passive obedience; on powers exercised without the concurrence of the people to be governed; on acts made in defiance of their prejudices and habits; on acquiescence procured by foreign mercenary troops and secured by standing armies. These may possibly be the

foundation of *other* thrones, but they must be the subversion of *yours*. It was not to passive principles in our ancestors that we owe the honour of appearing before a sovereign who cannot feel that he is a prince, without knowing that we ought to be free. The revolution is a departure from the ancient course of the descent of this monarchy. The people at that time re-entered into their original rights. And that was not because a positive law authorized what was then done, but because the freedom and safety of the *subject*, which is the origin and cause of all laws, required a proceeding that was paramount and superior to them. In that ever-memorable and instructive period, the *letter of the law* was superseded in favour of the *substance of liberty*., To the free choice of the people, therefore, without either king or parliament, we owe that happy establishment out of which both king and parliament were regenerated. From that great principle of liberty have originated the statutes confirming and ratifying the establishment from which your majesty derives your right to rule over us. Those statutes have not given us our liberties; our liberties have produced them. Every hour of your majesty's reign, your title stands upon the very same foundation on which it was laid at first; and we do not know a better one on which it can possibly be placed.

Convinced, sir, that you cannot have different rights and a different security in different parts of your dominions, we wish to lay an even platform for your throne; and to give it an unmovable stability, by laying it on the general freedom of your people; and by securing to your majesty that confidence and affection in all parts of your dominions, which makes your best security and dearest title in this, the chief seat of your empire.

Such, sir, being among us the foundation of monarchy itself, much more clearly and much more peculiarly, it is the ground of all *parliamentary* power. Parliament is a security provided for the protection of freedom, and not a subtle fiction contrived to amuse the people in its place. The authority of both houses can (still, less than that of the crown) be supported on different principles in different places, so as to be a protector of liberty for one part of your subjects, and a fund of despotism for another. Through this, a prerogative is extended by occasional powers, whenever an arbitrary will finds itself straitened by the restrictions of law. Had it seemed good to parliament to consider itself as the indulgent guardian and strong protector of the freedom of the subordinate popular assemblies, instead of exercising its power to their annihilation, there is no doubt that this could never have been their inclination — because it is not in their interest to raise questions on the extent of parliamentary rights, nor to enfeeble privileges which were the security of their own. Powers evident from necessity, and not suspicious from an alarming mode or purpose in their exertion, would be cheerfully submitted to, as they were formerly. And these would have been fully sufficient for the conservation of unity in the empire, and for directing its wealth to one common centre. Another use has produced other consequences; and a power which refuses to be limited by moderation must either be lost, or find other more distinct and satisfactory limitations.

BURKE'S DESIGN IN HIS GREATEST WORK.

He had undertaken to demonstrate by arguments which he thought could not be refuted, and by documents which he was sure could not be denied, that no comparison was to be made between the British government and the French usurpation; that those who

endeavoured madly to compare them, were by no means making the comparison of one good system with another good system, which varied only in local and circumstantial differences; much less that they were holding out to us a superior pattern of legal liberty which we might substitute in place of our old and, as they described it, superannuated constitution. He meant to demonstrate that the French scheme was not a comparative good, but a positive evil; that the question did not at all turn, as had been stated, on a parallel between a monarchy and a republic. He denied that the present scheme of things in France at all deserved the respectable name of a republic; he therefore had no comparison to make between monarchies and republics. What was done in France was a wild attempt to methodize anarchy; to perpetuate and fixate disorder. It was a foul, impious, monstrous thing, wholly out of the course of moral nature. He undertook to prove that it was generated in treachery, fraud, falsehood, hypocrisy, and unprovoked murder. He offered to make out that those who had led in that business, had conducted themselves with the utmost perfidy to their colleagues in function, and done it with the most flagrant perjury, both towards their king and their constituents. To the one, the Assembly had sworn fealty; and to the other, when they were under no sort of violence or constraint, they had sworn full obedience to their instructions. — That by the terror of assassination, they had driven away a very great number of the members, so as to produce a false appearance of a majority. — That this fictitious majority had fabricated a constitution which, as it now stands, is a tyranny far beyond any example that can be found in the civilized European world of our age. — That therefore the lovers of it must be lovers, not of liberty, but of the lowest and basest of all servitude, if they really understand its nature.

He proposed to prove — that the present state of things in France is not a transient evil, productive of a lasting good (as some have too favourably represented it); but that the present evil is only the means of producing future and *worse* evils (if that were possible). — That it is *not* an undigested, imperfect, and crude scheme of liberty which may gradually be mellowed and ripened into an orderly and social freedom; but that it is *so fundamentally wrong*, as to be utterly incapable of correcting itself by any length of time, or of being formed into any mode of polity of which a member of the House of Commons could publicly declare his approval.

LORD KEPPEL.

I ever looked on Lord Keppel as one of the greatest and best men of his age; and I loved and cultivated him accordingly. He was much in my heart, and I believe I was in his to the very last beat. It was at his trial at Portsmouth that he gave me this picture. With what zeal and anxious affection I attended him through his agony of glory; what part my son took in the early flush and enthusiasm of his virtue, and the pious passion with which he attached himself to all my connections. With what prodigality we both squandered ourselves in courting almost every sort of enmity for his sake. I believe he felt such friendship on such an occasion, just as I should have felt. I partook indeed of this honour with several of the first, and best, and ablest in the kingdom, but I was behindhand with none of them. And I am sure that if to the eternal disgrace of this nation, and to the total annihilation of every trace of honour and virtue in it, things had taken a different turn from what they did, I would have attended him to the quarter-deck with no less good-will and no more pride, though

with feelings far other than I partook of the general flow of national joy that attended the justice that was done to his virtue.

Pardon, my lord, the feeble wordiness of age, which loves to diffuse itself in discourse of the departed great. At my years, we live in retrospect alone. And wholly unfitted for the society of vigorous life, we enjoy the best balm to all wounds, which is the consolation of friendship in those only whom we have lost forever. Feeling the loss of Lord Keppel at all times, at no time did I feel it so much as on the first day when I was attacked in the House of Lords.

Had he lived, that reverend form would have risen in its place, and with a mild, parental reprehension to his nephew the Duke of Bedford, he would have told him that the favour of that gracious prince who had honoured his virtues with the government of the navy of Great Britain, and with a seat in the hereditary great council of his kingdom, was not undeservedly shown to the friend of the best portion of his life, and his faithful companion and counsellor under his rudest trials. He would have told him that, to whomever else these reproaches might be becoming, they were not decorous in his near-kindred. He would have told him that when men in that rank lose decorum, they lose everything. On that day I had a loss in Lord Keppel; but the public loss of him in this awful crisis — ! I speak from much knowledge of the person. He would never have listened to any compromise with the rabble-rout of this *sans-culotterie* of France.¹⁰⁸ His goodness of heart, his reason, his taste, his public duty, his principles, his prejudices, would have repelled him forever from all connection with that horrid medley of madness, vice, impiety, and crime.

Lord Keppel had two countries: one of descent, and one of birth. Their interest and their glory are the same; and his mind was capacious of both. His family was noble, and it was Dutch. That is, his was the oldest and purest nobility that Europe can boast, among a people renowned above all others for love of their native land. Though it was never shown in insult to any human being, Lord Keppel was somewhat highborn. It was a wild stock of pride, on which the tenderest of all hearts had grafted the milder virtues. He valued ancient nobility; and he was not disinclined to augment it with new honours. He valued the old nobility *and* the new — not as an excuse for inglorious sloth, but as an incitement to virtuous activity. He considered it a sort of cure for selfishness and a narrow mind. He conceived that a man born in an elevated place was nothing in himself, but everything in what went before, and what was to come after him. Without much speculation, but by the sure instinct of ingenuous feelings, and by the dictates of plain, unsophisticated, natural understanding, he felt that no great commonwealth could by any possibility long subsist without a body of some kind or other of nobility, decorated with honour, and fortified by privilege. This nobility forms the chain that connects the ages of a nation, which otherwise (with Mr. Paine) would soon be taught that no one generation may bind another. He felt that no political fabric could be well-made without some such order of things as might, over time, afford a rational hope of securing unity, coherence, consistency, and stability to the state. He felt that nothing else can protect it against the levity of courts, and the greater levity of the multitude.; that to talk of hereditary monarchy, without anything *else* of hereditary reverence in the commonwealth, was a low-minded absurdity, fit only for those detestable “fools aspiring to

¹⁰⁸ Or, “with the riffraff of this peasantry of France;” they wore *trousers*, not fashionable *knee breeches*. – WHG

be knaves,” who began to forge in 1789, the false money of the French constitution. It is one fatal objection to all *new fancied* and *new fabricated* republics (among a people who, once possessing such an advantage, have wickedly and insolently rejected it), that the *prejudice* of an old nobility is a thing that *cannot* be made. It may be improved, it may be corrected, it may be replenished; men may be taken from it or aggregated to it; but the *thing itself* is matter of *inveterate* opinion. And therefore it *cannot* be matter of mere positive institution. He felt that this nobility in fact does not exist in *wrong* of other orders of the state, but *by* them, and *for* them.

“THE LABOURING POOR.”

Let government protect and encourage industry, secure property, repress violence, and discountenance fraud; this is all that they have to do. In other respects, the less they meddle in these affairs the better; the rest is in the hands of our Master and theirs. We are in a constitution of things in which there is — “*Modo sol nimius, modo corripit imber*” (Just too much sun, just a little bit of rain). But I will push this matter no further. As I have said a good deal upon it at various times during my public service, and have lately written something on it which may yet see the light, I will content myself now with observing that the vigorous and laborious class of life has lately got from the *bon ton* of the humanity (the fashionable elite) of this day, the name of the “labouring poor.” We have heard many plans for the relief of the “labouring poor.” This puling (bemoaning) jargon is not as innocent as it is foolish. In meddling with great affairs, weakness is never innocuous (without adverse effects). Up to now, the label of *poor* (in the sense in which it is used to excite compassion) has not been used for those who can labour, but for those who cannot — for the sick and infirm, for orphan infancy, for languishing and decrepit age. But when we affect to pity, as *poor*, those who must labour or else the world cannot exist, we are trifling with the condition of mankind. It is the common doom of man that he must eat his bread by the sweat of his brow; that is, by the sweat of his body, or the sweat of his mind. If this toil was inflicted as a curse, then as might be expected from the curses of the Father of all blessings, it is tempered with many alleviations, many comforts. Every attempt to fly from it, and to refuse the very terms of our existence, becomes much more truly a curse. And heavier pains and penalties will fall upon those who would elude the tasks which are put upon them by the great Master Workman of the world — the one who, in His dealings with his creatures, sympathizes with their weakness; and in speaking of a creation that was wrought by mere will out of nothing, speaks of six days of *labour* and one of *rest*. I do not call a healthy young man — cheerful in his mind, and vigorous in his arms — I cannot call such a man *poor*. I cannot pity my kind as a kind, merely because they are men. This affected pity only tends to dissatisfy them with their condition, and to teach them to seek resources where no resources are to be found — in something other than their own industry, and frugality, and sobriety. Whatever may be the intention (which I cannot dispute, because I do not know) of those who would discontent mankind by this strange pity, they act towards us in the consequences, as if they were our worst enemies.

STATE CONSECRATED BY THE CHURCH.

I beg leave to speak of our church establishment, which is the first of our prejudices — not a prejudice destitute of reason, but involving in it profound and extensive wisdom. I speak of it first. It is first, and last, and midst in our minds. For, taking ground on that religious system of which we are now in possession, we continue to act on the early received and uniformly continued *sense* of mankind. That sense not only, like a wise architect, has built up the august fabric of states, but like a provident proprietor, to preserve the structure from profanation and ruin — like a sacred temple purged from all the impurities of fraud, and violence, and injustice, and tyranny — has solemnly and forever consecrated the commonwealth, and all who officiate in it. This consecration is made, so that all who administer in the government of men, in which they stand in the person of God himself, should have high and worthy notions of their function and destination; so that their hope should be full of immortality; so that they should not look to the paltry pelf of the moment, nor to the temporary and transient praise of the vulgar, but to a solid, permanent existence, in the permanent part of their nature, and to a permanent fame and glory in the example they leave as a rich inheritance to the world.

Such sublime principles ought to be infused into persons of exalted situations; and religious establishments ought to be provided, that may continually revive and enforce them. Every sort of *moral*, every sort of *civil*, every sort of *politic* institution, aiding the rational and natural ties that connect the human understanding and affections to the divine, are not more than necessary in order to build up that wonderful structure, Man. It is his prerogative to be, in a great degree, a creature of his own making; and when made as he ought to be made, he is destined to hold no trivial place in the creation. But whenever man is put over men, as the better nature should ever preside, in that case more particularly, he should as nearly as possible, be approximated to his perfection.

The consecration of the state, by a state religious establishment, is also necessary to operate with a wholesome awe upon free citizens, because in order to secure their freedom, they must enjoy some determinate portion of power. Therefore, to them a religion connected with the state, and with their duty towards it, becomes even more necessary than in those societies where the people, by the terms of their subjection, are confined to private sentiments and the management of their own family concerns. All persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully impressed with an idea that they act *in trust*; and that they are to account for their conduct in that trust, to the one great Master, Author, and Founder of society. This principle should be even more strongly impressed upon the minds of those who compose the *collective* sovereignty (a legislature), than upon those of single princes (kings). Without [such] instruments, these princes can do nothing. Whoever uses instruments,¹⁰⁹ in finding *helps* also finds *impediments*. Their power is

¹⁰⁹ No human legislature, no executive, not even a king, is a law unto themselves; nor is their power absolute. They must enact and enforce their laws through the help of others. Nor do laws have inherent authority or power. They must be willingly (or else forcibly) obeyed by the people, who are the objects of such laws. The means of enacting, enforcing, and carrying out such laws, are the *instruments* of any power and authority. Those same means can be an impediment to their exercise. Thus mutual trust, in the sight of God, is what makes this mutual dependence effectual.

– WHG

therefore by no means complete; nor are they safe in extreme abuse. Such persons, however elevated by flattery, arrogance, and self-opinion, must be sensible that whether covered or not by positive law,¹¹⁰ in some way or other they are accountable even *here* for the abuse of their trust. If they are not cut off by a rebellion of their people, they may be strangled by the very janissaries¹¹¹ kept for their security against all other rebellion. Thus we have seen the king of France sold by his soldiers for an increase of pay. But where popular authority is absolute and unrestrained, the people have an infinitely greater confidence in their own power, because it is far better founded. They are themselves, in great measure, *their own instruments*. They are nearer to their objects. Besides, they are under less responsibility to one of the greatest controlling powers on earth, the sense of fame and estimation (of being esteemed by others).

The share of infamy that is likely to fall to the lot of each individual in public acts, is small indeed; the operation of opinion being in the inverse ratio to the number of those who abuse power. Their own approval of their own acts has to them the appearance of a public judgment in their favour. A perfect democracy is therefore the most shameless thing in the world. As it is the most shameless, it is also the most fearless. No man apprehends in his person that he can be made subject to punishment. Certainly the people at large never should. For as all punishments are for example towards the conservation of the people at large, the people at large can never become the subject of punishment by any human hand.¹¹² It is therefore of infinite importance that they should not be allowed to imagine *their* will, any more than that of *kings*, is the standard of right and wrong. They ought to be persuaded that they are as little entitled, and far less qualified, to use any arbitrary power whatsoever for their own safety. Therefore, under a false show of liberty (but in truth), they are not to exercise an unnatural, inverted domination, to tyrannically exact from those who officiate in the state, not an entire *devotion* to their interest (which is their right), but an abject *submission* to their occasional will. They would thereby extinguish in all those who serve them, all moral principle, all sense of dignity, all use of judgment, and all consistency of character — while by the very same process, they would give themselves up as a proper, suitable, but most contemptible prey to the servile ambition of popular sycophants, or courtly flatterers.

FATE OF LOUIS XVIII.

Let those who have the trust of political or of natural authority, ever keep watch against the desperate enterprises of *innovation*; let even their benevolence be fortified and armed. They have before their eyes the example of a monarch — insulted, degraded, confined, deposed; his family dispersed, scattered, imprisoned; his wife insulted to his face like the vilest of the sex, by the vilest of all populace; and himself three times dragged by these wretches in an infamous triumph; his children torn from him, in violation of the first right of nature, and given into the tuition of the most desperate and impious of the leaders of desperate and

¹¹⁰ *Positive law*: laws made explicitly, as compared to *natural law*; they are expressly enacted or instituted. – WHG

¹¹¹ *Janissaries*: metaphorically, a Royal Bodyguard. – WHG

¹¹² *Quicquid multis peccatur inultum*.

impious clubs; his revenues dilapidated and plundered; his magistrates murdered; his clergy proscribed, persecuted, famished; his nobility degraded in their rank, undone in their fortunes, and fugitives in their persons; his armies corrupted and ruined; his whole people impoverished, disunited, and dissolved. While through the bars of his prison, and amidst the bayonets of his keepers, he hears the tumult of two conflicting factions, equally wicked and abandoned, who agree in principles, in dispositions, and in objects, but who tear each other to pieces about the most effectual means of obtaining their common end. The one contends to preserve for a while his name and his person, to more easily destroy the royal authority. The other clamours to altogether cut off the name, the person, and the monarchy, by one sacrilegious execution. All this accumulation of calamity, the greatest that ever fell upon one man, has fallen upon his head, because he left his virtues unguarded by caution; because he was not taught that, where power is concerned, the one who confers benefits must take precautions against ingratitude.

NOBILITY.

All this violent cry against the nobility I take to be a mere work of art. To be honoured and even privileged by the laws, opinions, and inveterate usages of our country, growing out of the prejudice of ages, has nothing to provoke horror and indignation in any man. Even to be too tenacious about those privileges is not absolutely a crime. The strong struggle in every individual, to preserve possession of what he has found to belong to him, and to distinguish him, is one of the securities implanted in our nature, against injustice and despotism. It operates as an instinct to secure property, and to preserve communities in a settled state. What is there to shock in this? Nobility is a graceful ornament to the civil order. It is the Corinthian capital of polished society. *Omnes boni nobilitati semper favemus* (All good people always favor the highborn),¹¹³ was the saying of a wise and good man. It is indeed one sign of a liberal and benevolent mind to incline to it with some sort of partial propensity. He feels no ennobling principle in his own heart, who wishes to level all the artificial institutions which have been adopted for giving a body to opinion, and permanence to fugitive esteem. It is a sour, malignant, envious disposition — without taste for the reality, or for any image or representation of virtue — that sees with joy the unmerited fall of what had long flourished in splendour and in honour. I do not like to see anything destroyed; any void produced in society; any ruin on the face of the land. It was therefore with no disappointment or dissatisfaction that my inquiries and observations did not present to me any incorrigible vices in the noblesse of France, or any abuse which could not be removed by a *reform* that is very short of *abolition*. Your noblesse did not deserve punishment: but to degrade is to punish.

It was with the same satisfaction I found that the result of my inquiry concerning your clergy was not dissimilar. It is no soothing news to my ears, that great bodies of men are incurably corrupt. It is not with much credulity that I listen to anyone, when they speak evil of those whom they are going to plunder. I rather suspect that vices are feigned or exaggerated when profit is looked for in their punishment. An enemy is a bad witness; a

¹¹³ Cicero, *Pro Sestio* 9.21.

robber is worse. There were undoubtedly, and *must* be, vices and abuses in that order. It was an old establishment, and not frequently revised. But I saw no crimes in the individuals, that merited confiscation of their substance, nor those cruel insults and degradations, and that unnatural persecution, which have been substituted in place of meliorating regulation.

If there had been any just cause for this new religious persecution, the atheistic libellers — who act as trumpeters to animate the populace to plunder — do not love anybody enough *not* to dwell with complacency on the vices of the existing clergy. This they have not done. They find themselves obliged to rake into the histories of former ages (which they have ransacked with a malignant and profligate industry) for every instance of oppression and persecution which has been made by that body (or in its favour), in order to justify — on very iniquitous, because they are very illogical principles of retaliation — their *own* persecutions, and their *own* cruelties. After destroying all other genealogies and family distinctions, they invent a sort of pedigree of crimes. It is not very just to chastise men for the offences of their natural ancestors. But to take the fiction of ancestry in a corporate succession, as a ground for punishing men who have no relation to guilty acts, except in names and general descriptions — is a sort of refinement in injustice, belonging to the philosophy of this Enlightened Age. The Assembly punishes men, many of whom (if not most) abhor the violent conduct of ecclesiastics in former times, as much as their present persecutors can do. And they would be as loud and as strong in the expression of that sense, if they were not well aware of the purposes for which all this declamation is employed. Corporate bodies are immortal for the *good* of the members, not for their *punishment*. Nations themselves are such corporations. In England, we might as well think of waging inexpiable war on all Frenchmen for the evils which they have brought upon us in the several periods of our mutual hostilities. You might, on your part, think yourselves justified in falling upon all Englishmen on account of the unparalleled calamities brought upon the people of France by the unjust invasions of our Henries and our Edwards. Indeed, we should be mutually justified in this exterminatory war upon each other, fully as much as you are, in the unprovoked persecution of your present countrymen, on account of the conduct of men of the same name in other times. Deu 24.16

LEGISLATION AND REPUBLICANS.

The legislators who framed the ancient republics knew that their business was too arduous to be accomplished with no better apparatus than the metaphysics of an undergraduate, and the mathematics and arithmetic of an exciseman (tax collector). They had to deal with men, and they were obliged to study human nature. They had to deal with citizens, and were obliged to study the effects of those habits which are communicated by the circumstances of civil life. They were sensible that the operation of this second nature on the first, produced a new combination. And from this arose many diversities among men, according to their birth, their education, their professions, the periods of their lives, their residence in towns or in the country, their several ways of acquiring and of fixing property, and according to the quality of the property itself — all of which rendered them, as it were, like so many different species of animals. From this, they thought themselves obliged to dispose their citizens into such classes, and to place them in such situations in the state, as their peculiar habits might qualify them to fill. And also to allot to them such appropriated privileges as might secure to

them what their specific occasions required, and which might furnish to each description such force as might protect it in the conflict caused by the diversity of interests that must exist, and must contend, in all complex societies. For the legislator would have been ashamed that the coarse husbandman should well know how to assort and use his sheep, horses, and oxen, and have enough common sense not to abstract and equalize them all into animals, without providing for each kind an appropriate food, care, and employment — while *he*, the economist, disposer, and shepherd of his own kindred, subliming himself into an airy metaphysician, was resolved to know *nothing* of his flocks, except as men in general. It is for this reason that Montesquieu observed, very justly, that in their classification of the citizens, the great legislators of antiquity made the greatest display of their powers, and even soared above themselves. It is here that your modern legislators have gone deep into the negative series, and sunk even below their own *nothing*.

As the first sort of legislators attended to the different kinds of citizens, and combined them into one commonwealth, the others (the metaphysical and alchemistic legislators), have taken the directly contrary course. They have attempted to confound all sorts of citizens, as well as they could, into one homogeneous mass. And then they divided their amalgam into a number of incoherent republics. They reduce men to loose counters, merely for the sake of simple tallying, and not to figures whose power is to arise from their *place* in the table. The elements of their own metaphysics might have taught them better lessons. The troll of their categorical table might have informed them that there was something else in the intellectual world besides *substance* and *quantity*. They might learn from the catechism of metaphysics, that there were eight more heads in every complex deliberation, which they have never thought of — though of all ten heads, these are the only subjects on which the skill of man can operate at all. So far from this able disposition of some of the old republican legislators — which follows with a solicitous accuracy, the moral conditions and propensities of men — they have leveled and crushed together all the orders which they found, putting them under the coarse, unartificial (natural) arrangement of the monarchy, in which mode of government the classing of the citizens is not of so much importance as in a republic. It is true, however, that every such classification, if properly ordered, is good in all forms of government. And it composes a strong barrier against the excesses of despotism, as well as it is the necessary means of giving effect and permanence to a republic. For want of something of this kind, if the present project of a republic should fail, then all securities to a moderated freedom fail along with it. All the indirect restraints which mitigate despotism would be removed insomuch that, if monarchy were ever again to obtain an entire ascendancy in France (under this or any other dynasty), and it were not voluntarily tempered at the outset by the wise and virtuous counsels of the prince, then it will probably be the most completely arbitrary power that has ever appeared on earth. This is to play a most desperate game.

PRINCIPLE OF STATE-CONSECRATION.

But one of the first and most leading principles on which the commonwealth and the laws are consecrated, is lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in it — unmindful of what they have received from their ancestors, or of what is due their posterity — should act as if they were the entire masters. They should not think it is among their rights, to cut off the

entail or to commit waste on the inheritance, by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their society. They would hazard leaving to those who come after them, a ruin instead of an habitation — and teaching these successors to respect their contrivances as little as they had themselves respected the institutions of their forefathers. By this unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as much, and in as many ways, as there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be broken. No one generation could link with the other. Men would become little better than the flies of summer.

And first of all, the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect, would be no longer studied, as a heap of old exploded errors. With all its defects, redundancies, and errors, it is the collected reason of ages, combining the principles of original justice, with the infinite variety of human concerns. Personal self-sufficiency and arrogance (the certain attendants upon all those who have never experienced a wisdom greater than their own) would usurp the tribunal. No certain laws, establishing invariable grounds of hope and fear, would keep the actions of men in a certain course, or direct them to a certain end. Nothing stable in the modes of holding property, or exercising any function, could form a solid ground on which any parent could speculate in the education of his offspring, or in a choice for their future establishment in the world. No principles would be early worked into their habits. As soon as the most able instructor had completed his laborious course of institution, instead of sending forth his pupil, accomplished in a virtuous discipline and fitted to procure him attention and respect in his place in society, he would find everything altered — and that he had turned out a poor creature to the contempt and derision of the world, ignorant of the true grounds of esteem. Who would insure a tender and delicate sense of honour beats almost with the first pulses of the heart, when no man could know what would be the *test* of honour in a nation that is continually varying the standard of its coin? No part of life would retain its acquisitions. Barbarism with regard to science and literature, unskilfulness with regard to arts and manufactures, would infallibly follow the lack of a steady education and a settled principle. And thus the commonwealth itself would crumble away in a few generations. It would be disconnected into the dust and powder of individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven.

Therefore, to avoid the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice, *we have consecrated the state*, so that no man should approach to look into its defects or corruptions except with due caution; that he should never dream of beginning its reformation by its subversion; that he should approach the faults of the state as he would to the wounds of a father, with pious awe and trembling solicitude. By this wise prejudice, we are taught to look with horror on those children of their country, who are prompt to rashly hack that aged parent in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds, and wild incantations, they might regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their father's life.

BRITISH STABILITY.

Four hundred years have gone over us; but I believe we are not materially changed since that period. Thanks to our sullen resistance to innovation, thanks to the cold sluggishness of

our national character, we still bear the stamp of our forefathers. We have not (as I conceive) lost the generosity and dignity of thinking of the fourteenth century; nor as yet have we devolved ourselves into savages. We are not the converts of Rousseau; we are not the disciples of Voltaire; Helvetius has made no progress among us. Atheists are not our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers. We know that *we* have made no discoveries; and we think that no discoveries are to be made in morality; nor many made in the great principles of government, nor in the ideas of liberty. These were understood long before we were born, altogether as well as they will be after the grave has heaped its mould upon our presumption, and the silent tomb shall have imposed its law on our pert loquacity.

In England, we have not yet been completely embowelled of our natural entrails. We still feel within us, and we cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faithful guardians, the active monitors of our duty, the true supporters of all liberal and manly morals. We have not been drawn and trussed in order to be filled, like stuffed birds in a museum, with chaff and rags and paltry blurred shreds of paper about the “Rights of Man.” We preserve the whole of our feelings still native and entire, unsophisticated by pedantry and infidelity. We have real hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms. We fear God; we look up with awe to kings; with affection to parliaments; with duty to magistrates; with reverence to priests; and with respect to nobility. Why? Because when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is *natural* to be so affected; because all other feelings are false and spurious, and tend to corrupt our minds, to vitiate our primary morals, to render us unfit for rational liberty; and by teaching us a servile, licentious, and abandoned insolence, to be our low sport for a few holidays — to make us perfectly fit for, and justly deserving of slavery, through the whole course of our lives.

You see, sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess that we are generally men of untaught feelings; that instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree; and to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them *because* they are prejudices — and the longer they have lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade, each on his own private stock of reason. That is because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of *nations*, and *ages*. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, they employ their own sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek (and they seldom fail), they think it wiser to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice, and leave nothing but naked reason behind. This is because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it permanence. Prejudice is of ready application to the emergency. It previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue. And in the moment of decision, it does not leave the man hesitating, sceptical, puzzled, and unresolved. Prejudice renders a man’s virtue his *habit*, not a series of unconnected acts. Through just (righteous) prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature.

LITERARY ATHEISTS.

The literary cabal had some years ago formed something like a regular plan for the destruction of the Christian religion. This object they pursued with a degree of zeal which hitherto had been evident only in the propagators of some system of piety. They were possessed with a spirit of *proselytism* in the most fanatical degree — and from there, by an easy progress, with the spirit of *persecution* according to their means. What was not to be done towards their great end by any direct or immediate act, might be wrought by a longer process, through the medium of *opinion*. To command that opinion, the first step is to establish a dominion over those who direct it. They contrived to possess themselves, with great method and perseverance, all the avenues to literary fame. Many of them indeed stood high in the ranks of literature and science. The world had done them justice; and in favour of general talents, it forgave the evil tendency of their peculiar principles. This was true liberality; which they returned by endeavouring to confine the reputation of sense, learning, and taste to *themselves* or to their followers. I will venture to say that this narrow, exclusive spirit has not been less prejudicial to literature and to taste, than to morals and true philosophy. Those atheistic fathers have a bigotry of their own; and they have learnt to talk *against* monks, with the spirit of a monk. But in some things, they are men of the world. The resources of intrigue are called in, to supply the defects of argument and wit. To this system of literary monopoly was joined an unremitting industry to blacken and discredit in every way, and by every means, all those who did not hold to their faction. To those who have observed the spirit of their conduct, it has long been clear that nothing was lacking but the power of carrying the *intolerance* of the tongue and of the pen, into a *persecution* which would strike at property, liberty, and life.

The desultory and faint persecution carried on against them — more from compliance with form and decency, than with serious resentment — neither weakened their strength, nor relaxed their efforts. The issue of the whole was that, what with opposition, and what with success, a violent and malignant zeal of a kind hitherto unknown in the world, had taken an entire possession of their minds, and rendered their whole conversation (which otherwise would have been pleasing and instructive) perfectly disgusting. A spirit of cabal, intrigue, and proselytism, pervaded all their thoughts, words, and actions. And as controversial *zeal* soon turns its thoughts on *force*, they began to insinuate themselves into a correspondence with foreign princes. This was in hopes that, through their authority (which at first they flattered), they might bring about the changes they had in view. To them it was indifferent whether these changes were to be accomplished by the thunderbolt of *despotism*, or by the earthquake of popular *commotion*. The correspondence between this cabal and the late king of Prussia, will throw no small light upon the spirit of all their proceedings. For the same purpose for which they intrigued with princes, they cultivated, in a distinguished manner, the monied interest of France. And partly through the means furnished by those whose peculiar offices gave them the most extensive and certain means of *communication*, they carefully occupied all the avenues to *opinion*.

Writers, especially when they act in a body, and with one direction, have great influence on the public mind. Therefore, the alliance of these writers with the monied interest, had no small effect in removing the popular odium and envy which attended that species of wealth.

These writers, like the propagators of all novelties, pretended to have great zeal for the poor and the lower orders, while in their satires they rendered hateful, by every exaggeration, the faults of courts, nobility, and priesthood. They became a sort of demagogues. They served as a link to unite obnoxious wealth to restless and desperate poverty, in favour of one object.

CITY OF PARIS.

The second material of cement for their new republic is the “superiority” of the city of Paris. And this I admit is strongly connected with the other cementing principle of paper circulation and confiscation. It is in this part of the project that we must look for the cause of the destruction of all the old bounds of provinces and jurisdictions, ecclesiastical and secular, and the dissolution of all ancient combinations of things, as well as the formation of so many small *unconnected* republics. The power of the city of Paris is evidently one great spring of all their politics. It is through the power of Paris, now become the centre and focus of jobbing, that the leaders of this faction direct, or rather *command* the whole legislative and the whole executive government. Everything therefore must be done which can confirm the authority of that city over the other republics. Paris is compact; she has an enormous strength that is wholly disproportioned to the force of any of the square republics. And this strength is collected and condensed within a narrow compass. Paris has a natural and easy connection of its parts, which will not be affected by any scheme of a geometric constitution. Nor does it much signify whether its proportion of representation is more or less, since it has the whole draft of fish in its dragnet. The other divisions of the kingdom being hacked and torn to pieces, and separated from all their habitual means, even principles of union cannot, for some time at least, confederate against her. Nothing was to be left in all the subordinate members but weakness, disconnection, and confusion. To confirm this part of the plan, the Assembly has lately come to a resolution that no two of their republics shall have the same commander-in-chief.

To a person who takes a view of the whole, the strength of Paris thus formed, will appear to be a system of general weakness. It is boasted that the geometric policy has been adopted, that all local ideas should be sunk, and that the people should no longer be Gascons, Picards, Bretons, or Normans; but Frenchmen, with one country, one heart, and one Assembly. But instead of being all Frenchmen, the greater likelihood is that the inhabitants of that region will shortly have *no* country. No man was ever attached by a sense of pride, partiality, or real affection, to a description of square measurements. He will never glory in belonging to Chequer No. 71, or to any other badge-ticket. We begin our public affections in our *families*. No cold relation is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our *neighbourhoods*, and to our habitual *provincial* connections.¹¹⁴ These are inns and resting-places. Such divisions of our country as have been formed by habit, and not by a sudden jerk of authority, were so many little images of the great country in which the heart found something which it could

¹¹⁴ France is not Paris; England is not London. Urban centers tend to have a different culture than suburban or rural areas. A large population facilitates specialized skills, arts, and technology. But it also requires centralization of power and a growing bureaucracy. This in turn facilitates increasing corruption through lack of accountability. This is because the leaders of a large city cannot be known by all, nor can the bureaucracy be effectively overseen by them. – WHG

fill. The love to the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. Perhaps it is a sort of elemental training to those higher and more large regards, by which alone men come to be affected (as with their own concern) in the prosperity of a kingdom so extensive as that of France. In that general territory itself, as in the old name of *provinces*, the citizens are interested from old prejudices and unreasoned habits, and not on account of the geometric properties of its figure. The power and pre-eminence of Paris certainly presses down and holds these republics together as long as it lasts. But for the reasons I have already given you, I think it cannot last very long.

PRINCIPLE OF CHURCH PROPERTY.

Why should the expenditure of a great landed property, which is a dispersion of the surplus product of the soil, appear intolerable to you or to me, when it takes its course,

- through the accumulation of vast libraries, which are the history of the force and weakness of the human mind;
- through great collections of ancient records, medals, and coins, which attest and explain laws and customs;
- through paintings and statues that, by imitating nature, seem to extend the limits of creation;
- through grand monuments to the dead, which continue the regards and connections of life beyond the grave;
- through collections of the specimens of nature, which become a representative assembly of all the classes and families of the world

— that by their disposition these *facilitate*, and by exciting curiosity, *open* the avenues to science? If by great permanent establishments, all these objects of expense are better secured from the inconstant sport of personal caprice and personal extravagance, are they worse than if the same tastes prevailed in scattered individuals? Does the sweat of the mason and carpenter who toil in order to partake the sweat of the peasant, not flow as pleasantly and as salubriously in the construction and repair of the majestic edifices of religion, as in the painted booths and sordid sties of vice and luxury? Does it not flow as honourably and as profitably in repairing those sacred works which grow hoary with innumerable years, as it does on the momentary receptacles of transient voluptuousness? As it does in opera-houses, and brothels, and gaming-houses, and club-houses, and obelisks in the Champ de Mars? Is the surplus product of the olive and the vine *worse* employed in the frugal sustenance of persons whom the fictions of a pious imagination raise to dignity by construing it to be *in the service of God*, than in pampering the innumerable multitude of those who are degraded by being made useless domestics, *subservient to the pride of man*? Are the decorations of temples an expenditure less worthy to a wise man, than ribbons and laces, and national *cockades*, and *petites maisons*, and *petits soupers*, and all the innumerable fopperies and follies in which opulence sports away the burden of its superfluity? ¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ *Cockade*: a commemorative ornament or medal worn on the hat; *petites maisons*: little houses built for the poor; *petits soupers*: informal dinner parties given for a few select guests. – WHG

We tolerate even these, not from love of them, but for fear of worse. We tolerate them because property and liberty, to a degree, acquire that toleration. But why proscribe the other, and surely in every point of view, the more *laudable* use of estates? Why forcibly carry them from the better to the worse through the violation of *all* property, and through an outrage upon every principle of liberty?

This comparison between the new individuals and the old corps, is made on a supposition that no reform could be made in the latter. But in a question of reformation, I always consider corporate bodies (whether sole or consisting of many) to be much more susceptible of a public direction by the power of the state — in the use of their property, and in the regulation of modes and habits of life in their members — than private citizens ever can be, or perhaps *ought* to be. This seems to me a very material consideration for those who undertake anything which merits the name of a *politic enterprise*, regarding the estates of monasteries.

With regard to the estates possessed by bishops, and canons, and commendatory abbots, I cannot find out for what reason some landed estates may not be held otherwise than by inheritance. Can any philosophic spoiler undertake to demonstrate the positive or the comparative evil of having a certain, and also a large, portion of landed property, passing in succession through persons whose title to it is always in theory, and often in fact, an eminent degree of piety, morals, and learning — a property, which, by its destination, in their turn, and on the score of merit, gives to the noblest families renovation and support, to the lowest the means of dignity and elevation; a property the tenure to which is the performance of some duty (whatever value you may choose to set upon that duty), and the character of whose proprietors demands, at least, an exterior decorum, and gravity of manners; who are to exercise a generous but temperate hospitality; part of whose income they are to consider as a trust for charity; and who, even when they fail in their trust, when they slide from their character, and degenerate into a mere common secular nobleman or gentleman, are in no respect worse than those who may succeed them in their forfeited possessions? Is it better that estates should be held by those who have no duty, than by those who have one? — by those whose character and destination point to virtues, than by those who have no rule and direction in the expenditure of their estates but their own will and appetite? Nor are these estates held altogether in the character or with the evils supposed inherent in mortmain. They pass from hand to hand with a more rapid circulation than any other. No excess is good; and therefore too great a proportion of landed property may be held officially for life: but it does not seem to me of material injury to any commonwealth, that there should exist some estates that have a chance of being acquired by means other than the previous acquisition of money.

PARSIMONY IS NOT ECONOMY.

I beg leave to tell him that mere parsimony is not economy. It is separable in theory from it; and in fact, it may or may not be a *part* of economy, according to circumstances. Expense, and great expense, may be an essential part in true economy. If parsimony were to be considered as one kind of that virtue, there is, however, another and a higher economy. Economy is a distributive virtue, and does not consist in saving, but in selection. Parsimony

requires no providence, no sagacity, no powers of combination, no comparison, no judgment. Mere instinct (and not an instinct of the noblest kind) may produce this false economy in perfection. The other economy has larger views. It demands a discriminating judgment, and a firm, sagacious mind. It shuts one door to impudent importunity, only to open another wider door to unpresuming merit. If none but meritorious service or real talent were to be rewarded, this nation has not lacked, and this nation will not lack, the means of rewarding all the service it will ever receive, and of encouraging all the merit it will ever produce. No state, since the foundation of society, has been impoverished by that species of profusion. If the economy of selection and proportion had at all times been observed, we would not now have had an overgrown Duke of Bedford, to oppress the industry of humble men, and to limit (by the standard of his own conceptions) the justice, the bounty, or if he pleases, the *charity* of the crown.

MAJESTY OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION.

I wish my countrymen to recommend to our [French] neighbours the example of the British constitution, rather than take models from *them* for the improvement of *our own*. In the former they have an invaluable treasure. They are not, I think, without some causes for apprehension and complaint; but they do not owe these to their constitution, but to their own conduct. I think our happy situation is owing to our constitution; but it is owing to the whole of it, and not to any part singly — and owing in great measure to what we have left standing in our several reviews and reformations of it, as well as to what we have altered or superadded. Our people will find employment enough for a truly patriotic, free, and independent spirit, in guarding what they possess from violation. Neither would I exclude alteration; but even when I changed it, it would be to preserve. I should be led to my remedy by a great grievance. In what I did, I would follow the example of our ancestors. I would make the *reparation* as nearly as possible in the style of the *building*. A politic caution, a guarded circumspection, a moral rather than a complexional timidity, were among the ruling principles of our forefathers in their most decided conduct. Not being illuminated with the light of which the gentlemen of France tell us they have gotten so abundant a share, our forefathers acted under a strong impression of the ignorance and fallibility of mankind. He that had made them thus fallible, rewarded them for having attended in their conduct, to their nature. Let us imitate their caution if we wish to deserve their fortune, or to retain their bequests. Let us *add*, if we please; but let us *preserve* what they have left. And standing on the firm ground of the British constitution, let us be satisfied to admire the aeronauts of France, rather than attempt to follow in their desperate flights.¹¹⁶

I have told you candidly my sentiments. I think they are not likely to alter yours. I do not know that they should. You are young; you cannot guide, but you must follow the fortune of your country. But hereafter they may be of some use to you, in some future form which your commonwealth may take. It can hardly remain in the present. But before its final settlement, it may be obliged to pass, as one of our poets says, “through great varieties of untried being,” and in all its transmigrations, to be purified by fire and blood.

¹¹⁶ Joseph and Étienne Montgolfier, of Ardèche in France, experimented with hot air balloons in 1782.

DUTY IS NOT BASED ON WILL.

I cannot too often recommend it to the serious consideration of all men who think civil society is within the province of moral jurisdiction, that if we owe to it any *duty*, it is not subject to our *will*. Duties are not voluntary. Duty and will are even contradictory terms. Now, though civil society might at first be a voluntary act (which in many cases it undoubtedly was), its continuance is under a permanent, standing covenant, co-existing with the society; and it attaches upon every individual of that society, without any formal act of his own. This is warranted by the general practice, arising out of the general sense of mankind. Men without their choice derive benefits from that association; without their choice they are subjected to duties in consequence of these benefits; and without their choice they enter into a virtual obligation as binding as any that is actual. Look through the whole of life and the whole system of duties. Much the strongest moral obligations are such as were never the results of our option. I allow that if no supreme ruler exists who is wise to form and potent to enforce the moral law, there is no sanction for any contract, virtual or even actual, that is against the will of prevalent power. On that hypothesis, let any set of men be strong enough to defy their duties, and they cease to be duties any longer. We have but *this* one appeal against irresistible power:

You who despise humanity and the rules of arms, remember:
the gods keep count of your transgressions. ¹¹⁷

Taking it for granted that I do not write to the disciples of the Parisian philosophy, I may assume that the awful Author of our being is the Author of our place in the order of existence. And I assume that, having disposed and marshalled us by a divine tactic — not according to our will, but according to His — he has virtually subjected us to act the part which belongs to the place assigned us, in and by that disposition. We have obligations to mankind at large, which are not in consequence of any special voluntary pact. They arise from the relation of man to man, and the relation of man to God, and these relations are not matters of choice. On the contrary, the force of all the pacts which we enter into with any particular person, or any number of persons among mankind, depends upon those prior obligations. In some cases, the subordinate *relations* are voluntary; in others they are necessary — but the *duties* are all compulsive. When we marry, the *choice* is voluntary, but the *duties* are not matter of choice. They are dictated by the nature of the situation. Dark and inscrutable are the ways by which we come into the world. The instincts which give rise to this mysterious process of nature are not of our making. But out of physical causes, unknown and perhaps unknowable to us, arise moral duties which, just as we are able perfectly to comprehend them, we are indispensably bound to perform them.

Parents may not be consenting to their moral relation; but consenting or not, they are bound to a long train of burdensome duties towards those with whom they have never made a convention of any sort. Children are not consenting to their relation; but their relation binds them to its duties, without their actual consent; or rather, it *implies* their consent because the presumed consent of every rational creature is in unison with the predisposed

¹¹⁷ “*Si genus humanum et mortalia temnitis arma,
At sperate Deos memores fandi atque nefandi.*” – Virgil, *Aeneid*, bk i, 539-43; *On the Laws of War*.

order of things. In that manner, men come into a community with the social state of their parents, endowed with all the benefits and loaded with all the duties of their situation. If the *social* ties and ligaments which are spun out of those *physical* relations which are the elements of the *commonwealth* — and if in most cases they begin and always continue independently of our will, and without any stipulation on our own part — then so are we bound by that relation called our *country*. This comprehends (as it has been well said) “all the charities of all.” Nor are we left without powerful instincts to make this duty as dear and grateful to us, as it is awful and coercive. It consists, in great measure, in the ancient order into which we are born. We may have the same geographical situation, but have another country; just as we may have the same country in another soil. The place that determines our duty to our country, is a social, *civil* relation.

ECCLESIASTICAL CONFISCATION.

The confiscators [of France] truly have made some allowance for their victims from the scraps and fragments of their own tables — from which they have been so harshly driven, and which have been so bountifully spread for a feast to the harpies of usury. But to drive men from independence, to live on alms, is itself great cruelty. That which might be a tolerable condition to men in one state of life, and not habituated to other things, may be a dreadful revolution when all these circumstances are altered. And it may be one to which a virtuous mind would feel pain in condemning any guilt, except that which would demand the life of the offender. But to many minds, this punishment of *degradation* and *infamy* is worse than death. Undoubtedly it is an infinite aggravation of this cruel suffering, that the persons who were taught a double prejudice in favour of religion — both by education and by the place they held in the administration of its functions — are to receive the remnants of the property as alms from the profane and impious hands of those who had plundered them of all the rest. They are to receive the [financial] maintenance of religion (if they are to receive it at all), not from the charitable contributions of the faithful, but from the insolent tenderness of known and avowed atheism. It is to be measured out to them on the standard of the contempt in which it is held; and for the purpose of rendering those who receive the allowance, vile and of no estimation in the eyes of mankind.

But this act of seizure of property, it seems, is a judgment in law, and not a confiscation. It seems they have found out in the academies of the Palais Royal and the Jacobins, that certain men had no right to the possessions which they held under law, usage, the decisions of courts, and the accumulated prescription of a thousand years. They say that ecclesiastics are fictitious persons, creatures of the state, whom they may destroy at pleasure, and of course limit and modify in every particular. They say that the goods they possess are not properly theirs, but belong to the state which created the fiction. And therefore we are not to trouble ourselves with what they may suffer in their natural feelings and natural persons, on account of what is done towards them in their constructive character. Of what import is it, under what names you injure men and deprive them of the just emoluments of a profession in which they were not only permitted, but *encouraged* by the state to engage; and upon the supposed certainty of which emoluments they had formed the plan of their lives, contracted debts, and led multitudes to an entire dependence upon them?

You do not imagine, sir, that I am going to compliment this miserable distinction of persons with any long discussion. The arguments of tyranny are as contemptible as its force is dreadful. If your confiscators, by their early crimes, had not obtained a power which secures indemnity against all the crimes of which they have since been guilty, or that they can commit, it is not the syllogism of the logician, but the lash of the executioner, that would have refuted a sophistry which becomes an accomplice of theft and murder. The sophistic tyrants of Paris are loud in their declamations against the departed regal tyrants who in former ages have vexed the world. They are thus bold, because they are safe from the dungeons and iron cages of their old masters. Shall we be more tender of the tyrants of our own time, when we see them acting worse tragedies under our eyes? Shall we not use the same liberty that they do, when we can use it with the same safety? when to speak honest truth only requires a contempt of the opinion of those whose actions we abhor?

MORAL OF HISTORY.

We do not draw the moral lessons we might from history. On the contrary, without care it may be used to vitiate our minds and to destroy our happiness. In history, a great volume is unrolled for our instruction, drawing the materials of future wisdom from the past errors and infirmities of mankind. The perversion may serve for a magazine, furnishing offensive and defensive weapons for parties in church and state, and supplying the means of keeping alive, or reviving, dissensions and animosities, and adding fuel to civil fury. History consists, for the greater part, of the miseries brought upon the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all the train of disorderly appetites which shake the public with the same;

*“troublous storms that toss the private state,
and render life unsweet.”*

These vices are the *causes* of those storms. Religion, morals, laws, prerogatives, privileges, liberties, rights of men, are the *pretexts*. The pretexts are always found in some specious appearance of a real good. You would not secure men from tyranny and sedition, by rooting out of the mind the *principles* to which these fraudulent pretexts apply? If you did, you would root out everything that is valuable in the human breast. As these are the *pretexts*, so the ordinary actors and *instruments* in great public evils are kings, priests, magistrates, senates, parliaments, national assemblies, judges, and captains. You would not cure the evil by resolving that there should be no more monarchs, nor ministers of state or of the gospel; no interpreters of law; no general officers; no public councils. You might change the names, but the things must remain, in some shape. A certain quantum of power must always exist in the community, in some hands, and under some appellation. Wise men will apply their remedies to vices, not to names; to the causes of evil which are permanent, not to the occasional organs by which they act, and the transitory modes in which they appear. Otherwise you will be wise *historically* — but a fool in *practice*. Seldom do two ages have the same fashion in their pretexts, and the same modes of mischief. Wickedness is a little more inventive. While you are discussing fashion, the fashion has gone by. The very same vice assumes a new body. The spirit transmigrates; and far from losing its principle of life by the change of its appearance, it is renovated in its new organs with the fresh vigour of a juvenile

activity. It walks abroad, it continues its ravages, while you are gibbeting the carcass, or demolishing the tomb. You are terrifying yourselves with ghosts and apparitions, while your house is the haunt of robbers. It is thus with all those who, by attending only to the shell and husk of history, think they are waging war with intolerance, pride, and cruelty — while under colour of abhorring the ill principles of antiquated parties, they are authorizing and feeding the same odious vices in different factions, and perhaps in worse factions.

USE OF DEFECTS IN HISTORY.

Not that I denigrate the use of history. It is a great improver of the understanding, by showing both men and affairs in a great variety of views. Much political wisdom may be learned from this source; that is, it may be learned as *habit*, not as *precept*; and as an exercise to strengthen the mind by furnishing materials to enlarge and enrich it, but not as a repertory of cases and precedents for a lawyer. If it were, it would be a thousand times better that a statesman had never learned to read — *vellem nescirent literas* (I wish they didn't know letters). This method turns their understanding from the object before them, and from the present exigencies of the world, to comparisons with former times of which, after all, we can know very little, and very imperfectly. And our guides, the historians, who are to give us their true interpretation, are often prejudiced, often ignorant, often fonder of *system* than of *truth*. Whereas, if a man with reasonable strengths and a natural sagacity, and not in the leading-strings of any master, would look steadily on the business before him without being diverted by retrospect and comparison, he may be capable of forming a reasonably good judgment of what is to be done.

There are some fundamental points in which nature never changes — but they are few and obvious, and they belong to *morals* rather than to *politics*. But so far as regards political matter, the human mind and human affairs are susceptible to infinite modifications, and of combinations that are wholly new and unlooked for. Very few, for instance, could have imagined that property, which has been taken for natural dominion, should lose all its importance and even its influence, through the whole of a vast kingdom. This is what history or books of speculation could hardly have taught us. How many could have thought that the most complete and formidable revolution in a great empire should be made by men of letters — not as subordinate instruments and trumpeters of sedition, but as the chief contrivers and managers — and in a short time, as the open administrators and sovereign rulers? Who could have imagined that atheism could produce one of the most violently operative principles of fanaticism? Who could have imagined that military commanders should be of little or no account in a commonwealth that, in a way, is cradled in war, and in extensive and dreadful war? That the Convention should not contain one military man of name? That administrative bodies in a state of the utmost confusion, and of but momentary duration — composed of men with not one imposing part of character — should be able to govern the country and its armies, with an authority which the most settled senates, and the most respected monarchs, scarcely ever had in the same degree? This, for one, I confess I did not foresee, though all the rest was present to me very early, and was not out of my apprehension even for several years.

SOCIAL CONTRACT.

Society is indeed a contract.¹¹⁸ Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure. But the *state* should not be considered little better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern — to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all *science*; a partnership in all *art*; a partnership in every *virtue*, and in all *perfection*. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those who, by an obligation above them and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law. The municipal corporations of that *universal* kingdom are not morally at liberty, at their pleasure and on their speculations of a contingent improvement, wholly to separate and tear asunder the bands of their *subordinate* community, and to dissolve it into an unsocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary principles. It is the first and supreme necessity only — a necessity that is not chosen, but chooses; a necessity paramount to deliberation; one that admits no discussion and demands no evidence — that which alone can justify a resort to anarchy. This necessity is no exception to the rule, because this necessity itself is a part, too, of that moral and physical disposition of things to which man must be obedient by consent of force. But if that which is only submission to necessity should be made the object of *choice*, then the law is broken, nature is disobeyed, and the rebellious are outlawed, cast out, and exiled from this world of reason, and order, and peace, and virtue, and fruitful penitence, into the antagonist world of madness, discord, vice, confusion, and unavailing sorrow.

PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS.

The crown has considered me after long service; the crown has paid the Duke of Bedford by advance. He has had a long credit for any service which he may perform hereafter. He is secure, and long may he be secure in his advance, whether he performs any services or not. But let him take care how he endangers the safety of that constitution which secures his own utility or his own insignificance; or how he discourages those who take up even puny arms to defend an order of things which, like the sun of heaven, shines alike on the useful and the worthless. His grants are engrafted on the public law of Europe, covered with the awful hoar of innumerable ages. They are guarded by the sacred rules of prescription, found in that full treasury of jurisprudence from which the jejuneness (tameness) and penury of our municipal law has, by degrees, been enriched and strengthened. I had my share (a very full

¹¹⁸ Referring to Thomas Hobbes' book, *The Leviathan* (1651). – WHG

share) in bringing this prescription to its perfection. The Duke of Bedford will stand as long as prescriptive law endures; as long as the great stable laws of property common to us with all civilized nations, are kept in their integrity, and without the smallest intermixture of laws, maxims, principles, or precedents of the “Grand Revolution.” They are secure against all changes but *one*. The whole revolutionary system — its institutes, digest, code, novels, text, gloss, and comment — are not only *not the same*, but the very *reverse*. It is the reverse, fundamentally, of all the laws on which civil life has up to now been upheld in all the governments of the world. The learned professors of the “rights of man” regard prescription *not* as a title to bar all claims set up against all possession, but they look on prescription as *itself* a bar against the possessor and proprietor. They hold an immemorial possession to be no more than a long-continued possession, and therefore an aggravated injustice.

Such are *their* ideas, such is *their* religion, and such is *their* law. But as to *our* country and *our* race,

- as long as the well-compacted structure of our church and state, the sanctuary — the holy of holies of that ancient law, defended by reverence, defended by power, at once a fortress and a temple — shall stand inviolate on the brow of the British Sion;
- as long as the British monarchy, which is not more *limited* than *fenced* by the orders of the state, shall — like the proud Keep of Windsor, rising in the majesty of proportion and girt with the double belt of its kindred and coeval towers; as long as this awful structure shall oversee and guard the subjected land;

— so long the mounds and dykes of the low, fat Bedford Level ¹¹⁹ will have nothing to fear from all the pickaxes of all the levellers of France.

As long as our sovereign lord the king, and his faithful subjects, the lords and commons of this realm — the triple cord, which no man can break;^{Ecc 4.12} the solemn, sworn, constitutional frank-pledge of this nation; the firm guarantees of each other’s *being*, and each other’s *rights*; the joint and several securities, each in its place and order for every kind and every quality of property and of dignity — *as long as these endure*, so long the Duke of Bedford is safe; and we are *all* safe together, the high from the blights of envy and the spoliations of rapacity; the low from the iron hand of oppression and the insolent spurn of contempt. Amen! and so be it: and so it will be —

As long as the house of Aeneas will dwell by the unmoved rock of the Capitol, and a Roman father holds dominion.¹²⁰

MADNESS OF INNOVATION.

Novelty is not the only source of zeal. Why should not a Maccabeus and his brethren arise to assert the honour of the ancient law, and to defend the temple of their forefathers, with as ardent a spirit as can inspire any innovator to destroy the monuments of the piety and the

¹¹⁹ *Bedford Level*: a flat marshy district on the E. coast of England, comprising the greater part of what is called the Fens, suitable as a landing site for invading armies. Here Burke juxtaposes the Level (a defensive position) with the levellers (whom he sees as a threat, an invading ideology). — WHG

¹²⁰ “*Dum domus Aeneae Capitoli immobile saxum
Accolet; imperiumque pater Romanus habebit.*” Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book IX: 446 - 472

glory of ancient ages? ¹²¹ It is not a hazarded assertion, it is a great truth, that once things have gone out of their ordinary course, it is by acts out of the ordinary course, that they can alone be re-established. Republican spirit can only be combated by a spirit of the same nature — of the same *nature*, but informed with another *principle*, and pointing to another *end*. I would persuade a resistance both to the corruption and to the reformation that prevails. It will not be weaker, but much stronger, for combating both together. A victory over real corruptions would enable us to baffle the spurious and pretended reformations. I would not wish to excite, or even to tolerate, that kind of evil spirit which invokes the powers of hell to rectify the disorders of the earth. No! I would add my voice with better, and I trust more potent charms, to draw down justice and wisdom and fortitude from heaven, for the correction of human vice, and for recalling human error from the devious ways into which it has been betrayed. I would wish to call the impulses of individuals at once to the *aid* and to the *control* of authority. By this alone, which I call the true republican spirit (paradoxical as it may appear), can monarchies be rescued from the *imbecility of courts* and the *madness of the crowd*. This republican spirit would not suffer men in high place to bring ruin on their country and on themselves. It would reform, not by destroying, but by saving the great, the rich, and the powerful. Such a republican spirit, we perhaps fondly conceive to have animated the distinguished heroes and patriots of old, who knew no mode of policy but religion and virtue. These they would have paramount to all constitutions. They would not suffer monarchs, or senates, or popular assemblies — under pretences of dignity, or authority, or freedom — to shake off those moral riders which reason has appointed to govern every sort of rude power. These appear to *overload* them by their weight, yet by that pressure they *augment* their essential force; the momentum is increased by the extra weight. It is true in moral, as it is in mechanical science. It is true not only in the draught, but in the race horse. These riders of the great, in effect, hold the reins which guide them in their course; they wear the spur that stimulates them to the goals of honour and of safety. The great must submit to the dominion of prudence and of virtue, or none will long submit to the dominion of the great.

“You rule because you consider yourself lower than the gods.” ¹²²

This is the feudal tenure which they cannot alter.

THE STATE, ITS OWN REVENUE.

The *revenue* of the state, *is* the state. In effect, all depends upon it, whether for support or for reformation. The dignity of every occupation wholly depends upon the quantity and the kind of virtue that may be exerted in it. As all great qualities of the mind, which operate in public, require *force* for their display, and are not merely permissive and passive — I almost said, for their unequivocal existence — the revenue, which is the spring of all power, becomes in its administration, the sphere of every active virtue. Public virtue, being of a magnificent and splendid nature, instituted for great things and conversant about great concerns, requires abundant scope and room. It cannot spread and grow under

¹²¹ Referring to the Apocrypha in the English Bible, 1Macc 2.4-22, in the period between the two testaments. – WHG

¹²² “*Dis te minorem quod geris imperas.*” – Horace, *Odes*, Book III, 5.

confinement, and in straitened, narrow, and sordid circumstances. Through the revenue alone, the body politic can act in its true genius and character. And therefore, it will display just as much of its *collective virtue*, as it is possessed of a *just revenue*; and of as much of that virtue which may characterize those who move it; those who are, as it were, its life and guiding principle. From this, not only magnanimity, and liberality, and beneficence, and fortitude, and providence, and the tutelary (custodial) protection of all good arts, derive their food, and the growth of their organs — but also continence, and self-denial, and labour, and vigilance, and frugality, and whatever else there is, in which the *mind* shows itself above the *appetite*. These are nowhere more in their proper element, than in the provision and distribution of the public wealth. It is therefore not without reason that the science of speculative and practical finance (which must take to its aid so many auxiliary branches of knowledge) stands high in the estimation, not only of the ordinary sort, but of the wisest and best men. And as this science has grown with the progress of its object, the prosperity and improvement of nations has generally increased with the increase of their revenues. And they will continue to both grow and flourish, as long as the balance between what is left to strengthen the efforts of individuals, and what is collected for the common efforts of the state, bear a due reciprocal proportion to each other, and are kept in close correspondence and communication.

METAPHYSICAL DEPRAVITY.

These philosophers are *fanatics*. Independent of any interest which, if it operated alone, would make them much more tractable, they are carried with such a headlong rage towards every desperate trial, that they would sacrifice the whole human race to the slightest of their experiments. I am better able to enter into the character of this description of men than the noble duke can be. I have lived long and variously in the world. Without any considerable pretensions to literature in myself, I have aspired to the love of letters. I have lived for a great many years in habitudes with those who professed them. I can form a tolerable estimate of what is likely to happen from a character chiefly dependent for fame and fortune on knowledge and talent, and do so in its morbid and perverted state, as well as in that state which is sound and natural. Naturally, men so formed and finished are the first gifts of Providence to the world. But once they have thrown off the fear of God, which was in all ages too often the case, and also the fear of men, which is now the case — and when in that state, they come to understand one another, and to act corporately, a more dreadful calamity cannot arise out of hell to scourge mankind. Nothing can be conceived that is harder than the heart of a thorough-bred metaphysician. It comes nearer to the cold malignity of a wicked spirit, than to the frailty and passion of a man. It is like that of the principle of evil itself: incorporeal, pure, unmixed, dephlegmated,¹²³ defecated¹²⁴ evil. It is no easy operation to eradicate humanity from the human breast. What Shakespeare calls “the compunctious visitings of nature,” (*Macbeth*, 1.5) will sometimes knock at their hearts, and protest against their murderous speculations.

¹²³ *Dephlegmated*: deprived of phlegm (one of four humors in Gr. medicine) representing sluggishness or indifference; in other words, this is an active, purposeful, and energetic evil. — WHG

¹²⁴ *Defecated*: purged of anything that might diminish its potency or effect. — WHG

But they have a means of compounding with their nature. Their humanity is not dissolved. They only give it a long prorogation (extension). They are ready to declare that they do not think two thousand years is too long a period for the good that they pursue. It is remarkable that they never see any way to their projected good, except by the road of some evil. Their imagination is not fatigued with the contemplation of human suffering through the wild waste of centuries added to centuries of *misery* and *desolation*. Their humanity is at their horizon — and like the horizon, it always flies before them. The geometricians and the chemists bring the one from the dry bones of their diagrams, and the other from the soot of their furnaces. These dispositions make them worse than indifferent about those feelings and habitudes which are the supports of the moral world. Ambition has come upon them suddenly. They are intoxicated with it, and it has rendered them fearless of the danger which may arise from that to others, or to themselves. In their experiments, these philosophers consider men no more than they do mice in an air-pump, or a recipient of mephitic (noxious) gas. Whatever his grace may think of himself, they look upon him and everything that belongs to him, with no more regard than they do upon the whiskers of that little long-tailed animal that has long been the game of the grave, demure, insidious, spring-nailed, velvet-pawed, green-eyed philosophers — whether going about on two legs or four.

PERSONAL AND ANCESTRAL CLAIMS.

I really am at a loss to draw any sort of parallel between the public merits of his grace, by which he justifies the grants he holds, and these services of mine, on the favourable construction of which I have obtained what his grace so much disapproves. In private life, I do not have at all the honour of acquaintance with the noble duke. But I ought to presume (and it costs me nothing to do so) that he abundantly deserves the esteem and love of all who live with him. But as to public service, why truly it would not be more ridiculous for me to compare myself in rank, in fortune, in splendid descent, in youth, strength, or figure, with the Duke of Bedford, than to make a parallel between his services and my attempts to be useful to my country. It would not be gross adulation, but uncivil irony, to say that he has any public merit of his own to keep alive the idea of the services by which his vast landed pensions were obtained. *My* merits, whatever they are, are original and personal; *his* are derivative. It is his ancestor, the original pensioner, that has laid up this inexhaustible fund of merit which makes his grace so very delicate and exceptious¹²⁵ about the merit of all other grantees of the crown. Had he permitted me to remain quiet, I would have said, 'Tis his estate; that's enough. It is his by law; what do I have to do with it, or with its history? He would naturally have said on his side, 'Tis this man's fortune. He is as good now as my ancestor was two hundred and fifty years ago. I am a young man with very old pensions: he is an old man with very young pensions — that's all.

Why will his grace, by attacking me, force me to reluctantly compare my little merit with that which obtained from the crown those prodigies of profuse donation by which he tramples on the mediocrity of humble and laborious individuals? I would willingly leave him to the herald's college, which the philosophy of the *sans culottes* (prouder by far than all the

¹²⁵ *Exceptious*: to take exception to something; to complain about or find fault with it.

Garters, and Norroys, and Clarencieux, and Rouge Dragons ¹²⁶ that ever pranced in a procession of what his friends call *aristocrats* and *despots*) will abolish with contumely (insults) and scorn. These historians, recorders, and blazoners of virtues and arms, differ wholly from that other description of historians, who never assign any act of politicians to a good motive. These gentle historians, on the contrary, dip their pens in nothing but the milk of human kindness. They seek no further for merit than the preamble of a patent, or the inscription of a tomb. With them, every man created a peer ¹²⁷ is first a hero, ready-made. They judge every man's capacity for office, by the offices he has filled; and the more offices, the more ability. Every general-officer with them is a Marlborough; every statesman a Burleigh; every judge a Murray or a Yorke.¹²⁸ Those who, when alive, were laughed at or pitied by all their acquaintances, make as good a figure as the best of them, in the pages of Guillim, Edmondson, and Collins.¹²⁹

MONASTIC AND PHILOSOPHIC SUPERSTITION.

But the institutions savour of superstition in their very principle; and they nourish it by a permanent and standing influence. I do not mean to dispute this; but it should not hinder you from deriving from superstition itself any resources which may be furnished from there for the public advantage. You derive benefits from many dispositions and many passions of the human mind, which are of as doubtful a colour in the moral eye, as superstition itself. It was your business to correct and mitigate everything which was noxious in this passion, as in all the passions. But is superstition the greatest of all possible vices? In its possible excess, I think it becomes a very great evil. It is, however, a *moral* subject; and of course that allows for all degrees and all modifications. Superstition is the religion of feeble minds; and they must be tolerated in an intermixture of it in some trifling or enthusiastic shape or other. Otherwise, you will deprive weak minds of a resource found necessary to the strongest. The body of all true religion consists, to be sure, in obedience to the will of the Sovereign of the world; in a confidence in His declarations, and in imitation of His perfections. The rest is our own. It may be prejudicial to the great end; it may be auxiliary. Wise men, who as such are not *admirers* of these things (not admirers at least of the *munera terrae* — gifts of the earth), are not violently attached to them, nor do they violently hate them. Wisdom is not the most severe corrector of folly. They are the rival follies, which mutually wage so unrelenting a war, and which make so cruel a use of their advantages, as they can happen to engage the immoderate vulgar in their quarrels, on one side or the other. Prudence would be neuter. But in the contention between fond attachment and fierce antipathy concerning those things which, in their nature, are not made to produce such

¹²⁶ Referring to the Coats of Arms of various nobles. – WHG

¹²⁷ *Peer*: a British nobleman (duke, marquis, earl, viscount or baron) who is a member of the British peerage. – WHG

¹²⁸ Each was a man of extraordinary achievements in his field. For example, William Murray, Lord Mansfield (1705-1793) established a body of rules regarding commercial transactions that became the foundation of British commercial law. He was Chief Justice of the King's Bench for over three decades. – WHG

¹²⁹ John Guillim (c. 1565-1621) – an antiquarian and officer of arms at the College of Arms in London. He is best remembered for his monumental work on heraldry, *A Display of Heraldry*, first published in London in 1610. It was the *Who's Who* of his day, listing the members of the Peerage. Arthur Collins edited the *Peerage of England* (1768). Joseph Edmondson published *The Present Peerages* (1785). – WHG

heats, if a prudent man were obliged to make a choice of what errors and excesses of enthusiasm he would condemn or bear, perhaps he would think the superstition which *builds*, to be more tolerable than that which *demolishes*;

- that which adorns a country, than that which deforms it;
- that which endows, than that which plunders;
- that which disposes to mistaken beneficence, than that which stimulates to real injustice;
- that which leads a man to refuse himself lawful pleasures, than that which snatches from others the scanty subsistence of their self-denial.

Such, I think, is very nearly the state of the question between the ancient founders of monkish superstition, and the superstition of the pretended philosophers of the hour.

DIFFICULTY AND WISDOM OF CORPORATE REFORM.

There are moments in the fortune of states when particular men are called to make improvements by great mental exertion. In those moments, even when they seem to enjoy the confidence of their prince and country, and to be invested with full authority, they do not always have apt instruments. To do great things, a politician looks for a *power* — what our workmen call a *purchase*. And if he finds that power, in politics as in mechanics, he cannot be at a loss to apply it. In the monastic institutions, in my opinion, was found a great *power* for the mechanism of politic benevolence. There were revenues with a public direction; there were men wholly set apart and dedicated to public purposes, without any other than public ties and public principles; men without the possibility of converting the estate of the community into a private fortune; men denied to self-interests, whose avarice is for some community; men to whom personal poverty is honour, and implicit obedience stands in the place of freedom. A man looks in vain to the possibility of making such things when he *wants* them. The winds blow as they list.^{Joh 3.8} These institutions are the products of enthusiasm; they are the instruments of wisdom. Wisdom cannot *create* materials; they are the gifts of nature or of chance; her pride is in the *use*. The perennial existence of corporate bodies and their fortunes are things particularly suited to a man who has long views; who contemplates designs that require time in fashioning, and which propose endurance when accomplished. He is not deserving to rank high, or even to be mentioned in the order of great statesmen who, having obtained the command and direction of such a power as existed in the wealth, discipline, and habits of such corporations — such as those which you have rashly destroyed — cannot find any way to convert it to the great and lasting benefit of his country.

On the view of this subject, a thousand uses suggest themselves to a contriving mind. To destroy any power growing wild from the rank productive force of the human mind, is almost tantamount, in the moral world, to the destruction of the apparently active properties of bodies in the material. It would be like the attempt to destroy (if it were in our competence to destroy) the expansive force of fixed air in potassium nitrate, or the power of steam, or of electricity, or of magnetism. These energies always existed in nature, and they were always discernible. Some of them seemed unserviceable, some noxious, some no better than a sport to children — until contemplative ability, combining with practical skill, tamed

their wild nature, subdued them to use, and rendered them at once the most powerful and the most tractable agents, in subservience to the great views and designs of men. Did fifty thousand persons, whose mental and whose bodily labour you might direct, and so many hundred thousand a year of a revenue, which was neither lazy nor superstitious, appear too big for your abilities to wield? Had you no way of using the men but by converting monks into pensioners? Had you no way of turning the revenue to account but through the improvident resource of a spendthrift sale? If you were thus destitute of mental funds, the proceeding is in its natural course. Your politicians do not understand their trade; and therefore they sell their tools.

DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF ENGLISH PROTESTANTISM.

“Protestantism of the English Church” is very indefinite, because the term *Protestant*, which you apply, is too general for the conclusions which someone of your accurate understanding would wish to draw from it; and because a great deal of argument will depend on the use that is made of that term. It is *not* a fundamental part of the settlement at the Revolution [of 1688], that the state should be protestant without *any qualification of the term*. With a qualification it is unquestionably true; though not in all its latitude. With the qualification, it was true *before* the Revolution. Our predecessors in legislation were not so irrational (not to say impious) as to form an exhaustive ecclesiastical establishment, and even to render the state itself in some degree subservient to it, when their religion (if it might be called such) was nothing but a mere *negation* of some other — without any positive idea either of doctrine, discipline, worship, or morals, in the scheme which they themselves professed, and which they imposed on others, even under penalties and incapacities. — No! no! This could never have been done, not even by reasonable *atheists*.

Those who think religion is of no importance to the *state*, have abandoned it to the conscience or caprice of the *individual*. They make no provision for it whatsoever, but leave every club to make, or not, a voluntary contribution towards its support, according to their fancies. This would be consistent. The other always appeared to me to be a monster of contradiction and absurdity. It was for that reason that some years ago, I strenuously opposed the clergy who petitioned (to the number of about three hundred) to be freed from subscription to the *Thirty-nine Articles*,¹³⁰ without proposing to substitute any other in their place. There has never been a religion of the state (the few years of the Parliament excepted), but that of the *Episcopal Church of England*. Before the Reformation, the Episcopal Church of England connected with the see of Rome. Since then, it disconnected, protesting against some of her doctrines, and against the whole of her authority, as binding in our national church.

Nor did the fundamental laws of this kingdom (it has been the same in Ireland) ever know, at any period, any other church *as an object of establishment* — nor in that light, any other Protestant religion. Indeed, our protestant *toleration* itself at the Revolution, and until a few years ago, required a signature of thirty-six, and part of the thirty-seventh, of the thirty-nine

¹³⁰ The *Thirty-Nine Articles* comprise the doctrinal statement of the Church of England. With the Book of Common Prayer, they govern the liturgy and doctrine of that church. — WHG

articles. They had so little idea at the Revolution, of indefinitely *establishing* Protestantism, that they did not indefinitely *tolerate* it under that name. I do not mean to praise that strictness where nothing more than merely religious toleration is concerned. Toleration, being a part of moral and political prudence, ought to be tender and large. A tolerant government ought not to be too scrupulous in its investigations. Rather, it may bear without blame, not only very ill-grounded doctrines, but even many things that are positively vices, where they are *adulta et praevalida* (mature and strong). The good of the commonwealth is the rule which rides over the rest; and to this, every other must completely submit.

FICTITIOUS LIBERTY.

A brave people will certainly prefer liberty accompanied with a virtuous poverty, to a depraved and wealthy servitude. But before the price of comfort and opulence is paid, one ought to be pretty sure it is *real* liberty which is purchased, and that she is to be purchased at no other price. However, I shall always consider, as very equivocal in her appearance, that liberty which does not have wisdom and justice for her companions, and does not lead prosperity and plenty in her train.

FRENCH IGNORANCE OF ENGLISH CHARACTER.

When I assert anything else concerning the people of England, I speak from observation, not from authority. But I speak from the experience I have had in a pretty extensive and mixed communication with the inhabitants of this kingdom, of all descriptions and ranks, after a course of attentive observation begun in early life, and continued for nearly forty years. I have often been astonished — considering that we are divided from you but by a slender dyke of about twenty-four miles, and that the mutual intercourse between the two countries has lately been very great — to find how little you seem to know of us. I suspect that this is owing to your forming a judgment of this nation from certain publications which, very erroneously, if at all, represent the opinions and dispositions generally prevalent in England. The vanity, restlessness, petulance, and spirit of intrigue of several petty cabals, who attempt to hide their total want of consequence in bustle and noise, and puffing, and mutual quotation of each other — makes you imagine that our contemptuous neglect of their abilities is a general mark of acquiescence in their opinions. No such thing, I assure you. Half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their importunate chink, while thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the British oak, chew the cud and are silent. Pray, do not imagine that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field; or that of course, they are many in number; or that after all, they are other than the little, shrivelled, meagre, hopping, though loud and troublesome insects of the hour.

THE “PEOPLE,” AND “OMNIPOTENCE” OF PARLIAMENT.

When the supreme authority of the people is in question, before we attempt to extend or to confine it, we ought to fix in our minds, with some degree of distinctness, an idea of what it is we mean when we say *the people*.

In a state of *rude* nature, there is no such thing as a people. A number of men in themselves have no collective capacity. The idea of a people is the idea of a corporation. It is wholly artificial; and like all other legal fictions, it is made by common agreement. What the particular nature of that agreement was, is collected from the form into which the particular society has been cast. Any other is not *their* covenant. When men, therefore, break up the original compact or agreement which gives its corporate form and capacity to a state, they are no longer a people; they no longer have a corporate existence; they no longer have a legal, coercive force to bind within, nor a claim to be recognised abroad. They are a number of vague, loose individuals, and nothing more. With them, all is to begin again. Alas! they little know how many a weary step is to be taken before they can form themselves into a mass which has a true, politic personality.

We hear much from men who have not acquired their hardness of assertion from the profundity of their thinking, about the omnipotence of a *majority* in such a dissolution of an ancient society as has taken place in France. But among men so disbanded, there can be no such thing as majority or minority, nor power in any one person to bind another. The power of acting by a majority — which the gentlemen theorists seem to assume so readily — after they have violated the contract out of which it has arisen (if it existed at all), must be grounded on two assumptions: *first*, that of an incorporation produced by unanimity; and *secondly*, a unanimous agreement that the act of a mere majority (say of one) shall pass with them and with others as the act of the whole.

We are so little affected by things which are habitual, that we consider this idea of the decision of a *majority* as if it were a law of our original nature. But such a constructive whole, residing only in a part, is one of the most violent fictions of positive law that has ever been or can be made on the principles of artificial incorporation. Outside of civil society, nature knows nothing of it; nor are men brought to submit to it at all, even when arranged according to civil order, other than by very long training. The mind is brought far more easily to acquiesce in the proceedings of one man, or of a few who act under a general procuration for the state, than in the vote of a victorious majority in councils, in which every man has his share in the deliberation. For there the beaten party is exasperated and soured by the previous contention, and mortified by the conclusive defeat. This mode of decision, where wills may be so nearly equal, where according to circumstances, the smaller number may be the stronger force, and where apparent reason may all be on one side, and on the other there is little else than impetuous appetite — all this must be the result of a very particular and special convention, confirmed afterwards by long habits of obedience, by a sort of discipline in society, and by a strong hand vested with stationary, permanent power to enforce this sort of constructive general will. Whatever organ it is that declared the corporate mind, is so much a matter of positive arrangement, that several states have required a proportion of voices much greater than that of a mere majority, for the validity of several of their acts. These proportions are so entirely governed by convention, that in some cases, the *minority* decides.

MAGNANIMITY OF ENGLISH PEOPLE.

I do not accuse the people of England. As to the great majority of the nation, they have done whatever in their several ranks, and conditions, and descriptions, was required of them by their relative situations in society. And from those, the great mass of mankind cannot depart without the subversion of all public order. They look up to that government which they obey, so that they may be protected. They ask to be led and directed by those rulers whom Providence and the laws of their country have set over them, and under their guidance, to walk in the ways of safety and honour. They have again delegated the greatest trust which they have to bestow, to those faithful representatives who made their true voice heard against the disturbers and destroyers of Europe. They suffered, with unapproving acquiescence, solicitations (which they had in no shape desired) to an unjust and usurping power whom they had never provoked, and whose hostile menaces they did not dread. When the exigencies of the public service could only be met by their voluntary zeal, they started out with an ardour which outstripped the wishes of those who had injured them by doubting whether it might not be necessary to have recourse to compulsion. In all things, they have reposed an enduring, but not an unreflecting confidence. That confidence demands a full return, and it fixes a responsibility on the ministers, that is entire and undivided. The people stand acquitted if the war is not carried on in a manner suited to its objects. If the public honour is tarnished, if the public safety suffers any detriment, the ministers — *not* the people — are to answer for it, and they alone. Its armies, its navies, are given to them without stint or restriction. Its treasures are poured out at their feet. Its constancy is ready to second all their efforts. They are not to fear a responsibility for acts of manly adventure. The responsibility which they are to dread is lest they show themselves unequal to the expectation of a brave people. The more doubtful the constitutional and economical questions may be, upon which they have received so marked a support, the more loudly they are called upon to support this great war — for the success of which their country is willing to supersede considerations of no slight importance. Where I speak of *responsibility*, I do not mean to exclude that species of it which the legal powers of the country have a right to finally exact from those who abuse a public trust. But high as this is, there is a responsibility which attaches to them, from which the whole legitimate power of this kingdom cannot absolve them. There is a responsibility to conscience and to glory; a responsibility to the existing world, and to that posterity which men of their eminence cannot avoid for glory or for shame; a responsibility to a tribunal at which not only ministers, but kings and parliaments, and even nations themselves, must one day answer.

TRUE BASIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

We know, and what is better, we *feel* inwardly, that religion is the basis of civil society, and the source of all good and of all comfort. In England we are so convinced of this, that there is no rust of superstition with which the accumulated absurdity of the human mind might have crusted it over in the course of ages, that ninety-nine in a hundred of the people of England would not prefer it to impiety. We shall never be such fools as to call upon an *enemy* to the substance of any system, to remove its corruptions, supply its defects, or perfect its construction. If our religious tenets should ever want a further elucidation, we will not call upon atheism to explain them. We shall not light up our temple from that

unhallowed fire. It will be illuminated with other lights. It will be perfumed with other incense than the infectious stuff which is imported by the smugglers of adulterated metaphysics. If our ecclesiastical establishment should want a revision, it is not avarice or rapacity, public or private, that we will employ for the audit, receipt, or application of its consecrated revenue. Violently condemning neither the Greek nor the Armenian, nor (since heats have subsided) the Roman system of religion, we prefer the Protestant — not because we think it has less of the Christian religion in it, but because, in our judgment, it has *more*. We are Protestants, not from indifference, but from *zeal*. We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is a religious animal by his constitution; that atheism is against not only our reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot long prevail. But if in the moment of riot, and in a drunken delirium from the hot spirit drawn out of the cauldron of hell, which is now so furiously boiling in France, we should uncover our nakedness by throwing off that Christian religion — which up to now has been our boast and comfort, and one great source of civilization among us and among many other nations — we are apprehensive (being well aware that the mind will not endure a void) that some uncouth, pernicious, and degrading superstition might take its place.

ROUSSEAU.

It is undoubtedly true in general, though it may seem paradoxical, that those who are habitually employed in finding and displaying *faults*, are unqualified for the work of *reformation*. This is because their minds are not only unfurnished with patterns of the fair and good, but by habit they come to take no delight in the contemplation of those things. By hating vices too much, they come to love men too little. It is therefore no wonder that they should be indisposed and unable to serve them. From this arises the complexional disposition of some of your guides to pull everything to pieces. At this malicious game they display the whole of their quadrumanous activity.¹³¹ As to the rest, the paradoxes of eloquent writers — brought forth purely as a sport of fancy, to test their talents, to rouse attention and excite surprise — are taken up by *these* gentleman, but not in the spirit of the original authors, as a means of cultivating their taste and improving their style. Rather, with *them* these paradoxes become serious grounds for action, upon which they proceed in regulating the most important concerns of the state. Cicero ludicrously describes Cato as endeavouring to act in the commonwealth upon the school paradoxes, which exercised the wits of the junior students in Stoic philosophy. If this was true of Cato, these gentlemen copy him in the manner of some persons who lived about his time — *pede nudo Catonem* (Cato with bare feet).¹³²

Mr. Hume ¹³³ told me that he had from Rousseau himself, the secret of his principles of composition. That acute, though eccentric observer, had perceived that to strike and interest the public, the *marvellous* must be produced; that the marvellous of heathen mythology had

¹³¹ *Quadrumanous*: Having four feet whose first digits are opposable; applies to all non-human primates. — WHG

¹³² If anyone imitates Cato, stern of face, barefooted and wearing mean clothes, does he also exemplify the morals and virtue of Cato? [amplified version] Horace, *Epistles* 1.19.12.14. — WHG

¹³³ David Hume (1711-1776): Scottish philosopher who said that skeptical philosophy restricts human knowledge to that which can be perceived by the senses. That is *original* knowledge; all other is *derived*. — *Stanford Ency. Philos.*

long since lost its effects; that giants, magicians, fairies, and heroes of romance which succeeded them, had exhausted the portion of credulity which belonged to their age; that now nothing was left to a writer but that species of the marvellous which might still be produced (and with as great an effect as ever), though in another way; that is, the marvellous in life, in manners, in characters, and in extraordinary situations — giving rise to new and unlooked-for strokes in politics and morals. I believe that if Rousseau were alive (and in one of his lucid intervals), he would be shocked at the practical frenzy of his scholars. In their paradoxes, they are servile imitators; and even in their incredulity, they reveal an implicit faith.

MORAL HEROES.

Mankind has no title to demand that we should be slaves to their guilt and insolence; or that we should serve them in spite of themselves. Minds, sore with the poignant sense of insulted virtue, or filled with high disdain against the pride of triumphant baseness, often do not have it in their choice to stand their ground. Their complexion (which might defy the rack) cannot go through such a trial. Something very high must fortify men to that proof. But when I am driven to a comparison, surely I cannot hesitate for a moment to prefer to such common men, those heroes who in the midst of despair, perform all the tasks of hope; who subdue their feelings to their duties; who in the cause of humanity, liberty, and honour, abandon all the satisfactions of life, and every day incur a fresh risk of life itself. Do me the justice to believe that I can never prefer any fastidious virtue (though virtue still) to the unconquered perseverance, to the affectionate patience of those who watch day and night by the bedside of their delirious country; who for their love to that dear and venerable name, bear all the disgusts and all the buffets they receive from their frantic mother. Sir, I do look on you as true martyrs; I regard you as soldiers who act far more in the spirit of our Commander-in-Chief and the Captain of our salvation, than those who have left you — though I must first bolt myself very thoroughly, and know that *I could do better*, before I can *censure them*. I assure you, sir, that when I consider your unconquerable fidelity to your sovereign, and to your country — the courage, fortitude, magnanimity, and long-suffering of yourself, and the Abbe Maury, and of Mr. Cazales, and of many worthy persons of all orders in your Assembly — I forget, in the lustre of these great qualities, that on your side has been displayed an eloquence so rational, manly, and convincing, that perhaps no time or country has ever excelled. But your *talents* disappear in my admiration of your *virtues*.

KINGDOM OF FRANCE.

When I consider the face of the kingdom of France — the multitude and opulence of her cities; the useful magnificence of her spacious high-roads and bridges; the opportunity of her artificial canals and navigations, opening the conveniences of maritime communication through a solid continent of so immense an extent;

- when I turn my eyes to the stupendous works of her ports and harbours, and to her whole naval apparatus, whether for war or trade;
- when I bring before my view the number of her fortifications, constructed with so bold and masterly a skill, and made and maintained at so prodigious a charge, presenting an armed front and impenetrable barrier to her enemies upon every side;

- when I recollect how very small a part of that extensive region is without cultivation, and to what complete perfection the culture of many of the best productions of the earth have been brought in France;
 - when I reflect on the excellence of her manufactures and fabrics, second to none but ours, and in some particulars not second; when I contemplate the grand foundations of charity, public and private;
 - when I survey the state of all the arts that beautify and polish life; when I reckon the men she has bred for extending her fame in war, her able statesmen, the multitude of her profound lawyers and theologians, her philosophers, her critics, her historians and antiquaries, her poets and her orators, sacred and profane;
- I behold in all this something which awes and commands the imagination, which checks the mind on the brink of precipitate and indiscriminate censure, and which demands that we should very seriously examine what and how great are the latent vices that could authorize us at once to level so specious a fabric to the ground.

I do not recognise in this view of things, the despotism of Turkey. Nor do I discern the character of a government that has been, on the whole, so oppressive, or so corrupt, or so negligent, as to be utterly *unfit for all reformation*. I must think that such a government well deserved to have its excellences heightened, its faults corrected, and its capacities improved into a British constitution.

GRIEVANCE AND OPINION.

This shows, in my opinion, how very quick and awakened all men ought to be — who are looked up to by the public, and who deserve that confidence — to prevent a surprise on their opinions, when dogmas are spread and projects pursued, by which the foundations of society may be affected. Before they listen even to moderate alterations in the government of their country, they ought to take care that principles are not propagated for that purpose, which are too big for their object. Doctrines limited in their present application, and wide in their general principles, are never meant to be confined to what they at first pretend. If I were to form a prognostic of the effect of the present machinations on the people, from their sense of any grievance they suffer under this constitution, my mind would be at ease. But there is a wide difference among the multitude, when they act against their government from a sense of *grievance*, or from zeal for some *opinions*. When men are thoroughly possessed with that zeal, it is difficult to calculate its force. It is certain that its power is by no means in exact proportion to its reasonableness. This must always have been discoverable by persons of reflection, but it is now obvious to the world, that *a theory concerning government* may become as much a cause of fanaticism as *a dogma in religion*. There is a boundary to men's passions when they act from *feeling*; but there is none when they are under the influence of *imagination*. Remove a grievance, and when men act from feeling, you go a great way towards quieting a commotion. But the good or bad *conduct* of a government — the protection men have enjoyed, or the oppression they have suffered under it — are of no sort of weight when a faction, proceeding upon speculative grounds, is thoroughly heated against its *form*. When a man is furious against monarchy or episcopacy, because of its *system*, the good *conduct* of the monarch or bishop has no other effect than to further irritate the adversary. The adversary is *provoked* by it, as if furnishing a plea for

preserving the thing which he wishes to destroy. His mind will be heated as much by the sight of a sceptre, mace, or verge (staff), as if he had been bruised and wounded by these symbols of authority daily. Mere spectacles, mere names, will become sufficient causes to stimulate the people to war and tumult.

PERPLEXITY AND POLICY.

Let us not deceive ourselves: we are at the beginning of great troubles. I readily acknowledge that the state of public affairs is infinitely more unpromising than at the period I have just now alluded to. And the position of all the powers of Europe, in relation to us and in relation to each other, is more intricate and critical beyond all comparison. Our situation is difficult indeed. In all situations of difficulty, men will be influenced in the part they take, not only by the reason of the case, but by the peculiar turn of their own character. The same ways to safety do not present themselves to all men, nor to the same men in different tempers. There is a courageous wisdom; there is also a false, reptile prudence, which is not the result of caution, but of fear. Under misfortunes, it often happens that the nerves of the understanding are so relaxed, and the pressing peril of the hour so completely confounds all the faculties, that no future danger can be properly provided for, justly estimated, or so much as fully seen. The eye of the mind is dazzled and vanquished. An abject distrust of ourselves, an extravagant admiration of the enemy, present us with no hope except in a compromise with his pride, by a submission to his will. This short plan of policy is the only counsel which will obtain a hearing. We plunge into a dark gulf with all the rash precipitation of fear. Without question, the nature of courage is to be conversant with danger. But in the palpable night of their terrors, men under consternation suppose, not that it is the *danger* which, by a sure instinct, calls out the *courage* to resist it; but that it is the *courage* which produces the *danger*. They therefore seek a refuge from their fears, in the fears themselves; and consider a temporizing meanness¹³⁴ as the only source of safety.

The rules and definitions of prudence can rarely be exact, and never universal. I do not deny that, in small, truckling states, a timely compromise with power has often been the means, and the *only* means, of extending their puny existence. But a great state is too much envied, and too much dreaded, to find safety in humiliation. To be *secure*, it must be *respected*. Power, eminence, and consideration, are not things to be *begged*. They must be *commanded*. And those who supplicate for mercy from others, can never hope for justice through themselves. Whatever justice they are to obtain as the alms of an enemy, depends on his character; and they should well know that, before they implicitly confide.

HISTORICAL INSTRUCTION.

Such is the effect of the perversion of history by those who, for the same nefarious purposes, have perverted every other part of learning. But those who will stand upon that elevation of reason which places centuries under our eye, and brings things to the *true* point of comparison — which obscures little names, and effaces the colours of little parties, and to which nothing can ascend but the spirit and moral quality of human actions — they will say

¹³⁴ *Temporizing meanness*: staying the immediate danger by placating it. – WHG

to the teachers of the Palais Royal — that the cardinal of Lorraine was the murderer of the *sixteenth* century, and you have the glory of being the murderers in the *eighteenth*; and this is the only difference between you. But history in the *nineteenth* century, better understood and better employed, will (I trust) teach a civilized posterity to abhor the misdeeds of both these barbarous ages. It will teach future priests and magistrates not to retaliate upon the speculative and inactive atheists of *future* times, the enormities committed by the *present* practical zealots and furious fanatics of that wretched error which, in its quiescent state, is more than punished whenever it is embraced. History will teach posterity not to make war upon either religion or philosophy, for the abuse which the hypocrites of *both* have made of the two most valuable blessings conferred upon us by the bounty of the universal Patron, the one who eminently favours and protects the race of man in all things.

MONTESQUIEU.

For instance, place before your eyes such a man such as Montesquieu.¹³⁵ Think of a genius not born in every country or every time; a man gifted by nature with a penetrating, aquiline eye; with a judgment prepared with the most extensive erudition; with an herculean robustness of mind, and nerves not to be broken with labour; a man who could spend twenty years in one pursuit. Think of a man like the universal patriarch in Milton (who had drawn up before him in his prophetic vision the whole series of the generations which were to issue from his loins); a man capable of placing in review — after having brought together from the east, west, north, and south, from the coarseness of the rudest barbarism to the most refined and subtle civilization — all the schemes of government which had ever prevailed among mankind: weighing, measuring, collating, and comparing them all; joining fact with theory, and calling into council, upon all this infinite assemblage of things, all the speculations which have fatigued the understandings of profound reasoners in all times! Let us *then* consider that all these were but so many preparatory steps to qualify a man — and *such* a man, tinctured with no national prejudice, with no domestic affection — to admire and hold out to the admiration of mankind, the constitution of England! And shall we Englishmen fail to follow such a suit? Shall we — when so much more than he has produced, still remains to be understood and admired — instead of keeping ourselves in the schools of real science, choose for our teachers men incapable of being taught, whose only claim to know is that they have never doubted; from whom we can learn nothing but their own indocility (willful ignorance); who would teach us to scorn what in the silence of our hearts we ought to adore?

ARTICLES, AND SCRIPTURE.

If you would have religion publicly practised and publicly taught, then you must have a power to say what that religion will be which you will protect, and encourage; and distinguish by such marks and characteristics as you in your wisdom think fit. As I said

¹³⁵ Charles-Louis Montesquieu (1689-1755) French political philosopher and satirist. His principal work, *The Spirit of Laws*, was a major contribution to political theory. Abandoning the classical divisions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, he assigned to each form of government an animating principle: the *republic*, based on virtue; the *monarchy*, based on honour; and *despotism*, based on fear. — *Ency. Brit.*

before, your determination may be unwise in this, as in other matters; but it cannot be unjust, hard, or oppressive, or contrary to the liberty of any man, or in the least degree exceeding your province.¹³⁶

Therefore, as a grievance, it is fairly none at all, nothing but what is essential not only to the order, but to the liberty of the whole community. The petitioners are so sensible of the force of these arguments, that they allow for one subscription, that is, to the Scripture. I will not consider how forcibly this argument militates with their whole principle *against* subscription as a usurpation on the rights of Providence. I content myself with submitting to the consideration of the house, that once that rule is established, it must have some authority to enforce the obedience; because you well know that a law without a sanction will be ridiculous. Somebody must sit in judgment on his conformity; he must judge on the charge; and if he judges, he must ordain execution. These things are necessary consequences one of the other. And then this judgment is an equal and a superior violation of private judgment; *the right of private judgment* ¹³⁷ is violated in a much greater degree than it can be by any previous subscription. You come round again to subscription as the best and easiest method. Men must judge his doctrine, and judge definitively, so that either his test is nugatory, or men must first or last prescribe his public interpretation of it.

PROBLEM OF LEGISLATION.

It is one of the finest problems in legislation, and what has often engaged my thoughts while I followed that profession, “What the state ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave (with as little interference as possible) to individual discretion.” Nothing, certainly, can be laid down on the subject that will not admit exceptions, many permanent, some occasional. But the clearest line of distinction which I could draw while I had my chalk to draw *any* line, was this: that the state ought to confine itself to what regards the state, or the creatures of the state — namely, the exterior establishment of its religion; its magistracy; its revenue; its military force by sea and land; the corporations that owe their existence to its fiat. In a word, to everything that is *truly and properly* public; to the public peace, to the public safety, to the public order, to the public prosperity.

In its preventive police, it ought to be sparing of its efforts, and to employ means that are few, infrequent, and strong, rather than many and frequent, and of course, as they multiply their puny politic race, and dwindle, small and feeble. Statesmen who know themselves will, with the dignity which belongs to wisdom, proceed only in this — the superior orb and first

¹³⁶ Burke decried separation of church and state, saying that democracy in the church leads to a secular religion. Here he shows the danger of using the sword of the state (Rom 13.4) to enforce the Articles of the church. That would be to “lord it over one another,” contrary to Christ’s warning in Mat 20.25-26. Hence, courts of equity (of the church) had long been kept distinct from civil courts (of the king). When Henry VIII declared himself head of the church, as well as the state, that distinction was blurred. Hence, the right of private judgment became a legal defense. – WHG

¹³⁷ In the 19th century, J.C. Ryle wrote that the **right** of *private judgment* is the right of every Christian to judge for himself, by the word of God, whether what is put before him as religious truth, is God’s truth or not. The **duty** of *private judgment* requires every Christian to use that right to compare man’s words and man’s writings with God’s revelation, and to make sure that he is not deluded and taken in by false teaching. – WHG

mover of their duty — steadily, vigilantly, severely, courageously. Whatever remains will, in a manner, provide for itself. But as they descend from the state to a province, from a province to a parish, and from a parish to a private house, they accelerate in their fall. They *cannot* do the *lower* duty; and in proportion as they try it, they will certainly fail in the *higher*. They ought to know the different departments of things — what belongs to *laws*, and what *manners* alone can regulate. To these, great politicians may give a leaning, but they cannot give a law.

ORDER, LABOUR, AND PROPERTY.

To tell the people that they are relieved by the dilapidation of their public estate, is a cruel and insolent imposition. Statesmen, before they valued themselves on the relief given to the people by the destruction of their revenue, should first have carefully attended to the solution of *this* problem: Whether it is more advantageous to the people to pay considerably, and to gain in proportion; or to gain little or nothing, and to be disburdened of all contribution? My mind is made up to decide in favour of the first proposition. Experience is with me, and I believe, the best opinions also. To keep a balance between the power of acquisition on the part of the subject, and the demands he is to answer on the part of the state, is the fundamental part of the skill of a true politician. The means of acquisition are prior in time and in arrangement. Good order is the foundation of all good things. To be enabled to acquire, the people must be tractable and obedient, without being servile. The magistrate must have his reverence, and the laws their authority. The body of the people must not find the principles of natural subordination rooted out of their minds by art (craftiness). They must respect that property of which they cannot partake. They must labour to obtain what can be obtained by labour; and when they find, as they commonly do, the success is disproportioned to the endeavour, they must be taught their consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice. Whoever deprives them of this consolation, deadens their industry, and strikes at the root of all acquisition, and of all conservation. He that does this is the cruel oppressor, the merciless enemy of the poor and wretched. At the same time, by his wicked speculations, he exposes the fruits of successful industry, and the accumulations of fortune, to the plunder of the negligent, the disappointed, and the unprosperous.

REGICIDAL LEGISLATURE.

This strange law is not made for a trivial object, not for a single port or a single fortress, but for a great kingdom. For the religion, the morals, the laws, the liberties, the lives and fortunes of millions of human creatures who without their consent, or that of their lawful government, are incorporated into their tyranny by an arbitrary act of this regicidal and homicidal government, which they call *a law*.

In other words, their will is the law not only at home, but as to the concerns of every nation. Who has made that law, if not the regicidal republic itself, whose laws, like those of the Medes and Persians, they cannot alter or abrogate,^{Dan 6.8} or even so much as take into consideration? Without the least ceremony or compliment, they have sent out of the world whole sets of laws and lawgivers. They have swept away the very constitutions under which

the legislators acted, and the laws were made. They have not scrupled to profane even the fundamental sacred *rights of man*. They have set this holy code at naught with ignominy and scorn. Thus they treat all their domestic laws and constitutions, even what they considered a *law of nature*. But whatever they have put their seal on for the purposes of their ambition, and the ruin of their neighbours, this alone is invulnerable, impassible, immortal. Assuming themselves to be masters of everything human and divine, here and here alone it seems they are limited, “cooped and cabined in.” And this omnipotent legislature finds itself wholly without the power of exercising its favourite attribute, *the love of peace*. In other words, they are powerful to usurp, impotent to restore. And equally by their power and their impotence they aggrandize themselves, and weaken and impoverish you and all other nations.

GOVERNMENT NOT TO BE RASHLY CENSURED.

The *purpose* for which the abuses of government are brought into view, forms a very material consideration in the mode of treating them. The complaints of a friend are very different things from the invectives of an enemy. The charge of abuses on the late monarchy of France was not intended to lead to its *reformation*, but to justify its *destruction*. Those who have raked into all history for the faults of kings, and who have aggravated every fault they have found, have acted consistently, because they acted as *enemies*. No man can be a friend to a tempered monarchy, who bears a decided hatred toward monarchy itself. Whoever at the present time is favourable or even fair to that system, must act towards it as towards a friend with frailties, who is under the prosecution of implacable foes. I think it is a duty, in that case, not to inflame the public mind against the obnoxious person by any exaggeration of his faults. It is our duty rather to palliate his errors and defects, or to cast them into the shade, and to industriously bring forward any good qualities that he may happen to possess. But when the man is to be amended, and by amendment to be preserved, then the line of duty takes another direction. When his safety is effectually provided for, it then becomes the office of a friend to urge his faults and vices with all the energy of enlightened affection, to paint them in their most vivid colours, and to bring the moral patient to a better habit.^{2Sam 12.1-14} Thus I think with regard to individuals; thus I think with regard to ancient and respected governments and orders of men. A spirit of reformation is never more consistent with itself, than when it refuses to be rendered the means of destruction.

ETIQUETTE.

Etiquette, if I understand the term rightly (which in any extent is of modern usage), had its original application to those ceremonial and formal observances practised at courts, which had been established by long usage in order to preserve the sovereign power from the rude intrusion of licentious familiarity, as well as to preserve majesty itself from a disposition to consult its ease at the expense of its dignity. Afterwards, the term came to have a greater latitude, and to be employed to signify certain formal methods used in the transactions between sovereign states.

In the more limited, as well as in the larger sense of the term, without knowing what the etiquette is, it is impossible to determine whether it is a vain and captious punctilio,¹³⁸ or a form that is necessary to preserve decorum in character and order in business. I readily admit that nothing tends to facilitate the issue of all public transactions more than a mutual disposition in the parties involved, to waive all ceremony. But the use of this temporary suspension of the recognised modes of respect consists in its being *mutual*, and in the spirit of *conciliation*, in which all ceremony is laid aside. On the contrary, when one of the parties to a treaty entrenches himself up to the chin in these ceremonies, and on his side will not abate a single punctilio, and all the concessions are on one side only, the conceding party places himself in a relation of inferiority by this act, and thereby he fundamentally subverts that equality which is of the very essence of all treaty.

ANCIENT ESTABLISHMENTS.

Old establishments are tested by their effects. If the people are happy, united, wealthy, and powerful, we presume the rest. We conclude that to be good, from which good is derived. In old establishments, various correctives have been found for their aberrations from theory. Indeed, they are the results of various necessities and expedencies. They are not often constructed after any theory; rather, theories are drawn from them. In these correctives, we often see the end best obtained, where the means do not seem perfectly reconcilable to what we may fancy was the original scheme. The means taught by experience may be better suited to political ends than those contrived in the original project. They again react upon the primitive constitution; and sometimes they improve the design itself, from which they seem to have departed. I think all this might be curiously exemplified in the British constitution. At worst, the errors and deviations of every kind in reckoning are found and computed, and the ship proceeds in her course. This is the case of old establishments. But in a new and merely theoretical system, it is expected that every contrivance appears, on the face of it, to answer its ends — especially where the projectors are in no way embarrassed by an endeavour to accommodate the new building to an old one, either in the walls or on the foundations.

SENTIMENT AND POLICY.

Never was there a jar or discord between genuine sentiment and sound policy. Never, no never, did Nature say one thing and Wisdom say another. Nor are sentiments of elevation in themselves turgid and unnatural. Nature is never more truly herself than in her grandest form. The Apollo of Belvedere (if the universal robber has yet left him at Belvedere)¹³⁹ is as much in nature as any figure from the pencil of Rembrandt, or any clown in the rustic revels of Teniers.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, it is when a great nation is in great difficulties, that minds must exalt themselves to the occasion, or all is lost. Strong passion, under the direction of a feeble

¹³⁸ *Captious punctilio*: emphasizing a fine point of etiquette just to demean someone. – WHG

¹³⁹ The Apollo of Belvedere is a marble sculpture of Apollo, probably a Roman copy of a bronze statue by the Greek sculptor Leochares – discovered in Belvedere Italy in the late 15th century and placed in the Vatican Palace in 1511. Around 1796, Napoleon had the sculpture sent to the Louvre. It was returned to the Vatican in 1815. – WHG

¹⁴⁰ David Teniers the Younger (1610-1690); famous Flemish painter of rustic life. – WHG

reason, feeds a low fever, which serves only to destroy the body that entertains it. But vehement passion does not always indicate an infirm judgment. It often accompanies, actuates, and is even auxiliary to a powerful understanding. When they both conspire and act harmoniously, their force is great to destroy disorder within, and to repel injury from abroad. If ever there was a time that calls on us for no vulgar conception of things, and for exertions in no vulgar strain, it is the awful hour that Providence has now appointed to this nation. Every little measure is a great error; and every great error will bring on no small ruin. Nothing can be directed above the mark that we must aim at: everything below it is absolutely thrown away.

PATRIOTISM.

I have little to recommend my opinions but long observation and much impartiality. They come from one who has been no tool of power, no flatterer of greatness; and who in his last acts does not wish to belie the tenor of his life. They come from one, almost the whole of whose public exertions has been a struggle for the liberty of others; from one in whose breast no durable or vehement anger has ever been kindled, except by what he considered tyranny; and who snatches from his share in the endeavours which are used by good men to discredit opulent oppression, the hours he has employed on your affairs; and who in so doing persuades himself he has not departed from his usual office. They come from one who desires honours, distinctions, and emoluments but little, and who expects them not at all; who has no contempt for fame, and no fear of obloquy; who shuns contention, though he will hazard an opinion; who would preserve consistency by varying his means to secure the unity of his end; and when the equipoise of the vessel in which he sails may be endangered by overloading it on one side, is desirous to carry the small weight of his reasons to that which may *preserve* its equipoise.

NECESSITY, A RELATIVE TERM.

The only excuse to be made for all our mendicant (beggarly) diplomacy is the same as in the case of all other mendicancy — namely, that it has been founded on absolute necessity. This deserves consideration. Necessity, just as it has no law, so it has no shame. But moral necessity is not like metaphysical or even physical necessity. In that category, it is a word of loose signification, and it conveys different ideas to different minds. To the low-minded, the slightest necessity becomes an invincible necessity. “The slothful man says, There is a lion in the way, and I shall be devoured in the streets.” ^{Pro 22.13} But when the necessity pleaded is not in the *nature* of things, but in the *vices* of the one who alleges it, the whining tones of commonplace beggarly rhetoric produce nothing but indignation. This is because they indicate a desire to keep up a dishonourable existence, without utility to others, and without dignity to itself; it is because they aim at obtaining the dues of labour without industry; and by frauds, they would draw from the compassion of others, what men ought to owe to their own spirit and their own exertions.

KING JOHN AND THE POPE.

He began with exacting an oath from the king, by which, without showing the extent of his design, he engaged him to everything he could ask. John swore to submit to the legate in all things relating to his excommunication. And first he was obliged to accept Langton as archbishop; then to restore the monks of Canterbury, and other deprived ecclesiastics, and to make them a full indemnification for all their losses.¹⁴¹ And now, by these concessions, all things seemed to be perfectly settled. The cause of the quarrel was entirely removed. But when the king expected a full absolution for so perfect a submission, the legate began a laboured harangue on his rebellion, his tyranny, and the innumerable sins he had committed. And in conclusion, he declared that there was no way left to appease God and the Church but to resign his crown to the Holy See, from whose hands he should receive it purified from all pollutions, and hold it for the future by homage, and an annual tribute. John was struck motionless at a demand so extravagant and unexpected. He knew not on which side to turn. If he cast his eyes toward the coast of France, he saw there his enemy Philip — who considered him a criminal as well as an enemy, and who aimed not only at his crown but his life — at the head of an innumerable multitude of fierce people, ready to rush in upon him. If he looked at his own army, he saw nothing there but coldness, disaffection, uncertainty, distrust, and a strength in which he knew not whether he ought to most confide, or fear.

On the other hand, the papal thunders, from the wounds of which he was still sore, were fully leveled at his head. He could not look steadily at these complicated difficulties — and truly, it is hard to say what choice he had, if any choice were left to kings in what concerns the independence of their crown. Therefore, surrounded with these difficulties — and so that all his recent humiliations might not be rendered as ineffectual as they were ignominious — he took the last step. And in the presence of a numerous assembly of his peers and prelates who turned their eyes from this mortifying sight, formally resigned his crown to the pope's legate, to whom at the same time he did homage, and paid the first fruits of his tribute. Nothing could be added to the humiliation of the king on this occasion, except the insolence of the legate, who spurned the treasure with his foot, and let the crown remain a long time on the ground before he restored it to the degraded owner.

In this proceeding, the motives of the king may be easily discovered. But how the barons of the kingdom who were deeply concerned, suffered without any protestation the independency of the crown to be thus forfeited, is mentioned by no historian of that time. In civil tumults, it is astonishing how little regard is paid by all parties to the honour or safety of their country. The king's *friends* were probably induced to acquiesce by the same motives that had influenced the king. His *enemies*, who were the most numerous, perhaps saw his abasement with pleasure, as they knew this action might one day be employed against him with effect. To the *bigots* it was enough that it aggrandized the pope. It is perhaps worthy of observation, that the conduct of Pandulf¹⁴² towards King John bore a very great affinity to

¹⁴¹ Stephen Langton (d. 1228) was an English cardinal whose appointment as archbishop of Canterbury precipitated King John's quarrel with Pope Innocent III, and played an important part in the Magna Carta crisis. — *Ency. Brit.*

¹⁴² Pandulf of Verracio (d. 1226) was bishop of Norwich, and the Pope's legate mentioned above. — WHG

that of the Roman consuls to the people of Carthage in the last Punic war. They drew concession after concession from them, and carefully concealed their design until they made it impossible for the Carthaginians to resist. Such was the strong resemblance produced by the same ambition in such distant times. And it is far from the sole instance in which we may trace a similarity between the spirit and conduct of the former and latter Rome, in their common design on the liberties of mankind.

CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCE.

The balance between consumption and production makes the price.¹⁴³ The market settles, and it alone can settle, that price. Market is the meeting and conference of the *consumer* and *producer*, when they mutually discover each other's wants. Nobody, I believe, has observed with any reflection what *market* is, without being astonished at the truth, the correctness, the celerity (rapidity), and the general equity with which the balance of wants is settled. Those who wish the destruction of that balance, and would gladly decree by arbitrary regulation, that inadequate production should not be compensated by increased price, directly lay their *axe* to the root of production itself. ^{Mat 3.10}

“PRIESTS OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN.”

His Grace,¹⁴⁴ like an able orator (as he is), begins with giving me a great deal of praise for talents which I do not possess. He does this to entitle himself, on the credit of this gratuitous kindness, to exaggerate my abuse of the parts which his bounty, and not that of nature, has bestowed upon me. In this, too, he has condescended to copy Mr. Erskine.¹⁴⁵ These priests (I hope they will excuse me — I mean *priests of the rights of man*) begin by crowning me with their flowers and their fillets, and bedewing me with their odours, as a preface to knocking me on the head with their consecrated axes. They say I have injured the constitution; and I have abandoned the Whig party and the Whig principles that I professed. I do not mean, my dear sir, to defend myself against his Grace. I do not have much interest in what the world thinks or says of me — as little as the world has an interest in what I think or say of anyone in it. And I wish that his Grace had allowed an unhappy man to enjoy, in his retreat, the melancholy privileges of obscurity and sorrow. At any rate, I have spoken and I have written on the subject. If I have written or spoken so poorly as to be quite forgotten, then a fresh apology will not make a more lasting impression. “I must let the tree lie as it falls.” ^{Ecc 11.3} Perhaps I must take some shame to myself. I confess that I have acted on my own principles of government, and not on those of his Grace, which are, I dare say, profound and wise — but which I do not pretend to understand.

As to the party to which he alludes (the Whigs), and which has long taken its leave of me, I believe the principles of the book which he condemns are very conformable to the opinions

¹⁴³ This is *the law of supply and demand*, which dates back at least 2000 years, to a Tamil book of wisdom. — WHG

¹⁴⁴ This and the following excerpt are from Burke's letter to William Elliot, Esq., May 28, 1795. — WHG

¹⁴⁵ Thomas Erskine (1750-1823); Scottish attorney and writer, and admirer of the French Revolution. He was the highest paid counsel in the history of the English bar. He defended Thomas Paine when, in 1792, he was tried for sedition regarding his book, *The Rights of Man*. Erskine gave a brilliant speech, but lost. — WHG

of many of the most considerable and gravest in that description of politicians. A few indeed, who I admit are equally respectable in all points, differ from me, and talk his Grace's language. I am too feeble to contend with them. They have the field to themselves. There are others, very young and very ingenious persons, who form probably the largest part of what his Grace, I believe, is pleased to consider as that party. Some of them were not born into the world, and all of them were children when I entered into that connection. I give due credit to the censorial brow, to the broad phylacteries, and to the imposing gravity of those magisterial rabbins and doctors in the cabala of political science. I admit that "wisdom is as the gray hair to man, and that learning is like honourable old age." But at a time when liberty is talked of a good deal, perhaps I might be excused if I caught something of the general indocility (ignorance). It might not be surprising if I lengthened my chain a link or two, and in an age of relaxed discipline, gave a trifling indulgence to my own notions. If that could be allowed, perhaps I might sometimes (by accident, and without an unpardonable crime) trust as much to my own very careful and very laborious, though perhaps somewhat purblind disquisitions (myopic arguments), as to their soaring, intuitive, eagle-eyed authority. But the modern liberty is a precious thing. It must not be profaned by too vulgar a use. It belongs only to the chosen few who are born to the hereditary representation of the whole democracy, and who leave nothing at all — no, not even the offal — to us poor outcasts of the plebeian race.

“HIS GRACE.”

Among those gentlemen who came to authority, as soon (or sooner) than they came of age, I do not mean to include his Grace. With all those native titles to empire over our minds which distinguish the others, he has a large share of experience. He certainly ought to understand the British constitution better than I do. He has studied it in the fundamental part. For one election I have seen, he has been concerned in twenty. Nobody is less of a visionary *theorist*; nobody has drawn his speculations more from *practice*. No peer has condescended to superintend with more vigilance the declining franchises of the poor commoners. "With thrice great Hermes ¹⁴⁶ he has outwatched the bear." Often his candles have been burned to the snuff, and glimmered and stunk in the sockets, while he grew pale at his constitutional studies. Long sleepless nights has he wasted; long, laborious, shiftless journeys has he made; and great sums has he expended in order to secure the purity, independence, and sobriety of elections, and to give a check, if possible, to the ruinous charges that go nearly to the destruction of the right of election itself. Amidst these labours of his, his Grace will be pleased to forgive me if my zeal — less enlightened to be sure than his by midnight lamps and studies — has presumed to talk too favourably of this constitution, and even to say something sounding like approval of that body which has the honour to reckon his Grace at the head of it. Those, who dislike this partiality, or if his Grace pleases, this flattery of mine, have a comfort at hand. I may be refuted and brought to shame by the most convincing of all refutations — a *practical* refutation. Every individual peer may

¹⁴⁶ Or *Hermes Trismegistus*: the god of a Roman cult, which is a combination of *Thoth*, the Egyptian god of wisdom, learning and communications; and *Hermes*, the Greek messenger of the gods — the founder of science, mathematics, alchemy, philosophy, and magic. Thus Burke implies it is the god of Reason and of the Enlightenment — WHG

show for himself that I was ridiculously wrong. The whole body of those noble persons may refute me for the whole corps. If they please, they are more powerful advocates *against themselves*, than a thousand scribblers like me can be *in their favour*. Even if I were possessed of those powers which his Grace, in order to heighten my offence, is pleased to attribute to me, there would be little difference. The eloquence of Mr. Erskine might save Mr. _____ from the gallows, but no eloquence could save Mr. Jackson from the effects of his own potion.

SPECULATION AND HISTORY.

I shall not live to behold the unravelling of the intricate plot which saddens and perplexes the awful drama of Providence now acting on the moral theatre of the world.¹⁴⁷ Whether for thought or for action, I am at the end of my career. You are in the middle of yours. In what part of its orbit the nation, with which we are carried along, moves at this instant, it is not easy to conjecture. It may perhaps be far advanced in its aphelion.¹⁴⁸ — But when to return?

Not to lose ourselves in the infinite void of the conjectural world, our business is with what is likely to be affected, for better or worse, by the wisdom or weakness of our plans. In all speculations upon men and human affairs, it is of no small moment to distinguish things of accident from permanent causes, and from effects that cannot be altered. It is not every irregularity in our movement that is a total deviation from our course. I am not quite of the mind of those speculators who seem assured that necessarily, and by the constitution of things, all states have the same periods of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude that are found in the individuals who compose them. Parallels of this sort furnish similitudes to illustrate or to adorn, rather than supply analogies from which to reason. The objects which are attempted to be forced into an analogy are not found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are physical beings subject to universal and invariable laws. The immediate cause acting in these laws may be obscure; the general results are subjects of certain calculation. But commonwealths are not *physical*, but *moral* essences. They are artificial combinations, and in their proximate efficient cause, they are arbitrary productions of the human mind. We are not yet acquainted with the laws which necessarily influence the stability of that kind of *work* made by that kind of *agent*. There is not in the physical order (with which they do not appear to hold any assignable connection) a distinct cause by which any of those fabrics must necessarily grow, flourish, or decay. Nor, in my opinion, does the moral world produce anything more determinate on that subject than what may serve as an amusement (liberal indeed, and ingenious, but still only an amusement) for speculative men. I doubt whether the history of mankind is yet complete enough, if it can ever be so, to furnish grounds for a sure theory on the internal causes which necessarily affect the fortune of a state. I am far from denying the operation of such causes: but they are infinitely uncertain and much more obscure — and much more difficult to trace — than the foreign causes that tend to raise, depress, and sometimes overwhelm a community. It is often impossible in these political inquiries to find any proportion between the apparent force of

¹⁴⁷ This prescient letter was sent to a member of Parliament, 1796-97. Burke died in 1797. — WHG

¹⁴⁸ Aphelion: the point in the orbit of a planet or comet that is at the greatest distance from the sun. — WHG

any moral causes we may assign, and their known operation. We are therefore obliged to deliver up that operation to mere chance, or more piously (perhaps, more rationally), to the occasional interposition and irresistible hand of the Great Disposer.

We have seen states of considerable duration, which for ages have remained nearly as they had begun, and could hardly be said to ebb or flow. Some appear to have spent their vigour at their commencement. Some blazed out in their glory a little before their extinction. The meridian of some has been the most splendid. Others (and they the greatest number) have fluctuated, and experienced at different periods of their existence a great variety of fortune. At the very moment when some of them seemed plunged in unfathomable abysses of disgrace and disaster, they suddenly emerged. They have begun a new course and opened a new reckoning. And even in the depths of their calamity, and on the very ruins of their country, they have laid the foundations of a towering and durable greatness. All this has happened without any apparent previous change in the general circumstances which had brought on their distress. The death of a man at a critical juncture — his disgust, his retreat, his disgrace — have brought innumerable calamities on a whole nation. A common soldier, a child, a girl at the door of an inn, have changed the face of fortune, and almost of nature.

Such has commonly been the fate of monarchies of long duration, often influenced by such causes. They have their ebbs and their flows. This has been eminently the fate of the monarchy of France. There have been times in which no power has ever been brought so low; and yet few have ever flourished in greater glory. By turns elevated and depressed, that power had been, on the whole, rather on the increase; and it continued not only powerful but formidable, to the hour of the total ruin of the monarchy. This fall of the monarchy was far from being preceded by any exterior symptoms of decline. The interior were not visible to every eye; and a thousand accidents might have prevented the operation of what the most clear-sighted were not able to discern, nor the most provident to divine. A very little time before its dreadful catastrophe, there was a kind of exterior splendour in the situation of the Crown, which usually adds to government strength and authority at home. The Crown seemed then to have obtained some of the most splendid objects of state ambition. None of the continental powers of Europe were the enemies of France. They were all either tacitly disposed to her, or publicly connected with her. And in those who kept the most aloof, there was little appearance of jealousy; there was no appearance of animosity at all. She had humbled the British nation, her great preponderating rival. To all appearance, she had weakened it; certainly she had endangered it by cutting off a very large, and by far the most growing part of her empire. In this *acme* of human prosperity and greatness, in the high and palmy state of the monarchy of France, it fell to the ground without a struggle. It fell without any of those vices in the monarch which have sometimes been the causes of the fall of kingdoms. But these existed in the highest degree in many other princes, without any visible effect on the state; and far from destroying their power, it had only left some slight stains on their character. The financial difficulties were only *pretexts* and *instruments* of those who accomplished the ruin of that monarchy. They were not the *causes* of it.

Deprived of the old government, in a manner deprived of *all* government, France, though fallen as a monarchy, might have appeared to common speculators more likely to be an object of pity or insult (according to the disposition of the surrounding powers), than to be

the scourge and terror of them all. But out of the tomb of the murdered monarchy in France, has arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre, in a far more terrific guise than any which has ever yet overpowered the imagination and subdued the fortitude of man. Going straight forward to its end, unappalled by peril, unchecked by remorse, despising all common maxims and all common means, that hideous phantom overpowered those who could not believe it was possible she could exist at all— except on the principles which *habit* rather than *nature* had persuaded them were necessary to their own particular welfare, and to their own ordinary modes of action. But the constitution of any *political* being, as well as that of any *physical* being, ought to be known before one can venture to say what is fit for its conservation, or what is the proper means of its power. The poison of other states is the food of the new republic. That bankruptcy, the very apprehension of which is one of the causes assigned for the fall of the monarchy, was the capital on which she opened her traffic with the world.

LABOUR AND WAGES.

In the case of the farmer and the labourer, their interests are always the same; and it is absolutely impossible that their free contracts can be onerous to either party. It is the interest of the farmer, that his work should be done with effect and speed. And that cannot be, unless the labourer is well fed, and otherwise found with such necessaries of animal life, according to his habitudes, as may keep the body in full force, and the mind gay and cheerful. For of all the *instruments* of his trade, the labour of man (what the ancient writers have called the *instrumentum vocale*) is that on which he is most to rely for the repayment of his capital. The other two, the *semivocale* in the ancient classification (that is, the working stock of cattle), and the *instrumentum mutum* (such as carts, ploughs, spades, and so forth), though not all inconsiderable in themselves, are very much inferior in utility or in expense; and without a given portion of the first (the farmer), they are nothing at all. For in all things whatsoever, the *mind* is the most valuable and the most important. And in this scale, the whole of agriculture is in a natural and just order: the beast is like an informing principle to the plough and cart; the labourer is like reason to the beast; and the *farmer* is like a thinking and presiding principle to the labourer. An attempt to break this chain of subordination in any part is equally absurd. But the absurdity is most mischievous in practical operation, where it is the easiest — that is, where it is most subject to an erroneous judgment.

It is plainly more the farmer's interest that his men should thrive, than that his horses should be well-fed, sleek, plump, and fit for use, or that his wagons and ploughs be strong, in good repair, and fit for service.

On the other hand, if the farmer ceases to profit from the labourer, and if his capital is not continually manured and fructified, it is impossible for him to continue that abundant nutriment, clothing, and lodging, which are proper for the protection of the *instruments* he employs.

It is therefore the first and fundamental interest of the labourer, that the farmer should have a full incoming profit on the product of his labour. This proposition is self-evident, and nothing but the malignity, perverseness, and ill-governed passions of mankind, and

particularly the envy they bear toward each other's prosperity, could prevent their seeing and acknowledging it, with thankfulness to the benign and wise Disposer of all things. He is the one who obliges men, whether they will or not, in pursuing their own selfish interests, to connect the general good with their own individual success.

But who are to judge what that profit and advantage ought to be? Certainly no authority on earth. It is a matter of convention dictated by the reciprocal conveniences of the parties, and indeed by their reciprocal necessities.

But what if the farmer is excessively avaricious? — why so much the better — the more he desires to increase his gains, the more interested he is in the good condition of those upon whose labour his gains must principally depend.

I will be told by the zealots of the sect of regulation, that this may be true, and may be safely committed to the convention of the farmer and the labourer, when the latter is in the prime of his youth, and at the time of his health and vigour, and in ordinary times of abundance. But what is to be done in calamitous seasons, under accidental illness, in declining life, and with the pressure of numerous offspring? These *future* nourishers of the community, are but the present drains and blood-suckers of those who produce them. When a man cannot live and maintain his family by the natural hire of his labour, should it not be raised by authority?

On this head I must be allowed to submit what my opinions have ever been; and somewhat at large. And first, I premise that labour is, as I have already intimated, a commodity; and, as such, it is an article of trade.^{1Tim 5.18} If I am right in this notion, then labour must be subject to all the laws and principles of trade — not to regulation that is foreign to them, or may be totally inconsistent with those principles and those laws. When any commodity is carried to market, it is not the necessity of the *vender*, but the necessity of the *purchaser*, that raises the price. The extreme want of the seller has rather (by the nature of things with which we will contend in vain) the direct contrary operation. If the goods at market are above the demand, they fall in their value; if below it, they rise. The impossibility of the subsistence of a man who carries his labour to a market, is totally beside the question in his way of viewing it. The only question is, *what is it worth to the buyer?*

But if the authority comes in and *forces* the buyer to a price, who is this authority in the case (say) of a farmer who buys the labour of ten or twelve labouring men, and three or four handicrafts? What is it, but to make an arbitrary division of his property among them?

The whole of his gains — I say this with the most certain conviction — never amount anything in value like what he pays to his labourers and artificers. So that a very small advance upon what *one* man pays to *many*, may absorb the whole of what he possesses, and amount to an actual partition of all his substance among them. A perfect equality will indeed be produced — that is to say, equal want, equal wretchedness, equal beggary, and on the part of the petitioners, a woeful, helpless, and desperate disappointment. Such is the event of all compulsory equalizations. They pull down what is above. They never raise what is below. And they depress high and low together, *beneath* the level of what was originally the lowest.

If a commodity is raised by authority above what it will yield with a profit to the buyer, that commodity will be less dealt in.¹⁴⁹ If a second blundering interposition is used to correct the blunder of the first, and an attempt is made to force the *purchase* of the commodity (of labour for instance), one of these two things must happen: either that the forced buyer is ruined, or the price of the product of the labour, is raised in that proportion,. Then the wheel turns round, and the evil complained of falls with aggravated weight on the complainant. The price of corn, which is the result of the expense of all the operations of husbandry taken together, and continued for some time, will rise on the labourer, considered as a consumer. The very best will be that he remains where he was. But if the price of the corn should not compensate the price of labour, what is far more to be feared, the most serious evil, the very destruction of agriculture itself, is to be apprehended.

Nothing is such an enemy to accuracy of judgment, as a *coarse discrimination*: a lack of such classification and distribution as the subject will allow. The regulators say, “increase the rate of wages to the labourer” — as if labour was but one thing, and of one value. But this very broad, generic term, *labour*, allows for at least two or three specific descriptions. And these will suffice to at least let gentlemen discern a little, the necessity of proceeding with caution in their coercive guidance of those whose existence depends on the observance of still nicer distinctions and subdivisions than they commonly resort to, in forming their judgments on this very enlarged part of economy.

The labourers in husbandry may be divided into:

1st. Those who are able to perform the full work of a man — that is, perform what can be done by a person from twenty-one to fifty years of age. I know no husbandry-work (mowing is hardly excepted) that is not equally within the power of all persons within those ages. The more advanced fully compensate by knack and habit, what they lose in activity. Unquestionably, there is a good deal of difference between the value of one man’s labour and that of another, from strength, dexterity, and honest application. But I am quite sure, from my best observation, that any given five men will, in total, afford a proportion of labour equal to any other five within the periods of life that I have stated. That is, among such five men there will be one possessing all the qualifications of a good workman, one bad, and the other three middling, and thus approximating to the first and the last. So that, even in so small a platoon as five, you will find the full complement of all that five men *can* earn. Taking five and five throughout the kingdom, they are equal. Therefore, an error cannot be considerable with regard to the equalization of their wages by those who employ five, as farmers do at the very least.

2nd. Those who are able to work, but not the complete task of a day-labourer. This class is infinitely diversified, but it will fall aptly enough into principal divisions:

- *men*, from the decline which after fifty becomes more sensible every year, to the period of debility and decrepitude, and the maladies that precede a final dissolution.

¹⁴⁹ That is, higher prices cause reduced demand, which results in lower production, and thus reduced availability to the consumer. The commodity, even labor, is priced out of the marketplace, or “what the market will bear.” – WHG

- *women*, whose employment on husbandry is but occasional, and who differ more in effective labour one from another than men do, on account of gestation, nursing, and domestic management; this is over and above the difference they have in common with men in advancing, in stationary, and in declining life.
- *children*, who proceed in the reverse order, growing from less to greater utility, but with a still greater disproportion of nutriment to labour than is found in the second of these subdivisions; this is visible to those who give themselves the trouble of examining into the interior economy of a Poor-House.

This inferior classification is introduced to show that laws prescribing, or magistrates exercising, a very stiff and often inapplicable rule, or a blind and rash discretion, can never provide just proportions between earning and salary on the one hand, and nutriment on the other. Whereas interest, habit, and the tacit convention that arise from a thousand nameless circumstances, produce a *tact* that regulates without difficulty, what laws and magistrates cannot regulate at all. The first class of labour lacks nothing to equalize it; it equalizes itself. The second and third are not capable of any equalization.

But what if the rate of hire for the labourer comes far short of his necessary subsistence, and the calamity of the time is so great as to threaten actual famine? Is the poor labourer to be abandoned to the flinty heart and griping hand of base self-interest, supported by the sword of law, especially when there is reason to suppose that the very avarice of farmers themselves has concurred with the errors of government, to bring famine on the land? ¹⁵⁰

A COMPLETE REVOLUTION.

Before this revolution in France, the annals of all time have not furnished an instance of a *complete* revolution. That Revolution seems to have extended even to the constitution of the mind of man. What is wonderful in it, is that it resembles what Lord Verulam ¹⁵¹ says of the operations of nature. It was *perfect* —not only in its elements and principles, but in all its members and its organs — from the very beginning. The moral scheme of France furnishes the only pattern ever known, which those who admire will *instantly* resemble. It is indeed an inexhaustible repertory of one kind of examples. In my wretched condition, though hardly to be classed with the living, I am not safe from them. They have tigers to fall upon animated strength. They have hyaenas to prey upon carcasses. The national menagerie is collected by the first physiologists of the time; and it is defective in no description of savage nature. They pursue even such as me, into the obscurest retreats, and haul them before their revolutionary tribunals. Neither sex, nor age, nor the sanctuary of the tomb, is sacred to

¹⁵⁰ Burke went on to give an answer (this letter is to the Right Hon. William Pitt, Nov 1795, Paymaster General):

“In that case, my opinion is this: Whenever it happens that a man can claim nothing according to the rules of commerce and the principles of justice, he passes out of that department, and comes within the jurisdiction of mercy. In that province, the magistrate has nothing at all to do; his interference is a violation of the property which it is his office to protect. Without all doubt, charity to the poor is a direct and obligatory duty upon all Christians, next in order after the payment of debts, fully as strong, and by Nature made infinitely more delightful to us... But the manner, mode, time, choice of objects, and proportion are left to private discretion... It is performed with greater satisfaction, because the discharge of it has more the appearance of freedom.” – WHG

¹⁵¹ Lord Verulam is better known as Francis Bacon (1561-1626). – WHG

them. They have so determined a hatred toward all privileged orders, that they deny even to the departed, the sad immunities of the grave. They are not wholly without an object. Their turpitude purveys to their malice; and they unplumb the dead for bullets to assassinate the living. If all revolutionists were not proof against all caution, I would recommend for their consideration, that no persons were ever known in history, either sacred or profane, to vex the sepulchre, and by their sorceries, to call up the prophetic dead with any other event than the prediction of their own disastrous fate. — “Leave me, oh leave me to repose!”¹⁵²

BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.

The British government in India, being a subordinate and delegated power, it ought to be considered as a fundamental principle in such a system, that it is to be preserved in the strictest obedience to the government at home. Administration in India, at an immense distance from the seat of the supreme authority; entrusted with the most extensive powers; liable to the greatest temptations; possessing the amplest means of abuse; ruling over a people guarded by no distinct or well-ascertained privileges, whose language, manners, and radical prejudices render not only redress, but all complaint on their part, a matter of extreme difficulty; such an administration, it is evident, can never be made subservient to the interests of Great Britain, nor even made tolerable to the natives, but by the strictest rigour in exacting obedience to the commands of the authority lawfully set over it.

MONEY AND SCIENCE.

My exertions, whatever they have been, were such as no hopes of pecuniary *reward* could possibly excite; and no pecuniary *compensation* can possibly reward them. Between money and such services, if done by abler men than I am, there is no common principle of comparison: they are incommensurable quantities. Money is made for the comfort and convenience of animal life. It cannot be a reward for what mere animal life must indeed *sustain*, but can never *inspire*. With submission to his Grace,¹⁵³ I have not had more than sufficient. As to any noble use, I trust I know how to employ, as well as he, a much greater fortune than he possesses. In a more confined application, I certainly stand in need of every kind of relief and easement much more than he does. When I say, I have not received more than I deserve, is this the language I hold to majesty? No! Far, very far from it! Before that presence, I claim no merit at all. Everything towards me is *favour*, and *bounty* — style one to a gracious benefactor; another to a proud and insulting foe.

His Grace is pleased to aggravate my guilt by charging my acceptance of his majesty’s grant as a departure from my ideas, and the spirit of my conduct with regard to economy. If it is, my ideas of economy were false and ill-founded. But they are the Duke of Bedford’s ideas of economy that I have contradicted, and not my own. If he means to allude to certain bills brought in by me on a message from the throne in 1782, I tell him that there is nothing in my conduct that can contradict either the letter or the spirit of those acts. Does he mean the Pay-office Act? I take it for granted he does not. The act to which he alludes is, I suppose,

¹⁵² Thomas Gray, from *The Descent of Odin, an Ode*, line 50, (1689)

¹⁵³ Taken from Burke’s 1796 letter to “A Noble Lord” regarding attacks against him by the Duke of Bedford. — WHG

the Establishment Act. I greatly doubt whether his Grace has ever read the one or the other. The first of these systems cost me incredible pains with every assistance which my then situation gave me. I found an opinion common through all the offices, and general in the public at large, that it would prove impossible to reform and methodize the office of Paymaster-General. I undertook it, however, and I succeeded in my undertaking. Whether the military service, or the general economy of our finances have profited by that act, I leave to those who are acquainted with the army and with the treasury to judge.

TWELVE POLITICAL AXIOMS.

1. Of all things, an indiscreet tampering with the trade of provisions is the most dangerous, and it is always worst in the time when men are most disposed to it: that is, in the time of scarcity. This is because there is nothing on which the passions of men are so violent, and their judgment so weak, and on which there exists such a multitude of ill-founded popular prejudices.

2. The great use of government is as a *restraint*; and there is no restraint which it ought to put upon others, and upon itself too, than that which is imposed on the fury of speculating under circumstances of irritation. The number of idle tales spread about by the industry of faction, and by the zeal of foolish good-intention, and greedily devoured by the malignant credulity of mankind, tends to infinitely aggravate prejudices which, in themselves, are more than sufficiently strong. In that state of affairs, and of the public with relation to them, the first thing that government owes to us, the people, is *information*; the next is timely coercion: — the one to guide our judgment; the other to regulate our tempers.

3. To provide for us in our necessities is not in the power of government. It would be a vain presumption in statesmen to think they can do it. The *people* maintain them, and not *they* the people. It is in the power of government to *prevent much evil*; it can do very little *positive good* in this, or perhaps in anything else. It is not only so of the state and statesmen, but of all the classes and descriptions of the rich — they are the pensioners of the poor, and are maintained by their superfluity. They are under an absolute, hereditary, and indefeasible dependence on those who labour, and are miscalled *the poor*.

4. The labouring people are only poor because they are numerous. Numbers in their nature imply poverty. In a fair distribution among a vast multitude, none can have much. That class of dependent pensioners called *the rich* is so extremely small, that if all their throats were cut, and a distribution made of all they consume in a year, it would not give a bit of bread and cheese for one night's supper to those who labour, and who in reality feed both the pensioners and themselves.

5. But the throats of the rich ought not to be cut, nor their magazines plundered; because in their persons they are trustees for those who labour, and their hoards are the banking-houses of these latter. Whether they mean it or not, they do, in effect, execute their trust — some with more, some with less fidelity and judgment. But on the whole, the duty is performed, and everything returns, deducting some very trifling commission and discount, to the place from whence it arose. When the poor rise to destroy the rich, they act as wisely for their own purposes as when they burn mills and throw corn into the river to make bread cheap.

6. When I say, that we ought to be informed of the people, I say inclusively that we should not be flattered; flattery is the reverse of instruction. The *poor* in that case would be rendered as improvident as the rich, which would not be at all good for them.

7. Nothing can be so base and so wicked as the political canting language, “The labouring *poor*.” Let compassion be shown in *action* (the more the better) according to every man’s ability; but let there be no lamentation of their condition. It is no relief to their miserable circumstances; it is only an insult to their miserable understandings. It arises from a total lack of charity, or a total lack of thought. Want of one kind was never relieved by want of any other kind. Patience, labour, sobriety, frugality, and religion should be recommended to them; all the rest is downright *fraud*. It is horrible to call them “The *once happy* labourer.”

8. Whether what may be called the moral or philosophical happiness of the laborious classes is increased or not, I cannot say. The seat of that species of happiness is in the mind; and there are few data to ascertain the comparative state of the mind at any two periods. Philosophical happiness is to want little. Civil or vulgar happiness is to want much, and to enjoy much.

9. If the happiness of the *animal* man (which certainly goes somewhere towards the happiness of the *rational* man) is the object of our estimate, then I assert without the least hesitation, that the condition of those who labour (in all descriptions of labour, and in all gradations of labour, from the highest to the lowest inclusively) is on the whole extremely meliorated, if more and better food is any standard of melioration. They work more, it is certain, but they have the advantage of their augmented labour. Yet, whether that increase of labour is on the whole a *good* or an *evil*, is a consideration that would lead us a great way, and it is not for my present purpose. But as to the fact of the melioration of their diet, I will enter into the detail of proof whenever I am called upon. In the mean time, the known difficulty of contenting them with anything but bread made of the finest flour, and meat of the first quality, is sufficient proof.

10. I further assert that even under all the hardships of the last year, the labouring people, either out of their direct gains or from charity (which it seems is now an insult to them), in fact, fared better than they did in seasons of common plenty, fifty or sixty years ago; or even at the period of my English observation, which is about forty-four years. I even assert that full as many in that class as were ever known to do it before, *continued* to save money. And this I can prove so far as my own information and experience extend.

11. It is not true that the rate of wages has not increased with the nominal price of provisions. I allow it has not fluctuated with that price, nor should it; and the squires of Norfolk had dined when they gave it as their opinion, that it might or ought to rise and fall with the market of provisions. The rate of wages in truth has no *direct* relation to that price. Labour is a commodity like every other, and it rises or falls according to the demand. This is in the nature of things. However, the nature of things has provided for their necessities. Wages have been raised twice in my time: and they bear a full proportion or even a greater proportion than formerly, to the *medium* of provision during the last bad cycle of twenty years. They bear a full proportion to the result of their labour. If we were to wildly attempt to force them beyond it, the stone which we had forced up the hill would only fall back upon

them in a diminished demand, or in what indeed is the far lesser evil, an aggravated price of all the provisions which are the result of their manual toil.

12. There is an *implied contract*, which is much stronger than any instrument or article of agreement between the labourer in any occupation, and his employer — that the labour, so far as that labour is concerned, will be sufficient to pay to the employer a profit on his capital, and a compensation for his risk. In a word, an implied contract that the labour will produce an advantage equal to the payment. Whatever is above that, is a direct *tax*; and if the amount of that tax is left to the will and pleasure of another, it is an *arbitrary tax*.

DISAPPOINTED AMBITION.

The true cause of his drawing so shocking a picture is no more than this, and it ought to claim our pity rather than excite our indignation — he finds himself out of power; and this condition is intolerable to him. The same sun which gilds all nature, and exhilarates the whole creation, does not shine upon disappointed ambition. It is something that rays out of darkness, and inspires nothing but gloom and melancholy. Men in this deplorable state of mind find a comfort in spreading the contagion of their spleen (quick temper). They find an advantage too; for it is a general popular error to imagine the loudest complainers for the public are the most anxious for its welfare. If such persons can answer the *ends* of relief and profit to themselves, they are apt to be careless enough about either the *means* or the *consequences*.

DIFFICULTY IS AN INSTRUCTOR.

Their purpose everywhere seems to have been to evade and slip aside from *difficulty*. It has been the glory of the great masters in all the arts to confront and to overcome this. And when they had overcome the first difficulty, to turn it into an instrument for new conquests over new difficulties. Thus they are enabled to extend the empire of their science, and even to push forward the landmarks of the human understanding itself, beyond the reach of their original thoughts. Difficulty is a severe instructor, set over us by the supreme ordinance of a parental Guardian and Legislator, who knows us better than we know ourselves, as he loves us better too. *Pater ipse colendi haud facilem esse viam voluit.* (The Father himself wanted the path of worship not to be easy). He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper. This amicable conflict with difficulty obliges us to an intimate acquaintance with our object, and it compels us to consider it in all its relations. It will not suffer us to be superficial. It is the want of nerves of understanding for such a task — it is the degenerate fondness for taking short-cuts, and for little fallacious facilities, that in so many parts of the world has created governments with arbitrary powers. They have created the recent arbitrary monarchy of France; they have created the arbitrary republic of Paris. With them, defects in *wisdom* are to be supplied by the plenitude of *force*. They get nothing by it. Commencing their labours on a principle of sloth, they have the common fortune of slothful men. The difficulties which they had eluded rather than escaped, meet them again in their course; they multiply and thicken on them. They are involved, through a labyrinth of confused detail, in an industry without limit and without direction; and in conclusion, the whole of their work becomes feeble, vicious, and insecure.

It is this inability to wrestle with difficulty which has obliged the arbitrary Assembly of France to commence their schemes of reform with abolition and total destruction. But is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed? Your mob can do this at least as well as your assemblies. The shallowest understanding, the rudest hand, is more than equal to that task. Rage and frenzy will pull down more in half an hour, than prudence, deliberation, and foresight can build up in a hundred years. The errors and defects of old establishments are visible and palpable. It calls for little ability to point them out; and where absolute power is given, it requires but a word to wholly abolish the vice and the establishment together. The same lazy but restless disposition which loves sloth and hates quiet, directs these politicians when they come to work for supplying the place of what they have destroyed. To make everything the reverse of what they have seen, is quite as easy as to destroy. No difficulties occur in what has never been tried. Criticism is almost baffled in discovering the defects of what has not existed. And eager enthusiasm and cheating hope have all the wide field of imagination in which they may expatiate with little or no opposition.

SOVEREIGN JURISDICTIONS.

With regard to the sovereign jurisdictions, I must observe, Sir, that whoever takes a view of this kingdom in a cursory manner will imagine that he beholds a solid, compacted, uniform system of monarchy in which all inferior jurisdictions are but as rays diverging from one centre. But on examining it more nearly, you find much eccentricity and confusion. It is not strictly a monarchy. But as in the Saxon times this country was an heptarchy, it is now a strange sort of *pentarchy*. It is divided into five several and distinct principalities, besides the supreme one. There is indeed this difference from the Saxon times: that as in the itinerant exhibitions of the stage, for lack of a complete company, they are obliged to throw a variety of parts on their chief performer, so too our sovereign condescends to act not only the principal, but all the subordinate parts in the play. He condescends to dissipate the royal character, and to trifle with those light, subordinate, lacquered sceptres in those hands that sustain the ball representing the world, or which wield the trident that commands the ocean. Cross a brook, and you lose the king of England. But you have some comfort in coming again under his majesty, though “shorn of his beams” and no more than prince of Wales. Go to the north and you find him dwindled to a Duke of Lancaster. Turn to the west of that north, and he pops upon you in the humble character of earl of Chester. Travel a few miles on, the earl of Chester disappears and the king surprises you again as count palatine of Lancaster. If you travel beyond Mount Edgecombe, you find him once more incognito, and he is Duke of Cornwall. So that, quite fatigued and satiated with this dull variety, you are infinitely refreshed when you return to the sphere of his proper splendour, and behold your amiable sovereign in his true, simple, undisguised, native character of majesty.

PRUDERY OF FALSE REFORM.

Everyone must remember that the cabal set out with the most astonishing prudery, both moral and political. Those who a few months after, soused over head and ears into the deepest and dirtiest pits of corruption, cried out violently against the indirect practices in the electing and managing of parliaments, which had formerly prevailed. This marvellous

abhorrence which the court had suddenly taken to all influence, was not only circulated in conversation through the kingdom, but pompously announced to the public, along with many other extraordinary things, in a pamphlet which had all the appearance of a manifesto preparatory to some considerable enterprise. Throughout it was a satire on the politics of the former reign. Though in terms that were managed and decent enough, it was indeed written with no small art and address.

In this piece appeared the first dawning of the new system. There first appeared the idea (then only in speculation) of *separating the court from the administration*; of carrying everything from *national* connection, to *personal* regards; and of forming a regular party for that purpose under the name of *King's Men*.¹⁵⁴

To recommend this system to the people, a perspective view of the court was exhibited to the gaping multitude — gorgeously painted and finely illuminated from within. *Party* was to be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to be cast down from court, as *Ate* was from heaven.¹⁵⁵ Power was thereafter to be the chosen residence of *public spirit*; and no one was assumed to be under any sinister influence, except those who had the misfortune of being in disgrace at court. This was to stand in lieu of all vices and all corruptions. It was a scheme of perfection, to be realized in a monarchy far beyond the visionary republic of Plato. The whole scenery was exactly disposed to captivate those good souls whose credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure to crafty politicians. Indeed, there was a means to charm everybody, except those few who are not much pleased with professions of supernatural virtue — who know what stuff such professions are made of, for what purposes they are designed, and in what they are sure constantly to end. Many innocent gentlemen who had been talking prose all their lives without knowing anything of the matter, began at last to open their eyes upon their own merits, and to attribute their not having been *lords of the treasury* and *lords of trade* many years before, merely to the prevalence of party, and to the ministerial power which had frustrated the good intentions of the court in favour of their abilities. Now was the time to unlock the sealed fountain of royal bounty which had been infamously monopolized and huckstered, and to let it flow at large upon the whole people. The time had come to restore royalty to its original splendour.

EXAGGERATION.

If a few puny libellers — acting under a knot of factious politicians without virtue, parts,¹⁵⁶ or character (they are constantly represented as such by these gentlemen) — are sufficient to excite this disturbance, then the disposition must be very perverse of that people among whom such a disturbance can be excited by such means. It is, besides, no small aggravation of the public misfortune, that on this hypothesis, the disease appears to be without remedy. If the wealth of the nation is the cause of its turbulence, I imagine it is not proposed to

¹⁵⁴ The *King's Men* was an English theatre company, known by that name after it came under royal patronage in 1603. Its previous name was the *Lord Chamberlain's Men*. — *Ency. Brit.* I suspect that Burke's use of *King's Men* drips with sarcasm; it is a term of contempt for this cartoonish but dangerous cabal. — WHG

¹⁵⁵ *Ate*: the Greek goddess of criminal rashness and its punishment. — WHG

¹⁵⁶ *Parts*: Intellectual ability or learning, as in "a man of parts." — WHG

introduce poverty as a constable to keep the peace. If our dominions abroad are the roots which feed all this rank luxuriance of sedition, it is not intended to cut them off in order to famish the fruit. If our liberty has enfeebled the executive power, I hope there is no design to call in the aid of despotism to fill up the deficiencies of law. Whatever may be intended, these things are not yet professed. We therefore seem to be driven to absolute despair; for we have no other materials to work upon but those out of which God has been pleased to form the inhabitants of this island. If these are radically and essentially vicious, all that can be said is that those men are very unhappy, to whose fortune or duty it falls to administer the affairs of this untoward people. I hear it indeed sometimes asserted that a steady perseverance in the present measures, and a rigorous punishment of those who oppose them, will in course of time infallibly put an end to these disorders. But in my opinion, this is said without much observation of our present disposition, and without any knowledge at all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of which this nation is composed is so very fermentable as these gentlemen describe it, leaven will never be lacking to work it up, as long as discontent, revenge, and ambition have existence in the world. Particular punishments are the cure for *incidental distempers* in the state; but they inflame rather than allay those heats which arise from the *settled mismanagement* of the government, or from a natural indisposition in the people. It is of the utmost moment not to make mistakes in the use of strong measures — and then, firmness is only a virtue when it accompanies the most perfect wisdom. In truth, inconstancy is a sort of natural corrective of folly and ignorance.¹⁵⁷

TACTICS OF CABAL.

It is a law of nature, that whoever is necessary to what we have made our object, is sure to become our master in some way, or in some time or other. However, all this is submitted to in order to avoid that monstrous evil of governing in concurrence with the opinion of the people. For it seems to be laid down as a maxim, that a king has some sort of interest in giving uneasiness to his subjects: that all who are pleasing to *them*, are of course to be disagreeable to *him*; that as soon as the persons who are odious at court are known to be odious to the people, it is snatched at as a lucky occasion to shower down on them all kinds of emoluments and honours. None are considered well-wishers to the crown, but those who advised him to some unpopular course of action; none are capable of serving the crown, but those who are obliged to call at every instant upon all its power for the safety of their lives. None are supposed to be fit priests in the temple of government, but the persons who are compelled to fly into it for sanctuary. Such is the effect of this refined project; such is ever the result of all the contrivances which are used to free men from the servitude of their reason, and from the necessity of ordering their affairs according to their evident interests. These contrivances oblige them to run into a real and ruinous servitude, in order to avoid a supposed restraint that might be attended with advantage.

¹⁵⁷ *Inconstancy*: a state in which things are likely to change frequently, without apparent or cogent reason. That is, when the government acts with folly or ignorance, it is palatable to the people if it is temporary and exceptional. — WHG

GOVERNMENT IS RELATIVE, NOT ABSOLUTE.

I never govern myself — no rational man ever did govern himself — by abstractions and universals. I do not put abstract ideas wholly out of question, because I well know that under that name, I would dismiss *principles*; and that without the guide and light of sound, well-understood principles, all reasonings in politics, as in everything else, would be only a confused jumble of particular facts and details, without the means of drawing out any sort of theoretical or practical conclusion. A statesman differs from a professor in an university. The professor has only the *general view* of society; the statesmen has a number of *circumstances* to combine with those general ideas, and to take into consideration. Circumstances are infinite; they are infinitely combined; they are variable and transient. Whoever does not take them into consideration is not erroneous, but stark mad — *dat operam ut cum ratione insaniat* (he is trying to be mad with logic) — he is *metaphysically* mad. A statesman, never losing sight of *principles*, is to be guided by *circumstances*; and by judging contrary to the exigencies of the moment, he may ruin his country forever.

I go on this ground, that government represents the society. It has a general superintending control over all the actions, and over all the publicly propagated doctrines of men. Without this, it could never adequately provide for all the wants of society; but then it is to use this power with an equitable discretion, which is the only bond of sovereign authority. For it is not, perhaps, so much by the assumption of *unlawful* powers, as by the unwise or unwarrantable use of those powers which are most *legal*, that governments oppose their true end and object. For there is such a thing as *tyranny*, as well as *usurpation*. You can hardly state to me a case to which legislature is the most confessedly competent, a case in which, if the rules of benignity and prudence are not observed, the most mischievous and oppressive things may not be done. So that, after all, it is a moral and virtuous discretion, and not any abstract theory of right, which keeps governments faithful to their ends. Crude, unconnected truths are in the world of *practice*, what falsehoods are in *theory*.

A reasonable, prudent, provident, and moderate coercion may be a means of preventing acts of extreme ferocity and rigour. For by propagating excessive and extravagant doctrines, such extravagant disorders take place as require the most perilous and fierce corrections to oppose them. It is not morally true that we are bound to establish in every country that form of religion which in *our* minds is most agreeable to truth, and conduces most to the eternal happiness of mankind. In the same manner, it is not true that, against the conviction of our own judgment, we are to establish a system of opinions and practises directly contrary to those ends, only because some majority of the people may prefer it, as told by the head. No conscientious man would willingly establish what he knew to be false and mischievous in religion, or in anything else. No wise man, on the contrary, would tyrannically set up his own sense so as to reprobate that of the great prevailing body of the community, and pay no regard to the established opinions and prejudices of mankind, or refuse them the means of securing a religious instruction suitable to these prejudices. A great deal depends on the state in which you find men.

GENERAL VIEWS.

The foundations on which obedience to governments is founded, are not to be constantly discussed. That we are here, supposes the discussion is already made and the dispute settled. We must assume that what represents the public, has the rights to control the individual, to make his will and his acts submit to their will, until some intolerable grievance makes us know that it does not answer its end, and it will submit neither to reformation nor restraint. Otherwise we should dispute all the points of morality before we can punish a murderer, robber, and adulterer; we should analyze all of society. By being despised, dangers grow great; and they do so by absurd provision against them. *Stulti est dixisse non putaram* (I didn't think it was a stupid thing to say). Whether an early discovery of evil designs, an early declaration, and an early precaution against them, are wiser than to stifle all inquiry about them for fear they might declare themselves earlier than they otherwise would, and therefore precipitate the evil — all of this depends on the *reality* of the danger. Is it only an unbookish jealousy, as Shakespeare calls it? ¹⁵⁸ It is a question of fact. Does a design against the constitution of this country exist?

If it does; and if it is carried on with increasing vigour and activity by a restless faction; and if it receives countenance by the most ardent and enthusiastic applauses of its object — in the great council of this kingdom, by men of the first parts which this kingdom produces, perhaps by the first it has ever produced — can I think that there is no danger? If there is danger, must there be no precaution at all against it? If you ask whether I think the danger is urgent and immediate, I answer, thank God, I do not. The body of the people is yet sound, the constitution is in their *hearts*, while wicked men are endeavouring to put another into their *heads*. But if I see the very same *beginnings* which have commonly ended in great calamities, I ought to act as if they might produce the very same *effects*. Early and provident fear is the mother of safety; because in that state of things the mind is firm and collected, and the judgment is unembarrassed. But when the fear, and the *evil* feared, come on together, and press at once upon us, deliberation itself is ruinous, which saves upon all other occasions. This is because, when perils are instant, it delays decision. The man is in a flutter, and in a hurry, and his judgment is gone, just as the judgment of the deposed king of France and his ministers was gone, if his ministers did not premeditatedly betray him. He had just come from his usual amusement of hunting, when the head of the column of treason and assassination arrived at his house. Let not the king, let not the prince of Wales, be surprised in this manner. Let not both houses of parliament be led in triumph along with him, and have law dictated to them by the constitutional, the revolutionary, and the Unitarian societies. While these insect reptiles go on only caballing and toasting, they only fill us with disgust. But if they get above their natural size, and increase the quantity while they keep the quality of their venom, they become objects of the greatest terror. A spider in his natural size is only a spider, ugly and loathsome; and his flimsy net is fit only for catching flies. But good God! imagine a spider as large as an ox, and that he spread cables about us— all the wilds of Africa would not produce anything so dreadful:

¹⁵⁸ William Shakespeare, *Othello*, Act 4,1, line 120. – WHG

“No savage more portentous stain’d
Apulia’s spacious wilds with gore;
None fiercer Juba’s thirsty land,
Dire nurse of raging lions, bore.”¹⁵⁹

Think of them, those who dare menace the way they do in their present state. What would they do if they had power commensurate to their malice? God forbid I should ever have a despotic master; but if I must, my choice is made. I will rather have Louis XVI than Monsieur Bailly, or Brissot, or Chabot; rather George III, or George IV, than Dr. Priestley or Dr. Kippis — persons who would not load a tyrannous power by the poisoned taunts of a vulgar, low-bred insolence. I hope we still have spirit enough to keep us from the one or the other. The insults of tyranny are the worst parts of it.

MAGNITUDE IN BUILDING.

Greatness of dimension seems requisite to the sublime in building; for on a few parts, and those small, the imagination cannot rise to any idea of infinity. No greatness in the manner can effectually compensate for the lack of proper dimensions. There is no danger of drawing men into extravagant designs by this rule; it carries its own caution along with it. This is because too great a length in buildings will destroy the purpose of greatness which it was intended to promote. The perspective will lessen it in height as it gains in length, and will bring it at last to a point. This turns the whole figure into a sort of triangle, the poorest in its effect of almost any figure that can be presented to the eye. I have ever observed that colonnades and avenues of trees of a moderate length were, without comparison, far grander than when they were suffered to run to immense distances. A true artist should put a generous deceit on the spectators, and effect the noblest designs by easy methods. Designs that are vast only by their dimensions, are always the sign of a common and low imagination. No work of art can be great except as it deceives; to be otherwise is the prerogative only of nature. A good eye will fix the medium between an excessive length or height, and a short or broken quantity (for the same objection lies against both). And perhaps it might be ascertained to a tolerable degree of exactness, if it was my purpose to descend far into the particulars of any art.

SOCIETY AND SOLITUDE.

The second branch of the social passions is that which administers to *society in general*. With regard to this, I observe that society, merely as society, without any particular heightenings, gives us no positive pleasure in the enjoyment. But absolute and entire *solitude* — that is, the total and perpetual exclusion from all society — is as great a positive pain as can almost be conceived. Therefore, in the balance between the pleasure of general *society*, and the pain of absolute solitude, *pain* is the predominant idea. But the pleasure of any particular social enjoyment very considerably outweighs the uneasiness caused by the

¹⁵⁹ “*Quale portentum neque militaris
Daunias in latis alit esculetis,
Nec Jubae tellus generat leonum
Arida nutrix.*” — Horace, *Carmina*, Book 1, Poem 22.

lack of that particular enjoyment; so that the strongest sensations relative to the habitudes of *particular society* are sensations of pleasure. Good company, lively conversations, and the endearments of friendship, fill the mind with great pleasure. A temporary solitude, on the other hand, is itself agreeable. This may perhaps prove that we are creatures designed for contemplation as well as action, since solitude as well as society has its pleasures. As from the former observation, we may discern that an entire life of solitude contradicts the purposes of our being, since death itself is scarcely an idea of more terror.

EAST-INDIA BILL AND COMPANY.

I therefore freely admit to the East-India their claim to exclude their fellow-subjects from the commerce of half the globe. I admit their claim to administer an annual territorial revenue of seven million sterling; to command an army of sixty thousand men; and to dispose of the lives and fortunes of thirty million of their fellow-creatures — under the control of a sovereign, imperial discretion, and with the due observance of the natural and local law. All this they possess by charter, and by acts of parliament, without a shadow of controversy (in my opinion).

Those who carry the rights and claims of the company the furthest, do not contend for more than this; and all this I freely grant. But granting all this, they must grant to me, in turn, that all political power which is set over men, and all privilege that is claimed or exercised in exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and so much a derogation from the natural quality of mankind at large, it should in some way or other be exercised ultimately for their benefit.

If this is true with regard to every species of political dominion, and every description of commercial privilege — none of which can be original, self-derived rights, or grants for the mere private benefit of the holders — then such rights, or privileges, or whatever else you choose to call them, are all in the strictest sense a *trust*. And it is of the very essence of every trust to be rendered *accountable*; and even to totally *cease* when it substantially varies from the purposes for which alone it could have a lawful existence.

This I conceive, Sir, to be true of trusts of power vested in the highest hands, and those which seem to apply to no human creature. But I do not see how a controversy can be maintained about the application of this principle to subordinate, *derivative* trusts. To whom then would I make the East-India Company accountable? Why, to parliament, to be sure; to parliament, from which their trust was derived; to parliament, which alone is capable of comprehending the magnitude of its object, and its abuse; and which alone is capable of an effectual legislative remedy. The very charter which is held out to exclude parliament from correcting misconduct with regard to the high trust vested in the company, is the very thing which at once gives a title and imposes on us a duty to interfere with effect, wherever power and authority originating from ourselves are perverted from their purposes, and become instruments of wrong and violence. If parliament, Sir, had nothing to do with this charter, we might have some sort of Epicurean excuse to stand aloof — indifferent spectators of what passes in the company's name in India and in London. But if we are the very *cause* of the evil, then we are in a special manner engaged to the redress. And for us to passively bear with oppressions committed under the sanction of our own authority, is in truth and reason for this house to be an active *accomplice* in the abuse.

It is very certain that the power, notoriously, grossly abused, has been bought from us. But this circumstance which is urged against the bill, becomes an additional motive for our interference, lest we be thought to have sold the blood of millions of men, for the base consideration of money. We sold, I admit, all that we had to sell — that is, our *authority*, not our *control*. We did not have a right to make a market of our duties.¹⁶⁰

I ground myself therefore on this principle — that if the abuse is proved, the contract is broken, and we re-enter into all our rights; that is, into the exercise of all our duties. Our own authority is indeed as much a trust *originally*, as the company's authority is a trust *derivatively*. And it is the use we make of the resumed power, that must justify or condemn us in the resumption of it. When we have perfected the plan laid before us by the right honourable mover, the world will then see what it is we destroy, and what it is we create. By that test we stand or fall; and by that test I trust that it will be found in the issue (results), that we are going to supersede a charter abused to the full extent of all the powers which it could abuse, and exercised in the plenitude of despotism, tyranny, and corruption; and that in one and the same plan, we provide a real chartered security for the *rights of men*, cruelly violated under that charter.

This bill, and those connected with it, are intended to form the magna charta of Hindostan. Whatever the treaty of Westphalia is to the liberty of the princes and free cities of the empire, and to the three religions professed there — whatever the great charter, the statute of tallage, the petition of right, and the declaration of right, are to Great Britain — *these* bills are to the people of India. I am certain their condition is capable of this benefit. And when I know that they are capable of more, my vote shall most assuredly be for our giving to the full extent of their capacity of receiving. And no charter of dominion shall stand as a bar in my way to their charter of safety and protection.

The strong admission I have made of the company's rights (I am conscious of it) binds me to do a great deal. I do not presume to condemn those who argue *a priori* against the propriety of leaving such extensive political powers in the hands of a company of merchants. I know much is said, and much more may be said *against* such a system. But with my particular ideas and sentiments, I cannot go that way to work. I feel an insuperable reluctance in giving my hand to destroy any established institution of government, upon a *theory*, however plausible it may be. My experience in life teaches me nothing clear upon the subject. I have known merchants with the sentiments and the abilities of great statesmen; and I have seen persons in the rank of statesmen, with the conceptions and characters of peddlers. Indeed, my observation has furnished me with nothing that is to be found in any habits of life or education, which tends to wholly disqualify men for the functions of government, except that by which the power of *exercising* those functions is very frequently obtained — I mean a spirit and habits of low cabal and intrigue. I have never, in one instance, seen these united with a capacity for sound and manly policy. To justify us taking the administration of their affairs out of the hands of the East-India Company, on my principles, I must see several conditions:

¹⁶⁰ That is, parliament has no right to sell their duties outright. *To delegate is not to abdicate*. The one delegated remains accountable to the one who delegates; the one is a steward to the other. — WHG

- 1st. The object affected by the abuse should be great and important.
- 2nd. The abuse affecting this great object ought to be a great abuse.
- 3rd. It ought to be habitual, and not incidental.
- 4th. It ought to be utterly incurable in the body as it now stands constituted.

All this ought to be made as visible to me as the light of the sun, before I would strike off an atom of their charter.

PARLIAMENTS AND ELECTIONS.

All are agreed that parliaments should not be perpetual. The only question is, *What is the most convenient time for their duration?* On which there are three opinions. We are agreed, too, that the term should not be chosen that is most likely in its operation to spread corruption, and to augment the already overgrown influence of the Crown. On these principles I mean to debate the question. It is easy to pretend a zeal for liberty. Those who think themselves not likely to be encumbered with the performance of their promises — either from their known inability, or their total indifference about the performance — never fail to entertain the loftiest ideas. They are certainly the most specious; and they cost them neither reflection to frame, nor pains to modify, nor management to support. The task is of another nature to those who mean to promise nothing that is not in their intention, or may possibly be in their power to perform — to those who are bound and principled to no more delude the understandings, than to violate the liberty of their fellow-subjects. We ought to be faithful watchmen over the rights and privileges of the people. But our duty, if we are qualified for it as we ought to be, is to give them information, and not to receive it from them. We are not to go to school with them, to learn the principles of law and government. In doing so, we would not dutifully serve, but we would basely and scandalously betray the people, who are not capable of this service by nature, nor in any instance are they called to it by the constitution.

I reverentially look up to the opinion of the people, and with an awe that is almost superstitious. I would be ashamed to show my face before them if I changed my ground, as they cried up or cried down men, or things, or opinions; if I wavered and shifted about with every change, and joined in it, or opposed it, as best answered any low interest or passion; if I held up hopes to them, which I knew I never intended; or promised what I well knew I could not perform. Of all these things, *they* are perfect sovereign judges, without appeal. But as to the detail of particular measures, or to any general schemes of policy, they have neither enough of private speculation, nor of experience in business, to decide upon it. They can well see whether we are tools of a court, or their honest servants. Of that they can well judge; and I wish, that they always exercised their judgment; but of the particular merits of a measure I have other standards.

I most readily admit that the frequency of elections proposed by this bill has a tendency to increase the power and consideration of the electors, but not lessen their corruptibility. So far it is *desirable*; this is what it *has*. I will tell you now what it does *not* have:

1st. It has no sort of tendency to increase their integrity and public spirit, unless an increase of power has an operation upon voters in elections, that it has in no other situation in the world, and upon no other part of mankind.

2nd. This bill has no tendency to limit the quantity of influence in the Crown, to render its operation more difficult, or to counteract that operation which it cannot prevent in any way whatsoever. It has its same full weight, full range, and uncontrolled operation on the electors, exactly as it had before.

3rd. Nor, thirdly, does it abate the interest or inclination of ministers to apply that influence to the electors. On the contrary, it renders it much more necessary for them (if they seek to have a majority in parliament) to increase the means of that influence, and to redouble their diligence, and to sharpen dexterity in the application.

The whole effect of the bill is therefore the removal of the application of some part of the influence from the *elected*, to the *electors*, and to further strengthen and extend a court interest already great and powerful in boroughs. Here it would fix their magazines and places of arms, and thus make them the principal, not the secondary theatre of their manoeuvres for securing a determined majority in parliament. I believe nobody will deny that the electors are corruptible. They are men; it is saying nothing worse about them. Many of them are but ill informed in their minds; many are feeble in their circumstances — easily over-reached, easily seduced. If they are many, the wages of corruption are lower. And would to God it were not a contemptible and hypocritical adulation, rather than a charitable sentiment, to say that there is already no debauchery, no corruption, no bribery, no perjury, no blind fury, no interested faction among the electors in many parts of this kingdom. Nor is it surprising, or at all blamable in that class of private men, when they see their neighbours aggrandised, and themselves poor and virtuous, without that *éclat* or dignity which attends men in higher situations.

But even if it were true that the great mass of the electors is too vast an object for court influence to grasp or extend to, and that they must abandon it in despair. Someone must be very ignorant of the state of every popular interest, who does not know that in all the corporations, all the open boroughs, indeed in every district of the kingdom, there is some leading man, some agitator, some wealthy merchant or considerable manufacturer, some active attorney, some popular preacher, some money-lender, etc., etc. who is followed by the whole flock. This is the style of all free countries.

"This man has great worth in the Fabian, in the Veline tribe;
he will give the fasces to anyone, and snatch the ivory from whom he pleases."¹⁶¹

These spirits, each of which informs and governs his own little orb, are neither so many, nor so little powerful, nor so incorruptible, but that a minister may, as he frequently does, find means of gaining them, and *through* them, all their followers. To establish, therefore, a very general influence among electors, will no more be found an impracticable project, than to gain an undue influence over members of parliament. Therefore I am apprehensive that this

¹⁶¹ "...multum in Fabia valet hic, valet ille Velina; Cuilibet hic fasces dabit eripietque curule." – Horace, *Epistles*, Book 1, poem 6. In ancient Rome, the fasces (or bundle of sticks) was a symbol of a magistrate's power. – WHG

bill, though it shifts the place of the disorder, it by no means relieves the constitution. I went through almost every contested election in the beginning of this parliament, and acted as a manager in very many of them. By this, though it was like a school of pretty severe and rugged discipline, I came to have some degree of instruction concerning the means by which parliamentary interests are in general procured and supported.

I know *theory* would suppose that every general election is a day of judgment for the representative, in which he appears before his constituents to account for the use of the talent with which they entrusted him, and for the improvement which he made of it for the public advantage. It would be so, if every corruptible *representative* were to find an enlightened and incorruptible *constituent*. But the practice and knowledge of the world will not permit us to be ignorant that the constitution on *paper* is one thing, and in *fact* and *experience* is another. We must know that the candidate, instead of trusting at his election to the testimony of his behaviour in parliament, he must bring the testimony of a large sum of money — the capacity of liberal expense in entertainments, the power of serving and obliging the rulers of corporations, of winning over the popular leaders of political clubs, associations, and neighbourhoods. It is ten thousand times more necessary to show himself to be a man of *power*, than a man of *integrity*, in almost all the elections with which I have been acquainted.

Elections, therefore, become a matter of heavy expense. And if contests are frequent, to many they will become a matter of an expense that is totally ruinous, which no fortunes can bear; but least of all the landed fortunes, encumbered as they often (indeed as they *mostly*) are with debts, portions, jointures; and are tied up in the hands of the possessor by the limitations of settlement. This is a *material* consideration, in my opinion a *lasting* consideration in all the questions concerning election. Let no one think the charges of elections are a trivial matter. Therefore, the charge of elections should never be lost sight of in a question concerning their frequency; because the grand object you seek is independence. Independence of *mind* will ever be more or less influenced by independence of *fortune*. And if every three years, the exhausting sluices of entertainments, drinkings, open houses (to say nothing of bribery) are to be periodically drawn up and renewed — if government-favours are to be called for on every occasion, and for which now, in some shape or other, the whole race of men are candidates — I see that private fortunes will be washed away, and every trace of independence, even to the least, will be borne down by the torrent. I do not seriously think this constitution, even to the wrecks of it, could survive five triennial elections. If you are to fight the battle, you must put on the armour of the ministry. You must call in the public, to the aid of private money. The expense of the last election has been computed (and I am persuaded that it has not been over-rated) at 1,500,000 pounds; — three shillings in the pound, and more in the land tax.¹⁶²

About the close of the last parliament, and the beginning of this, several agents for boroughs went about, and I remember well that it was in every one of their mouths — “Sir, your election will cost you three thousand pounds, if you are independent; but if the ministry supports you, it may be done for two, and perhaps for less.” And indeed, the thing spoke

¹⁶² A British pound in old money, contained 20 shillings. So 3 in 20 was 15 percent. — WHG

itself. Where a living was to be gotten for one, a commission in the army for another, a lift in the navy for a third, and custom-house offices scattered about without measure or number, who doubts but that money may be saved? The treasury may even add money; but indeed it is superfluous. A gentleman of two thousand a year, who meets another of the same fortune, fights with equal arms. But if to one of the candidates you add a thousand per year in places for himself, and a power of giving away as much among others, one must (or there is no truth in arithmetical demonstration) ruin his adversary if he is to meet him and fight with him every third year. It will be said that I do not allow for the operation of character. But I *do*; and I know it will have its weight in most elections; perhaps it may be decisive in some. But there are few in which it will be prevent great expenses.

The destruction of independent fortunes will be the consequence on the part of the candidate. What will be the consequence of triennial corruption, triennial drunkenness, triennial idleness, triennial lawsuits, litigations, prosecutions, triennial frenzy of society dissolved, industry interrupted, or ruined; of those personal hatreds that will never be allowed to soften; those animosities and feuds which will be rendered immortal; those quarrels which are never to be appeased; morals vitiated and gangrened to the vitals? I think no stable and useful advantages were ever made by the money gotten at elections by the voter, but all he gets is doubly lost to the public;. It is money given to diminish the general stock of the community, which is in the industry of the subject. I am sure that it is a good while before he or his family settle again to their business. Their heads will never cool; the temptations of elections will be forever glittering before their eyes. They will all grow politicians; every one quitting his business, will choose to enrich himself by his vote. They will all take the gauging-rod; new places will be made for them; they will run to the custom-house quay,¹⁶³ their looms and ploughs will be deserted.

So Rome was destroyed by the disorders of continual elections, though those of Rome were sober disorders. They had nothing but faction, bribery, bread, and stage plays to debauch them. We have the inflammation of liquor superadded, a fury hotter than any of them. There the contest was only between citizen and citizen; here you have the contest of ambitious citizens on one side, supported by the Crown, to oppose to the efforts (let it be so) of private and unsupported ambition on the other. Yet Rome was destroyed by the frequency and charge of elections, and the monstrous expense of an unremitted courtship to the people. I think, therefore, the independent candidate and elector may each be destroyed by it; the whole body of the community be an infinite sufferer; and a vitious ministry will be the only gainer.

RELIGION AND MAGISTRACY.

In a Christian commonwealth the church and the state are one and the same thing, being different integral parts of the same whole. For the church has been always divided into two parts, the clergy and the laity. The laity is as much an essential integral part of the church; has its duties and privileges as much as the clerical member; and it has its share in the rule, order, and government of the church. In my opinion, religion is so far from being outside of

¹⁶³ *Quay*: a wharf usually built parallel to the shoreline. – WHG

the province of the duty of a Christian magistrate, that it is, and ought to be, not only his care, but the *principal* thing in his care. This is because it is one of the great bonds of human society; and its object is the supreme good, the ultimate end and object of man himself.

The magistrate — who is a man, and charged with the concerns of men, and to whom very specially nothing human is remote and indifferent — has a *right* and a *duty* to watch over it with an unceasing vigilance, to protect, to promote, and to forward it by every rational, just, and prudent means. It is principally his duty to prevent the abuses which grow out of every strong and efficient principle that actuates the human mind. As religion is one of the bonds of society, he should not allow it to be made the pretext of destroying its peace, order, liberty, and its security. Above all, he ought to strictly look to it when men begin to form new combinations, to be distinguished by new names, and especially when they mingle a political system with their religious opinions, whether true or false, plausible or implausible.

It is the *interest* and it is the *duty*. And because it is the interest and the duty, it is the *right* of government to attend much to *opinions* because, as opinions soon combine with *passions* (even when they do not produce them), they have a great influence on *actions*. Factions are formed upon opinions. In effect, these factions become corporate bodies in the state. Indeed, factions generate opinions *in order* to become a centre of union, and to furnish watch-words to parties. And this may make it expedient for government to forbid things that are in themselves innocent and neutral. I am not fond of defining with precision what the ultimate rights of the sovereign supreme power may be, or may not extend to, in providing for the safety of the commonwealth. It will signify very little what *my* notions or what *their* own notions on the subject may be, because according to the exigence, they will, in fact, take the steps which seem to them necessary for the preservation of the whole. For as self-preservation in *individuals* is the first law of nature, the same will prevail in *societies*. They will, right or wrong, make that preservation an object that is paramount to all other rights whatsoever.

PERSECUTION, FALSE IN THEORY.

The bottom of this theory of persecution is false. It is not permitted to us to sacrifice the temporal good of any body of men to our own ideas of the truth and falsehood of any religious opinions. By making men miserable in this life, they counteract one of the great ends of charity — which is (as much as it lies in us) to make men happy in every period of their existence, and most happy in what most depends upon us. But give to these old persecutors their mistaken principle, and they are consistent in their reasoning, and may even be kind and good-natured in their tempers. But whenever a faction would render millions of mankind miserable — some millions of the race co-existent with themselves, and many millions in their succession — without knowing, or so much as pretending to ascertain the doctrines of their own school (in which there is much of the lash and nothing of the lesson), and the errors which the persons in such a faction fall into, are not those errors that are natural to human imbecility, nor is the least mixture of mistaken kindness to mankind, an ingredient in the severities they inflict. The whole is nothing but pure and perfect malice. It is, indeed, a perfection in that kind belonging to beings of a higher order than man, and we ought to leave it to them.

This kind of persecutor, without zeal and without charity, knows well enough that religion — to bypass all questions of the truth or falsehood of any of its particular systems (a matter I abandon to the theologians on all sides) — is a source of great comfort to us mortals in our short but tedious journey through the world. They know that to enjoy this consolation, men must believe their religion upon some principle or other, whether of education, habit, theory, or authority. When men are driven from any of those principles on which they have received religion, without embracing some *other* system with the same assurance and cordiality, a dreadful void is left in their minds; and a terrible shock is given to their morals. They lose their guide, their comfort, their hope. None but the cruelest and most hard-hearted of men, who had banished all natural tenderness from their minds — such as those beings of iron, the *atheists* — could bring themselves to any persecution like this. *Strange* it is, but *so* it is, that men driven by force from their habits in one mode of religion, have often quietly settled in another, by contrary habits, under the same force. They suborn their *reason* to declare in favour of their *necessity*. Man and his conscience cannot always be at war. If the first races have not been able to make a pacification between the *conscience* and the *convenience*, then their descendants generally come to submit to the violence of the *laws*, without violence to their *minds*.¹⁶⁴

IRISH LEGISLATION.

The legislature of Ireland, like all legislatures, ought to frame its laws to suit the people and the circumstances of the country, and no longer make it their whole business to force the nature, temper, and inveterate habits of a nation to conform to speculative systems concerning any kind of laws. Ireland has an established government, and a religion that is legally established, which are to be preserved. It has a people who are to be preserved too, and to be led by reason, principle, sentiment, and interest, to acquiesce in that government. Ireland is a country under peculiar circumstances. The people of Ireland are a very mixed people; and the quantities of the several ingredients in the mixture are very much disproportioned to each other. Are we to govern this mixed body as if it were composed of the simplest elements, comprehending the whole in one system of benevolent legislation? Or are we not rather to provide for the several parts according to the various and diversified necessities of the heterogeneous nature of the mass? Would not common reason and common honesty dictate to us the policy of regulating the people in the several descriptions of which they are composed, according to the natural ranks and classes of an orderly civil society, under a common protecting sovereign, and under a form of constitution that is favourable at once to authority and to freedom — such as the British constitution boasts to be, and such as it is to those who enjoy it?

HENRY OF NAVARRE.

I have observed the affectation which has prevailed in Paris for many years past, even to a perfectly childish degree, of idolizing the memory of your Henry the Fourth. If anything could put anyone out of humour with that ornament to the kingly character, it would be this overdone style of insidious panegyric (praise). The persons who have worked this engine the

¹⁶⁴ They've been habituated to the change, rather than knowingly and willingly embracing it. — WHG

most busily, are those who have ended their panegyrics in dethroning his successor and descendant — a man at least as good natured as Henry the Fourth; altogether as fond of his people; and who has done infinitely more to correct the ancient vices of the state than that great monarch did, or (we are sure) he ever meant to do. It is well for his panegyrists that they do not have him to deal with. For Henry of Navarre was a resolute, active, and politic prince. He indeed possessed great humanity and mildness; but a humanity and mildness that never stood in the way of his interests. He never sought to be loved, without first putting himself in a condition to be feared. He used soft language with determined conduct. He asserted and maintained his authority in the gross, and distributed his acts of concession only in the detail. He spent the income of his prerogative nobly; but he took care not to break in upon the capital. He never abandoned for a moment any of the claims which he made under the fundamental laws, nor spared to shed the blood of those who opposed him — often in the field, sometimes upon the scaffold. Because he knew how to make his virtues respected by the ungrateful, he has merited the praises of those whom, if they had lived in his time, he would have shut up in the Bastille, and brought to punishment along with the regicides whom he hanged after he had famished Paris into a surrender.

TEST ACTS.

In a discussion which took place in the year 1790, Mr. Burke declared his intention — in case the motion for repealing the Test Acts ¹⁶⁵ had been agreed to — of proposing to substitute the following test in place of what was intended to be repealed.

“I, A.B. do, in the presence of God, sincerely profess and believe that a religious establishment in this state is not contrary to the law of God, or disagreeable to the law of nature, or to the true principles of the Christian religion, or that it is noxious to the community; and I do sincerely promise and engage, before God, that I will never, by any conspiracy, contrivance, or political device whatever, attempt, or abet others in any attempt, to subvert the constitution of the church of England, as the same is now established by law; and that I will not employ any power or influence which I may derive from any corporate office, or any other office which I hold or shall hold, under his majesty, his heirs and successors, to destroy and subvert the same; or to cause members to be elected into any corporation, or into parliament, give my vote in the election of any member or members of parliament, or into any office, for or on account of their attachment to any other or different religious opinions or establishments, or with any hope that they may promote the same to the prejudice of the established church; but will dutifully and peaceably content myself with my private liberty of conscience, as the same is allowed by law. So help me God.”

WHAT FACTION OUGHT TO TEACH.

If, however, you could discover these pedigrees of guilt, I do not think the difference would be essential. History records many things which ought to make us hate evil actions. But

¹⁶⁵ *Test Acts*: any law that made a person's eligibility for public office depend upon his profession of the established religion. The U.S. Constitution (1789), Art. VI, Clause 3, *prohibited* a religious test for holding office. — WHG.

neither history, nor morals, nor policy, can teach us to punish innocent men on that account. What lesson does the iniquity of prevalent factions read to us? It ought to lesson (instruct) us into an abhorrence of the abuse of our own power in our own day, when we hate its excesses so much in other persons and in other times. True statesmen ought to be satisfied to leave mankind to that school. They should not call from the dead all the discussions and litigations which formerly inflamed the furious factions which had torn their country to pieces. They should not rake into the hideous and abominable things which were done in the turbulent fury of an injured, robbed, and persecuted people, and which were afterwards cruelly revenged in the execution, and were as outrageously and shamefully exaggerated in the representation, in order to find some colour (excuse) for justifying them — a hundred and fifty years after — in the eternal proscription and civil excommunication of a whole people.

GRIEVANCES BY LAW.

This business appears in two points of view.

1. Whether it is a matter of grievance.
2. Whether it is within our province to redress it with propriety and prudence.

I would not inquire too curiously, whether it comes properly before us on a petition upon a matter of grievance. I know that, technically speaking, nothing agreeable to law can be considered as a grievance. But an over-attention to the rules of any act does sometimes defeat the ends of it. And I think it does so in *this* parliamentary act, at least as much as in any *other*. I know many gentlemen think that the very essence of liberty consists in being governed according to law — as if grievances had nothing real and intrinsic in them. But I cannot be of that opinion. *Grievances may subsist by law*. Indeed, I do not know whether any grievance can be considered as intolerable *until* it is established and sanctified by law. If the act of toleration were not perfect, if there were a complaint about it, I would gladly consent to amend it. But when I heard a complaint about pressure on religious liberty, to my astonishment, I find that there was no complaint whatsoever of the insufficiency of the act of King William, nor any attempt to make it more sufficient. The matter therefore does not concern *toleration*, but *establishment*. And it is not the rights of private conscience that are in question, but the propriety of the terms which are proposed by law, as a title to public emoluments. So that, the complaint is not that there is not toleration of diversity in opinion, but that diversity in opinion is not *rewarded* by bishoprics, rectories, and collegiate stalls.

When gentlemen complain of the subscription ¹⁶⁶ as a matter of grievance, the complaint arises from confounding *private judgment*, whose rights are anterior to law, and the *qualifications* which the law creates for its own magistracies, whether civil or religious. To take away from men their lives, their liberty, or their property — those things for the protection of which society was introduced — is a great hardship and an intolerable tyranny. But to annex any condition you please to artificially created benefits, is the most just, natural, and proper thing in the world. When *de novo* (anew) you form an arbitrary benefit, an advantage, pre-eminence, or emolument — not by nature, but by institution — you order

¹⁶⁶ *Subscription*: a signature on a document, required to hold an office or gain a privilege. — WHG

and modify it with all the power of a creator over his creature. Such benefits of institution include royalty, nobility, priesthood; all of which you may limit to birth; you might prescribe even the shape and stature. The Jewish priesthood was hereditary. Founders' kinsmen have a preference in the election of Fellows in many colleges of our universities. The qualifications at *All Souls College* (Oxford) are that they should be — *optime nati, bene vestiti, mediocriter docti* (well-born, well-dressed, moderately educated).

By contending for liberty in the candidate for orders, you take away the liberty of the elector, which is the people — that is, the *state*. If they can choose, they may assign a reason for their choice; if they can assign a reason, they may do it in writing, and prescribe it as a condition. They may transfer their authority to their representatives, and enable them to exercise the same. In all human institutions, a great part (almost all regulations) are made from the mere necessity of the case, let the theoretical merits of the question be what they will. For nothing happened at the Reformation, except what will happen in all such revolutions. When tyranny is extreme, and abuses of government are intolerable, men resort to the rights of nature to shake it off. When they have done so, the very same principle of the necessity of human affairs — to establish some other authority to preserve the order of this new institution — must be obeyed, until they grow intolerable. And you will not be allowed to plead *original liberty* against such an institution. See Holland, Switzerland.

If you would have religion publicly practised and publicly taught, then you must have a power to say what that religion will be which you will protect and encourage; and to distinguish it by such marks and characteristics as you in your wisdom shall think fit. As I said before, your determination may be unwise in this as in other matters; but it cannot be unjust, hard, or oppressive, or contrary to the liberty of any man, or in the least degree exceeding your province.

Therefore, as a grievance it is fairly none at all — nothing but what is essential not only to the order, but to the liberty of the whole community.

REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS.

In France you are now in the crisis of a revolution, and in the transition from one form of government to another — you cannot see that character of men exactly in the same situation in which we see it in this country. With us it is militant; with you it is triumphant; and you know how it can act when its power is commensurate to its will. I would not be supposed to confine those observations to any description of men, or to comprehend all men of any description within them. No! far from it. I am as incapable of that injustice, as I am of keeping terms with those who profess principles of extremes; and who, under the name of religion, teach little else than wild and dangerous politics. The worst of these politics of revolution is this: they temper and harden the breast, in order to prepare it for the desperate strokes which are sometimes used in extreme occasions. But as these occasions may never arrive, the mind receives a gratuitous taint. And the moral sentiments suffer not a little, when no political purpose is served by the depravation. This sort of people are so taken up with their theories about the *rights* of man, that they have totally forgotten his *nature*. Without opening one new avenue to the *understanding*, they have succeeded in stopping up

those that lead to the *heart*. They have perverted in themselves, and in those that attend to them, all the well-placed sympathies of the human breast.

This famous sermon of the Old Jewry breathes nothing but this spirit through all the political part. To some people, plots, massacres, assassinations, seem a trivial price for obtaining a revolution. A cheap, bloodless reformation, a guiltless liberty, appear flat and vapid to their taste. There must be a great change of scene; there must be a magnificent stage effect; there must be a grand spectacle to rouse the imagination that has grown torpid with the lazy enjoyment of sixty years' security, and the still unanimating repose of public prosperity. The preacher found them all in the French revolution. This inspires a juvenile warmth through his whole frame. His enthusiasm kindles as he advances; and when he arrives at his peroration, it is in full blaze.¹⁶⁷ Then viewing from the Pisgah of his pulpit,¹⁶⁸ the free, moral, happy, flourishing, and glorious state of France, as in a bird-eye landscape of a promised land, he breaks out into rapture.

TOLERATION BECOME INTOLERANT.

When any Dissenters, or any body of people, come here with a petition, it is not the number of people, but the reasonableness of the request that should weigh with the house. A body of Dissenters come to this house and say,

Tolerate us — we desire neither the parochial advantage of tithes, nor dignities, nor the stalls of your cathedrals. No! let the venerable orders of the hierarchy exist with all their advantages.

And shall I tell them,

I reject your just and reasonable petition, not because it shakes the church, but because there are others who will kick and bite you while you lie grovelling upon the earth?

Judge which of these descriptions of men comes with a fair request — that which says,

Sir, I desire liberty for my own, because I trespass on no man's conscience;

Or the other, which says,

I desire that these men should not be allowed to act according to their consciences, even though I am tolerated to act according to mine. But I sign a body of articles, which is my title to toleration; I sign no more, because more are against my conscience. But I desire that you will not tolerate these men, because they will not go so far as I, even though I desire to be tolerated, who will not go as far as you. No, *imprison them* if they come within five miles of a corporate town, because they do not believe what I do in point of doctrines.

Shall I not say to these men,

“Arrangez-vous, canaille?” (Get over it, scoundrel). You who are not the predominant power, will not give to others the relaxation under which you are yourself allowed to live. I have as high an opinion of the doctrines of the church as you. I receive them implicitly, or I put my own explanation on them, or I take that which seems to me to come best recommended by authority.

¹⁶⁷ *Peroration*: the concluding exhortation of an oratorical speech. – WHG

¹⁶⁸ Mount Pisgah was where Moses glimpsed the Promised Land. (Deu 34.1) – WHG

There are those of the Dissenters, who think more rigidly of the doctrine of the articles relative to predestination than others do. They sign the article relative to it *ex animo* (from the heart), and literally. Others allow a latitude of construction. These two parties are in the church, as well as among the Dissenters; and yet in the church we live quietly under the same roof. I do not see why, as long as Providence gives us no further light into this great mystery, we should not leave things as the Divine wisdom has left them. But suppose that all these things are clear to me (which Providence, however, seems to have left obscure), while Dissenters claim a toleration in things which, seeming clear to *me*, are obscure to *them*. Without entering into the merit of the articles, with what kind of face can these men say, *Tolerate us, but do not tolerate them?* Toleration is good for all, or it is good for none.

The discussion this day is not between *establishment* on one hand, and *toleration* on the other — but between those who, being tolerated themselves, refuse toleration to others. That power should be puffed up with pride, that authority should degenerate into rigour, which if not laudable, is only too natural. But this proceeding of theirs is much beyond the usual allowance to human weakness. It not only is shocking to our reason, but it provokes our indignation. *Quid domini facient, audent cum talia fures?* (What will the owners do with such brazen thieves?) It is not the proud prelate thundering in his commission court, but a pack of manumitted slaves with the lash of the beadle (constable) flagrant on their backs, and their legs still galled with their fetters, who would drive their brethren into that prison-house from which they have just been permitted to escape. If instead of puzzling themselves in the depths of the Divine counsels, they would turn to the mild morality of the gospel, they would read their own condemnation: “O you wicked servant; I forgave you all that debt because you begged me: should you not also have compassion on your fellow-servant, even as I had pity on you?” ^{Mat 18.32-33}

WILKES AND THE RIGHT OF ELECTION.

In the last session, the corps called the “king’s friends” made a hardy attempt, all at once, *to alter the right of election itself*; to put it into the power of the House of Commons to disable any person disagreeable to them from sitting in parliament, without any other rule than their own pleasure; to make disqualifications, either general for descriptions of men, or particular for individuals; and to take into their body, persons who avowedly have never been chosen by the majority of legal electors, nor agreeably to any known rule of law.

The arguments upon which this claim was founded and combated are not my business here. Never has a subject been more amply and more learnedly handled, nor in my opinion, more satisfactorily on one side. Those who are not convinced by what is already written would not receive conviction *though one arose from the dead*.^{Luk 16.31} I too have thought on this subject. But my purpose here is only to consider it as a part of the favourite project of government — to make observations on the motives which led to it; and to trace its political consequences.

A violent rage for the punishment of Mr. Wilkes was the pretence of the whole.¹⁶⁹ This gentleman, by setting himself strongly in opposition to the court cabal, had become at once

¹⁶⁹ John Wilkes (1725-1797) was an outspoken journalist and popular London politician. He came to be regarded as a victim of persecution and a champion of liberty, because he was repeatedly expelled from Parliament. — WHG

an object of *their* persecution, and of the *popular* favour. The hatred of the court party pursuing him, and the countenance of the people protecting him, it very soon became not at all a question on the man, but a trial of strength between the two parties. The advantage of the victory in this particular contest was the present object, but not the only (nor by any means the principal) object. Its operation on the character of the House of Commons was the great point in view. The point to be gained by the cabal was this: that a precedent should be established, tending to show *that the favour of the people was not so sure a road as the favour of the court, even to popular honours and popular trusts*. A strenuous resistance to every appearance of lawless power; a spirit of independence carried to some degree of enthusiasm; an inquisitive character to *discover*, and a bold one to *display* every corruption and every error of government. These are the [favourable] qualities which recommend a man to a seat in the House of Commons, in open and merely popular elections.

[By contrast,] an indolent and submissive disposition; a disposition to think charitably of all the actions of men in power, and to live in a mutual intercourse of favours with them; an inclination to countenance a strong use of authority, rather than to bear any sort of licentiousness on the part of the people; these are unfavourable qualities in an open election for members of parliament. The instinct which carries the people towards the choice of the former, is justified by reason — because a man of such a character, even in its exorbitances, does not directly contradict the purposes of a trust, the end of which is a control (a limit) on power. The latter character, even when it is not in its extreme, will execute this trust but very imperfectly; and if deviating to the least excess, it will certainly frustrate instead of forwarding the purposes of a control on government. But when the House of Commons was to be newly modelled, this principle was not only to be changed but reversed.

While any errors committed in support of power were left to the law — with every advantage of favourable construction, of mitigation, and finally of pardon — all excesses on the side of liberty, or in pursuit of popular favour, or in defence of popular rights and privileges, were not only to be punished by the rigour of the known law, but by a *discretionary* proceeding which brought on *the loss of the popular object itself*. Popularity was to be rendered, if not directly penal, at least highly dangerous. The favour of the people might lead even to a disqualification of representing them. Strained through the medium of two or three constructions, their odium might become the means of sitting as the trustee of all that was dear to them. This is punishing the offence in the offending part. Until this time, the opinion of the people through the power of an assembly (still in some sort popular), led to the greatest honours and emoluments in the gift of the crown. Now the principle is reversed; and the favour of the court is the only sure way of obtaining and holding those honours which ought to be in the disposal of the people.

It signifies very little how this matter may be quibbled away. Example, which is the only argument of effect in civil life, demonstrates the truth of my proposition. Nothing can alter my opinion concerning the pernicious tendency of this example, till I see some man rendered incapable of sitting in parliament, for his indiscretion in support of power, or for his violent and intemperate servility. For as it now stands, the fault of overstraining popular qualities, and of asserting popular privileges (irregularly, if you please), has led to disqualification; the opposite fault has never produced the slightest punishment. Resistance

to power has shut the door of the House of Commons to one man; obsequiousness and servility shut it to none.

Not that I would encourage popular disorder, or any disorder. But I would leave such offences to the law, to be punished in measure and proportion. The laws of this country are for the most part constituted (and wisely so) for the general ends of government, rather than for the preservation of our particular liberties. Whatever, therefore, is done in support of liberty, by persons who are not in public trust, or not acting merely in that trust, is liable to be more or less out of the ordinary course of the law; and the law itself is sufficient to address it with great severity. Nothing indeed can hinder that severe letter from crushing us, except the temperaments that it may receive from a trial by jury. But if the habit prevails of *going beyond the law*, and superseding this judicature — of carrying offences, real or supposed, into the legislative bodies, who will establish themselves into *courts of criminal equity* (so *The Star Chamber* has been called by Lord Bacon) — all the evils of the *Star Chamber* are revived. A large and liberal construction in ascertaining offences, and a discretionary power in punishing them, is the idea of *criminal equity*; this is, in truth, a monster in jurisprudence. It signifies nothing, whether a court for this purpose is a committee of council, or a house of commons, or a house of lords — the liberty of the subject will be equally subverted by it.

The true end and purpose of that house of parliament which entertains such a jurisdiction, will be destroyed by it. I will not believe, what no other living man believes: that Mr. Wilkes was punished for the indecency of his publications, or the impiety of his ransacked closet. If he had fallen in a common slaughter of libellers and blasphemers, I could well believe that nothing more was meant than was pretended. But when I see that, for years together, writings about religion, and virtue, and order, fully as impious and perhaps more dangerous, have not been punished, nor their authors discountenanced; that the most audacious libels on royal majesty have passed without notice; that the most treasonable invectives against the laws, liberties, and constitution of the country have not met with the slightest criticism — then I must consider this as a shocking and shameless pretence. Never did an envenomed scurrility (obscene abuse) against everything sacred and civil, public and private, rage through the kingdom with such a furious and unbridled licence. All of this while the peace of the nation must be shaken to ruin one libeller, and to tear a single favourite from the populace.

Nor is it that vice merely skulks in an obscure and contemptible impunity. Does not the public behold with indignation, persons who are not only generally scandalous in their lives, but the identical persons who, by their society, their instruction, their example, their encouragement, have drawn this man into the very faults which have furnished the cabal with a pretence for his persecution — loaded with every kind of favour, honour, and distinction which a court can bestow? Add but the crime of servility (the *foedum crimen servitutis*) to every other crime, and the whole mass is immediately transmuted into virtue, and it becomes the just subject of reward and honour. When I therefore reflect upon this method pursued by the cabal, in distributing rewards and punishments, I must conclude that Mr. Wilkes is the object of persecution — not on account of what he has done *in common* with others who are the objects of reward, but for that in which he *differs* from

many of them. He is pursued for the spirited dispositions which are blended with his vices; for his unconquerable firmness, for his resolute, indefatigable, strenuous resistance against oppression.

In this case, therefore, it was not the *man* that was to be punished, nor his *faults* that were to be discountenanced. Opposition to acts of power was to be marked by a kind of civil proscription. The popularity which might arise from such an opposition, was shown to be unable to protect it. The qualities by which deference ¹⁷⁰ is made to the people, would be to render every fault inexpiable, and every error irretrievable. The qualities by which deference is made to power, would be to cover and to sanctify everything. He that would have a sure and honourable seat in the House of Commons, must take care how he adventures to cultivate popular qualities; otherwise he may remember the old maxim, *Breves et infaustos populi Romani amores* (the love of the Roman people is short and unfortunate). Therefore, if a pursuit of popularity exposes a man to greater dangers than a disposition to servility, the principle which is the life and soul of popular elections will perish out of the constitution.

ROCKINGHAM AND CONWAY.

It is now given out for the usual purposes, by the usual emissaries, that Lord Rockingham ¹⁷¹ did not consent to the repeal of this act until he was bullied into it by Lord Chatham. And the reporters have gone so far as to publicly assert, in a hundred companies, that the honourable gentleman under the gallery, who proposed the repeal in the American committee, had another set of resolutions in his pocket directly the reverse of those he moved. These artifices of a desperate cause are spread abroad at this time with incredible care, in every part of the town, from the highest to the lowest companies; as if the industry of the circulation were to make amends for the absurdity of the report. Sir, whether the noble lord is of a complexion to be bullied by Lord Chatham, or by any man, I must submit to those who know him. I confess, when I look back to that time, I consider him as placed in one of the most trying situations in which perhaps any man ever stood. In the House of Peers there were very few of the ministry, outside of the noble lord's own particular connection (except Lord Egmont, who acted, as far as I could discern, an honourable and manly part), that did not look to some other future arrangement, which warped his politics. There were in both houses new and menacing appearances, that might very naturally drive any other, than a most resolute minister, from his measure or from his station. The household troops openly revolted. The allies of ministry (I mean those who supported some of their measures, but refused responsibility for any) endeavoured to undermine their credit, and to take ground that must be fatal to the success of the very cause which they would be thought to countenance. The question of the repeal was brought on by ministry in the committee of this house, in the very instant when it was known that more than one court negotiation was carrying on with the heads of the opposition. Everything, on every side, was

¹⁷⁰ Originally, "by which court is made to the people" – meaning to court their favor. – WHG

¹⁷¹ Charles Watson-Wentworth, 2nd marquess of Rockingham (1730-1782); prime minister of Great Britain from July 1765 to July 1766 and from March to July 1782. He led the parliamentary group known as Rockingham Whigs, which opposed Britain's war against its colonists in North America (1775-83). He obtained a **repeal of the Stamp Act**, but agreed to the *Declaratory Act*, which affirmed Parliament's power to tax the colonists. – *Ency. Brit.*

full of traps and mines. Earth below shook; heaven above menaced; all the elements of ministerial safety were dissolved. It was in the midst of this chaos of plots and counterplots — it was in the midst of this complicated warfare against public opposition and private treachery — that the firmness of that noble person was put to the proof. He never stirred from his ground: no, not an inch. He remained fixed and determined in principle, in measure, and in conduct. He practised no managements. He secured no retreat. He sought no apology.

I will likewise do justice, as I ought to do it, to the honourable gentlemen who led us in this house. Far from the duplicity wickedly charged on him, he acted his part with alacrity and resolution. We all felt inspired by the example he gave us, down even to myself, the weakest in that phalanx. I declare for one, that I knew well enough (it could not be concealed from anybody) the true state of things; but in my life, I never came with so much spirits into this house. It was a time for a *man* to act in. We had powerful enemies, but we had faithful and determined friends; and a glorious cause. We had a great battle to fight, but we had the means of fighting; not as now, when our arms are tied behind us. We fought that day, and conquered.

I remember, Sir, with a melancholy pleasure, the situation of the honourable gentleman (General Conway ¹⁷²) who made the motion for the repeal. It was in that crisis when the whole trading interest of this empire, crammed into your lobbies with a trembling and anxious expectation, waited almost to a winter's return of light, their fate from your resolutions. When at length you had determined in their favour, and your doors were thrown open, and you showed them the figure of their deliverer in the well-earned triumph of his important victory, there arose an involuntary burst of gratitude and transport from the whole of that grave multitude. They jumped upon him like children on a long-absent father. They clung about him as captives about their redeemer. All England, all America joined to his applause. Nor did he seem insensible to the best of all earthly rewards, the love and admiration of his fellow-citizens. *Hope elevated, and joy brightened his crest.* I stood near him; and his face, to use the expression of the scripture of the first martyr, "his face was as if it had been the face of an angel." ^{Act 6.15} I do not know how others feel, but if I had stood in that situation, I would never have exchanged it for all that kings in their profusion could bestow. I did hope that that day's danger and honour would have been a bond to hold us all together for ever. But alas! that, with other pleasing visions, has long since vanished.

Sir, this act of supreme magnanimity has been represented as if it had been a measure of an administration, that having no scheme of their own, took a middle line, pilfered a bit from one side and a bit from the other. Sir, they took NO middle lines. They differed fundamentally from the schemes of both parties; but they preserved the objects of both. They preserved the authority of Great Britain. They made the Declaratory Act; they repealed the Stamp Act. They did both *fully*, because the Declaratory Act was without *qualification*, and the repeal of the Stamp Act was *total*. This they did in the situation I have described.

¹⁷² Henry Seymour Conway (1721-1795); military commander and prominent British politician who urged moderate treatment of the American colonies. — *Ency. Brit.*

POLITICS IN THE PULPIT.

It is plain that the mind of this *political* preacher was at the time big with some extraordinary design; and it is very probable that the thoughts of his audience, who understood him better than I do, all along ran before him in his reflection, and in the whole train of consequences to which it led. Before I read that sermon, I really thought I had lived in a free country; and it was an error that I cherished, because it gave me a greater liking to the country I lived in. I was indeed aware that a jealous, ever-waking vigilance to guard the treasure of our liberty, not only from invasion, but from decay and corruption, was our best wisdom, and our first duty. However, I considered that treasure as a possession to be secured, rather than a prize to be contended for. I did not discern how the present time came to be so very favourable to all *exertions* in the cause of freedom. The present time differs from any other only by the circumstance of what is going on in France. If the example of that nation is to have an influence on this one, I can easily conceive why some of their proceedings which have an unpleasant aspect, and are not quite reconcilable to humanity, generosity, good faith, and justice, are palliated with so much milky good-nature towards the actors, and born with so much heroic fortitude towards the sufferers. It is certainly not prudent to discredit the authority of an example we mean to follow.

But allowing this, we are led to a very natural question: — What is that cause of liberty, and what are those exertions in its favour, to which the example of France is so singularly auspicious? Is our monarchy to be annihilated, with all the laws, all the tribunals, and all the ancient corporations of the kingdom? Is every landmark of the country to be done away in favour of a geometrical and arithmetical constitution? Is the House of Lords to be voted useless? Is episcopacy to be abolished? Are the church lands to be sold to Jews and jobbers; or given to bribe new-invented municipal republics into a participation in sacrilege? Are all the taxes to be voted grievances, and the revenue reduced to a patriotic contribution, or patriotic presents? Are silver shoe-buckles to be substituted in place of the land-tax and the malt-tax, for the support of the naval strength of this kingdom? Are all orders, ranks, and distinctions to be confounded, so that out of universal anarchy, joined to national bankruptcy, three or four thousand democracies should be formed into eighty-three, so they may all, by some sort of unknown attractive power, be organized into one? For this great end, is the army to be seduced from its discipline and its fidelity, first by every kind of debauchery, and then by the terrible precedent of a donative in the increase of pay? Are the curates to be secluded from their bishops, by holding out to them the delusive hope of a dole out of the spoils of their own order? Are the citizens of London to be drawn from their allegiance, by feeding them at the expense of their fellow-subjects? Is a compulsory paper currency to be substituted in place of the legal coin of this kingdom? Is what remains of the plundered stock of public revenue to be employed in the wild project of maintaining two armies to watch over and to fight with each other?

If these are the ends and means of the Revolution Society, I admit they are well assorted; and France may furnish them for both with precedents in point. I see that your example is held out to shame us. I know that we are supposed a dull, sluggish race, rendered passive by finding our situation tolerable, and prevented by a mediocrity of freedom, from ever attaining to its full perfection. Your leaders in France began by affecting to admire, almost

to adore the British constitution. But as they advanced, they came to look upon it with a sovereign contempt. The friends of your National Assembly among us have full as mean an opinion of what was formerly thought the glory of their country. The Revolution Society has discovered that the English nation is not free. They are convinced,

- that the inequality in our representation is a “defect in our constitution which is *so gross and palpable*, as to make it excellent chiefly in its *form and theory*.”¹⁷³
- that a representation in the legislature of a kingdom is not only the basis of all constitutional liberty in it, but of “*all legitimate government*.”
- that without it, “a *government* is nothing but a *usurpation*.”
- that “when the representation is *partial*, the kingdom possesses liberty only *partially*; and if extremely partial it gives only a *semblance* of liberty; and if not only extremely partial, but corruptly chosen, it becomes a *nuisance*.”

Dr. Price¹⁷⁴ considers this inadequacy of representation as our *fundamental grievance*. And though, as to the corruption of this semblance of representation, he hopes it is not yet arrived to its full perfection of depravity, he fears that,

“nothing will be done towards gaining for us this *essential blessing*, until some *great abuse of power* again provokes our resentment, or some *great calamity* again alarms our fears, or perhaps till the acquisition of a *pure and equal representation by other countries*, while we are *mocked* with the *shadow*, kindles our shame.”

To this he subjoins a note in these words. “A representation chosen chiefly by the treasury, and a *few* thousand of the *dregs* of the people who are generally paid for their votes.”

You will smile here at the consistency of those democratists who, when they are not on their guard, treat the humbler part of the community with the greatest contempt, while at the same time, they pretend to make them the depositories of all power. It would require a long discourse to point out to you the many fallacies that lurk in the generality and equivocal nature of the terms “inadequate representation.” I will only say here, in justice to that old-fashioned constitution under which we have long prospered, that our representation has been found perfectly adequate to all the purposes for which a representation of the people can be desired or devised. I defy the enemies of our constitution to show the contrary. To detail the particulars in which it is found to promote its ends so well, would demand a treatise on our practical constitution. I state here the doctrine of the revolutionists, only that you and others may see what an opinion these gentlemen entertain of the constitution of *their* country, and why they seem to think that some great abuse of power, or some great calamity — as giving a chance for the blessing of a constitution according to their ideas —

¹⁷³ Discourse on the Love of our Country, 3rd edition page 39.

¹⁷⁴ Dr. Richard Price was known for his involvement in the Revolution Society. It was a group of individuals who supported the principles of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and advocated for political reform and the spread of “enlightened” ideas. His sermon on “The Love of One’s Country” in 1791 is what provoked Burke’s famous critique of the French Revolution. His circle of friends included Benjamin Franklin, William Pitt, Lord Shelburne, and David Hume. A Dissenter, like his father, he ministered to Presbyterians near London. His *Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals* (1758) pleaded the cause of ethical intuitionism and Rationalism, foreshadowing both Kant’s ethics and 20th-century developments. He was made LL.D. by Yale College in 1781. — *Ency. Brit.*

would be much palliated to their feelings. You see *why they* are so enamoured of your fair and equal representation from which, once obtained, the same effects might follow. You see that they consider our House of Commons as only “a semblance,” “a form,” “a theory,” “a shadow,” “a mockery,” perhaps “a nuisance.”

WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR.

There is nothing more memorable in history than the actions, fortunes, and character of this great man; whether we consider the grandeur of the plans he formed, the courage and wisdom with which they were executed, or the splendour of that success which, adorning his youth, continued without the smallest reserve to support his age even to the last moments of his life. He lived above seventy years, and reigned within ten years as long as he lived: sixty years over his dukedom, more than twenty over England.¹⁷⁵ Both of these he acquired or kept by his own magnanimity, with hardly any other title than he derived from his arms — so that he might be reputed in all respects to be as happy, and the most fully gratified, as the highest ambition can make a man. He neither had nor sought the silent inward satisfactions of domestic happiness. He had a body suited to the character of his mind — erect, firm, large, and active. While to be active was a praise, a stern countenance became his command. Magnificent in his living, reserved in his conversation, grave in his common deportment, but relaxing with a wise facetiousness (playfulness), he knew how to relieve his mind and preserve his dignity. For he never forfeited by a personal acquaintance, that esteem he had acquired by his great actions. Unlearned in books, he formed his understanding by the rigid discipline of a large and complicated experience. He knew men much, and therefore he generally trusted them but little. Yet when he knew any man to be good, he reposed in him an entire confidence, which prevented his prudence from degenerating into a vice. He had vices in his composition, and great ones; but they were the vices of a great mind. *Ambition*, the malady of every extensive genius; and *avarice*, the madness of the wise. One chiefly actuated his youth; the other governed his age. The vices of young and light minds, the joys of wine, and the pleasures of love, never reached his aspiring nature. He looked at the general run of men with contempt, and treated them with cruelty when they opposed him. Nor was the rigour of his mind to be softened except with the appearance of extraordinary fortitude in his enemies. This, by a sympathy congenial to his own virtues, always excited his admiration, and insured his mercy.

So that there were often seen in this one man, at the same time, the extremes of a savage cruelty, and a generosity that does honour to human nature. Religion, too, seemed to have a great influence on his mind, from policy or from better motives. But his religion was displayed in the regularity with which he performed his *duties*, not in the submission he showed to its *ministers*, which was never more than what good government required. Yet his choice of a counsellor and favourite was not, according to the mode of the time, out of

¹⁷⁵ William I (c. 1028 -1087). Burke's estimate of his age may have been off by ten years. William was the illegitimate child of Robert I of Normandy. He was a noble who made himself the mightiest in France, and then conquered England in 1066. He was one of the greatest soldiers and rulers of the Middle Ages. He was duke of Normandy from 1035, at age seven, and king of England from 1066 until his death. — *Ency. Brit.*

that order. It was a choice that does honour to his memory. This was Lanfranc,¹⁷⁶ a man of great learning for the times, and of extraordinary piety. He owed his elevation to William. But, though always inviolably faithful, he was never the tool or flatterer of the power which raised him; and the greater freedom he showed, the higher he rose in the confidence of his master. He did not lose his religion and conscience by mixing with the concerns of state, nor make them covers or instruments of ambition. But tempering the fierce policy of a new power by the mild lights of religion, he became a blessing to the country in which he was promoted. The English owed to the virtue of this stranger, and the influence he had on the king, the little remains of liberty they continued to enjoy. And at last, he had such a degree of the king's confidence, as in some sort counterbalanced the severities of the former part of his reign.

KING ALFRED.

When Alfred ¹⁷⁷ had once more reunited the kingdoms of his ancestors, he found the whole face of things in the most desperate condition. There was no observance of law and order; religion had no force; there was no honest industry; the most squalid poverty, and the grossest ignorance, had overspread the whole kingdom. Alfred at once enterprised the cure of all these evils. To remedy the disorders in the government, he revived, improved, and digested all the Saxon institutions; insomuch that he is generally honoured as the founder of our laws and constitution.¹⁷⁸ He divided the shire into hundreds and the hundreds into tithings (tenths). Every freeman was obliged to be entered into some tithing, the members of which were mutually bound to each other for the preservation of the peace, and avoiding theft and rapine.

For securing the liberty of the subject, he introduced the method of giving bail, the most certain fence against the abuses of power. It has been observed that the reigns of weak princes are times favourable to liberty; but the wisest and bravest of all the English princes

¹⁷⁶ Lanfranc of Pavia (c. 1005-1089) — originally a lawyer, Lanfranc won a reputation as a teacher at a school he established at Avranches, Normandy (1039–42). He then entered the Benedictine monastery at Bec where, after three years of seclusion, he became prior and resumed teaching. William made Lanfranc first abbot of St. Stephen's at Caen (c. 1063); after the Conquest, he nominated him to the see of Canterbury. Lanfranc embarked upon a successful reform and reorganization of the English Church. Although a firm supporter of papal sovereignty, he assisted William in maintaining the fullest possible independence for the English Church. — *Ency. Brit.*

¹⁷⁷ Alfred (849-899); the king of Saxon Wessex (871–899). He prevented England from falling to the Danes, and he promoted learning and literacy. The compilation of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* began during his reign. — *Ency. Brit.*

¹⁷⁸ Historians, copying one another and examining little, have attributed to this monarch the institution of juries; an institution which certainly never prevailed among the Saxons. They have likewise attributed to him the distribution of England into shires, hundreds, and tithings, and of appointing officers over these divisions. But it is very obvious that the shires were never settled on any regular plan, nor are they the result of any single design. But these reports, however ill-imagined, are a strong proof of the high veneration in which this excellent prince has always been held; as it has been thought that the attributing these regulations to him would endear them to the nation. He probably settled them in such an order, and made such reformatations in his government, that some of the institutions themselves, which he improved, have been attributed to him. And indeed, there was one work of his which serves to furnish us with a higher idea of the political capacity of that great man than any of these fictions. He made a general survey and register of all the property in the kingdom, who held it, and what it was distinctly. It was a vast work for an age of ignorance and time of confusion, which has been neglected in more civilized nations and settled times. It was called the "Roll of Winton," and served as a model of a work of the same kind made by William the Conqueror.

is the father of their freedom. This great man was even jealous of the privileges of his subjects. And as his whole life was spent in protecting them, his last will breathes the same spirit, declaring that he had left his people as free as their own thoughts. He not only collected with great care a complete body of laws, but he wrote comments on them for the instruction of his judges, who were in general ignorant, by the misfortune of the time. If he took care to correct their ignorance, he was rigorous towards their corruption. He inquired strictly into their conduct; he heard appeals in person; he held his Wittena-Gemotes, or parliaments, frequently, and he kept every part of his government in health and vigour.

Nor was he less solicitous for the defence, than he had shown himself for the regulation of his kingdom. He nourished with particular care the new naval strength which he had established. He built forts and castles in the most important posts. He settled beacons to spread an alarm on the arrival of an enemy. And he ordered his militia in such a manner, that there was always a great power in readiness to march, well-appointed and well-disciplined. But that a suitable revenue might not be lacking for the support of his fleets and fortifications, he gave great encouragement to trade, which by the piracies on the coasts, and the rapine and injustice exercised by the people within, had long become a stranger to this island.

In the midst of these various and important cares, he gave peculiar attention to learning, which by the rage of the recent wars had been entirely extinguished in his kingdom. “There were very few (says this monarch) on this side the Humber,¹⁷⁹ who understood their ordinary prayers; or who were able to translate any Latin book into English — so few, that I do not remember even one qualified to the southward of the Thames when I began my reign.” To cure this deplorable ignorance, he was indefatigable in his endeavours to bring into England men of learning in all branches, from every part of Europe; and he was unbounded in his liberality to them. He enacted by a law, that every person possessed of two hides of land ¹⁸⁰ should send their children to school until sixteen. Wisely considering where to put a stop to his love even of the liberal arts, which are only suited to a liberal condition, he enterprised a still greater design than that of forming the *growing* generation — to instruct even the *grown*. He enjoined all his aldermen and sheriffs to immediately apply themselves to learning, or else to quit their offices.

To facilitate these great purposes, he made a regular foundation of a university, which with great reason is believed to have been at Oxford. Whatever trouble he took to extend the benefits of learning among his subjects, he showed the example himself, and applied to the cultivation of his mind with unparalleled diligence and success. He could neither read nor write at twelve years old; but he improved his time in such a manner that he became one of the most knowing men of his age, in geometry, in philosophy, in architecture, and in music. He applied himself to the improvement of his native language. He translated several valuable works from Latin, and wrote a vast number of poems in the Saxon tongue, with a wonderful facility and happiness. He not only excelled in the *theory* of the arts and sciences,

¹⁷⁹ Humber: An estuary in central northeastern England formed by the Ouse and Trent Rivers. – WHG

¹⁸⁰ In early English history, a *hide* was the land necessary to support a free peasant family. In the 12th and 13th centuries, the hide commonly was 120 acres of arable land, but probably much smaller before 1066. – *Ency. Brit.*

but possessed a great mechanical genius for the *executive* part. He improved the manner of ship-building, introduced a more beautiful and commodious architecture, and even taught his countrymen the art of making bricks, for most of the buildings had been of wood before his time. In a word, he comprehended in the greatness of his mind the whole of government and all its parts at once; and what is most difficult to human frailty, he was at the same time sublime and minute.

In Alfred's father, *religion* was so prejudicial to affairs. But in him, it was of a more enlarged and noble kind, without being at all inferior in its zeal and fervour. Far from being a prejudice to his government, it seems to have been the principle that supported him in so many fatigues, and it fed his civil and military virtues like an abundant source. To his religious exercises and studies, he devoted a full third of his time. It is pleasant to trace a genius even in its smallest exertions, in measuring and allotting his time for the variety of business he was engaged in. According to his severe and methodical custom, he had a type of wax candles made of different colours, in different proportions, according to the time he allotted to each particular affair. As he carried these about with him wherever he went, to make them burn evenly, he invented horn lanterns. One cannot help being amazed that a prince who lived in such turbulent times — who commanded personally in fifty-four pitched battles, who had so disordered a province to regulate, who was not only a legislator but a judge, and who was continually superintending his armies, his navies, the traffic of his kingdom, his revenues, and the conduct of all his officers — could have bestowed so much of his time on religious exercises and speculative knowledge. But the exertion of all his faculties and virtues seemed to have given a mutual strength to all of them. Thus all historians speak of this prince, whose whole history was one panegyric. And whatever dark spots of human frailty may have adhered to such a character, they are entirely hidden in the splendour of his many shining qualities and grand virtues, that throw a glory over the obscure period in which he lived, and which for no other reason is worthy of our knowledge.

DRUIDS.

The Druids ¹⁸¹ are said to be very expert in astronomy, in geography, and in all parts of mathematical knowledge. And authors speak in a very exaggerated strain, of their excellence in these and in many other sciences. I suppose they had some elemental knowledge; but I can scarcely be persuaded that their learning was either deep or extensive. In all countries where Druidism was professed, the youth were generally instructed by that order. And yet there was little either in the manners of the people, in their way of life, or their works of art, that demonstrates profound science, or particularly mathematical skill. Britain — where their discipline was in its highest perfection, and was therefore resorted to by the people of Gaul, as an oracle in Druidical questions — was more barbarous in all other respects than Gaul itself, or than any other country then known in Europe. Those piles of rude magnificence, Stonehenge and Abury, are in vain produced as proof of their mathematical abilities. These vast structures have nothing which can be admired, but the greatness of the

¹⁸¹ Literally “oak-knower,” or firm knower, great sage. A member of the high-ranking priestly class in ancient Celtic cultures dating to the 4th century BC. Druids were religious leaders as well as legal authorities, adjudicators, lore keepers, medical professionals, and political advisors. Their beliefs did not permit written accounts. – WHG

work; and they are not the only instances of the great things which the mere labour of many hands united, and persevering in their purpose, may accomplish with very little help from mechanics. This may be evinced by the immense buildings, and the low state of the sciences, among the original Peruvians. The Druids were eminent above all the philosophic lawgivers of antiquity, for their care in impressing the doctrine of the soul's immortality on the minds of their people, as an operative and leading principle. This doctrine was inculcated on the scheme of transmigration,¹⁸² which some imagine they derived from Pythagoras. But it is by no means necessary to resort to any particular teacher for an opinion which owes its birth to the weak struggles of unenlightened reason, and to natural mistakes of the human mind.

The idea of the soul's immortality is indeed ancient, universal, and in a way inherent in our nature. But it is not easy for a rude people to conceive any other mode of existence than one similar to what they had experienced in life; nor any other world as the scene of such an existence, except the one we inhabit. Beyond the bounds of this, the mind extends itself with great difficulty. Admiration, indeed, was able to exalt to heaven a few selected heroes. It did not seem absurd that those who had distinguished themselves as superior and overruling spirits in their mortal state, should after death ascend to that sphere which influences and governs everything below; or that the proper abode of beings who are at once so illustrious and permanent, should be in that part of nature in which they had always observed the greatest splendour and the least mutation. But on ordinary occasions, it was *natural* that some should imagine that the dead retired into a remote country, separated from the living by seas or mountains. It was *natural* that some should follow their imagination with a simplicity still purer, and pursue the souls of men no further than the sepulchres in which their bodies had been deposited. While others of deeper penetration — observing that bodies worn out by age, or destroyed by accidents, still afforded the materials for generating new ones — likewise concluded that a soul being dislodged did not wholly perish, but was destined, by a similar revolution in nature, to act again, and to animate some *other* body.

This last principle gave rise to the doctrine of *transmigration*. But we must not presume of course, that where it prevailed it necessarily excluded the other opinions. For it is not remote from the usual procedure of the human mind, in obscure matters, to blend imagination and reasoning together, and to unite the most inconsistent ideas. When Homer represents the ghosts of his heroes appearing at the sacrifices of Ulysses, he supposes they are endued with life, sensation, and a capacity of moving. But he has joined to these powers of living existence, frightfulness, lack of strength, lack of distinction, or the characteristics of a dead carcass. This is what the mind is apt to do — it is very apt to confound the ideas of the surviving soul and the dead body. The vulgar have always, and still do confound these very irreconcilable ideas. They lay the scene of apparitions in churchyards; they cloak the ghost in a shroud; and it appears in all the ghastly paleness of a corpse. A contradiction of this kind has given rise to a doubt whether Druids in reality held the doctrine of transmigration. There is positive testimony that they did. There is also just as positive testimony that they buried or burned with the dead, utensils, arms, slaves, and whatever might be judged useful

¹⁸² *Transmigration*: rebirth or reincarnation of the soul.

to them, as if they were to be removed into a separate state. They might have held *both* these opinions; and we should not be surprised to find inconsistent error.

SAXON CONQUEST AND CONVERSION.

But whatever was the condition of the *other* parts of Europe, it is generally agreed that the state of *Britain* was the worst of all. Some writers have asserted that, except for those who took refuge in the mountains of Wales and Cornwall, or fled into Armorica, the British race was in a manner *destroyed*. What is extraordinary, is that we find England was in a very tolerable state of population, less than two centuries after the first invasion of the Saxons. And it is hard to imagine either that the transplantation, or the increase of that single people, was sufficient for the settlement of so great an extent of country in so short a time. Others speak of the Britons, not as extirpated, but as reduced to a state of slavery. And here these writers fix the origin of personal and predial servitude in England.¹⁸³

I will lay fairly before the reader all I have been able to discover concerning the existence or condition of this unhappy people. I think we may infer that they were much more broken and reduced than any other nation which had fallen under the German power. This is from two considerations:

First, that in all other parts of Europe, the ancient *language* subsisted after the conquest, and was at length incorporated with the language of the conquerors. Whereas in England, the Saxon language received little or no tincture from the Welsh. And even among the lowest people, it seems to have continued to be a dialect of pure Teutonic to the time in which it was itself blended with the Norman.

Secondly, that on the continent, after the northern irruptions, the Christian *religion* not only remained, but flourished. It was very early and universally adopted by the ruling people. But in England, it was so entirely extinguished that when Augustin undertook his mission, it does not appear that there was a single person professing Christianity among all the Saxons.

The sudden extinction of the ancient religion and language appears sufficient to show that Britain must have suffered more than any of the neighbouring nations on the continent. But it must not be concealed that there are likewise proofs that the British race, though much diminished, was not wholly extirpated; and that those who remained were not merely as Britons, reduced to servitude. For they are mentioned as existing in some of the earlier Saxon laws. In these laws they are allowed a compensation on the footing of the lower kind of English. And they, as well as the English, are even permitted to emerge out of that low rank into a more liberal condition. This is *degradation*, but not *slavery*.¹⁸⁴ The affairs of that whole period are, however, covered with an obscurity that is not to be dissipated. The Britons had little leisure or ability to write a just account of a war by which they were ruined. And the Anglo-Saxons who succeeded them, attentive only to arms, were ignorant of the use of letters, until their conversion.

¹⁸³ *Predial servitude*: slavery attached to land or farms (serfdom). – WHG

¹⁸⁴ Laws of Ina 32, concerning a Welsh man possessing land. Id. 54.

It is on this darkened theatre that some old writers have introduced those characters and actions which have afforded such ample matter to poets, and so much perplexity to historians. This is the fabulous and heroic age of our nation. After the natural and just representations of the Roman scene, the stage is again crowded with enchanters, giants, and all the extravagant images of the wildest and most remote antiquity. No personage makes so conspicuous a figure in these stories as King Arthur. He was a prince. It is uncertain whether he was of British or Roman origin, whether born on this island or in Armorica.¹⁸⁵ But it appears that he opposed the Saxons with remarkable virtue, and no small degree of success. This has rendered him and his exploits so large an argument of romance, that both are almost disclaimed by history. Light scarcely begins to dawn until the introduction of Christianity which, bringing with it the use of letters, and the arts of civil life, affords at once a juster account of things, and facts that are more worthy of relation. Nor is there, indeed, any revolution so remarkable in the English story.

The bishops of Rome had for some time meditated on the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons. Pope Gregory I (c. 540-604), who is surnamed *the Great*, affected that pious design with an uncommon zeal. And at length he found a circumstance highly favourable to it, in the marriage of a daughter of Charibert, a king of the Franks, to the reigning monarch of Kent. This opportunity induced Pope Gregory to commission Augustin, a monk of Rheims, and a man of distinguished piety, to undertake this arduous enterprise.

It was in the year of Christ 600, and 150 years after the coming of the first Saxon colonies into England, that Ethelbert, king of Kent, received intelligence of the arrival in his dominions of a number of men in a foreign garb, practising several strange and unusual ceremonies. They desired to be conducted to the king's presence, declaring that they had things to communicate to him and to his people, of the utmost importance to their eternal welfare. This was Augustin, with forty of the associates of his mission, who now landed in the Isle of Thanet,¹⁸⁶ the same place by which the Saxons had entered before, when they extirpated Christianity.

MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

It is no excuse at all for a minister, who at our desire takes a measure contrary to our safety, that it is our own act. He who does not stay the hand of suicide, is guilty of murder. On our part, I say that to be instructed, is not to be degraded or enslaved. Information is an advantage to us; and we have a right to demand it. He that is bound to act in the dark cannot be said to act freely. When it appears evident to our governors that our desires and our interests are at variance, they should not gratify the former at the expense of the latter. Statesmen are placed in eminence, that they may have a larger horizon than we can possibly command. They have a whole before them, which we can contemplate only in the parts, and often without the necessary relations. Ministers are not only our natural rulers but our natural guides. Reason that is clearly and manfully delivered, has in itself a mighty force: but reason in the mouth of legal authority is, I may fairly say, irresistible. I admit that

¹⁸⁵ *A Armorique*: a region of Gaul between the Seine and the Loire; it includes the Brittany Peninsula. – WHG

¹⁸⁶ The Isle of Thanet is a peninsula at the easternmost part of Kent, England. It is no longer an island. – WHG

reason of state will not, in many circumstances, permit the disclosure of the true ground of a public proceeding. In that case silence is manly and it is wise. It is fair to call for trust when the principle of reason itself suspends its public use. I take the distinction to be this: it is rarely proper to divulge the ground of a particular measure making a *part* of a plan; but all the broader grounds of policy on which the *general* plan is to be adopted, should as rarely be concealed. Those who do not have the whole cause before them — call them politicians, call them people, call them what you will — are no judges. The difficulties of the case, as well as its fair side, ought to be presented. This *ought* to be done; and it is all that *can* be done. When we have our true situation distinctly presented to us, if we then resolve with a blind and headlong violence, to resist the admonitions of our friends, and to cast ourselves into the hands of our potent and irreconcilable foes, then — and not *till* then — the ministers stand acquitted before God and man for whatever may come.

MONASTIC INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS.

In the change of religion, care was taken to render the transit from falsehood to truth as little violent as possible. Though the first proselytes were kings, it does not appear that there was any persecution. It was a precept of Pope Gregory, under whose auspices this mission was conducted, that the heathen temples should not be destroyed, especially where they were well built. But that, first removing the idols, they should be consecrated anew by holier rites, and to better purposes,¹⁸⁷ in order that the prejudices of the people might not be too rudely shocked by a declared profanation of what they had so long held sacred. And that beholding everywhere the same places to which they had formerly resorted for religious comfort, they might be gradually reconciled to the new doctrines and ceremonies which were introduced there. And because the sacrifices used in the Pagan worship were always attended with feasting, and consequently were highly grateful to the multitude, the pope ordered that oxen should be slaughtered as usual near the church, and the people indulged in their ancient festivity.¹⁸⁸ Whatever popular customs of heathenism were not found to be absolutely incompatible with Christianity were retained; and some of them were continued to a very late period. At a certain season, deer were brought into St. Paul's Church in London, and laid on the altar;¹⁸⁹ and this custom subsisted until the Reformation. The names of some of the church festivals were, with a similar design, taken from those of the heathen, which had been celebrated at the same time of the year. Nothing could have been more prudent than these regulations; they were indeed formed from a perfect understanding of human nature.

While the inferior people were thus insensibly led into a better order, the example and countenance of the great had completed the work. For the Saxon kings and ruling men embraced religion with so *signal*, and in their rank so *unusual* a zeal, that in many instances they even sacrificed to its advancement the prime objects of their ambition. Wulfere, king of

¹⁸⁷ Bede's *Eccles. Hist. of Eng.*, Smith's ed. 1722. (*Bed. Hist. Eccl.*), l. i. c. 30.

¹⁸⁸ *Id.* c. eod.

¹⁸⁹ Wm. Dugdale's *History of St. Paul's*, 1658 — (orig. fn.). His illustrated history was written before the Great Fire of London destroyed the building in 1666. Christopher Wren redesigned and rebuilt St. Paul's, 1668-1701. Final touches continued until 1722. Wren died in 1723, aged 91. — WHG

the West Saxons, bestowed the Isle of Wight on the king of Sussex, to persuade him to embrace Christianity.¹⁹⁰ This zeal operated in the same manner in favour of their instructors. The greatest kings and conquerors frequently resigned their crowns, and shut themselves up in monasteries. When kings became monks, a high lustre was reflected upon the monastic state, and great credit accrued to the power of their doctrine. This was able to produce such extraordinary effects upon persons over whom religion commonly has the slightest influence.

The zeal of the missionaries was also much assisted by their superiority in the arts of civil life. At their first preaching in Sussex, that country was reduced to the greatest distress from a drought which had continued for three years. The barbarous inhabitants, destitute of any means to alleviate the famine, and in an epidemic transport of despair, frequently united forty and fifty in a body; and joining their hands, they precipitated themselves from the cliffs, and were either drowned or dashed to pieces on the rocks. Though a maritime people, they did not know how to fish. This ignorance probably arose from a remnant of Druidical superstition, which had forbidden the use of that sort of diet. In this calamity, Bishop Wilfred, their first preacher, collected nets, and at the head of his attendants, he plunged into the sea. Having opened this great resource of food, he reconciled the desperate people to life, and reconciled their minds to the spiritual care of those who had shown themselves so attentive to their temporal preservation.¹⁹¹ The same regard to the welfare of the people appeared in all their actions. The Christian kings sometimes made donations to the church of lands conquered from their heathen enemies. The clergy immediately baptized and manumitted (freed) their new vassals. Thus they endeared to all sorts of men, these doctrines and teachers, who could mitigate the rigorous law of conquest. And they rejoiced to see *religion* and *liberty* advancing with equal progress.

Nor were the monks at this time more worthy of their praise in anything, than in their zeal for personal freedom. In the canon, in which they provided against the alienation of their lands, among other charitable exceptions to this restraint they particularize the purchase of liberty.¹⁹² In their transactions with the great, the same point was always strenuously laboured. When they imposed penance, they were remarkably indulgent to persons of that rank. But they always made them purchase the remission of corporal austerity, by acts of beneficence. They urged their powerful penitents to the enfranchisement of their own slaves, and to the redemption of those which belonged to others. They directed them to the repair of highways, and to the construction of churches, bridges, and other works of general utility.¹⁹³ They extracted the fruits of virtue even from crimes; and whenever a great man expiated his private offences, he provided in the same act, for the public happiness. The monasteries were then the only corporate bodies in the kingdom. And if any persons were desirous to perpetuate their charity by a fund for the relief of the sick or indigent, there was

¹⁹⁰ Bed. *Hist. Eccl.* l. iv. c. 13. [*King Wulfere reigned over Mercia 657-674.* – WHG]

¹⁹¹ Bed. *Hist. Eccl.* l. iv. c. 13.

¹⁹² Sir Henry Spelman's *Concilia Ecclesiastica Orbis Britannici* (1639), Page 329.

¹⁹³ *Instauret etiam Dei ecclesiam; et instauret vias publicas, pontibus super aquas profundas et super caenosas vias; et manumittat servos suos proprios, et redimat ab aliis hominibus servos suos ad libertatem.* – L. Eccl. Edgari 14. - During King Edgar's rule (959-975), the Benedictine Reform movement led to a revival of monasticism. – WHG

no other way than to confide this trust to some monastery. The monks were the sole channel through which the bounty of the rich could pass in any continued stream to the poor; and the people turned their eyes towards them in all their distresses.

We must observe that the monks of that time, especially those from Ireland,¹⁹⁴ who had a considerable share in the conversion of all the northern parts, did not show that rapacious desire for riches which had long disgraced, and finally ruined their successors. Not only did they not seek, but they seemed even to shun such donations. This prevented that alarm which might have arisen from an early and declared avarice. At this time, the most fervent and holy anchorites (monks) retired to the farthest places that could be found from human concourse and help — to the most desolate and barren situations which, even from their horror, seemed particularly adapted to men who had renounced the world. Many persons followed them in order to partake of their instructions and prayers, or to form themselves upon their example. After their death, an opinion of their miracles drew still greater numbers. Establishments were gradually made. The monastic life was frugal, and their government moderate. These causes drew a constant concourse. Sanctified deserts assumed a new face; the marshes were drained, and the lands cultivated.

And as this revolution seemed to be the effect of the holiness of the place, rather than of any natural causes, it increased their credit; and every improvement drew with it a new donation. In this manner, the great abbeys of Croyland and Glastonbury, and many others, from the most obscure beginnings, were advanced to a degree of wealth and splendour little less than royal. In these primitive ages, government was not yet fixed upon solid principles, and everything was full of tumult and distraction. As the monasteries were secured from violence by their character — better than any other places by laws — several great men, and even sovereign princes, were obliged to take refuge in convents. When by a more happy revolution in their fortunes they were reinstated in their former dignities, they thought they could never make a sufficient return for the safety they had enjoyed under the sacred hospitality of these roofs. Not content to enrich them with ample possessions, so that others might also partake of the protection they had experienced, they formally erected those monasteries and their adjacent territory, into an asylum. So that all thronged to that refuge, who were rendered unquiet by their crimes, their misfortunes, or the severity of their lords. And content to live under a government to which their *minds* were subject, they raised the importance of their masters by their numbers, their labour, and above all, by an inviolable attachment.

The monastery was always the place of sepulture (burial) for the greatest lords and kings. This added to the other causes of reverence, a sort of sanctity which, in universal opinion, always attends the repositories of the dead. And they also acquired thereby a more particular protection against the great and powerful — for who would violate the tomb of his ancestors, or his own? It was not an unnatural weakness to think that some advantage might be derived from lying in holy places, and among holy persons. And this superstition

¹⁹⁴ Aidanus Finanus and Colmanus were of wonderful sanctity and frugality. For the priests of that time were so free from avarice that they would not accept territories except under compulsion. — Hen. Hunting. apud Decem. l. iii. page 333. Bed. *Hist. Eccl.* l. iii. c. 26.

was fomented with the greatest industry and art. The monks of Glastonbury spread a notion that it was almost impossible that any person should be damned, whose body lay in their cemetery. This must be considered as coming in aid of the amplest of their resources, prayer for the dead.

But there was no part of their policy, of whatever nature, that procured for them a greater or juster credit than their cultivation of learning and useful arts. For if the monks contributed to the fall of science in the Roman empire, it is certain that the introduction of learning and civility into this northern world is entirely owing to their labours. It is true that they cultivated letters only in a secondary way, and as subsidiary to religion. But the scheme of Christianity is such that it almost necessitates an attention to many kinds of learning. For the Scripture is by no means an irrelative system of moral and divine truths. But it stands connected with so many histories, and with the laws, opinions, and manners of so many various sorts of people, and in such different times, that it is altogether impossible to arrive to any tolerable knowledge of it, without having recourse to much exterior inquiry. For this reason, the progress of this religion has always been marked by the progress of letters.

There were two other circumstances at this time, that contributed no less to the revival of learning. The sacred writings had not been translated into any vernacular language, and even the ordinary service of the church was still continued in the Latin tongue. Therefore, all who formed themselves for the ministry, and hoped to make any figure in it, were in a way driven to the study of the writers of polite antiquity, in order to qualify themselves for their most ordinary functions.¹⁹⁵ By this means, a practice that is liable to great objections in itself, had a considerable share in preserving the wrecks of literature. It was one means of conveying down to our times those inestimable monuments which otherwise, in the tumult of barbarous confusion on one hand, and untaught piety on the other, must inevitably have perished.

The second circumstance, the *pilgrimages* of that age, if considered in itself, was as liable to objection as the former. But it proved of equal advantage to the cause of literature. A principal object of these pious journeys was *Rome*, which contained all the little that was left in the western world, of ancient learning and taste. The other great object of those pilgrimages was *Jerusalem*. This led them into the Grecian empire, which still subsisted in the East with great majesty and power. Here the Greeks had not only not discontinued the ancient studies, but they added to the stock of arts many inventions of curiosity and convenience that were unknown to antiquity. When afterwards the Saracens prevailed in that part of the world, the pilgrims also had, by the same means, an opportunity to profit from the improvements of that laborious people. However little the majority of these pious travellers might have had such objects in view, something useful must unavoidably have stuck to them. A few certainly saw with more discernment, and they rendered their travels serviceable to their country by importing other things besides miracles and legends. Thus a communication was opened between this remote island, and countries of which it otherwise could then scarcely have heard mention. Pilgrimages thus preserved that intercourse among

¹⁹⁵ That is, the study of classical Greek and Roman literature (Aristotle, Plato, Tacitus, Cicero, Horace, *et al*) aided their study of Scripture, and the early church fathers (Irenaeus, Clement, Tertullian, Augustine, *et al*). – WHG

mankind, which is now formed by politics, commerce, and learned curiosity. It is not wholly unworthy of observation, that Providence, which strongly appears to have intended the continual intermixture of mankind, never leaves the human mind destitute of a principle to effect it. This purpose is sometimes carried on by a sort of migratory instinct, sometimes by the spirit of conquest. At one time avarice drives men from their homes; at another they are actuated by a thirst for knowledge. Where none of these causes can operate, the sanctity of particular places attracts men from the most distant quarters. It was *this* motive which sent thousands in those ages to Jerusalem and to Rome; and now, in a full tide, it impels half the world annually to Mecca.

By those voyages, the seeds of various kinds of knowledge and improvement were at different times imported into England. They were cultivated in the leisure and retirement of monasteries; otherwise they could not have been cultivated at all. For it was altogether necessary to draw certain men from the generally primitive and fierce society, and to set a bar wholly between them and the barbarous life of the rest of the world, in order to fit them for study, and for the cultivation of arts and science. Accordingly, we find everywhere, in the first institutions for the propagation of knowledge among any people, that those who followed it were set apart and secluded from the mass of the community.

The great ecclesiastical chair of this kingdom, for near a century, was filled by foreigners. They were nominated by the popes, who were in that age just or politic enough to appoint persons of a merit that was in some degree adequate to that important charge. Through this series of foreign and learned prelates, continual accessions were made to the originally slender stock of English literature. The greatest and most valuable of these accessions was made in the time and by the care of Theodorus, the seventh archbishop of Canterbury. He was a Greek by birth; a man of a high ambitious spirit, and of a mind more liberal, and talents better cultivated, than generally fell to the lot of the western prelates. He first introduced the study of his native language into this island. He brought with him a number of valuable books in many faculties. Among them was a magnificent copy of the works of Homer, the most ancient and best of poets. And the best chosen to inspire a people who had just been initiated into letters, with an ardent love, and with a true taste for the sciences. Under his influence, a school was formed at Canterbury. And thus the other great fountain of knowledge, the Greek tongue, was opened in England in the year of our Lord 669.

COMMON LAW AND THE MAGNA CHARTA.

The common law, as it then prevailed in England, was in a great measure composed of some remnants of the old Saxon customs, joined to the feudal institutions brought in at the Norman conquest. And here it is to be observed that the constitutions of Magna Charta are by no means a renewal of the laws of St. Edward, or the ancient Saxon laws, as our historians and law-writers generally assert, though groundlessly. They bear no resemblance in any particular to the laws of St. Edward, nor to any other collection of these ancient institutions. Indeed, how should they? The object of Magna Charta is the correction of the feudal policy which was first introduced, at least in any regular form, at the Conquest, and did not subsist before it. It may be further observed that in the preamble to the Great Charter, it is stipulated that the barons shall *hold* the liberties, there granted *to them and*

their heirs, from the King and his heirs. This shows that the doctrine of an unalienable tenure was always uppermost in their minds. Their idea even of liberty was not (if I may use the expression) *perfectly* free; and they did not claim to possess their privileges upon any natural principle or independent bottom, but just as they held their lands, *from the king.* This is worthy of observation. By the feudal law, all landed property is, by a feigned conclusion, supposed to be derived — and therefore to be mediately or immediately held — from the Crown.

If some estates were so derived, others were certainly procured by the same original title of conquest by which the crown itself was acquired; and the derivation from the king could in reason only be considered as a fiction of law. But once its consequent rights are supposed, many real charges and burdens grew from a fiction made only for the preservation of subordination. And in consequence of this, a great power was exercised over the persons and estates of the tenants. The fines on the succession to an estate, called “Reliefs,” in the feudal language, were not fixed to any certainty. And therefore they were frequently made so excessive that they might be considered as redemptions or new purchases, rather than acknowledgments of superiority and tenure. With respect to that most important article of marriage, there was a great restraint laid upon it in the very nature of the feudal holding. It was of importance to the lord, that the person who received the feud ¹⁹⁶ should be submissive to him. He therefore had a right to interfere in the marriage of the heiress who inherited the feud. This right was carried further than the necessity required; the male heir himself was obliged to marry according to the choice of his lord. And even widows who had made one sacrifice to the feudal tyranny, were neither allowed to continue in the widowed state, nor to choose for themselves the partners of their second bed. In fact, marriage was publicly set up for sale. The ancient records of the exchequer afford many instances where some women purchased by heavy fines, the privilege of a single life; some the free choice of a husband; others the liberty of rejecting some particularly disagreeable person. And what may appear extraordinary, examples are not lacking where a woman has fined in a considerable sum, so that she might not be compelled to marry a certain man. The suitor on the other hand has outbid her; and solely by offering more for the marriage than the heiress could offer to prevent it, he carried his point directly and avowedly against her inclinations.

Now, as the king claimed no right over his immediate *tenants*, which they did not exercise in the same or in a more oppressive manner over their *vassals*, it is hard to conceive a more general and cruel grievance than this shameful market which so universally outraged the most sacred relations among mankind. But the tyranny over women was not over with the marriage. As the king seized into his hands the estate of every deceased tenant in order to secure his relief, the widow was often driven by a heavy composition, to purchase the admission to her dower, into which it seems she could not enter without the king’s consent.

All these were marks of a real and grievous servitude. The Great Charter was made not to destroy the root, but to cut short the overgrown branches of the feudal service — *first*, in moderating and in reducing to a certainty, the reliefs which the king’s tenants paid upon succeeding to their estate according to their rank; and *secondly*, in taking off some of the

¹⁹⁶ *Feud*: an estate granted to a vassal by a feudal lord in exchange for service. – WHG

burdens which had been laid on marriage, whether compulsory or restrictive, thereby preventing that shameful market which had been made in the persons of heirs, and the most sacred things among mankind.

There were other provisions made in the Great Charter, that went deeper than the feudal tenure, and affected the whole body of the civil government. A great part of the king's revenue then consisted in the fines and amercements which were imposed in his courts. A fine was paid for the liberty to commence or conclude a suit. The punishment of offences by fine was discretionary; and this discretionary power had been very much abused. But by Magna Charta, things were so ordered that a delinquent might be punished, but not ruined, by a fine or amercement, because the degree of his offence, and the rank he held, were to be taken into consideration. His freehold, his merchandise, and those instruments by which he obtained his livelihood, were made sacred from such impositions. A more grand reform was made with regard to the administration of justice. The kings in those days seldom resided long in one place, and their courts followed their persons. This erratic justice must have been productive of infinite inconvenience to the litigants. It was now provided that civil suits, called *common pleas*, should be fixed to some certain place. Thus one branch of jurisdiction was separated from the king's court, and detached from his person. They had not yet come to that maturity of jurisprudence as to think this might be made to extend to criminal law *also*; and that the latter was an object of still greater importance. But even the former may be considered as a great revolution. A tribunal was established — a creature of mere law, independent of personal power. And this separation of a king's *authority* from his *person* was a matter of vast consequence towards introducing ideas of freedom, and confirming the sacredness and majesty of laws.

But the grand article, and that which cemented together all the parts of the fabric of liberty, was this: "that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, except by judgment of his peers."

There is another article of nearly as much consequence as the former (considering the state of the nation at that time), by which it is provided that the barons shall grant to their *tenants* the same liberties which they had stipulated for *themselves*. This prevented the kingdom from degenerating into the worst imaginable government, a feudal aristocracy. The English barons were not in the condition of those great princes who had made the French monarchy so low in the preceding century; nor like those who reduced the imperial power to a name. They had been brought to moderate bounds by the policy of the first and second Henrys, and were not in a condition to set up for petty sovereigns by an usurpation equally detrimental to the Crown and the people. They were able to act only in confederacy; and this common cause made it necessary to consult the common good, and to study popularity by the equity of their proceedings. This was a very happy circumstances to the growing liberty.

EUROPE AND THE NORMAN INVASION.

Before the period of which we are going to treat, England was little known or considered in Europe. Their situation, their domestic calamities, and their ignorance, circumscribed the views and politics of the English people within the bounds of their own island. But the Norman conqueror threw down all these barriers. The English laws, manners, and maxims,

were suddenly changed; the scene was enlarged. And the communication with the rest of Europe being thus opened, it has been preserved ever since in a continued series of wars and negotiations. That we may therefore enter more fully into the matters which lie before us, it is necessary that we understand the state of the neighbouring continent at the time when this island first came to be interested in its affairs.

The northern nations which had overrun the Roman empire, were at first actuated by avarice rather than ambition, and were more intent upon plunder than conquest. They were carried beyond their original purposes when they began to form regular governments, for which they had been prepared by no just *ideas* of legislation. For a long time, therefore, there was little order in their affairs, or foresight in their designs. The Goths, the Burgundians, the Franks, the Vandals, the Suevi, after they had prevailed over the Roman empire, they by turns prevailed over each other in continual wars. These were carried on upon no principles of a determinate policy, entered into upon motives of brutality and caprice, and ended as fortune and primitive violence chanced to prevail. Tumult, anarchy, and confusion overspread the face of Europe; and an obscurity rests upon the transactions of that time, which allows us to discover nothing but its extreme barbarity.

Before this cloud could be dispersed, the Saracens began to carry their arms, their manners, and their religion into every part of the universe. This was another body of barbarians from the south, animated by a fury not unlike that which gave strength to the northern irruptions, but heightened by enthusiasm, and regulated by subordination and a uniform policy. Spain was entirely overwhelmed by the torrent of their armies. Italy and the islands were harassed by their fleets, and all Europe was alarmed by their vigorous and frequent enterprises. Italy, which had so long sat as the *mistress* of the world, was by turns the *slave* of all nations. The possession of that fine country was hotly disputed between the Greek emperor and the Lombards, and it suffered infinitely by that contention. Germany, the parent of so many nations, was exhausted by the swarms she had sent abroad. However, in the midst of this chaos, there were principles at work which reduced things to a certain form, and gradually unfolded a system in which the chief movers and main springs were the papal and the imperial powers. The aggrandisement or diminution of these have been the drift of almost all the politics, intrigues, and wars which have employed and distracted Europe to this day.

The whole western world had received its Christianity from Rome. She was the asylum of whatever learning had escaped the general desolation; and even in her ruins she preserved something of the majesty of her ancient greatness. On these accounts she had a respect and a weight which increased every day among a simple religious people, who looked but a little way into the consequences of their actions. The rudeness of the world was very favourable for the establishment of an *empire of opinion*. The moderation with which the popes at first exerted this empire, made its growth unfelt until it could no longer be opposed. The policy of later popes, building on the piety of the first, continually increased it; and they made use of every instrument but that of force. They equally employed the virtues and the crimes of the great. They favoured the lust of kings for absolute authority, and the desire of subjects for liberty. They provoked war, and mediated peace. And they took advantage of every turn in the minds of men, whether of a public or private nature, to extend their influence and to

push their power from ecclesiastical to civil — from subjection to independency; from independency to empire.

France had many advantages over the other parts of Europe. The Saracens had no permanent success in that country. The same hand which expelled those invaders, deposed the last of a race of heavy and degenerate princes, more like eastern monarchs than German leaders. They had neither the force to repel the enemies of their kingdom, nor to assert their own sovereignty. This usurpation placed on the throne princes of another character; princes, who were obliged to supply their lack of title, by the vigour of their administration. The French monarch had need of some great and respected authority to throw a veil over his usurpation, and to sanctify his newly-acquired power by those names and appearances which are necessary to make it respectable to the people. On the other hand, the pope, who hated the Grecian empire, and equally feared the success of the Lombards, saw with joy this new star arise in the north, and gave it the sanction of his authority. Presently he called it to his assistance. Pepin crossed the Alps, relieved the pope, and invested him with the dominion of a large country in the best part of Italy.¹⁹⁷

Charlemagne pursued the course which was marked out for him, and put an end to the Lombard kingdom, weakened by the policy of his father, and by the enmity of the popes who never willingly saw a strong power in Italy. Then he received from the hand of the pope the imperial crown, sanctified by the authority of the Holy See, and with it the title of Emperor of the Romans. This was a venerable name from the fame of the old empire, and which was supposed to carry great and unknown prerogatives. And thus the empire rose again out of its ruins in the West. What is remarkable, is that it was by means of one of those nations which had helped to destroy it. If we take in the conquests of Charlemagne, the empire was very nearly as extensive as formerly — though its constitution was altogether different, being based entirely on the northern model of government.

From Charlemagne, the pope received in return an enlargement and a confirmation of his new territory. Thus the papal and imperial powers mutually gave birth to each other. They continued for some ages and, in some measure, still continue closely connected with a variety of pretensions upon each other, and on the rest of Europe. Though the imperial power had its origin in France, it was soon divided into two branches, the *Gallic* and the *German*. The latter alone supported the title of empire; but the power being weakened by this division, the papal pretensions had the greater weight. The pope, because he first revived the imperial dignity, claimed a right of disposing of it, or at least of giving validity to the election of the emperor. The emperor, on the other hand, claimed the same privileges in the election of a pope. He remembered the rights of those sovereigns whose title he bore, and how recently the power which insulted him with such demands, had arisen from the bounty of his predecessors, The claims of both were somewhat plausible. The one was supported by force of arms, and the other by ecclesiastical influence — powers which in those days were very nearly balanced. Italy was the theatre upon which this prize was disputed. In every city the parties in favour of each of the opponents were not far from being equal in their numbers and strength. While these parties disagreed in the choice of a master,

¹⁹⁷ Others say it was Pope Stephen who crossed the alps in 754 to meet Pepin at Ponthion in France. – WHG

by contending for a choice in their subjection, they grew imperceptibly into freedom, and passed through the medium of faction and anarchy into regular commonwealths. Thus arose the republics of Venice, of Genoa, of Florence, Sienna, and Pisa, and several others. These cities, established in this freedom, turned the frugal and ingenious spirit contracted in such communities, to navigation and traffic. And pursuing them with skill and vigour, while commerce was neglected and despised by the rustic gentry of the *martial* governments, they grew to a considerable degree of wealth, power, and civility.

The Danes, who in this latter time preserved the spirit and the numbers of the ancient Gothic people, had seated themselves in England in the Low Countries, and in Normandy. They passed from there to the southern part of Europe, and in this romantic age gave rise to a new kingdom, and a new line of princes in Sicily and Naples.

All the kingdoms on the continent of Europe were governed nearly in the same form. From this arose a great similitude in the manners of their inhabitants. The feudal discipline extended itself everywhere, and influenced the conduct of the courts, and the manners of the people, with its own irregular martial spirit. Subjects who were under the complicated laws of a various and rigorous servitude, exercised all the prerogatives of sovereign power. They distributed justice, they made war and peace at pleasure. The sovereign, with great pretensions, had but little power; he was only a greater lord among great lords, who profited from the differences of his peers. Therefore no steady plan could be well pursued, either in war or peace. In that day, a prince seemed irresistible at the head of his numerous vassals, because their duty obliged them to war, and they performed this duty with pleasure. The next day saw this formidable power vanish like a dream, because this fierce undisciplined people had no patience, and the time of the feudal service was contained within very narrow limits. It was therefore easy at all times to find a number of persons ready to follow any standard; but it was hard to complete a considerable design, which required a regular and continued movement. This enterprising disposition in the gentry was very general, because they had little occupation or pleasure except in war. And the greatest rewards then attended personal valour and prowess. All who professed arms, became in some sort an equality. A knight was the peer of a king; and men had been used to seeing the bravery of private persons opening a road to that dignity. The temerity of adventurers was greatly justified by the ill order of every state, which left it prey to almost any who should attack it with sufficient vigour.

Thus, little checked by any superior power, full of fire, impetuosity, and ignorance, they longed to signalize themselves wherever an honourable danger called them; and wherever that invited them, they did not weigh very deliberately the probability of success. The knowledge of this general disposition in the minds of men will naturally remove a great deal of our wonder at seeing an attempt like that of William, which was founded on such slender appearances of right, and supported by a power so little proportioned to the undertaking. Yet he was so warmly embraced and so generally followed, not only by his own subjects, but by all the neighbouring potentates. The counts of Anjou, Bretagne, Ponthieu, Boulogne, and Poictou, sovereign princes, adventurers from every quarter of France, the Netherlands, and the remotest parts of Germany — laying aside their jealousies and enmities to one another, as well as to William — ran with an inconceivable ardour into this enterprise. They were

captivated with the splendour of the object, which obliterated all thoughts of the uncertainty of the event. William kept up this fervour by promises of large territories to all his allies and associates in the country to be reduced by their united efforts. But after all, it became equally necessary to reconcile to his enterprise the three great powers of whom we have just spoken, whose disposition must have had the most influence on his affairs.

His feudal lord, the king of France, was bound by his most obvious interests to oppose the further aggrandisement of one who was already too potent for a vassal. But the king of France was then a minor; and Baldwin, earl of Flanders, whose daughter William had married, was regent of the kingdom. This circumstance rendered the remonstrance of the French council against his design of no effect. Indeed, the opposition of the council itself was faint. The idea of having a king under vassalage to their crown might have dazzled the more superficial courtiers; while those who thought more deeply, were unwilling to discourage an enterprise which they believed would probably end in the ruin of the undertaker. The emperor was in his minority, as well as the king of France. But by what arts the duke prevailed upon the imperial council to declare in his favour, is altogether uncertain, whether or not by an idea of creating a balance to the power of France (if we can imagine that *any* such idea then subsisted). But it is certain that he obtained leave for the vassals of the empire to engage in his service, and that he made use of this permission. The pope's consent was obtained with still less difficulty. William had shown himself in many instances a friend to the church, and a favourer of the clergy. On this occasion, he promised to improve those happy beginnings in proportion to the means he might acquire by the favour of the Holy See. It is said that he even proposed to hold his new kingdom as a fief from Rome. The pope therefore entered heartily into his interests. He excommunicated all those who might oppose William's enterprise, and sent him, as a means of ensuring success, a consecrated banner.¹⁹⁸

ANCIENT INHABITANTS OF BRITAIN.

We are assured by the best proofs, that Britain was first peopled from Gaul: the proximity of their situation, and a resemblance in language and manners. We must be contented to remain in ignorance of the time in which this event happened, for we have no monuments. But we may conclude that it was a very ancient settlement, since the Carthaginians found this island inhabited when they traded here for tin — as the Phoenicians, whose tracks they followed in this commerce, are said to have done long before them. It is true that when we consider the short interval between the universal deluge and that period, and compare it with the first settlement of men at such a distance from this corner of the world, it may not seem easy to reconcile such a claim to antiquity with the only authentic account we have of the origin and progress of mankind. Especially as in those early ages the whole face of nature was extremely primitive and uncultivated — when the links of commerce, even in the countries first settled, were few and weak; navigation imperfect; geography unknown; and the hardships of travelling excessive. But the spirit of migration, of which we now have only some faint ideas, was then strong and universal; and it fully compensated all these

¹⁹⁸ You will find a few more details here: <https://regia.org/research/history/papalpolitics.htm> - WHG

disadvantages. Many writers indeed imagine that these migrations, so common in primitive times, were caused by the prodigious increase of people beyond what their several territories could maintain. But this opinion, far from being supported, is rather contradicted by the general appearance of things in that early time. In every country, vast tracts of land were allowed to lie almost useless in morasses and forests. Nor is it more countenanced by the ancient modes of life, which were in no way favourable to population. I apprehend that these first settled countries, so far from being overstocked with inhabitants, were rather thinly peopled. And the same causes which occasioned that thinness, also occasioned those frequent migrations which make so large a part of the first history of almost all nations. For in these ages, men subsisted chiefly by pasturage or hunting. These are occupations which *spread* the people without *multiplying* them in proportion. They teach them an extensive knowledge of the country; they frequently carry them far from their homes; and they weaken those ties which might attach them to any particular habitation.

It was in a great degree from this manner of life, that mankind became scattered in the earliest times over the whole globe. But their peaceful occupations did not contribute so much to that end, as their wars, which were no less frequent and violent because the people were few, and the interests for which they contended were of but small importance. Ancient history has furnished us with many instances of whole nations, expelled by invasion, falling in upon others which they have entirely overwhelmed. They were more irresistible in their defeat and ruin, than in their fullest prosperity. The rights of war were then exercised with great inhumanity. A cruel death, or a servitude scarcely less cruel, was the certain fate of all conquered people. The terror which hurried men from habitations to which they were but little attached, to seek security and repose under any climate that, however undesirable in other respects, might afford them refuge from the fury of their enemies. Thus the bleak and barren regions of the north, not being peopled by *choice*, were peopled in all probability as early as many of the milder and more inviting climates of the southern world. And thus, by a wonderful disposition of the Divine Providence, a life of *hunting* (which does not contribute to increase), and *war* (which is the great instrument in the destruction of men), were the two principal causes of their being spread so early and so universally over the whole earth. From what is very commonly known of the state of North America, it need not be said how often, and to what distance, several of the nations on that continent are used to migrating. Though thinly scattered, they occupy an immense extent of country. Nor are the causes of it less obvious — their *hunting* life, and their inhuman *wars*.

Such migrations, sometimes by choice, but more frequently from necessity, were common in the ancient world. Frequent necessities introduced a fashion which subsisted after the original causes. For how could it happen — if not from some universally established public prejudice, which always overrules and stifles the private sense of men — that a whole nation should deliberately think it a wise measure to quit their country in a body, so that they might obtain settlement in a foreign land which must wholly depend on the chance of war? Yet this resolution was taken, and actually pursued, by the entire nation of the Helvetii, as it is minutely related by Caesar.¹⁹⁹ The method of reasoning which led them to it, must appear

¹⁹⁹ *Helvetii*: a Gallic tribe that occupied the plain of Switzerland. — WHG

to us utterly inconceivable. They were far from being compelled to this extraordinary migration by any lack of subsistence at home. For it appears that they raised without difficulty, as much corn in one year as supported them for two. They could not complain of the barrenness of such a soil.

This spirit of migration, which grew out of ancient manners and necessities, and sometimes operated like a blind instinct (such as actuates birds of passage), is very sufficient to account for the early habitation of the remotest parts of the earth. And in some way, it also justifies that claim which has been so fondly made by almost all nations unto great antiquity. Gaul, from where Britain was originally peopled, consisted of three nations; the Belgae towards the north; the Celtae in the middle countries; and the Aquitani to the south. Britain appears to have received its people only from the Belgae and Celtae. From the Celtae were derived the most ancient tribes of the Britons, of which the most considerable were called Brigantes. The Belgae, who did not even settle in Gaul until after Britain had been peopled by colonies from the former, forcibly drove the Brigantes into the inland countries; and possessed the greatest part of the coast, especially to the south and west. These Brigantes, as they entered the island in a more improved age, brought with them the knowledge and practice of agriculture, which only prevailed in their own countries, however. The Brigantes still continued their ancient way of life by pasturage and hunting. They differed in this respect alone; so that whatever we say in treating their manners, is equally applicable to both. And though the Britons were further divided into an innumerable multitude of lesser tribes and nations, yet all were branches of these two stocks; it is not to our purpose to consider them more minutely.

In the time of Julius Caesar [100-44 BC], Britain was what it is at this day in climate and natural advantages — temperate and reasonably fertile. But being destitute of all those improvements which in a succession of ages it has received from ingenuity, commerce, riches, and luxury, it wore then a very rough and savage appearance. The country was forest or marsh; the habitations, cottages; the cities, hiding-places in woods; the people, naked or only covered with skins; their sole employment, pasturage and hunting. They painted their bodies for ornament or terror, by a custom general among all savage nations. Being passionately fond of show and finery, and having no object but their naked bodies on which to exercise this disposition, they have in all times painted or cut their skins, according to their ideas of ornament. They shaved the beard on the chin; the hair on the upper lip was allowed to remain and grow to an extraordinary length, to favour the martial appearance in which they placed their glory. In their natural temper, they were not unlike the Gauls — impatient, fiery, inconstant, ostentatious, boastful, fond of novelty. And like all barbarians, they were fierce, treacherous, and cruel. Their arms were short javelins, small shields of a slight texture, and great cutting swords with a blunt point, in the Gaulish fashion.

Their chiefs went to battle in chariots, not unartfully contrived, nor unskilfully managed. I cannot help thinking that it was something extraordinary, and not easily to be accounted for, that the Britons should have been so expert in the fabric of those chariots, when they seemed utterly ignorant in all other mechanic arts; but thus it is delivered to us. They also had horses, though of no great reputation in their armies. Their infantry was without heavy armour; it had no firm body, nor was it instructed to preserve their ranks, to maneuver, or

to obey their commanders. But they are said to have excelled in tolerating hardships, and in their dexterity of forming ambushes (the military art of savages). A natural ferocity, and an impetuous onset, stood in place of discipline.

PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS.

Public prosecutions have become little better than schools for treason. They are of no use but to improve the dexterity of criminals in the mystery of evasion; or to show with what complete impunity men may conspire against the commonwealth; or with what safety assassins may attempt its awful head. Everything is secure, except what the laws have made sacred; everything that is not fury and faction, is tameness and languor. While the distempers of a relaxed fibre prognosticate and prepare all the morbid force of convulsion in the body of the state, the steadiness of the physician is overpowered by the very aspect of the disease. The doctor of the constitution, pretending to underrate what he is not able to contend with, shrinks from his own operation. He doubts and questions the salutary but critical terrors of the cautery and the knife. He takes a poor credit even from his defeat, and covers impotence under the mask of leniency. He praises the moderation of the laws, as he sees them baffled and despised in his hands. Is all this because in our day the statutes of the kingdom are not engrossed in as firm a character, nor imprinted in as black and legible a type as ever? No! The law is a clear, but it is a dead letter. Dead and putrid, it is insufficient to save the state, but potent to infect and to kill. Living law, full of reason, equity, and justice (as it is, or it should not exist), ought to be severe and awful too. Or the words of menace — whether written on the parchment roll of England, or cut into the brazen tablet of Rome — will excite nothing but contempt.

How does it happen that in all the state prosecutions of magnitude, from the Revolution to these past two or three years, the Crown has scarcely ever retired from its courts, disgraced and defeated? Where does this alarming change come from? By a connection easily felt, and not impossible to be traced to its cause, all the parts of the state have their correspondence and consent. Those who bow to the enemy abroad, will not be of power to subdue the conspirator at home. It is impossible not to observe that the fascination grows irresistible in proportion, as we approximate to the poisonous jaws of anarchy. In proportion as we are attracted towards the focus of illegality, irreligion, and desperate enterprise, all the venomous and blighting insects of the state are awakened into life. The promise of the year is blasted, and shrivelled, and burned up before them. Our most salutary and most beautiful institutions yield nothing but dust and smut; the harvest of our law is no more than stubble. It is in the nature of these eruptive diseases in the state, to sink by fits, and then re-appear. But the fuel of the malady remains. And in my opinion it is not in the smallest degree mitigated in its malignity, even if it awaits the favourable moment of a freer communication with the *source* of regicide, to exert and increase its force.

Is it because the people are changed, that the commonwealth cannot be protected by its laws? I hardly think it. On the contrary, I conceive that these things happen because men are *not* changed, but always remain what they always were. They remain what the bulk of us must ever be when abandoned to our vulgar propensities, without guide, leader, or control. That is, we are made to be full of a blind elevation in prosperity; to despise untried dangers;

to be overpowered with unexpected reverses; to find no clue in a labyrinth of difficulties; to get out of a present inconvenience with any risk of future ruin; to follow and to bow to fortune; to *admire* successful though wicked enterprise, and to *imitate* what we admire. We condemn the government which announces danger from sacrilege and regicide while they are only in their infancy and their struggle, but which finds nothing that can alarm in their adult state, and in the power and triumph of those destructive principles. In a mass, we cannot be left to ourselves. We must have *leaders*. If none will undertake to lead us rightly, we will find guides who will contrive to conduct us to shame and ruin.

TRUE NATURE OF A JACOBIN WAR.

As for me, I was always steadily of the opinion that this disorder was not intermittent in its nature. I conceived that, once begun, the contest could not be laid down again, to be resumed at our discretion. Rather, our first struggle with this evil would also be our last. I never thought we could make peace with the system, because it was not for the sake of an object that we pursued a rivalry with each other; we were at war with the system itself. As I understood the matter, we were at war not with its *conduct*, but with its *existence* — convinced that its existence and its hostility were the same.

This faction is not local or territorial. It is a *general* evil.²⁰⁰ Even where it least appears in action, it is still full of life. it recruits its strength in its sleep, and it prepares for exertion. Its spirit lies deep in the corruption of our common nature. The *social order* which restrains it, *feeds* it. It exists in every country in Europe; and among all orders of men in every country, who look up to France as to a common head. The centre is there. The circumference is the world of Europe, wherever the race of Europe may be settled. Everywhere else the faction is militant; in France it is triumphant. In France is the bank of deposit, and the bank of circulation, of all the pernicious principles that are forming in every state. It will be a folly scarcely deserving of pity, and too mischievous for contempt, to think of restraining it in any other country while it is predominant there. War, instead of being the *cause* of its force, has suspended its operation. It has at least given a reprieve to the Christian world. The true nature of a Jacobin war, in the beginning, was felt, acknowledged, and even declared in the most precise manner by most of the Christian powers. In the joint manifesto, published by the emperor and the king of Prussia, on the 4th of August 1792, it is expressed in the clearest terms. And it was based on principles which could not fail (if they had adhered to them) of classing those monarchs with the first benefactors of mankind. This manifesto was published, as they themselves express it,

“to lay open to the present generation, as well as to posterity, their motives, their intentions, and the *disinterestedness* of their personal views; taking up arms for the purpose of preserving

²⁰⁰ *Jacobins* were the most radical element of the French Revolution, who instituted the Reign of Terror. Jacobins are distinct from the Jacobites of England, who supported the exiled king James II (Latin: *Jacobus*) and his descendants. The *Jacobins* of France got their name from meeting at Saint Jacques, the Dominican Monastery in Paris (*Jacques* is *Jacobus* in Latin). Burke uses the term here to describe a general international movement bent on overthrowing existing governments, in favor of dictatorships, to deal with war, economic chaos, and insurrection. It employs class warfare, price controls, and the brutal suppression of political opponents. Socialist Louis Blanqui wrote in 1849, that socialism needed to be built on the foundations laid by the French Revolution and the Enlightenment. — WHG

social and political order among all civilized nations, and to secure to *each* state its religion, happiness, independence, territories, and real constitution.” —

“On this ground, they hoped that all empires and all states would be unanimous; and becoming the firm guardians of the happiness of mankind, that they could not fail to unite their efforts to rescue a numerous nation from its own fury, to preserve Europe from the return of barbarism, and the universe from the subversion and anarchy with which it was threatened.”

The whole of that noble performance ought to be read at the first meeting of any congress which may assemble for the purpose of pacification. In that peace, “these powers expressly renounce all views of personal aggrandisement,” and confine themselves to objects worthy of so generous, so heroic, and so perfectly wise and politic an enterprise. It was to the principles of this confederation, and to no other, that we wished our sovereign and our country to accede, as a part of the commonwealth of Europe. To these principles, with some trifling exceptions and limitations, they fully acceded.²⁰¹ And all our friends who took office, acceded to the ministry (whether wisely or not), as I always understood the matter, on the faith and on the principles of that declaration.

As long as these powers flattered themselves that the *menace* of force would produce the *effect* of force, they acted on those declarations. But when their menaces failed to succeed, their efforts took a new direction. It did not appear to them that virtue and heroism ought to be purchased by millions of rix-dollars.²⁰² It is a dreadful truth, but it is a truth that cannot be concealed — in ability, in dexterity, in the distinctness of their views, the Jacobins are our superiors. They saw the thing right from the very beginning. Whatever were the first motives to the war among politicians, they saw that in its spirit, and for its objects, it was a *civil war*; and they pursued it as such. It is a war between the partisans of the ancient, civil, moral, and political order of Europe, against a sect of fanatical and ambitious atheists which means to change them all. It is not France extending a foreign empire over other nations: it is a sect aiming at *universal* empire, and beginning with the conquest of France. The leaders of that sect secured the *centre of Europe*. And that secured, they knew, that whatever might be the outcome of battles and sieges, their *cause* was victorious. Whether its territory had a little more or a little less peeled from its surface, or whether an island or two was detached from its commerce, was of little moment to them.

The conquest of France was a glorious acquisition. Once that was well laid as a basis of empire, opportunities could never be lacking to regain or to replace what had been lost, and to dreadfully avenge themselves on the faction of their adversaries. They saw it was a *civil war*. It was their business to persuade their adversaries that it ought to be a *foreign* war. The Jacobins everywhere set up a cry against the new crusade; and they intrigued with effect in the cabinet, in the field, and in every private society in Europe. Their task was not difficult. The condition of princes, and sometimes of first ministers too, is to be pitied. The creatures of the desk, and the creatures of favour, had no relish for the principles of the manifestoes. They promised no governments, no regiments, no revenues from where

²⁰¹ See Declaration, Whitehall, October 29, 1793.

²⁰² *Rixdollar*: English term for silver coinage used throughout the European continent. — WHG

emoluments might arise by perquisite or by grant. In truth, the tribe of vulgar politicians are the lowest of our species. There is no trade so vile and mechanical as government in their hands. Virtue is not their habit. They are beyond themselves in any course of conduct that is recommended only by conscience and glory. With them, a large, liberal, and prospective view of the interests of states passes for romance; and the principles that recommend it, pass for the wanderings of a disordered imagination. The calculators compute them out of their senses. The jesters and buffoons shame them out of everything grand and elevated. To them, littleness in object and in means, appears as soundness and sobriety. They think there is nothing worth pursuit, but that which they can handle; which they can measure with a two-foot rule; which they can count on ten fingers.

Without the principles of the Jacobins, perhaps without any principles at all, they played the game of that faction. There was a beaten road before them. The powers of Europe were armed; France had always appeared dangerous; the war was easily diverted from France as a *faction*, to France as a *state*. The princes were easily taught to slide back into their old, habitual course of politics. They were easily led to consider the flames that were consuming France, not as a warning to protect their own buildings (which were without any party-wall, and linked by an incorporation into the edifice of France), but as a happy occasion for pillaging the goods, and for carrying off the materials, of their neighbour's house. Their provident fears were changed into avaricious hopes. They carried on their new designs without seeming to abandon the principles of their old policy. They pretended to seek, or they flattered themselves that they did seek, a *defensive* security in the accession of new fortresses, and new territories. But the security wanted was against a kind of power which was not so truly dangerous in its fortresses nor in its territories, as in its spirit and its principles. They aimed, or pretended to aim, at *defending* themselves against a danger from which there can be no security in any *defensive* plan. If armies and fortresses were a defence against Jacobinism, Louis the Sixteenth would reign this day as a powerful monarch over a happy people.

This error obliged them, even in their offensive operations, to adopt a plan of war, against the success of which there was something little short of mathematical demonstration. They refused to take any step which might strike at the heart of affairs. They seemed unwilling to wound the enemy in any vital part. They acted through the whole, as if they really wished the conservation of the Jacobin power, as what might be more favourable than the lawful government, to the attainment of the petty objects they looked for. They always kept on the circumference. And the wider and remoter the circle was, the more eagerly they chose it as their sphere of action in this centrifugal war. In its nature, the plan they pursued demanded a great length of time. In its execution, those who went the nearest way to work, were obliged to cover an incredible extent of country. It left to the enemy every means of destroying this extended line of weakness. Ill success in any part, was sure to defeat the effect of the whole. This is true of Austria. It is still truer of England. On this false plan, even good fortune, by further weakening the victor, only put him further off from his object.

As long as there was any appearance of success, the spirit of aggrandisement, and consequently the spirit of mutual jealousy, seized upon all the coalesced powers. Some sought an accession of territory at the expense of France, some at the expense of each other,

some at the expense of third parties. And when the vicissitude of disaster took its turn, they found common distress to be a treacherous bond of faith and friendship. The greatest skill conducting the greatest military apparatus has been employed; but it has been worse than uselessly employed, through the false policy of the war. The operations of the *field* suffered by the errors of the *cabinet*. If the same spirit continues when peace is made, the peace will fix and perpetuate all the errors of the war, because it will be made upon the same false principle. What has been lost in the field, may be regained in the field. In its nature, an arrangement of peace is a permanent settlement; it is the effect of counsel and deliberation, and not of fortuitous events. If it is built on a basis that is fundamentally erroneous, it can only be retrieved by some of those unforeseen dispensations which the all-wise but mysterious Governor of the world sometimes interposes to snatch nations from ruin. It would not be pious error, but mad and impious presumption, for anyone to trust in an unknown order of dispensations, and in defiance of the rules of prudence, which are formed upon the known march of the ordinary providence of God.

NATIONAL DIGNITY.

I admit that national dignity in all treaties is an important consideration. They have given us a useful hint on that subject. But up to now, dignity has belonged to the mode of proceeding, not to the matter of a treaty. Never before has it been mentioned as the standard for rating the conditions of peace — no, never by the most violent of conquerors. Indemnification is capable of some estimate; but dignity has no standard. It is impossible to guess what acquisitions pride and ambition may think fit for their *dignity*.

PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT NOT ABSOLUTE, BUT RELATIVE.

I reprobate (reject) no form of government merely upon abstract principles. There may be situations in which the purely democratic form will become necessary. There may be some (very few, and very particularly circumstanced) where it would be clearly desirable. I do not take this to be the case of France, nor of any other great country. Until now, we have seen no examples of considerable democracies. The ancients were better acquainted with them. Not being wholly unread in the authors who had seen the most of those constitutions, and who best understood them, I cannot help concurring with their opinion that an absolute democracy, no more than absolute monarchy, is to be reckoned among the legitimate forms of government. But they think it is the corruption and degeneracy, rather than the sound constitution of a republic. If I recollect rightly, Aristotle observes that a democracy has many striking points of resemblance with a tyranny. ²⁰³

²⁰³ When I [*i.e.*, Burke] wrote this, I quoted from memory, after many years had elapsed from my reading the passage. A learned friend has found it, and it is as follows:

To ethos to auto, kai ampho despotika ton Beltionon, kai ta psephismata, ospot ekei ta epitagmata kai o demagogos kai o kolax, oi autoi kai analogoi kai malista ekateroi par ekaterois ischuousin, oi men kolakes para turannois, oi de demagogoi para tois demois tois toioutois.

“The ethical character is the same; both exercise despotism over the better class of citizens; and decrees are in the one, what ordinances and decrees are in the other: the demagogue too, and the court favourite, are not infrequently

I am certain of this, that in a democracy, the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the cruelest oppressions upon the minority, whenever strong divisions prevail in that kind of polity, as they often must. And that oppression of the minority will extend to far greater numbers, and will be carried on with much greater fury, than can almost ever be apprehended from the dominion of a single sceptre. In such a popular persecution, individual sufferers are in a much more deplorable condition than in any other. Under a cruel *prince* they have the balmy compassion of mankind to assuage the smart of their wounds; they have the plaudits of the people to animate their generous constancy under their sufferings. But those who are subjected to wrong under *multitudes*, are deprived of all external consolation. They seem deserted by mankind, overpowered by a conspiracy of their whole species. But admitting that democracy does not have that inevitable tendency to party tyranny, which I suppose it to have, and admitting it to possess as much good in it when it is unmixed — as I am sure it possesses when compounded with other forms — does monarchy, on its part, contain nothing at all to recommend it? I do not often quote Bolingbroke, nor have his works in general left any permanent impression on my mind. He is a presumptuous and a superficial writer. But he has one observation which, in my opinion, is not without depth and solidity. He says that he prefers a monarchy to other governments, because you can better engraft any description of republic on a monarchy, than engraft anything of monarchy upon the republican forms. I think he is perfectly in the right. The fact is so historically; and it agrees well with the speculation.

I know how easy a topic it is to dwell on the faults of departed greatness. By a revolution in the state, the fawning sycophant of yesterday is converted into the austere critic of the present hour. But steady, independent minds will disdain to assume the part of satirists and declaimers, when they have an object of so serious a concern to mankind as government under their contemplation. They will judge human institutions as they do human characters. They will sort out the good from the evil, which is mixed in mortal institutions, just as it is mixed in mortal men.

DECLARATION OF 1793.

It is not difficult to discern what sort of humanity our government is to learn from these syren singers. Our government also, I admit with some reason (as a step towards the proposed fraternity), is required to abjure (disavow) the unjust hatred which it bears to this body, of honour and virtue. I thank God that I am neither a minister nor a leader of the opposition. I protest that I *cannot* do what they desire. I could not do it if I were under the guillotine; or as they ingeniously and pleasantly express it, “looking out of the little national window.” Even at that opening, I could receive none of their light. I am fortified against all such affections by the declaration of the government, which I must yet consider as lawful, made on the 29th of October 1793, and still ringing in my ears:

the same identical men, and always bear a close analogy; and these have the principal power, each in their respective forms of government — favourites with the absolute monarch, and demagogues with a people such as I have described.” — Arist. *Politic.* lib. iv. cap 4.

“In their place has succeeded a system that is destructive of all public order, maintained by proscriptions, exiles, and confiscations without number; by arbitrary imprisonment; by massacres which cannot be remembered without horror; and at length by the execrable murder of a just and beneficent sovereign, and of the illustrious princess who, with an unshaken firmness, has shared all the misfortunes of her royal consort, his protracted sufferings, his cruel captivity, and ignominious death.

“They (the allies) have had to encounter acts of aggression without pretext, open violation of all treaties, unprovoked declarations of war — in a word, whatever corruption, intrigue, or violence could effect for the purpose, openly avowed, of subverting all the institutions of society, and of extending over all the nations of Europe that confusion which has produced the misery of France.

“This state of things cannot exist in France without involving all the surrounding powers in one common danger, without giving them the right — without imposing it upon them as a *duty* — to stop the progress of an evil which exists only by the successive violation of all law and all property, and which attacks the fundamental principles by which mankind is united in the bonds of civil society.

“The king would impose none other than equitable and moderate conditions, not such as the expense, the risks, and the sacrifices of the war might justify; but such as his majesty thinks himself under the indispensable necessity of requiring, with a view to these considerations, and still more to that of his own security and of the future tranquility of Europe. His majesty desires nothing more sincerely than thus to terminate a war which he in vain endeavoured to avoid, and all the calamities of which, as now experienced by France, are to be attributed only to the ambition, the perfidy, and the violence of those whose crimes have involved their own country in misery, and disgraced all civilized nations.

“The king promises, on his part, the suspension of hostilities, friendship, and (as far as the course of events will allow, of which the will of man cannot dispose) security and protection to all those who, by declaring for a monarchical form of government, shall shake off the yoke of sanguinary anarchy; of that anarchy which has broken all the most sacred bonds of society, dissolved all the relations of civil life, violated every right, confounded every duty; which uses the name of *liberty* to exercise the most cruel *tyranny*, to annihilate all property, to seize all possessions; which founds its power on the pretended consent of the people, and itself carries fire and sword through extensive provinces for having demanded their laws, their religion, and their *lawful sovereign*.”

This declaration was transmitted not only to our commanders by sea and land, but to our ministers in every court of Europe. It is the most eloquent and highly-finished in the style, the most judicious in the choice of topics, the most orderly in the arrangement, and the most rich in the colouring, without employing the smallest degree of exaggeration, of any state paper that has ever yet appeared. An ancient writer, Plutarch I think it is, quotes some verses on the eloquence of Pericles, who is called “the only orator that left stings in the minds of his hearers.” Like his, the eloquence of the declaration — not contradicting, but enforcing sentiments of the truest humanity — has left stings that have penetrated more than skin-deep into my mind. And never can they be extracted by all the surgery of murder;

never can the throbbings they have created be assuaged by all the emollient cataplasms ²⁰⁴ of robbery and confiscation. I *cannot* love the republic.

MORAL DIET.

To diet a man into weakness and languor, in order to give him greater strength afterwards, has more of the empiric (unproven) than the rational physician. It is true that some persons have been *kicked* into courage; and this is not a bad hint to give to those who are too forward and liberal in bestowing insults and outrages on their passive companions. But such a course does not at first view appear a well-chosen discipline to form men to a decent sense of honour, or a lively resentment from injuries. A long habit of humiliation does not seem a very good preparative to manly and vigorous sentiment. It may not leave, perhaps, enough energy in the mind to fairly discern what are good terms or what are not. Men who are low and dispirited may regard those terms as not at all amiss, which in another state of mind they might think intolerable. If they grow peevish in this state of mind, they may be roused, not against the *enemy* whom they have been taught to fear, but against the *ministry* who are more within their reach, and who have refused conditions that are not unreasonable, acting from power that they have been taught to consider irresistible.

KING WILLIAM'S POLICY.

His majesty ²⁰⁵ did determine, and did take and pursue his resolution. In all the tottering imbecility of a new government, and with parliament totally unmanageable, he persevered. He persevered to expel the fears of his people by his fortitude — to steady their fickleness by his constancy — to expand their narrow prudence by his enlarged wisdom — to sink their factious temper in his public spirit. In spite of his people, he resolved to make them great and glorious — to incline England to shrink into her narrow self, the arbitress of Europe, the tutelary angel of the human race. In spite of the ministers, who staggered under the weight that his mind imposed upon theirs, unsupported as they felt themselves by the popular spirit, he infused into them his own soul, he renewed in them their ancient heart, he rallied them in the same cause. It required some time to accomplish this work. The people were first gained, and then *through* them, their distracted representatives. Under the influence of King William, Holland had rejected the allurements of every seduction, and had resisted the terrors of every menace. With Hannibal at her gates,²⁰⁶ she had nobly and magnanimously refused all separate treaty, or anything which might for a moment appear to divide her affection or her interest, or even to distinguish her in identity from England. Having settled the great point of the consolidation of the countries (which he hoped would be eternal), made for a common interest, and common sentiment, the king, in his message to both

²⁰⁴ *Emollient cataplasm*: A soothing medical dressing consisting of a soft heated mass of meal or clay that is spread on a cloth, and applied to the skin to treat inflamed areas. This is Burke's caustic indictment that what is proposed is not at all a soothing cure for some alleged malady, but a deadly poison.— WHG

²⁰⁵ Burke is speaking of William I of Orange, appointed stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht by Phillip II of Spain. He became king of England in 1688. France and Spain were then considering an alliance. — WHG

²⁰⁶ "Hannibal" alludes to the Holy Roman Emperor, who threatens the Netherlands, as Hannibal once threatened Rome. For a more detailed treatment of the historical context, see this link: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Holland-historical-region-Netherlands> - WHG

houses, calls their attention to the affairs of the *States-General*. The House of Lords was perfectly sound, and entirely impressed with the wisdom and dignity of the king's proceedings. In answer to the message, which you will observe was narrowed to a single point (the *danger* of the States-General), after the usual professions of zeal for his service, the lords opened themselves at large. They go far beyond the demands of the message. They express themselves as follows:

“We take this occasion *further* to assure your majesty, that we are sensible of the *great and imminent danger to which the states-general are exposed. and we perfectly agree with them in believing that their safety and ours are so inseparably united, that whatever is ruin to the one must be fatal to the other.*

“We humbly desire your majesty will be pleased *not only* to made good all the articles of any *former* treaties to the States-General, but that you will enter into a strict league with them, offensive and defensive, *for their common preservation; and that you will invite into it all princes and states who are concerned in the present visible danger arising from the union of France and Spain.*

“And we further desire your majesty, that you will be pleased to enter into such alliances with the *emperor* as your majesty shall think fit, pursuant to the ends of the treaty of 1689; towards all of which we assure your majesty of our hearty and sincere assistance; not doubting, but whenever your majesty shall be obliged to be engaged for the defence of your allies, *and securing the liberty and quiet of Europe*, Almighty God will protect your sacred person in so righteous a cause. And we desire that the unanimity, wealth, and courage of your subjects will carry your majesty with honour and success *through all the difficulties of a just war.*”

The House of Commons was more reserved; the recent popular disposition was still prevalent to a great degree in the *representative*, after it had been made to change in the *constituent* body. The principle of the grand alliance was not directly recognised in the resolution of the Commons, nor was the war announced, though they were well aware that the alliance was formed for the war. However, compelled by the returning sense of the people, they went so far as to fix the three great immovable pillars of the safety and greatness of England — as they were then, as they are now, and as they must ever be to the end of time. They asserted in general terms the necessity of supporting Holland, of keeping united with our allies, and maintaining the liberty of Europe; though they restricted their vote to the succours stipulated by actual treaty. But now that they were fairly embarked, they were obliged to go with the course of the vessel. And the whole nation — split before into a hundred adverse factions, with a king at its head, who was evidently declining to his tomb — the whole nation, lords, commons, and people, proceeded as one body, informed by one soul. Under the *British* union, the union of *Europe* was consolidated; and it long held together with a degree of cohesion, firmness, and fidelity, not known before or since in any political combination of that extent.

Just as the last hand was given to this immense and complicated machine, the master workman died. But the work was formed on true mechanical principles, and it was just as truly wrought. It went by the impulse it had received from the first mover. The *man* was dead, but the grand *alliance* survived, in which King William lived and reigned. That heartless and dispirited people whom Lord Somers had represented about two years before

as being dead in energy and operation, continued that war to which it was supposed they were unequal in mind, and in means, for nearly thirteen years.

For what purpose have I entered into all this detail? To what purpose have I recalled your view to the end of the last century? It has been done to show that the British nation was then a great people — to point out how and by what means they came to be exalted above the vulgar level, and to take that lead which they assumed among mankind. To qualify us for that pre-eminence, we then had a high mind and an unconquerable constancy; we were then inspired with no flashy passions, but such as were durable as well as warm, such as corresponded to the great interests we had at stake. This force of character was inspired, as all such spirit must ever be, *from above*. Government gave the impulse. As well may we fancy, that the sea will swell of itself, and that the billows will insult the adverse shore without winds, as to fancy that the gross mass of the people will be moved, and elevated, and continue by a steady and permanent direction to bear upon one point, without the influence of Superior Authority, or Superior Mind.

In my opinion, this impulse ought to have been given in this war; and it ought to have been continued to it at every instant. It is made, if ever war was made, to touch all the great springs of action in the human breast. It ought not to have been a war of apology. The minister had, in this conflict, the means to glory in success; to be consoled in adversity; to hold high his principle in all fortunes. If it were not given to him to support the falling edifice, he ought to bury himself under the ruins of the civilized world. All the art of Greece, and all the pride and power of eastern monarchs, never heaped upon their ashes, so grand a monument.

DISTEMPER OF REMEDY.

This distemper of remedy, grown habitual by a vulgar and prostituted use, relaxes and wears out the spring of that spirit which is to be exerted on great occasions. It was in the most patient period of Roman servitude, that themes of tyrannicide were made the ordinary exercise of boys at school — *cum perimit saevos classis numerosa tyrannos* (while a crowded class kills savage tyrants).²⁰⁷ In the ordinary state of things, it produces the worst effects in a country like ours, even in the cause of that liberty which it abuses with the dissoluteness of an extravagant speculation. After a short space, almost all the high-bred republicans of my time have become the most decided, thorough-paced courtiers. They soon left the business of a tedious, moderate, but practical resistance, to those of us whom they have slighted in the pride and intoxication of their theories, as not much better than Tories. Hypocrisy, of course, delights in the most sublime speculations. For, never intending to go beyond speculation, it costs nothing to have it magnificent. But even in cases where levity rather than fraud was to be suspected in these ranting speculations, the issue has been much the same.

These professors, finding their extreme principles are not applicable to cases which call only for a qualified, or as I may say, civil and legal resistance, employ no resistance at all in such cases. With them, it is a war or a revolution, or else it is nothing. Finding their schemes of

²⁰⁷ Juvenal, *Satires* 7 150–51.

politics are not adapted to the state of the world in which they live, they often come to think lightly of all public principle; and they are ready, on their part, to abandon for a very trivial *interest*, what they find of very trivial *value*. Some indeed are of a steadier and more persevering nature. But these are eager politicians outside of parliament, who have little to tempt them to abandon their favourite projects. They constantly have in their view some change in the Church, or State, or both. When that is the case, they are always bad citizens, and perfectly unsure connections. For, considering their speculative designs as of infinite value, and the actual arrangement of the state as of no estimation, they are at best indifferent about it. They see no merit in the good, and no fault in the vicious management of public affairs. They rather rejoice in the latter, as more propitious to revolution. They see no merit or demerit in any man, or any action, or any political principle, any further than as they may forward or retard their design for change. They therefore take up, one day, the most violent and stretched prerogative, and at another time the wildest democratic ideas of freedom. And they pass from the one to the other without any sort of regard to cause, to person, or to party.

WAR AND WILL OF THE PEOPLE.

In matters of state, a constitutional competence to act is in many cases the smallest part of the question. Without disputing (God forbid I should dispute) the sole competence of the king and the parliament, each in its province, to decide on war and peace, I venture to say that no war can be long carried on against the will of the people. This war, in particular, cannot be carried on unless they are enthusiastically in favour of it. Acquiescence will not do. There must be *zeal*. Universal zeal in such a cause, and at such a time as this is, cannot be looked for; neither is it necessary. Zeal in the larger part carries the force of the whole. Without this, no government, and certainly not our government, is capable of a great war. None of the ancient regular governments have the wherewithal to fight abroad with a foreign foe, and to fight at home to overcome repining, reluctance, and chicanery. It must be some portentous thing, like regicide France, that can exhibit such a prodigy. Yet even she, the mother of monsters, more prolific than the country of old called *Ferax monstrorum* (wild monsters ²⁰⁸), shows symptoms of being almost effete already. And she will be so, unless the fallow of a peace comes to recruit her fertility. But whatever may be represented concerning the meanness ²⁰⁹ of the popular spirit, I for one do not think so desperately of the British nation. Our minds, as I said, are light, but they are not depraved. We are dreadfully open to delusion and to dejection; but we are also capable of being animated and undeceived.

It cannot be concealed: we are a divided people. But in divisions, where a part is to be taken, we are to muster our strength. I have often endeavoured to compute and to class those who, in any political view, are to be called *the people*. Without doing something of this sort, we must proceed absurdly. We would not be much wiser if we pretended to very great accuracy in our estimate. But I think that in the calculation I have made, the error cannot be very

²⁰⁸ Burke refers to the monster of an ungoverned and unreasoning multitude (as in mob rule). – WHG

²⁰⁹ *Meanness* means lowliness; limited in possessions, education, generosity, or even sentiments. – WHG

material. In England and Scotland, I compute that those of adult age, not declining in life, of tolerable leisure for such discussions, and of some means of information, whether more or less, and who are above menial dependence (or virtually what is such), may amount to about four hundred thousand.²¹⁰ There is such a thing as a natural representative of the people. This body is that representative; and on this body, more than on the legal constituent, the artificial representative depends. *This* is the British public; and it is a very numerous public. The rest, when feeble, are the objects of protection; when strong, the means of force. Those who affect to consider that part of us in any other light, insult while they cajole us. They do not want us for counsellors in deliberation, but to list us as soldiers for battle.

Of these four hundred thousand political citizens, I look upon one-fifth, or about eighty thousand, to be pure Jacobins; utterly incapable of amendment. They are objects of eternal vigilance, and when they break out, objects of legal constraint. No reason, no argument, no example, no venerable authority, can have the slightest influence on these. They desire a change; and they will have it if they can. If they cannot have it by English cabal, they will make no sort of scruple about having it by the cabal of France, into which they are virtually incorporated already. It is only their assured and confident expectation of the advantages of French fraternity, and the approaching blessings of regicide intercourse, that skins over their mischievous dispositions with a momentary quiet. This minority is great, and formidable. I do not know whether if I aimed at the total overthrow of a kingdom, I should wish to be encumbered with a larger body of partisans. They are more easily disciplined and directed than if the number were greater. But by their spirit of intrigue, and by their restless agitating activity, these are of a force far superior to their numbers. And if times grew the least critical, they have the means of debauching or intimidating many of those who are now sound, as well as adding to their force large bodies of the more passive part of the nation. This minority is numerous enough to make a mighty cry for peace, *or* for war, *or* for any object they are led to vehemently desire. By passing from place to place with incredible velocity, and diversifying their character and description, they are capable of *mimicking* the general voice. We must not always judge general opinion by the noise of acclamation.

FALSE POLICY IN OUR FRENCH WAR.

We have never put forth half the strength which we have exerted in ordinary wars. In the fatal battles which have drenched the continent with blood, and shaken the system of Europe to pieces, we have never had any considerable army of a magnitude to be compared to the least of those by which, in former times, we so gloriously asserted our place as protectors, not oppressors, at the head of the great commonwealth of Europe. We have never manfully met the danger up front. The enemy resigned to us our natural dominion of the ocean, and abandoned the defence of his distant possessions to the infernal energy of the destroying principles which he had planted there for the subversion of the neighbouring colonies. By one sweeping law of unprecedented despotism, he drove forth his armed multitudes on every side, to overwhelm the countries and states which had for centuries stood the firm barriers against the ambition of France. We drew back the arm of our military

²¹⁰ The population of England in 1800 was 8.3 million; Scotland 1.6 million. This is 4% of that population. His figure agrees with modern studies in political science, and holds true in all large groups of people. – WHG

force, which had never been more than half raised to oppose him. From that time we have been combating only with the other arm of our naval power — the right arm of England, I admit. But it struck almost unresisted, with blows that could never reach the heart of the hostile mischief.

From that time, without a single effort to regain those outworks, which we ever so strenuously maintained till now, as the strong frontier of our own dignity and safety, no less than the liberties of Europe. With but one feeble attempt to succour those brave, faithful, and numerous allies whom, for the first time since the days of our Edwards and Henrys, we now have in the bosom of France itself, we have instead been entrenching, and fortifying, and garrisoning ourselves at home. We have been redoubling security on security, to protect ourselves from invasion, which has now become a serious object of alarm and terror to us. Alas! the few of us who have protracted life in any measure near to the extreme limits of our short period, have been condemned to see strange things — new systems of policy, new principles, and not only new men, but what might appear to be a new *species* of men. I believe that any person who was of age to take a part in public affairs forty years ago (if the intermediate space of time were expunged from his memory) would hardly credit his senses, when he might hear from the highest authority, that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in this island, and that in the neighbouring island there were at least eighty thousand more.

But when he had recovered from his surprise upon being told of this army, which has no parallel, what must his astonishment have been to be told again that this mighty force was kept up for the mere purpose of an inert and *passive defence* — and that its far greater part was disabled by its constitution and very essence from defending us against an enemy by any one preventive stroke, or by any one operation of active hostility? What must his reflections be upon learning further, that a fleet of five hundred men of war — the best appointed, and to the full as ably commanded as any this country ever had upon the sea — was for the greater part employed in carrying on the same system of *unenterprising defence*? What must be the sentiments and feelings of someone who remembers the former energy of England, when he is given to understand that these two islands, with their extensive and everywhere vulnerable coast, should be considered as a garrisoned sea-town? What should such a man, what would *any* man think, if the garrison of so strange a fortress should be such (and so feebly commanded) as never to make a sally? And that, contrary to all which has up to now been seen in war, an infinitely inferior army, with the shattered relics of an almost annihilated navy, ill found and ill manned, may with safety besiege this superior garrison, and without hazarding the life of a man, ruin the place, merely by the menaces and false *appearances* of an attack? Indeed, indeed, my dear friend, I look upon this matter of our defensive system as much the most important of all considerations at this moment. It has oppressed me with many anxious thoughts which, more than any bodily distemper, have sunk me to the condition in which you know that I am. Should it please Providence to restore to me even the late weak remains of my strength, I propose to make this matter the subject of a particular discussion. I only mean here to argue that the mode of conducting the war on our part, be it good or bad, has prevented even the common havoc of war in our population, and especially among that class whose duty and privilege of superiority it is to lead the way amidst the perils and slaughter of the field of battle.

MORAL ESSENCE MAKES A NATION.

Mere locality does not constitute a body politic. Had Cade and his gang gotten possession of London, ²¹¹ they would not have been the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council. The body politic of France existed in the majesty of its throne, in the dignity of its nobility, in the honour of its gentry, in the sanctity of its clergy, in the reverence of its magistracy, in the weight and consideration due to its landed property in the several bailliages, in the respect due to its moveable substance represented by the corporations of the kingdom. All these particular moleculae united form the great mass of what is truly the body politic in all countries. They are so many deposits and receptacles of justice, because they can only exist by justice. *Nation* is a moral essence, not a geographical arrangement, or a denomination of the nomenclator. France, though out of her territorial possession, exists because the sole possible claimant exists, and claims — I mean the proprietary, and the government to which the proprietary adheres. God forbid that if you were expelled from your house by ruffians and assassins, that I should call the material walls, doors, and windows of _____, the ancient and honourable family of _____. Am I to transfer to the *intruders*, all the esteem and respect that I owe to *you* — those who, not content to turn you out naked to the world, would rob you of your very name? The regicides in France are not France. France is out of her bounds; but the *kingdom* is the same.

PUBLIC SPIRIT.

Other great states, having been without any regular, certain course of elevation or decline, we may hope that the British fortune may fluctuate also — because the public mind, which greatly influences that fortune, may have its changes. We are therefore never authorised to abandon our country to its fate, nor to act or advise as if it had no resource. There is no reason to apprehend, because ordinary means threaten to fail, that no others can spring up. While our heart is whole, it will *find* means, or *make* them. The heart of the citizen is a perennial spring of energy to the state. Because the pulse seems to intermit, we must not presume that it will instantly cease to beat. The public must never be regarded as incurable. I remember in the beginning of what has lately been called the Seven Years' War, that an eloquent writer and ingenious speculator, Dr. Brown, upon some reverses which happened in the beginning of that war, published an elaborate philosophical discourse to prove that the distinguishing features of the people of England have been totally changed, and that a frivolous effeminacy had become the national character. Nothing could be more popular than that work. It was thought a great consolation to us, the light people of this country (who were and are light, but who were not and are not effeminate), that we had found the causes of our misfortunes in our vices. Pythagoras could not be more pleased with his leading discovery. But while in that splenetic (irritable) mood, we amused ourselves in a sour, critical speculation of which we were ourselves the objects, and in which every man lost his *particular* sense of the public disgrace, in the *epidemic* nature of the distemper.

²¹¹ Jack Cade (d. 1450) leader of a rebellion against the government of King Henry VI. Though suppressed, it contributed to the breakdown of royal authority that led to the Wars of the Roses (1455–85). — *Ency. Brit.*

While, as in the Alps, *goître* kept *goître* in countenance;²¹² while we were thus abandoning ourselves to a direct confession of our inferiority to France — and while many, very many, were ready to act upon a sense of that inferiority — a few months effected a total change in our variable minds. We emerged from the gulf of that speculative despondency, and were buoyed up to the highest point of practical vigour. Never did the masculine spirit of England display itself with more energy, nor did its genius ever soar with a prouder pre-eminence over France, than at the time when frivolity and effeminacy had been at least tacitly acknowledged as their national character, by the good people of this kingdom.

PROGRESSIVE GROWTH OF CHRISTIAN STATES.

When I contemplate the scheme on which France is formed, and when I compare it with these systems with which it is, and ever must be in conflict, those things which seem as defects in her polity, are the very things which make me tremble. The states of the Christian world have grown up to their present magnitude in a great length of time, and by a great variety of accidents. They have been improved to what we see them with greater or lesser degrees of felicity and skill. Not one of them has been formed upon a regular plan, or with any unity of design. As their constitutions are not systematic, they have not been directed to any *peculiar* end, eminently distinguished, and superseding every other. The objects which they embrace are of the greatest possible variety, and have in a way become infinite. In all these old countries, the state has been made to the people, and not the people conformed to the state. Every state has pursued not only every sort of social advantage, but it has cultivated the welfare of every individual. His wants, his wishes, even his tastes, have been consulted. This comprehensive scheme virtually produced a degree of personal liberty in forms that are the most adverse to it. That liberty was found under absolute monarchies, in a degree unknown to the ancient commonwealths. From hence, the powers of all our modern states meet, in all their movements, with some obstruction. It is therefore no wonder that, when these states are to be considered as machines to operate for some one great end, this dissipated and balanced force is not easily concentrated, nor made to bear with the whole force of the nation on one point.

The British state is, without question, that which pursues the greatest variety of ends, and is the least disposed to sacrifice any one of them to another, or to the whole. It aims at taking in the entire circle of human desires, and securing for them their fair enjoyment. Our legislature has been ever closely connected, in its most efficient part, with individual feeling and individual interest. Personal liberty, the liveliest of these feelings and the most important of these interests — which in other European countries has arisen from the system of manners and the habitudes of life, rather than from the laws of the state (in which it flourished more from neglect than attention) — in England, it has been a direct object of government.

On this principle England would be the weakest power in the whole system. Fortunately, however, the great riches of this kingdom arising from a variety of causes, and the

²¹² The “i” in the first *goître* is circumflex, the second is acute. Burke is pointing out that even though French is spoken in the Alps, it is pronounced differently. — WHG

disposition of the people, which is as great to spend as to accumulate, has easily afforded a disposable surplus that gives a mighty momentum to the state. This difficulty, with these advantages to overcome it, has called forth the talents of the English financiers who, by the surplus of industry poured out by prodigality, have outdone everything which has been accomplished in other nations. The present minister has outdone his predecessors; and as a minister of revenue, he is far above my power of praise. But still there are cases in which England feels more than several others (though they *all* feel) the perplexity of an immense body of balanced advantages, and of individual demands, and of some irregularity in the whole mass.

France differs essentially from all those governments, which are formed without system, which exist by habit, and which are confused with the multitude, and with the perplexity of their pursuits. What now stands as government in France is struck out at a heat.²¹³ The design is wicked, immoral, impious, oppressive — but it is spirited and daring; it is systematic; it is simple in its principle; and it has unity and consistency in perfection.

PETTY INTERESTS.

It is undoubtedly the business of ministers very much to consult the inclinations of the people, but they ought to take great care that they do not receive that inclination only from the few persons who may happen to approach them. The petty interests of such gentlemen, the low conceptions of things, their fears arising from the danger to which the very arduous and critical situation of public affairs may expose their places; their apprehensions from the hazards to which the discontents of a few popular men at elections may expose their seats in parliament — all these causes, trouble and confuse the representations which they make to ministers, of the real temper of the nation. If instead of following the great indications of the constitution, ministers proceed on such reports, they will mistake the whispers of a cabal for the voice of the people, and the counsels of imprudent timidity for the wisdom of a nation.

PIUS VII.

It is not for his Holiness that we intend this consolatory declaration of our own weakness, and of the tyrannous temper of his grand enemy. That prince has known both the one and the other from the beginning. The artists of the French revolution had given their very first essays and sketches of robbery and desolation against his territories, in a far more cruel “murdering piece” than had ever entered into the imagination of painter or poet. Without ceremony they tore from his cherishing arms the possessions which he held for five hundred years, undisturbed by all the ambition of all the ambitious monarchs who have reigned in France during that period. In our recent negotiation, to his wrong, we have ceded his now unhappy countries near the Rhone, which until lately were among the most flourishing (perhaps the most flourishing for their extent) of all the countries on earth, Is it to him that we are to prove the sincerity of our resolution to make peace with the barbarism republic? That venerable potentate and pontiff is sunk deep into the vale of years; he is half disarmed by his peaceful character; his dominions are more than half disarmed by a peace of two

²¹³ *Struck out at a heat*: drawn up in a heated rush. — WHG

hundred years — defended as they were, not by forces, but by reverence. Yet in all these straits, amidst the recent ruins and the new defacements of his plundered capital, along with the mild and decorated piety of the modern one, we see him display all the spirit and magnanimity of ancient Rome!

Does he who nobly refused to receive pecuniary compensations for the protection he owed to his people of Avignon, Carpentras, and the Venaisin, though unable to defend them himself — does he want proofs of our good disposition to deliver that people over to this cruel enemy, without any security for them, or any compensation to their sovereign? Does he want to be satisfied of the sincerity of our humiliation to France, when he has seen his free, fertile, and happy city and state of Bologna — the cradle of regenerated law, the seat of sciences and of arts — so hideously metamorphosed while he was crying to Great Britain for aid, and offering to purchase that aid at any price? Is it him, who now sees that chosen spot of plenty and delight converted into a Jacobin ferocious republic, and dependent on the homicides of France? Is it him, who, from the miracles of his beneficent industry, has done a work which defied the power of the Roman emperors, even with an enthralled ²¹⁴ world to labour for them? Is it him, who has drained and cultivated the *Pontine marshes*,²¹⁵ that we are to satisfy concerning our cordial spirit of conciliation with those who, in their “equity,” are restoring Holland again to the seas, whose maxims poison more than the exhalations of the most deadly fens, and who turn all the fertilities of nature and of art into a howling desert? Is it to him, that we are to demonstrate the good faith of our submissions to the cannibal republic; to him who is commanded to deliver into their hands Ancona and Civita Vecchia — seats of commerce, raised by the wise and liberal labours and expenses of the present and recent pontiffs — ports that no more belong to the Ecclesiastical State than to the commerce of Great Britain. Thus wresting from his hands the power of the keys of the centre of Italy, as before they had taken possession of the keys of the northern part, from the hands of the unhappy king of Sardinia, the natural ally of England? Is it to *him* that we are to prove our good faith in the peace which we are soliciting to receive from the hands of both his and our robbers — the enemies of all arts, all sciences, all civilization, and all commerce?

EXTINCTION OF LOCAL PATRIOTISM.

That day was, I fear, the fatal term of *local patriotism*. On that day, I fear, there was an end of that narrow scheme of relations called *our country*, with all its pride, its prejudices, and its partial affections. All the little quiet rivulets that watered an humble, a contracted, but not an unfruitful field, are to be lost in the waste expanse, in the boundless, barren ocean of the homicide philanthropy of France. The aggrandizement of a new power which teaches like a professor, that philanthropy in *their* chair — while it propagates by arms, and establishes by conquest, the comprehensive system of “universal fraternity” — is no longer an object of terror. In what light is all this viewed in a great assembly? The party which takes the lead *there*, no longer has any apprehensions except those that arise from not being admitted to the closest and most confidential connections with the *metropolis* of that

²¹⁴ A world in thralldom — that is, under their control. — WHG

²¹⁵ The Pontine Marshes was formerly an extensive swampy area between Rome and Naples. The area was drained and reclaimed, and is today mostly used for agriculture. — WHG

fraternity. That reigning party no longer touches on its favourite subject — the display of those horrors that must attend the existence of a power — with such dispositions and principles seated in the heart of Europe. It is satisfied to find some loose, ambiguous expressions in its former declarations, which may set it free from its professions and engagements. It always speaks of peace with the regicides as a great and an undoubted blessing; and it is such a blessing that, if obtained, it promises as much as any human disposition of things *can* promise — security and permanence. It holds out nothing at all definite towards this security. It only seeks to find a plausible plea for a present retreat from an embarrassing position, by a restoration to some of their former owners, some fragments of the general wreck of Europe. As to the future, that party is content to leave it covered in a night of the most palpable obscurity. It has never once entered into a particle of detail of what our own situation must be, or that of other powers, under the blessings of the peace we seek. To the extent of my power, I mean to supply this defect; so that if any persons might still continue to think an attempt at foresight is any part of the duty of a statesman, then I may contribute my trifle to the materials of his speculation.

As to the other party, the minority of today, possibly the majority of tomorrow, small in number but full of talents and every species of energy, which upon the avowed ground of being more acceptable to France, is a candidate for the helm of this kingdom. It has never changed from the beginning. It has preserved a perennial consistency. This would be a never-failing source of true glory if springing from just and right. But it is truly dreadful if it is an arm of Styx, which springs out of the profoundest depths of a poisoned soil. The French maxims were at no time condemned by these gentlemen. I speak of their language in the most moderate terms. There are many who think that they have gone much further — that they have always magnified and extolled the French maxims; that not in the least disgusted or discouraged by the monstrous evils which have attended these maxims from the moment of their adoption, both at home and abroad, they still continue to predict that in due time they must produce the greatest good to the poor human race. They obstinately persist in stating those evils as incidental matters; as things wholly collateral to the system. It is observed that this party has never spoken of an ally of Great Britain with the smallest degree of respect or regard. On the contrary, it has generally mentioned them under opprobrious appellations, and in such terms of contempt or execration as had never been heard before, because no such terms would have formerly been permitted in our public assemblies. The moment, however, that any of those allies quit this obnoxious connection, the party has instantly passed an act of indemnity and oblivion in their favour. After this, no sort of censure on their conduct; no imputation on their character! From that moment their pardon was sealed in a reverential and mysterious silence. With the gentlemen of this minority, there is no ally from one end of Europe to the other, with whom we should not to be ashamed to act. The whole college of the states of Europe is no better than a gang of tyrants. With them all our connections were broken off at once. We should have cultivated France, and France alone, from the moment of her revolution. On that happy change, all our dread of that nation as a power was to cease. She became in an instant dear to our affections, and one with our interests. We ought to have commanded all other nations not to trouble her sacred throes, while she was in labour to bring into a happy birth her abundant litter of constitutions.

WALPOLE AND HIS POLICY.

In this century, there has not been any foreign peace or war, in its origin, that was the fruit of popular desire, except the war that was made with Spain in 1739. Sir Robert Walpole ²¹⁶ was forced into the war by the people, who were inflamed to this measure by the most leading politicians, by the first orators and the greatest poets of the time. For that war, Alexander Pope sung his dying notes. For that war, Samuel Johnson, in more energetic strains, employed the voice of his early genius. For that war, Richard Glover distinguished himself in the way in which his muse was the most natural and happy.²¹⁷ The crowd readily followed the politicians in the cry for a war, which threatened little bloodshed, and which promised victories that were attended with something more solid than glory. A war with Spain was a war of plunder. In the present conflict with regicide, Mr. Pitt has not up to now had, nor will have, perhaps for a few days, many prizes to hold out in the lottery of war, to tempt the lower part of our character. He can only maintain it by an appeal to the higher; and for his support, he must look most to those in whom that higher part is the most predominant. While he holds out no inducements to the wise, nor bribes to the avaricious, he may be forced by a vulgar cry, into a peace that is ten times more ruinous than the most disastrous war. The weaker he is in the fund of motives which apply to our avarice, laziness, and lassitude — if he means to carry the war to any end at all — the stronger he ought to be in his addresses to our magnanimity and to our reason.

In stating that Walpole was driven by popular clamour into a measure that is not to be justified, I do not mean to wholly excuse his conduct. My time of observation did not exactly coincide with that event, but I read much about the controversies then carried on. Several years after the contests of parties had ceased, the people were amused, and in a degree warmed with them. The events of that era seemed then of magnitude which the revolutions of our time have reduced to parochial importance; and the debates which then shook the nation, now appear of no higher moment than a discussion in a vestry. When I was very young, a general fashion told me I was to admire some of the writings against that minister; a little more maturity taught me as much to despise them. I observed one fault in his general proceeding. He never manfully put forward the entire strength of his cause. He temporised, he managed, and adopting very nearly the sentiments of his adversaries, he opposed their inferences. For a political commander, this is the choice of a weak post. His adversaries had the better of the argument as he handled it, and not as the reason and justice of his cause enabled him to manage it.

I say this after having seen, and with some care examined, the original documents concerning certain important transactions of those times. They perfectly satisfied me of the extreme injustice of that war, and of the falsehood of the colours which, to his own ruin and

²¹⁶ Robert Walpole (1676-1745), 1st Earl of Orford, regarded as the first British Prime Minister. He is known for his influential role in reshaping the British government from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. This particular stage of the Anglo-Spanish conflict was known as the War of Jenkins' Ear. Walpole didn't want the conflict to escalate, but opponents in his own Whig party, and the Tories, forced his hand by stoking public outrage. That's what Burke is describing here. In 1739, British forces conquered Portobello in Panama, which they had previously failed to do. The following year (1740), "Rule Britannia" was written for a popular stage play titled, *Alfred, a Masque*. – *Ency. Brit.*

²¹⁷ Burke only included the surnames Pope, Johnson, and Glover. I inserted their first names. – WHG

guided by a mistaken policy, he suffered to be daubed over that measure. Some years after, it was my fortune to converse with many of the principal actors against that minister, and with those who principally excited that clamour. *None* of them, no not one, in the least defended the measure, nor attempted to justify their conduct. They condemned it as freely as they would have done in commenting upon any proceeding in history, in which they were *totally unconcerned*. Thus it will be. Those who stir up the people to improper desires, whether of peace or war, will be condemned by *themselves*. Those who weakly yield to them, will be condemned by *history*.

POLITICAL PEACE.

How a question of peace can be discussed without having [these considerations] in view,²¹⁸ I cannot imagine. If you or others see a way out of these difficulties, I am happy. I see, indeed, a fund from which equivalents will be proposed. I *see* it, but I cannot just now *touch* it. It is a question of high moment. It opens another *Iliad* of woes to Europe.²¹⁹

Such is the time proposed for making *a common political peace* — to which no single circumstance is propitious. As to the grand principle of the peace, it is, as if by common consent, left wholly out of the question.

Viewing things in this light, I have frequently sunk into a degree of despondency and dejection, hardly to be described. Yet out of the profoundest depths of this despair, an impulse which I have in vain endeavoured to resist, has urged me to raise one feeble cry *against* this unfortunate coalition which is formed at home, to make a coalition with France, and is subversive of the whole ancient order of the world. No disaster of war, no calamity of season, could ever strike me with half the horror which I felt from what is introduced to us by this junction of parties, under the soothing name of “peace.” We are apt to speak of a low and pusillanimous spirit, as the ordinary cause by which dubious wars terminated in humiliating treaties. Here, it is the direct contrary. I am perfectly astonished at the boldness of character, at the intrepidity of mind, at the firmness of nerve, in those who are able with deliberation to face the perils of Jacobin fraternity.

This fraternity is indeed so terrible in its nature, and in its manifest consequences, that there is no way of quieting our apprehensions about it, except by totally putting it out of sight — or by substituting for it, through a sort of periphrasis, something of an ambiguous quality, and describing such a connection under the terms of “*the usual relations of peace and amity*.” By this means, the proposed fraternity is hustled in the crowd of those treaties which imply no change in the public law of Europe, and which do not, upon a system, affect the interior condition of nations. It is confounded with those conventions in which matters of dispute among sovereign powers are compromised, by more or less taking off a duty by the surrender of a frontier town, or a disputed district on one side or the other; by pacts in which the pretensions of families are settled (like a conveyancer making family substitutions

²¹⁸ This excerpt is taken from the second letter Burke wrote to someone then in Parliament (*Works*, vol. 5). These considerations, listed in the opening of the letter, included the impact of Jacobin rule in France, on British trade in the West Indies; and therefore on the balance of power there and in Europe. — WHG

²¹⁹ *The Iliad* was a Greek epic poem (attributed to Homer) describing the siege of Troy. — WHG

and successions) — without any alterations in the laws, manners, religion, privileges, and customs of the cities or territories which are the subject of such arrangements.

This entire body of old conventions, composing the vast and voluminous collection called the *Corps Diplomatique*, forms the code or statute law — just as the methodised reasonings of the great publicists and jurists form the digest and jurisprudence of the Christian world. In these treasures are to be found the *usual* relations of peace and amity in civilized Europe; and there the relations of ancient France were to be found among the rest.

But the present system in France is not the ancient France. It is not the ancient France with ordinary ambition and ordinary means. And it is not a new power of an old kind. *It is a new power of a new species.* When such a questionable shape is to be admitted for the first time into the brotherhood of Christendom, it is not a mere matter of idle curiosity to consider how far its nature is alliable with the rest, or whether “the relations of peace and amity” with this new state are likely to be of the same nature with the *usual* relations of the states of Europe.

PUBLIC LOANS.

It is never, therefore, wise to quarrel with the interested views of men while they are combined with the public interest, and *promote* it. It is our business to tie the knot closer, if possible. Resources that are derived from extraordinary virtues, as such virtues are rare, so they must be unproductive. It is a good thing for a monied man to pledge his property on the welfare of his country. He shows that he places his treasure where his heart is; and revolving in this circle, we know that “wherever a man’s treasure is, there his heart will be also.” ^{Mat 6.21} For these reasons, and on these principles, I have been sorry to see the attempts which have been made — with more good meaning than foresight and consideration — towards raising the annual interest of this loan by private contributions. Wherever a regular revenue is established, voluntary contribution can serve no purpose, except to disorder and disturb it in its course. To recur to such aids is so much to dissolve the community, and to return to a state of unconnected nature. And even if such a supply were to be productive in a degree commensurate to its object, it must also be productive of much vexation, and much oppression. Either the citizens, by the proposed duties, pay their proportion according to some rate made by public authority, or they do not. If the law is well made, and the contributions are founded on just proportions, everything superadded by something that is not as regular as law, nor as uniform in its operation, will become more or less out of proportion. If, on the contrary, the law is not made on a proper calculation, it is a disgrace to the public wisdom. It fails to skillfully assess the citizen in just measure, and according to his means. But the hand of authority is not always the heaviest hand. It is obvious that men may be oppressed by many ways, besides those which take their course from the supreme power of the state. Suppose the payment is wholly discretionary. Whatever has its origin in caprice, is sure not to improve in its progress, nor to end in reason. It is impossible for each private individual to have any measure conformable to the particular condition of each of his fellow-citizens, or to the general exigencies of his country. ‘Tis a random shot at best.

When men proceed in this irregular mode, the first contributor is apt to grow peevish with his neighbours. He is only too well disposed to measure *their* means by his own *envy*, and

not by the real state of their fortunes, which he can rarely know, and which it may be an act of the grossest imprudence in them to reveal. Hence the odium and lassitude with which people will look upon a provision for the public, which is bought by discord, at the expense of social quiet. Hence the bitter heart-burnings, and the war of tongues, which are so often the prelude to other wars. Nor is every contribution (called *voluntary*), according to the free will of the giver. A false shame, or a false glory, against his feelings and his judgment, may tax an individual to the detriment of his family, and to the wrong of his creditors. A pretence of public spirit may disable him from the performance of his private duties. It may disable him even from paying the legitimate contributions which he is to furnish according to the prescript of the law. But what is most dangerous of all is that malignant disposition to which this mode of contribution evidently tends, and which at length leaves the comparatively indigent to judge the wealth, and to prescribe to the opulent (or those whom they conceive to be such), the use they are to make of their fortunes. From there it is but one step to the subversion of all property.

HISTORICAL STRICTURES.

The author does not confine the benefit of the regicide lesson to kings alone.²²⁰ He has a diffusive bounty. Nobles and men of property will likewise be greatly reformed. They too will be led to a review of their social situation and duties, “and will reflect, that their large allotment of worldly advantages is for the aid and benefit of the whole.” Is it then from the fate of Juignie, archbishop of Paris, or of the cardinal de Rochefoucault, and of so many others who gave their fortunes and, I may say, their very beings to the poor, that the rich are to learn that their “fortunes are for the aid and benefit of the whole?” I say nothing of the liberal persons of great rank and property, lay and ecclesiastic, men and women, to whom we have had the honour and happiness of affording an asylum — I pass by these, lest I should never have mentioned, or lest I should omit some who are as deserving as any I might mention. Why will the author then suppose that the nobles and men of property in France have been banished, confiscated, and murdered, on account of the savageness and ferocity of their character, and their being tainted with vices beyond those of the same order and description in other countries? No judge of a revolutionary tribunal, with his hands dipped in their blood, and his maw (mouth) gorged with their property, has yet dared to assert what this author has been pleased to insinuate by way of a moral lesson.

Their nobility and their men of property, in a mass, had the very same virtues and the very same vices, and in the very same proportions, as the same description of men in this and in other nations. I must do justice to suffering honour, generosity, and integrity. I do not know that any time, or any country, has furnished more splendid examples of every virtue, both domestic and public. I do not enter into the councils of Providence. But humanly speaking, many of these nobles and men of property, from whose disastrous fate we are, it seems, to learn a general softening of character, and a revision of our social situations and duties, appear to me fully as little deserving of that fate as the author, whoever he is, can be. Many

²²⁰ This is from Burke's fourth letter, addressed to the Earl Fitzwilliam (*Works*, vol. 6). He writes, “A piece has been sent to me, called “Some Remarks on the Apparent Circumstances of the War in the Fourth Week of October, 1795.” It is the author of that piece, that Burke refers to and quotes here. — WHG

of them, I am sure, were such as I might be proud indeed to be able to compare myself with in knowledge, in integrity, and in every other virtue. My feeble nature might shrink from the proof, though theirs did not. But my reason and my ambition tell me that it would be a good bargain to purchase their *merits* with their *fate*.

For which of his vices did that great magistrate, D'Espremeni,²²¹ lose his fortune and his head? What were the abominations of Malesherbes,²²² that other excellent magistrate, whose sixty years of uniform virtue was acknowledged, in the very act of his murder, by the judicial butchers who condemned him? On account of what misdemeanors was he robbed of his property, and slaughtered with two generations of his offspring? With a refinement of cruelty, the remains of the third race (lest they appear to reclaim the property forfeited by the virtues of their ancestor) are confounded (mixed together) in an hospital with thousands of those unhappy foundling infants who are abandoned —without relation and without name — by the wretchedness or by the profligacy of their parents.

Is the fate of the queen of France to produce this softening of character? Was she a person so very ferocious and cruel as to frighten us into common humanity, by the example of her death? Is there no way to teach the emperor a softening of character, and a review of his social situation and duty, except his consent — by an infamous accord with regicide, to drive a second coach with the Austrian arms through the streets of Paris? ²²³ Along these same streets, after a series of preparatory horrors exceeding the atrocities of the bloody execution itself, the glory of the imperial race had been carried to an ignominious death. Is this a lesson of *moderation* to a descendant of Maria Theresa, drawn from the fate of the daughter of that incomparable woman and sovereign? If he learns this lesson from such an object, and from such teachers, the *man* may remain, but the *king* is deposed. If he does not carry quite another memory of that transaction in the inmost recesses of his heart, he is unworthy to *reign*; he is unworthy to *live*. In the chronicle of disgrace he will have but this short tale told of him, “He was the first emperor of his house that embraced a regicide: he was the last that wore the imperial purple.” I am far from thinking so ill of this august sovereign, who is at the head of the monarchies of Europe, and who is the trustee of their dignities and his own. What ferocity of character invited the fate of Elizabeth, the sister of King Louis the Sixteenth? For which of the vices of that pattern of benevolence, of piety, and of all the virtues, did they put *her* to death? For which of her vices did they put to death the mildest of all human creatures, the duchess of Biron? What were the crimes of those crowds of matrons and virgins of condition, whom they massacred with their juries of blood, in prisons and on scaffolds? What were the enormities of the infant king ²²⁴ whom they caused,

²²¹ Jean-Jacques Duval d'Eprémesnil (1745-1794), French magistrate and politician, born in India. He was a zealous defender of the rights of Parliament against the royal prerogative, and an opponent of Marie Antoinette. – WHG

²²² Guillaume-Chrétien de Lamoignon de Malesherbes (1721-1794), French statesman and minister, and counsel for the defense of Louis XVI. He is known for his vigorous criticism of royal abuses.

²²³ Maria Theresa (1717-1780) part of the Hapsburg dynasty; daughter of Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI; wife of Emperor Francis I; archduchess of Austria; queen of Hungary and Bohemia (1740-1780). Her son Joseph was made co-regent in 1765, then Emperor in 1780. Several of Maria's children died from smallpox, as did she. Her daughter Elizabeth contracted it, but survived. In 1781, Elisabeth went to Innsbruck, where she resided as abbess for fifteen years. – WHG

²²⁴ Louis XVII of France, also known as the “Lost Dauphin”, imprisoned at age 8. – WHG

by lingering tortures, to perish in their dungeon, and whom at last was dispatched by poison? That detestable crime was the only act of mercy they have ever shown.

What softening of character is to be had, what review of their social situations and duties is to be taught by these examples, to kings, to nobles, to men of property, to women, and to infants? The royal family perished, *because* it was royal. The nobles perished, *because* they were noble. The men, women, and children who had property, were robbed *because* they had property to be robbed of. The priests were punished after they had been robbed of their all, not for their vices, but for their virtues and their piety. It made them an honour to their sacred profession, and to that nature of which we ought to be proud, since they belong to it. My Lord, nothing can be learned from such examples, except the danger of being kings, queens, nobles, priests, and children — to be butchered on account of their inheritance. These are things at which, not vice, not crime, not folly, but wisdom, goodness, learning, justice, probity, and beneficence stand aghast. By these examples our reason and our moral sense are not enlightened, but confounded. And there is no refuge for astonished and affrighted virtue, except being annihilated in humility and submission — sinking into a silent adoration of the inscrutable dispensations of Providence — and flying with trembling wings from this world of daring crimes, and feeble, pusillanimous, half-bred, bastard justice, to the asylum of another order of things, in an unknown form, but in a better life.

Whatever the politician or preacher of September or of October may think of the matter,²²⁵ it is a most comfortless, disheartening, desolating example. Dreadful is the example of ruined innocence and virtue, and the completest triumph of the completest villainy that ever vexed and disgraced mankind! The example is ruinous in every point of view, religious, moral, civil, political. It establishes that dreadful maxim of Machiavelli, that in great affairs men are not to be wicked by halves. This maxim is not made for a middle sort of beings who, because they cannot be angels, ought to thwart their ambition, and not endeavour to become infernal spirits. It is too well exemplified in the present time, where the faults and errors of humanity, checked by the imperfect timorous virtues, have been overpowered by those who have stopped at no crime. It is a dreadful part of the example, that infernal malevolence has had pious apologists who read their lectures on frailties in favour of crimes; who abandon the weak, and court the friendship of the wicked. To root out these maxims, and the examples that support them, is a wise object of years of war. *This is that war*. This is that *moral war*. It was said by old Marshal Trivulzio, that the battle of Marignan was the battle of the giants, that all the rest of the many he had seen were those of the cranes and pigmies.²²⁶ This is true of the objects, at least, of the contest. For the greater part of those which we have contended for up to now, were the toys of children in comparison.

²²⁵ In Burke's letter, after mentioning the piece he received, he writes, "The time is critically chosen. A month or so earlier would have made it the anniversary of a bloody Parisian September, when the French massacre one another... Finding the last week in October so particularly referred to, the author says, *for a cold now caught may last the whole winter*." — hence it is a metaphor for the persistence of this Jacobin evil, once begun. — WHG

²²⁶ The Battle of Marignano was the last major engagement of the War of the League of Cambrai and took place on Sep 13–14, 1515. It pitted the French army, composed of the best heavy cavalry and artillery in Europe, against the Old Swiss Confederacy, whose mercenaries until that point were regarded as the best medieval infantry force in Europe. With the French were German mercenaries, and their Venetian allies. — WHG

The October politician is so full of charity and good nature, that he supposes these very robbers and murderers are themselves in a course of melioration. On what ground I cannot conceive, except on the long practice of every crime, and by its complete success. He is an Origenist,²²⁷ and believes in the conversion of the devil. All that runs in the place of blood in his veins is nothing but the milk of human kindness. He is as soft as a curd, though as a politician he might be supposed to be made of sterner stuff. He supposes (to use his own expression) “that the salutary truths, which he inculcates, are making their way into their bosoms.” Their bosom is a rock of granite, on which falsehood has long since built her stronghold. Poor truth has had a hard work of it with her little pickaxe. Nothing but gunpowder will do. As a proof of the progress of this sap of Truth, however, he gives us a confession that they had made not long before he wrote. “Their fraternity” (as recently stated by them in a solemn report) “has been the brotherhood of Cain and Abel, and they have organized nothing but Bankruptcy and Famine.” That is a very honest confession, truly; and much in the spirit of their oracle, Rousseau. Yet, what is still more marvellous than the confession, is that this is the very fraternity to which our author gives us such an obliging invitation to accede. There is, indeed, a vacancy in the fraternal corps; a brother and a partner is wanted. If we please, we may fill up the place of the butchered Abel; and while we await the destiny of the departed brother, we may enjoy the advantages of the partnership by entering, without delay, into a shop of ready-made bankruptcy and famine. These are the *douceurs* (incentives) by which we are invited to regicide fraternity and friendship. But still our author considers the confession as a proof, that “truth is making its way into their bosoms.” No! It is *not* making its way into their bosoms. It has *forced* its way into their mouths! The evil spirit by which they are possessed, though essentially a liar, is forced by the tortures of conscience, to confess the truth — to confess enough for their condemnation, but not for their amendment. Shakespeare very aptly expresses this kind of confession, devoid of repentance, from the mouth of a usurper, a murderer, and a regicide —

*“We are ourselves compelled,
Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults,
To give in evidence.”*²²⁸

Where is their amendment? Why, the author writes that on their murderous insurrectionary system, their own lives are not sure for an hour; nor does their power have a greater stability. *True*. They are convinced of it; and accordingly, the wretches have done all they can to preserve their lives, and to secure their power; but they have not taken one step to amend the one, or to make a more just use of the other.

CONSTITUTION IS NOT THE PEOPLE’S SLAVE.

There is one topic upon which I hope I shall be excused in going a little beyond my design. The factions that are now so busy among us, in order to divest men of all love for their country, and to remove from their minds all duty with regard to the state, endeavour to

²²⁷ *Origenist*: a student of Origen (AD 185-265), who interpreted scripture allegorically, and was overly optimistic about the conquest of evil in this world. – WHG

²²⁸ Hamlet, Act 3, scene 3, lines 65-69. – WHG

propagate an opinion that, in forming their commonwealth, the *people* have by no means parted with their power over it. This is an impregnable citadel to which these gentlemen retreat whenever they are pushed by the battery of laws, and usages, and positive conventions. Indeed, it is of such and so great a force, that all they have done in defending their outworks, is so much time and labour thrown away. Discuss any of their schemes, and their answer is, "It is the act of the *people*," and that is sufficient. Are we to deny to a *majority* of the people the right of altering even the whole frame of their society, if such should be their pleasure? They may change it, they say, from a monarchy to a republic today; and tomorrow, change back again from a republic to a monarchy, and do so back and forth as often as they like. They are *masters* of the commonwealth; because in substance they are *themselves* the commonwealth. The French revolution, they say, was the act of the majority of the people; and if the majority of any other people, the people of England for instance, wish to make the same change, they have the same right. *Just* the same, *undoubtedly*. And that is, none at all. Neither the few nor the many have a right to act merely by their will, in any matter connected with duty, trust, engagement, or obligation. Once the constitution of a country is settled upon some compact, whether tacit or expressed, there is no power existing to alter it by force, without the breach of the covenant, or the consent of all parties. *Such is the nature of a contract*. And the votes of a majority of the people, whatever their infamous flatterers may teach in order to corrupt their minds, cannot alter the *moral* essence, any more than they can alter the *physical* essence of things. The people are not to be taught to think lightly of their engagements to their governors, or else they teach governors to think lightly of their engagements towards them. In that kind of game, the people are sure to be losers in the end. To flatter them into a contempt of faith, truth, and justice, is to ruin them; for in these virtues consist their whole safety. To flatter any man, or any part of mankind, in any description, by asserting that in engagements he or they are *free* while any other human creature is *bound*, is ultimately to vest the rule of morality in the pleasure of those who ought to be rigidly submitted to it; and to subject the sovereign reason of the world to the caprices of weak and giddy men.

But, as no *one* of us men can dispense with public or private faith, or with any other tie of moral obligation, so neither can any *number* of us. The large number engaged in crimes, instead of turning them into laudable acts, only augments the quantity and intensity of the guilt. I am well aware that men love to hear of their *power*, but they have an extreme disrelish to be told of their *duty*. This is, of course, because every duty is a limitation of some power. Indeed, arbitrary power is so much to the depraved taste of the vulgar, of the vulgar of every description, that almost all the dissensions which lacerate the commonwealth, are not concerning the *manner* in which it is to be exercised, but concerning the *hands* in which it is to be placed. Somewhere they are resolved to have it. Whether they desire it to be vested in the many or the few, depends with most men upon the chance which they imagine they themselves may have of partaking in the exercise of that arbitrary sway, in one mode or the other.

It is not necessary to teach men to thirst after power. But it is very expedient that, by moral instruction, they should be *taught*, and by their civil constitutions they should be *compelled*, to put many restrictions upon the immoderate exercise of it, and the inordinate desire of it. The best method of obtaining these two great points forms the important, but at the same

time the difficult problem for the true statesman. He thinks of the place in which political power is to be lodged, with no other attention than as it may render its salutary restraint, and its prudent direction, more or less practicable,. For this reason, no legislator, at any period of the world, has willingly placed the seat of active power in the hands of the multitude. That is because *there* it allows for no control, no regulation, no steady direction whatsoever. The people are the natural control on authority; but to exercise and to control *together* is contradictory and impossible.

As the exorbitant exercise of power cannot, under popular sway, be effectually restrained, so the other great object of political arrangement — the means of abating an excessive desire for it — is still worse provided for in such a state. The democratic commonwealth is the foodful nurse of ambition. Under the other forms it meets with many restraints. In states which have had a democratic basis, whenever the legislators have endeavoured to put restraints upon ambition, their methods were as violent as they were ineffectual in the end — indeed, as violent as any which the most jealous despotism could invent. The ostracism could not save *itself* very long, and much less the *state* which it was meant to guard, from the attempts of ambition — which is one of the natural, inbred, incurable distempers of a powerful democracy.

MODERN “LIGHTS.”

“Great lights,” they say, “are lately obtained in the world.” And Mr. Burke, instead of shrouding himself in exploded ignorance, ought to have taken advantage of the blaze of illumination which has been spread about him. It may be so. The enthusiasts of this time, it seems, like their predecessors in another faction of fanaticism, deal in lights. — Hudibras pleasantly says to them, they

*“Have LIGHTS, where better eyes are blind,
As pigs are said to see the wind.”*²²⁹

The author of the Reflections has *heard* a great deal concerning the modern lights; but he has not yet had the good fortune to *see* much of them. He has read more than he can justify to anything but the spirit of curiosity, of the works of these illuminators of the world. He has learned nothing from the far greater number of them, than a full certainty of their shallowness, levity, pride, petulance, presumption, and ignorance. Where the old authors whom he has read, and the old men whom he has conversed with, have left him in the dark, he is in the dark still. If others, however, have obtained any of this extraordinary light, they will use it to guide them in their researches and their conduct. I have only to wish that the nation may be as happy and as prosperous under the influence of the new light, as it has been in the sober shade of the old obscurity.

²²⁹ *Hudibras* was a satirical poem, written by Samuel Butler during Cromwell’s *Interregnum*, mocking it. Paradoxically here, Burke mocked the so-called “Enlightenment” just as Butler mocked the Interregnum. He equated it with Cromwell’s populist overthrow of the monarchy, and with the ideology of the Jacobins. He saw it as a growing *darkness*, not a dawning light. He warned it would lead to despotism, not liberty. This was an unpopular view.

This and the next section are extracts from *An Appeal from The New To The Old Whigs, In Consequence of Some Late Discussions In Parliament Relative to the Reflections On The French Revolution, 1791*. (see *Works*, vol. 4). They show how others received Burke’s *Reflections*, which was critical of the French Revolution and its spreading effects.

REPUBLICS IN THE ABSTRACT.

In the same debate, Mr. Burke was said by Mr. Fox to argue in a manner which implied that the British constitution could not be defended, except by abusing all republics ancient and modern. [Burke] said nothing to give the least ground for such a censure. He never abused all republics. He has never professed himself a friend or an enemy to republics or to monarchies in the abstract. He thought that the circumstances and habits of each country — which it is always perilous and productive of the greatest calamities to *force* — are to decide upon the form of its government. There is nothing in his nature, his temper, or his faculties, which would make him an enemy to any republic modern or ancient. Far from it. He has studied the form and spirit of republics very early in life; he has studied them with great attention; and with a mind undisturbed by affection or prejudice. He is indeed convinced that the science of government would be poorly cultivated without that study. But the result in his mind from that investigation has been, and is, that neither England nor France, without infinite detriment to them, in the *event* as well as in the *experiment*, could be brought into a republican form. But that everything republican which can be introduced with safety into either of them, must be built upon a monarchy; built upon a real, not a nomina, monarchy, *as its essential basis*; that all such institutions, whether aristocratic or democratic, must originate from the crown, and must refer to it in all their proceedings; that by the energy of that main spring alone, those republican parts must be set in action, and from there they must derive their whole legal effect (as they actually do among us), or else the whole will fall into confusion. These republican members have no other point in which they can possibly unite, except the crown.

This is the opinion expressed in Mr. Burke's book. He has never varied in that opinion since he came to years of discretion. But surely, if at any time of his life he had entertained other notions (which he has never held or professed to hold, however), the horrible calamities brought upon a great people, by the wild attempt to force their country into a republic, might be more than sufficient to undeceive his understanding, and to free it forever from such destructive fancies. He is certain that many, even in France, have been made sick of their theories by their very success in realizing them.

AN ENGLISH MONARCH.

He is a real king, and not an executive officer. If he will not trouble himself with contemptible details, nor wish to degrade himself by becoming a party in little squabbles, I am far from sure that a king of Great Britain — in whatever concerns him as a king, or indeed as a rational man, who combines his public interest with his personal satisfaction — does not possess a more real, solid, extensive power, than the king of France was possessed of before this miserable revolution. The direct power of the king of England is considerable. His indirect, and far more certain power, is great indeed. He stands in need of nothing towards dignity; of nothing towards splendour; of nothing towards authority; of nothing at all towards consideration abroad. When was it that a king of England lacked the means to make himself respected, courted, or perhaps even feared, in every state of Europe?

PHYSIOGNOMY – THE FACE.

The *physiognomy* has a considerable share in beauty, especially in that of our own species. The manners give a certain determination to the countenance. Being observed to correspond pretty regularly with them, it is capable of joining the effect of certain agreeable qualities of the mind, to those of the body. So that to form a finished human beauty, and to give it its full influence, the face must be expressive of such gentle and amiable qualities, as correspond with the softness, smoothness, and delicacy of the outward form.

THE EYE.

I have up to now purposely omitted to speak of the *eye*, which has so great a share in the beauty of the animal creation, because it did not fall so easily under the foregoing heads, though in fact it is reducible to the same principles. I think, then, that the beauty of the eye consists, FIRST, in its *clearness*. What *coloured* eye pleases most, depends a good deal on particular fancies; but none are pleased with an eye whose water (to use that term) is dull and muddy. We are pleased with the eye in this view, on the principle upon which we like diamonds, clear water, glass, and similar transparent substances. SECONDLY, the motion of the eye contributes to its beauty, by continually shifting its direction. But a slow and languid motion is more beautiful than a brisk one; the latter is enlivening; the former lovely. THIRDLY, with regard to the union of the eye with the neighbouring parts, it is to hold the same rule that is given of other beautiful ones — it is not to make a strong deviation from the line of the neighbouring parts; nor to verge into any exact geometrical figure. Besides all this, the eye *affects* as it is expressive of some qualities of the mind; and its principal power generally arises from this. So that, what we have just said of the physiognomy is applicable here.

ABOLITION AND USE OF PARLIAMENTS.

According to their invariable course, the framers of your constitution have begun with the outer abolition of the parliaments. These venerable bodies, like the rest of the old government, stood in need of reform, even if no change were made in the monarchy. They required several more alterations to adapt them to the system of a free constitution. But they had particulars in their constitution (and those were not a few) which deserved approval from the wise. They possessed one fundamental excellence — they were *independent*. The most doubtful circumstance attendant on their office, that of its being vendible (marketable), contributed however to this independency of character. They held office for life. Indeed they may be said to have held it by inheritance. Appointed by the monarch, they were considered as nearly outside of his power. The most determined exertions of that authority against them only showed their radical independence. They composed permanent political bodies, constituted to resist arbitrary innovation. And from that corporate constitution, and from most of their forms, they were well calculated to afford both certainty and stability to the laws. They had been a safe asylum to secure these laws in all the revolutions of passion and opinion. They had saved that sacred deposit of the country during the reigns of arbitrary princes, and the struggles of arbitrary factions. They kept alive the memory and record of the constitution. They were the great security to private

property; which might be said (when personal liberty had no existence) to be, in fact, as well guarded in France as in any other country. Whatever is supreme in a state, ought to have, as much as possible, its judicial authority so constituted as not to *depend* upon it, but also in some way to *balance* it. It ought to give a security to its *justice* against its *power*. It ought to make its judicature, as it were, something exterior to the state. These parliaments had furnished, not the best certainly, but some considerable corrective to the excesses and vices of the monarchy. Such an independent judicature was ten times more necessary when a democracy became the absolute power of the country. In that constitution, elective, temporary, local judges (such as you have contrived), exercising their dependent functions in a narrow society, must be the *worst* of all tribunals. In them it will be vain to look for any appearance of justice towards strangers, towards the obnoxious rich, towards the minority of routed parties, towards all those who in the election have supported unsuccessful candidates. It will be impossible to keep the new tribunals clear of the worst spirit of faction. All contrivances by ballot, we know experimentally to be vain and childish to prevent a revelation of inclinations. Where they may the best answer the purposes of concealment, they also produce suspicion; and this is a still more mischievous cause of partiality.

If the parliaments had been preserved, instead of being dissolved at so ruinous a change to the nation, they might have served in this new commonwealth — perhaps not precisely the same (I do not mean an exact parallel), but nearly the same — purposes such as the court and senate of Areopagus did in Athens. That is, they might have served as one of the balances and correctives to the evils of a light and unjust democracy. Everyone knows that this tribunal was the great stay of that state; everyone knows with what care it was upheld, and with what a religious awe it was consecrated. The parliaments were not wholly free from faction, I admit. But this evil was exterior and incidental, and not so much the vice of their constitution itself, as it must be in your new contrivance of sexennial (six-year) elective judicatories. Several English [critics] commend the abolition of the old tribunals, supposing that they determined everything by bribery and corruption. But they have stood the test of monarchic and republican scrutiny. The court was well disposed to prove corruption in those bodies when they were dissolved in 1771. Those who have again dissolved them would have done the same if they could. But both inquisitions having failed, I conclude that gross pecuniary corruption must have been rather rare among them.

It would have been prudent, along with the *parliaments*, to preserve their ancient power of *registering*, and of *remonstrating* at least, upon all the decrees of the National Assembly, as they did upon those which passed in the time of the monarchy. It would be a means of squaring the occasional decrees of a democracy to some principles of general jurisprudence. The vice of the ancient democracies, and one cause of their ruin, was that they ruled, as you do, by *occasional* decrees — *psephismata*.²³⁰ This practice soon broke in upon the tenor and consistency of the laws; it abated the respect of the people towards them; and it totally destroyed them in the end.

In the time of the monarchy, the power of remonstrance existed in the parliament of Paris. You vest this power in your principal executive officer whom , in spite of common sense, you

²³⁰ A decree or resolution of the ancient popular assembly (the *ecclesia* of Athens). – WHG

persevere in calling *king*, which is the height of absurdity. You ought never to suffer remonstrance from the one who is to execute. This is to understand neither counsel nor execution; neither authority nor obedience. The person whom you call *king*, ought not to have this power, or he ought to have more.

CROMWELL AND HIS CONTRASTS.

Cromwell, when he attempted to legalize his power and to settle his conquered country in a state of order, did not look for dispensers of justice in the instruments of his usurpation. Quite the contrary. He sought out, with great solicitude and selection, even from the party that was most opposite to his designs, men of weight and decorum of character; men unstained with the violence of the times, and with hands that were not fouled with confiscation and sacrilege. For he chose *Hale* for his chief justice, even though he absolutely refused to take his civic oaths, or to make any acknowledgment whatsoever of the legality of his government. Cromwell told this great lawyer, that since he did not approve of his title, all he required of him was to administer, in a manner agreeable to his pure sentiments and unspotted character, that justice without which human society cannot subsist; that it was not his particular government, but civil order itself which, as a judge, he wished him to support. Cromwell knew how to separate the institutions expedient to his usurpation from the administration of the public justice of his country. For Cromwell was a man in whom ambition had not wholly suppressed, but only suspended, the sentiments of religion, and the love (as far as it could consist with his designs) of fair and honourable reputation. Accordingly, we are indebted to this act of his for the preservation of our laws, which some senseless assertors of the rights of men were then on the point of entirely erasing as relics of feudality and barbarism. Besides this, he gave in the appointment of that man, to that age and to all posterity, the most brilliant example of sincere and fervent piety, exact justice, and profound jurisprudence.²³¹ But these are not the things in which your philosophic usurpers choose to follow Cromwell.

One would think that after an honest and necessary revolution (if they had a mind that theirs should pass for such) your masters would have imitated the virtuous policy of those who have been at the head of revolutions of that glorious character. Burnet tells us that nothing tended to reconcile the English nation to the government of King William so much as the care he took to fill the vacant bishoprics with men who had attracted the public esteem by their learning, eloquence, and piety, and above all, by their known moderation in the state. With you, in your “purifying” revolution, whom have you chosen to regulate the church? Mr. Mirabeau is a fine speaker — and a fine writer — and a fine, a very fine man. But really, nothing gave more surprise to everybody here, than to find him the supreme head of your ecclesiastical affairs. The rest is a matter of course. Your Assembly addresses a manifesto to France, in which they tell the people, with an insulting irony, that they have brought the church back to its primitive condition. In one respect, their declaration is undoubtedly true; for they have brought it to a state of poverty and persecution. What can be hoped for after this? Haven’t men (if they deserve the name), under this new hope and

²³¹ See Gilbert Burnett’s *Life of Sir Matthew Hale*, Oxford, 1856.

head of the church, been made bishops for no other merit than having acted as instruments of *atheists*? For no other merit than having thrown the children's bread to dogs? In order to gorge the whole gang of usurers, peddlers, and itinerant Jew-discounters at the street corners, they have starved the poor of their Christian flocks, and their own brother pastors. Haven't such men been made bishops to administer in temples, in which (if the "patriotic donations" haven't already stripped them of their vessels) the churchwardens ought to take security for the altar-plate, and not so much as trust the chalice in their sacrilegious hands — so long as Jews have assignats on ecclesiastic plunder, to exchange for the silver stolen from churches?

DELICACY.

An air of robustness and strength is very prejudicial to beauty. An appearance of *delicacy*, and even of fragility, is almost essential to it. Whoever examines the vegetable or animal creation will find this observation to be founded in nature. It is not the oak, the ash, or the elm, or any of the robust trees of the forest, which we consider as beautiful. Rather, they are awful and majestic; they inspire a sort of reverence. It is the delicate myrtle, it is the orange, it is the almond, it is the jasmine, it is the vine, which we look on as vegetable beauties. It is the flowery species, so remarkable for their weakness and momentary duration, that give us the liveliest idea of beauty and elegance. Among animals, the greyhound is more beautiful than the mastiff; and the delicacy of a gennet, a barb,²³² or an Arabian horse, is much more amiable than the strength and stability of some horses of war or carriage. Here I need say little about the fair sex, where I believe the point will be easily allowed me. The beauty of women is considerably owing to their weakness or delicacy, and is even enhanced by their timidity — a quality of mind analogous to beauty. I would not be understood here as saying that weakness betraying very bad health has any share in beauty. But the ill effect of this is not because it is weakness, but because the ill state of health, which produces such weakness, alters the other conditions of beauty. The parts in such a case collapse; the bright colour — the *lumen purpureum juventae* (the purple light of youth), is gone; and the fine variation is lost in wrinkles, sudden breaks, and right lines.

CONFISCATION AND CURRENCY.

As to the operation of the first ²³³ (the confiscation and paper currency) merely as a cement, I cannot deny that these (the one depending on the other) may for some time compose some sort of cement, if their madness and folly in the management and in the tempering of the parts together, does not produce a repulsion in the very outset. But allowing to the scheme some coherence and some duration, it appears to me that if, after a while, the confiscation were not found sufficient to support the paper coinage (as I am morally certain it will not), then instead of cementing, it will add infinitely to the dissociation, distraction, and confusion of these confederate republics — both with relation to each other, and to the several parts within themselves. But if the confiscation were to succeed so far as to sink the

²³² A **genet** is a nocturnal carnivorous mammal, spotted, with a ringed-tail; a **barb** is a carp-like fish. — WHG

²³³ This excerpt is taken from Burkes' *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. (Works, vol. 3).

paper currency, the cement is gone with the circulation. In the meantime, its binding force will be very uncertain, and it will straiten or relax with every variation in the credit of the paper.

One thing only is certain in this scheme, which is a seemingly collateral effect, but I have no doubt, it is direct in the minds of those who conduct this business — that is, its effect in producing an *oligarchy* in every one of the republics. A paper circulation that is not founded on any real money deposited or engaged for, must put the whole of whatever power, authority, and influence is left, in whatever form it may assume, into the hands of the managers and conductors of this circulation. It already amounts to forty-four millions of English money.²³⁴ And this currency is substituted by force in place of the coin of the kingdom, thereby becoming the substance of its revenue, as well as the medium of all its commercial and civil intercourse.

In England we feel the influence of the bank, though it is only the centre of a voluntary dealing. Whoever does not see the force of the management of a monied concern which is so much more extensive, and in its nature, so much more dependent on the managers than any of ours, knows little indeed of the influence of money upon mankind. But this is not merely a money concern. There is another member in the system inseparably connected with this money management. It consists in the means of drawing out at its discretion, portions of the confiscated lands for sale; and carrying on a process of continual transmutation of paper into land, and of land into paper. When we follow this process in its effects, we may conceive something of the intensity of the force with which this system must operate. By this means, the spirit of money-jobbing and of speculation goes into the mass of land itself, and incorporates with it. By this kind of operation, that species of property becomes (as it were) volatilized. It assumes an unnatural and monstrous activity. And thereby it throws into the hands of the several managers — principal and subordinate, Parisian and provincial — all the representative of money, and perhaps a full tenth of all the land in France. It has now acquired the worst and most pernicious part of the evil of a paper circulation — the greatest possible uncertainty in its value. They have reversed the Latonian kindness to the landed property of Delos.²³⁵ They have sent their currency to be blown about, like the light fragments of a wreck, *oras et littora circum* (around the coasts and shores).²³⁶

The new dealers, all being habitually adventurers, and without any fixed habits or local predilections, will purchase in order to job it out again, as the market of paper, or of money, or of land, presents an advantage. For though a holy bishop thinks that agriculture will derive great advantage from the “enlightened” usurers who are to purchase the church confiscations, I — who am not a good, but an old farmer — with great humility, beg leave to tell his late lordship, that usury is not the tutor of agriculture. And if the word “enlightened” is understood according to the new dictionary, as it always is in your new schools, I cannot

²³⁴ This matches England’s entire GDP in 1800, estimated to be £43.2 million. – WHG

²³⁵ The goddess Latona was pregnant with twins by Juna’s husband Jupiter. Latona was forced to flee from land to land, unable to find a place to rest and give birth. Eventually, she found refuge on the floating island of Delos, where she gave birth to Apollo and Diana, making Delos stable and sacred. – WHG

²³⁶ Virgil, *Aeneid* 3.75.

conceive how a man's not believing in God can teach him to cultivate the earth with the least of any additional skill or encouragement. An old Roman said, "*Diis immortalibus sero*," (it is late for the immortal gods). He said this when he held one handle of the plough, while Death held the other. Even if you were to join in the commission, all the directors of the two academies, to the directors of the Caisse d'Escompte,²³⁷ an old experienced peasant is worth them all. I have gotten more information upon a curious and interesting branch of husbandry, in one short conversation with an old Carthusian monk, than I derived from all the Bank directors I ever conversed with. However, there is no cause for apprehension from the meddling of money-dealers with the rural economy. These gentlemen are *too wise* in their generation. At first, perhaps, their tender and susceptible imaginations may be captivated with the innocent and unprofitable delights of a pastoral life. But in a little time they will find that agriculture is a trade that is much more laborious, and much less lucrative, than that which they had left. After making its panegyrics (singing its praises), they will turn their backs on it, like their great precursor and prototype. They may, like him, begin by singing "Beatus ille" (he is happy) — but what will be the end?

"When Alphius the moneylender spoke,
He was already going to be a peasant.
They read everything for money;
Trying to keep warm."²³⁸

They will cultivate the Caisse d'Eglise (Church fund), under the sacred auspices of this prelate, with much more profit than its vineyards and its corn-fields. They will employ their talents according to their habits and their interests. They will not follow the plough while they can direct treasuries, and govern provinces.

Your legislators, in everything new, are the very first who have founded a commonwealth upon gaming, and infused this spirit into it as its vital breath. The great object in these politics is to metamorphose France from a great kingdom, into one great play-table: to turn its inhabitants into a nation of gamblers; to make speculation as extensive as life; to mix it with all its concerns; and to divert the whole of the hopes and fears of the people from their usual channels, into the impulses, passions, and superstitions of those who live on chances. They loudly proclaim their opinion that their present system of a republic cannot possibly exist without this kind of gaming fund; and that the very thread of its life is spun out of the staple of these speculations. The old gaming in funds was undoubtedly mischievous enough; but it was only so to individuals. Even when it had its greatest extent in the Mississippi and South Sea, it affected but comparatively few. Where it extends further, as in lotteries, the spirit has but a single object. And the law, which in most circumstances forbids gaming, and in none countenances it, is itself debauched, so as to reverse its nature and policy. It expressly forces the subject to this destructive table, by bringing the spirit and symbols of gaming into the minutest matters, and engaging everybody in it. And thus in everything, a

²³⁷ Caisse d'Escompte was a French financial institution established in 1776. — WHG

²³⁸ "*Haec ubi locutus foenerator Alphius,
Jam jam futurus rusticus
Omnem relegit Idibus pecuniam;
Quaerit Calendis ponere.*" — Horace, *Alphius vel Alfius*, Epod. Od. 2.

more dreadful epidemic distemper of that kind is spread than has yet appeared in the world. With you, a man can neither earn nor buy his dinner without speculation. What he receives in the morning will not have the same value at night. What he is compelled to take as pay for an old debt, will not be received as the same amount when he comes to pay a debt contracted by himself. Nor will it be the same when, by prompt payment, he would avoid contracting any debt at all. Industry must wither away. Economy must be driven from your country. Careful provision will have no existence. Who will labour without knowing the amount of his pay? Who will study to increase what none can estimate? Who will accumulate, when he does not know the value of what he saves? If you abstract it from its uses in gaming, to accumulate your paper wealth, it would not be the providence of a man, but the distempered instinct of a jackdaw.²³⁹

“OMNIPOTENCE OF CHURCH PLUNDER.”

Their fanatical confidence in the omnipotence of church plunder has induced these philosophers to overlook all care of the public estate, just as the dream of the philosopher's stone induces dupes, under the more plausible delusion of the hermetic art (alchemy), to neglect all rational means of improving their fortunes. With these philosophic financiers, this universal medicine made of church mummy (pulp) is to cure all the evils of the state. These gentlemen, perhaps, do not believe a great deal in the miracles of piety; but it cannot be questioned that they have an undoubting faith in the prodigies of sacrilege. Is there a debt which presses them? — Issue *assignats*.²⁴⁰ Are compensations to be made, or a maintenance decreed to those whom they have robbed of their freehold in their office, or expelled from their profession? — *Assignats*. Is a fleet to be fitted out? — *Assignats*. If sixteen million sterling of these assignats, forced on the people, leave the wants of the state as urgent as ever — issue thirty million sterling of assignats, says one — issue eighty million more of assignats, says another. The only difference among their financial factions is on the greater or lesser quantity of assignats to be imposed on the public sufferance. They are all professors of assignats. Even those whose natural good sense and knowledge of commerce, not obliterated by philosophy, furnish decisive arguments *against* this delusion, they yet conclude their arguments by proposing the emission of assignats. I suppose they must talk of assignats, as no other language would be understood. All experience of their inefficacy does not in the least discourage them. Are the old assignats depreciated at market? What is the remedy? *Issue new assignats*. —

*Mais si maladie opiniatria, non vult se garire, quid illi facere?
assignare — postea assignare; ensuite assignare.* ²⁴¹

²³⁹ *Jackdaw*: a common black-and-grey Eurasian bird noted for thievery. — WHG

²⁴⁰ Assignats were paper money (fiat currency) authorized by the Constituent Assembly in France from 1789 to 1796, to address imminent bankruptcy. They were originally backed by the value of properties now held by the nation; those of the crown taken over on 7 October, and those of the Catholic Church, which were confiscated on the motion of Mirabeau, by the Assembly on 2 November 1789. Credit was wrecked, according to Talleyrand; for Mirabeau “the deficit was the treasure of the nation”. In September the treasury was empty. *Wikipedia*.

²⁴¹ Apparently a line from an old French comedy. Roughly, “*But if it is an ill opinion he doesn't want to hold himself, what should he do? Assign it — assign it later, assign it after.*” — WHG

The word is a trifle altered. The Latin of your present doctors may be better than that of your old comedy; their wisdom and the variety of their resources are the same. They do not have more notes in their song than the cuckoo; though, far from the softness of that harbinger of summer and plenty, their voice is as harsh and as ominous as that of the raven.

UGLINESS.

It may, perhaps, appear like a sort of repetition of what we have before said, to insist here upon the nature of *ugliness*; as I imagine it to be in all respects the opposite to those qualities which we have laid down for the constituents of beauty. But though ugliness is the opposite to beauty, it is not the opposite to proportion and fitness. For it is possible that a thing may be very ugly with *any proportions*, and with a perfect fitness for *any uses*. Ugliness I likewise imagine to be consistent enough with an idea of the sublime. But I would by no means insinuate that ugliness of itself is a sublime idea, unless it is united with such qualities as excite a strong terror.

GRACE.

Gracefulness is an idea not very different from beauty; it consists in much the same things. Gracefulness is an idea belonging to *posture* and *motion*. In both these, to be graceful, it is requisite that there be no appearance of difficulty. There is required a small inflection of the body; and a composure of the parts in such a manner as not to encumber each other, not to appear divided by sharp and sudden angles. In this ease, this roundness, this delicacy of attitude and motion, is what all the magic of grace consists in, and what is called its *je ne sais quoi*;²⁴² as will be obvious to any observer who considers attentively the *Venus de Medicis*, the *Antinous*, or any statue generally admitted to be graceful in a high degree.

ELEGANCE AND SPECIOUSNESS.

When any body is composed of smooth and polished parts, without pressing on each other, without showing any ruggedness or confusion, and at the same time affecting some *regular shape*, I call it *elegant*. It is closely allied to the beautiful, differing from it only in this *regularity*. However, as it makes a very material difference in the affection produced, it may very well constitute another species. Under this head I rank those delicate and regular works of art that imitate no determinate object in nature — such as elegant buildings, and pieces of furniture. When any object partakes of the above-mentioned qualities, which are those of beautiful bodies, and is additionally of great dimensions, it is full as remote from the idea of mere beauty; — I call it *fine* or *specious* [*i.e.*, especially pleasant to look at].

THE BEAUTIFUL IN FEELING.

The foregoing description of beauty, so far as it is taken in by the eye, may be greatly illustrated by describing the nature of objects which produce a similar effect through the *touch*. This I call beautiful in *feeling*. It corresponds wonderfully with what causes the same

²⁴² A quality or attribute that is difficult to describe or express. — WHG

species of pleasure to the *sight*. There is a chain in all our sensations. They are all but different sorts of feelings calculated to be affected by various sorts of objects, but all are to be affected in the same manner. All bodies that are pleasant to the touch, are pleasant by the slightness of the resistance they make. Resistance is either to motion along the surface, or to the pressure of the parts on one another. If the former is slight, we call the body *smooth*; if the latter, it is *soft*. The chief pleasure we receive by feeling, is in one or the other of these qualities; and if there is a combination of both, our pleasure is greatly increased. This is so plain that it is more fitting to illustrate other things, than to be illustrated itself by an example. The next source of pleasure in this sense, as in every other, is continually presenting something new. And we find that bodies which continually vary their surface, are the most pleasant or beautiful to the feeling, as anyone who pleases may experience. The third property in such objects is that, though the surface continually varies its direction, it never varies it suddenly. The application of anything sudden, even though the impression itself has little or nothing of violence, is disagreeable. The quick application of a finger that is a little warmer or colder than usual, without notice, makes us startle; a slight tap on the shoulder, not expected, has the same effect. Hence angular bodies, bodies that suddenly vary the direction of the outline, afford so little pleasure to the feeling. Every such change is a sort of climbing or falling in miniature — so that squares, triangles, and other angular figures, are beautiful neither to the sight nor feeling. Whoever compares his state of mind, upon feeling soft, smooth, variated, unangular bodies, with that state in which he finds himself onup the view of a beautiful object, will perceive a very striking analogy in the effects of both. And this may go a good way towards discovering their common cause. Feeling and sight, in this respect, differ in but a few points. The touch takes in the pleasure of softness, which is not primarily an object of sight. Sight, on the other hand, comprehends colour, which can hardly be made perceptible to the touch. The touch again has the advantage in a new idea of pleasure resulting from a moderate degree of *warmth*; but the eye triumphs in the infinite *extent* and *multiplicity* of its objects. But there is such a similitude in the pleasures of these senses, that I am apt to fancy that if it were possible that one might discern colour by feeling (as it is said some blind men have done), that the same colours, and the same disposition of colouring, which are found beautiful to the *sight*, would be found likewise most grateful to the *touch*. But setting aside conjectures, let us pass to the other sense: of *Hearing*.

THE BEAUTIFUL IN SOUNDS.

In this sense we find an equal aptitude to be affected in a soft and delicate manner. And how far sweet or beautiful sounds agree with our descriptions of beauty in *other* senses, the experience of each one must decide. Milton has described this species of music in one of his juvenile poems. (L'Allegro.) I need not say that Milton was perfectly well versed in that art; and that no man had a finer ear, with a happier manner of expressing the affections of one sense by metaphors taken from another. The description is as follows: —

— “*And ever against eating cares,
Lap me in SOFT Lydian airs:
In notes with many a WINDING bout
OF LINKED SWEETNESS LONG DRAWN out;*

*With wanton heed, and giddy cunning,
The MELTING voice through MAZES running;
UNTWISTING all the chains that tie
The hidden soul of harmony.”*

Let us parallel this with the softness, the winding surface, the unbroken continuance, the easy gradation of the beautiful in other things; and all the diversities of the several senses, with all their several affections; will help to throw lights from one another to finish one clear, consistent idea of the whole, rather than obscure it by their intricacy and variety.

To the above-mentioned description, I will add one or two remarks. The *first* is that the beautiful in music will not bear that loudness and strength of sounds which may be used to raise other passions; nor bear notes which are shrill or harsh, or deep. It agrees best with those that are clear, even, smooth, and weak. The *second* is that great variety, and quick transitions from one measure or tone to another, are contrary to the genius of the beautiful in music. Such transitions often excite mirth, or other sudden or tumultuous passions — but not that sinking, that melting, that languor, which is the characteristic effect of the beautiful as it regards every sense. (I ne'er am merry when I hear sweet music. — Shakespeare.) The passion excited by beauty is in fact nearer to a species of melancholy, than to jollity and mirth. Here I do not mean to confine music to any one species of notes, or tones. Neither is it an art in which I can say I have any great skill. My sole design in this remark is to settle a *consistent* idea of beauty. The infinite variety of the affections of the soul will suggest to a good head, and a skilful ear, a variety of sounds that are fitted to raise them. It can be no prejudice to this, to clear and distinguish some few particulars that belong to the same class, and are consistent with each other, from the immense crowd of different, and sometimes contradictory ideas that rank vulgarly under the standard of beauty. And of these, it is my intention to mark only those leading points which show the conformity of the sense of hearing with the other senses, in the article of their pleasures.

BRITISH CHURCH.

It is something extraordinary, that the only symptom of alarm in the Church of England should appear in the petition of some Dissenters — with whom, I believe, very few in this house are yet acquainted; and of whom you know no more than what you are assured by the honourable gentleman, that they are not Mahometans. We know they are not of the Church, by the name that they assume. They are then *Dissenters*. The first symptom of an alarm comes from some Dissenters assembled round the lines of Chatham; these lines become the security of the Church of England! The honourable gentleman, in speaking of the lines of Chatham, tells us that they serve not only for the security of the wooden walls of England, but for the defence of the Church of England. I suspect the wooden walls of England secure the lines of Chatham, rather than the lines of Chatham secure the wooden walls of England.

Sir, if the Church of England is only defended by this miserable petition upon your table, I am afraid that upon the principles of true fortification, it must be soon destroyed. But fortunately her walls, bulwarks, and bastions, are constructed of other materials than stubble and straw. They are built up with the strong and stable matter of the gospel of liberty, and founded on a true, constitutional, legal establishment. But Sir, she has *other*

securities. She has the security of her own doctrines. She has the security of the piety, the sanctity of her own professors; their learning is a bulwark to defend her. She has the security of the two universities, unshaken in any single battlement, in any single pinnacle. ...

But if, after all, this danger is to be apprehended — if you are really fearful that Christianity will indirectly suffer by this liberty — you have my free consent: go directly by the *straight* way, and not by a circuit in which you may destroy your friends in your road. Point your arms against these men who do the mischief that you fear promoting. Point your arms against men who are not contented with endeavouring to turn your eyes from the blaze and effulgence of light by which life and immortality is so gloriously demonstrated by the Gospel; those who would even extinguish that faint glimmering of nature, that only comfort supplied to ignorant man before this great illumination; those who, by attacking even the possibility of all revelation, arraign all the dispensations of Providence to man. *These* are the wicked Dissenters you ought to fear. *These* are the people against whom you ought to aim the shafts of law. These are the men to whom, arrayed in all the terrors of government, I would say, “You shall not degrade us into brutes.” *These* men, these factious men, as the honourable gentleman properly called them, are the just objects of vengeance — not the conscientious Dissenter. *These* men would take away whatever ennobles the rank or consoles the misfortunes of human nature, by breaking off that connection of observations, of affections, of hopes and fears, which bind us to the Divinity, and constitute the glorious and distinguishing prerogative of humanity: that of being a religious creature. Against these I would have the laws rise in all their majesty of terrors, to fulminate such vain and impious wretches, and to awe them into impotence by the only dread they can fear or believe, to learn that eternal lesson — *Discite justitiam moniti, et non temnere Divos* (Learn to know justice by this warning, and do not despise the gods).²⁴³

At the same time that I would cut up the very root of atheism, I would respect all conscience — all conscience that really is such, and which its very tenderness perhaps proves to be sincere. I wish to see the established Church of England great and powerful. I wish to see her foundations laid low and deep, that she may crush the giant powers of rebellious darkness. I would have her head raised up to that heaven to which she conducts us. I would have her open wide her hospitable gates by a noble and liberal comprehension; but I would have no breaches in her wall. I would have her cherish all those who are within, and pity all those who are without. I would have her be a common blessing to the world — an example, if not an instructor — to those who do not have the happiness to belong to her. I would have her give a lesson of peace to mankind, that a vexed and wandering generation might be taught to seek for repose and toleration in the maternal bosom of Christian charity, and not in the harlot lap of infidelity and indifference.

²⁴³ From Virgil's *Aeneid*.